The Death of the Armor Corps
The Death of the Armor Corps
by Colonel Gian P. Gentile
Download the full article: The Death of the Armor Corps
The Armor Corps in the American Army is gone, it is no more.
The Army has become decidedly infantry centric. This wouldn’t be so bad if it was a fighting kind of infantry centered army. But instead it is an infantry centric Army grounded in the principles of population centric counterinsurgency and Rupert Smith’s view of war in the future as “wars amongst the people.”
To be sure the American Army will be told to do lots of things from winning hearts and minds in the Hindu Kush, to passing out humanitarian relief in the troubled spots around the world, to nation building in Iraq. But first and foremost it must be an Army grounded in combined arms competencies. This must come first, and not second or third after fuzzy concepts as “whole of government approach” and building emotional relationships with local populations. The latter may of course be important, depending on the mission, but those kinds of competencies must be premised on combined arms and not the other way around.
Download the full article: The Death of the Armor Corps
The author is a serving Army Colonel. The views in this article are his own and not those of the Department of Defense.
As a Kiwi with great respect for the American Army, I am surprised to hear that the author hasn’t quite got the lesson of the last years since Afghanistan:
The US Army has to do both combined arms and COIN/SASO/whatever. Both are equally important.
We will probably never need to head up to Smolensk from the Polish border, but China etc and other demand that combined arms competencies must be retained.
But yet, the Army will be involved in many Somalias, Bosnias, even maybe some Rwandas, and definitely more wars on the lines of Iraq and Afghanistan.
I had imagined that the American Army, now more competent than the British Army at COIN, realised that both spheres are critical. Both are important and neither can be allowed to wither. Neither can be subordinate to the other – or do we want to mess up the village war in Vietnam for an extended period all over again?
In chronological order
Sven Ortmann is correct.
Mark Pyruz was ably and logically answered by William F. Owen. Predicting the end of war or of a type of warfare is even older than I am. Everyone including Omar Bradley was wrong…
Patmc is right on the money. Armor and Artillery both gain and suffer from being vaguely scientific in that many of their functions lend themselves to empirical data and fairly accurate quantification (gunnery and maintenance and gunnery…). That double edged sword leads them to perhaps over rely on those factors in judging performance as opposed to the more ethereal and subjective art of tactical employment. Still , he’s correct — if Armor is not up to its own snuff, then Armor should take a look in the mirror.
William F. Owen, as stated above, is correct — attempts to predict the future of warfare are not only unlikely to be correct, they can lead to dangerous fallacies like the so-called Weinberger and Powell Doctrines — two ideas that were doomed before they were uttered and a US Army that criminally eschewed so-called phase 4 and FID operations…
Lastly, Mike F. also quite correct. I have seen a number of American tanks killed or put out of action in combat. Virtually none of them were due to better gunnery on the part of opponents, poor US operational employment or strategic issues. Almost all were due to tactical mistakes at the platoon and company level. As Mike F said: “The fundamentals of fire and maneuver are the same. Section and squad bounding are the same whether it’s a light infantry platoon or tank section.”
Emphasizing gunnery and maintenance over tactical performance is perhaps natural in a culture that prizes ‘objectivity’ and is highly competitive. That it is natural does not mean that it is the correct thing to do.
His bottom line has it right:
That should not be problematic — except for the parochialism and branch politics that have intruded in the past and are certain to do so this time…
As an armor officer having maneuvered in both heavy and light combined arms operations, I can relate to some of COL Gentile’s observations. I agree with his thesis in the short-term, i.e. if we had to attack into another country tomorrow, then we may have some issues; however, I disagree with his long-term assessment.
I think we should look at the problem as far as what are we doing right and what are we lacking at. Then, we can work to figure out how to mitigate our shortcomings.
What are we doing right? Well for starters, we have a generation of Armor officers brought up actually engaged in combat and not just practicing it at the CTC’s.
1. Platform doesn’t matter. Whether it is a HMMWV, Stryker, Chinook, or tank, platform is irrelevant. The fundamentals of fire and maneuver are the same. Section and squad bounding are the same whether it’s a light infantry platoon or tank section. I employed the same techniques as a tank platoon leader during the Thunder Runs as I did as an Airborne Recon Commander taking down a AQ training camp.
2. Call for Fires. PL’s and SL’s are actually getting the opportunity to work indirect fires and employ CAS in a real world environment.
Those are two things we’re doing right.
So, what do we need to improve upon? As COL Gentile rightly noted, we are lacking in our technical skills. Manning a .50 cal from a HMMWV is not the same as boresighting and firing a 120mm tank or learning how to recycle the ghost round of a Bradley.
So, IMO, the real questions we need to look at are what technical skills do we need to replinish, how long will it take to rebuild these skills, and how much will it cost.
v/r
Mike
…. alas, there will be no “Battle of Prokhorovka,” “Chinese Farm,” or “Valley of the Tears” in the near to foreseeable future.
Are you sure? What about “Wadi Salukis” and “Fallujahs”. Good combined arms is not a pick up game. It requires the highest form of skill in Land Warfare. Once lost it may never be recovered, except at great expense.
What if a heavy Brigade Combat Team in Iraq was told to pick up and head east and do a movement to contact into a threatening country?
They would run into a defense based upon the Mosaic doctrine, incorporating (but not limited to) the lessons learned during the Iraq War (~35,000+ US casualties) and the 33 Day War.
I have great respect for COL Gentile, but alas, there will be no “Battle of Prokhorovka,” “Chinese Farm,” or “Valley of the Tears” in the near to foreseeable future.
Thanks Sven. Correcting now…
A few years ago, Field Artillery branch was hurting. Its officers, NCOs, and Soldiers were training for and conducting non-standard missions, such as convoy or base security. My own FA Brigade deployed in OIF IV to perform convoys, then almost deployed again to conduct a security force mission. The unit went almost three years without full FA training. When the unit received an order to deploy to A-stan and actually shoot, we put together a tough FA training plan and got back to standard. It was painful, but we did it.
If Armor branch is not training to its standard, that is the fault of Armor leaders. COL Gentile writes that he had officers, NCOs, and Soldiers that could not do table gunnery. If these were essential skill sets, why didn’t he train his men on them? FA units deployed without guns. Most Armor or Mech units still deploy with/or fall in on their vehicles and fire in combat. There are larger picture issues, such as BDE or above level operations, but BN and below is still in the hands of its leaders.
The Army has shifted some BCTs away from heavy. These forces are needed in a light role right now. Blame higher for not growing the Army to meet its actual needs. He laments that 3rd ACR lost its tanks. From my understanding, 3rd ACR has been formatted as a regular BCT the last few years, and the ACR was more esprit de corps than actual role. RSTAs were supposed to serve as mini-cav, but because of need for boots, they’re usually used as regular maneuver.
It is good for COL Gentile to point out that Armor is at a crossroads, just as “The King and I” a few years ago brought attention to issues within FA, but I think he is overstating the problem. We worked with Abrams and Bradleys on one mission during my time in Iraq. We were riding around in Mad Max gun trucks, so having real armor around was a nice morale boost. The Army should not abandon Armor, and I don’t think it has. The priority and resources are shifting where needed for the current fight. The Armor schoolhouse and Armor leaders need to ensure their troops still know their skills. In the end, it is their responsibility.
“…we have eviscerated the Armor Corps to the point of its distinction.”
“distinction”? Maybe extinction?
Anyway; there will be a reversing combined arms fashion after OEF-A & ISAF.The Lebanon Conflict of 2006 and the South Ossetia conflict of 2008 provide enough arguments.
In the conventional sense of the pre-9/11 military the Armor branch is dead or dying on the branch. However, as MikeF points out: 1. The insertion platform doesn’t matter. Be it a jinga truck, your boots or a fast rope insertion you’re just getting to the actions on the objective. 2. Whether you’re a Infantry PL, a Cav Scout Section leader or a Mech company commander you have to fire and maneuver and CFF satisfactory IOT win the fight.
What is key is defining and preparing for the next war. There is something to be said for the Dessert Storm era of Armor forces although to a lesser extent than previously needed. The same could be said of Airborne Infantry but they may have a greater utility in the run up to the next war because of financial considerations in our generation of warfare. Retaining and continuing to develop the next generation of leaders is of the utmost importance. Their branch should be irrelevant.
What happens when we are no longer in the ME? Do we bury our heads in the sands of NTC or swamps of JRTC and fight the next ‘enemy’, which undoubtedly will take the form of the current enemy lest we take a leap of faith and attempt to visualize our next enemy. Which may be something between a conventional military with terrorist tactics and forces. The west has exposed our weakness and there is no reason to think our enemies don’t see it like Hamas did in 2006.
A branch immaterial approach would seem best so that we ensure we are keeping those who understand how to fire and maneuver while remaining thoughtful enough to know how to relate across cultural boundaries, stay in the military. We should adopt other militaries approach to developing and maintaining these softer skills while immersing our leaders in foreign cultures. There are only limited opportunities for this in grad school programs or externships that are often viewed as derailing a leader off the prescribed career path.
As the Aussie points out there are not enough U.S. soldiers who truly understand COIN. There are many Armor, Engineer, Artillery, and Chemical CPTs and MAJs that do and they should stay in the service regardless of whom are next enemy is because they are adaptive and agile leaders who understand both likely facets of future warfare.
This generation of LTs, CPTs and MAJs will be tomorrows COLs and general officers. Keeping the proper personnel will mean they can put together past GWOT experiences, visualize the next enemy and train the future competencies necessary.
So the Armoured Corps of the West are dying out?
I say good riddance.
And on the 3rd day God created the Infantry. And for the next 4 days he rested while they did all the work.
Manpower and rotation times. Are there really enough to do both (COIN, Armor) at this time? It cannot be COIN or Armor for the foreseeable future, it must be both, but with the tight rotations of the past years, it had to be COIN. Maybe the drawdown in Iraq will provide enough of a breather.
That there are Armor (19K) Non Commissioned Officers as high as the rank of Staff Sergeant who have never qualified on a M1 Tank sounds distressing to M1 tankers, but there are other chariots, and so long as the commanders of those platforms meet the standards established for technical and tactical proficiency, we don’t have a problem, unless those established standards are unrealistic or too hard/expensive/time consuming to train to meet.
Amongst lnjuns… …a tribe’s greatness is figured on how mighty its enemies be. Armor Branch’s enemies nowadays ain’t nothing compared to the 1st Guards Tank Army.
It is not about the M1 tank or dreaming of better past days of fulda or the VOD at NTC. It is about an armor state of mind that has left the American Army. To be sure the Army needs to undergo transformation: but that transormation should be premised on combined arms and not of O’Hanlon like Peace Brigades.
My simple point is that the Army must be able to do combined arms first if it expects to be able to do anything else.
The armor corps was a critical component of combined arms competencies. To be sure a modern army needs specialization in terms of light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, special forces, etc.
My worry is that we have lost one key component of that balanced force–the armor corps–and we should not sweep the problem away with notions of a future filled mostly of irregular warfare and on the notion that learning and adapting leaders can solve any problem. To be sure they can, but their ability to learn and adapt is premised on combined arms competencies and not more fuzzy notions of cultural awareness, whole of government, or whatever other flavor of the day term is currently en vogue.
gian
As an Armor officer I agree with COL Gentile to an extent.
I had not heard that 3d ACR was losing their tanks. If thats true it is a big mistake. As outlined in an article by MAJ Chris Mahaffey in Armor Magazine July 09 the 3d ACR is the only remaining heavy cavalry unit in our Army. Many of our early problems in 2003 with reconnaissance and with controlling lines of communication were because of the lack of a corps level cavalry force. Tanks are necessary for armored cav to complete its mission of defeating the enemys security zone. This is further supported by LTC Jeffrey Broadwater in his article on the anemic brigade level recon squadrons https://www.knox.army.mil/center/oco…adwater07c.pdf, in that piece he calls for the addition of tanks to add more offensive power.
Another cause for concern is the move of the Armor Center from Fort Knox to Fort Benning. Maneuvering vehicles is not the same as maneuvering infantry and Armor should remain a distinct and separate institution. I have yet to read a convincing argument for the move which seems to me an opportunity for the Infantry branch to take a greater role in Strykers, mounted reconnaissance and the Bradley
As far as the horror stories of unqualified staff sergeants and units untrained in gunnery. I think its too early to say the armor corps is extinct. As a counter example, my unit went as far as firing a modified table 8 in Iraq during the deployment. At NTC, we consistently executed a deliberate battalion level attack with a breach under fire.
We have had some deterioration of our combined arms capability but the sky isnt falling and the goal remains a full spectrum force.
Mike:
Good to hear from you!
Fair points. To be sure there are still combined arms battalions in heavy brigades that have their tanks and bradleys and have done some good combined arms training. Not to mention the fact that armor and cavalry soldiers have performed (and continue to do so) superbly and bravely over the last 9 years in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But what is extinct is an armor “state of mind” that we had once before but it is now gone. That state of mind was premised on an identity of an armor corps made up of soldiers, ncos, and officers. And that state of mind was an essential component to the other critical parts of our balanced army like the infantry and artillery. But as I seen things, Mike, that balance is no longer there and the armor state of mind is gone. Perhaps we can retrieve it, I certainly hope so, and any good infantryman out there should want it back too.
Since as my friend Niel Smith often makes the point that armor forces are not only essential to fighting at the higher end of the conflict spectrum but have actually done quite well and have done important things in irregular warfare. I mean shoot what two army brigades are most often mentioned for their superb and brilliant performances in Iraq? 1/1AD and 3ACR.
I just think that the army and its armor soldiers should recognize that we have lost the armor state of mind, and that we at least need to try to get it back. Not for us in some anachronistic way but for the good of the army and our role in support of the common defense.
Patmc has been in a battalion that finally pulled together a battalion training plan and trained as an artillery battalion.
Well and good. The technical delivery of fires is actually a pretty easy skillset to maintain (says the retired third generation artilleryman) as was evidenced by the many fine technical delivery-of-fires battalions of the Guard and Reserve (yes, Virginia, the USAR once was a combat formation other than the 100th Infantry).
The issue for the artillery isn’t maintaining technical gunnery skills. It’s maintaining full-spectrum fire support skills.
How many DIVARTY (excuse me, Fires Brigade) staffs have planned and conducted large scale maneuver support including air, other than single tactical engagments?
How many Division and higher staffs have even considered an org for combat and fire planning (anyone remember Corps-level JAATs?) for division and higher ops?
That’s the skill-set that’s atrophying. It’s a skillset that has to be practiced to be maintained.
No, we’re not going to be planning 3 day rolling barrages with thousands of guns (but I could plan that if you need it). But we do need to know how to do more than snipe.
The odd thing – if my small group students of the early 90’s took a tactics exam today and provided the answers that were correct then – they would fail the test.
Don’t get me wrong, I lurves me some PGWs. I like long-ranged artillery missiles that can take out targets with a singleton strike. I’m not necessarily a big fan of creating a mass of low-density minefields by shooting DPICM everywhere I look. But I also know that mass has a quality all it’s own when you need it – and you need to be organized and trained in how to provide it when it’s needed.
We have a tough row to hoe, as many here have pointed out – my problem with it all is that historically, we have trouble finding a balance – we tend to go all one way or another. And then pay in blood when we guess wrong.
I’m certainly no expert on Armor, growing up in artillery and now in EOD, but it’s always struck me how otherwise thoughtful and brilliant men confuse Armor with Cavalry. I don’t mean you’ve done this, Col Gentile, but I always notice it and to avoid it I think any discussion of armor needs to proceed with an awareness of the difference between the two. Armor still has a place but we’ve moved past the point when it was our only option to use the instrument of cavalry. I’ve incidentally heard anecdotal tales that some forward thinkers in Armor, even way back when, saw this change coming and tried to claim Aviation as a sub-branch of armor.
Close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, maneuver and shock sounds bloody-minded and politically incorrect to American ears in 2010. The “armor state of mind” started to flicker out when the Strykers came in and 19K’s became Mobile Gun System crewman and airlift became the preferred method of transporting fighting vehicles, and besides, major mounted combat between near peers is so 3GW.
Faster, lighter, more agile. The advocates of the Main Battle Tank failed to strategically communicate to the American taxpayer that we needed a Next Generation Main Battle Tank, so we keep upgrading the Abrams, maybe eventually to Mark I Bolo standard, but in the end our beloved panzers will be replaced by Unmanned Ground Vehicles, and the last tankers will be TOC Rat gamers.
“Close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, maneuver and shock ”
Dude, that’s what we do. I’m sorry if it doesn’t fit nicely in some box of how the world should be, but that’s what we’re here for.
“Another cause for concern is the move of the Armor Center from Fort Knox to Fort Benning. Maneuvering vehicles is not the same as maneuvering infantry and Armor should remain a distinct and separate institution. I have yet to read a convincing argument for the move which seems to me an opportunity for the Infantry branch to take a greater role in Strykers, mounted reconnaissance and the Bradley.”
Mike B- with great exception to parochialism and budgets, the move is a good thing. In short, a good commander should be able to lead an infantry squad or Div Cav. That’s just simple combat calculus and leadership.
Furthermore, you are wrong in stating that “Maneuvering vehicles is not the same as maneuvering infantry.” That is a false generalization from the 1990’s army.
Finally, we’re going to merge the maneuver branches. We’ve started integrating 19D’s into observer controller roles in Ranger and RSLC. If egos subside, the 19Ds, LRRS boys, and SOF guys may actually collaborate.
If we get past the BS mindset of the 1990’s that armor leaders are big thinkers and infantry pound sand, then we can all actually grow.
Keep in mind, in historical context, Rommel was an infantryman.
v/r
Mike
I’ll bring it home in another manner…
In combat, I directly observed,
– a Combat Engineer Commander maneuver heavy and light forces during the intial invasion to include an ad-hoc river crossing.
– a light infantry commander fail to prepare an adequate defense and strongpoint that resulted in 10 US KIA.
– a tank company commander seizing enemy strongpoints despite overwhelming odds
– a tank platoon leader stricken by fear and refusing to move
– a light infantry commander storm and conquer an AQ stronghold.
Branch is irrelevant. Platform is irrelevant. Leadership is everything.
Mike:
I disagree. Branches are relevant for a balanced army that relies on a reasonable amount of specialization in light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, etc.
If we go so far as you seem to suggest doing away with branches because they are “irrelevant” and rely only on “leadership” then in our army today that has become decidedly light infantry centric, then where does that leave us?
Combined Arms competencies will not just magically appear. They are grounded at least partially in the skills and intellectual framework provided by each branch and its role in the overall combined arms team. To be sure branch parochialism can go too far, but to say that they are irrelevant is pushing it a bit.
Also Mike the notion that “platform” is irrelevant too is a bit of a stretch, at least in practice, dont you think? I mean you cant really be saying that a scout platoon manned with light skin humvees even with the best platoon leader and platoon sergeant in the Army could have gone up against a defending republican guard battalion, performed its reconnaissance role, stayed alive, and lived to report and maintain contact? Come on, that is why the BRT platoons in the march up were mostly placed on the flanks or rear to do movement control.
Platforms do matter and to think otherwise seems to have bought into the Zen version of war that taps into the force that can overcome basic physics. This is one of the pernicious effects of the Coin movement: the notion that learning and adapting leaders who have read the starfish and the spider can overcome any tactical problem simply because they pray at the altar of “learning and adapting.”
At some point cant we agree that Branches and Platforms still matter? If not we seem to be drifting in a morass of fuzzy concepts that will be severely tested and blooded when our Army drives into the teeth of an enemy who fights beyond cell-like IED emplacement and small arms ambushes.
gian
Gian
While I agree with many of your comments, just to be clear – the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment has not turned in its tanks – yet . In fact we just completed a full up level I gunnery firing every Tank and Bradley crew in the Regiment both stabilized and unsterilized IAW the new HBCT Gunnery Manuel . We made the time to do that so that we would not have another generation of scouts and tanks who have not fired their primary weapon system in years or ever. As for the Regiments future that remains to be seen…
R6
Brave Rifles!
73d Colonel of the Regiment
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment
Death of Armor starts here…
http://www.knox.army.mil/school/mcoe.asp
“The Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) 2005 recommendations became law on Nov. 9, 2005. One of the many elements of this law is that the U.S. Army Armor Center and School will relocate from Fort Knox to Fort Benning. As part of TRADOCs transformation, the activities relocating from Fort Knox along with activities currently at Fort Benning, Georgia, notably the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School, will integrate to establish the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE).”
COL Gentile,
Hi Sir. This conversation would be so much easier if we were all just having some beers and talking this out at Fiddler’s Green. In reality, I agree with you and Mike Burgoyne. In fact, Chris Mahaffey is an old mentor of mine who brilliantly negoitated a peace for his boys in Sadr City back in 2004 long before we could spell COIN. I’ve posted my comments to expand the debate and possibly find some better truths. Actually, I usually agree with most of your writings to an extent. At a minimum, I learn something, and I have to think. So, thank you for continuing to write. I believe what you’re doing is a great service to our military and country.
This weekend, I got a call from one of my old PL’s. He’s dropped his 4187 branch transfer request from Armor to Infantry. He’s the fourth of my friends, peers, and subordinates to do so. . He (and the others that switched) are top 5%- some of the best, brightest, and most gifted officers that I’ve EVER served with. We’ve discussed his dilemma over the last couple of months. Finally, after he made his decision, I asked him why. He stated, “the writing is on the wall, sir.” Frankly, I was disappointed and frustrated. He called me this weekend ashamed in the same manner that one’s dog might be when you get home and he’s pooped in the living room. So, the timing of your article was impeccable. Last night, an old 1SGT of mine (light infantry type) and I discussed his decision and your article in detail over some beers. So, take my comments in that context.
I love tanks. I graduated in 2000 and chose Armor precisely for that reason. If we were going to war, then I wanted to ride in style. I love the thrill of rolling at 40mph over open desert, the challenge of diagnosing and dissecting a faulty transmission or malfunctioning breech, and the thrill of nailing my commander’s engagement during TT VIII. Moreover, I am still in awe of the firepower of the 120mm. Just as if it was yesterday, I remember a Fedayeen soldier vaporizing from the Heat round that I put into his bunker during the Thunder Runs. Six years ago, as a cocky tank XO in 3rd ID, I would have been on the Gentile band wagon after this article rattling my saber with my stetson adorned on my head. Any fool that contends that there will never be another big war because we’re only doing small wars is just that- a fool reminiscent of the over-indulgent optimistics that contended WWI was the war to end all wars.
Any amateur historian such as myself with a limited understanding can realize that we’re only one major economic disaster away from a major war. In some ways, the inter-connectiveness of our global economy is as fragile and fickle as the political treaties and alliances that allowed the assasination of one archduke to bring the whole system down. If that powder keg goes boom, then the Islamicist and small wars will be as irrelevant as the anarchist at the turn of the 20th century. So, I feel you on that one. Duh, we need tanks.
But, but, but…to what extent? This is where our thoughts may diverge. In the past six years, my experience shifted. Branch sent me to Bragg to work light cavalry in the airborne world. Division sent me to the Special Forces world for a while. I got off my tank, learned how to sneak around in the woods during the middle of the night like we used to do as kids, learned how to jump out of an airplane and seize an airfield, and learned how to conduct FID, coaching and assisting foreign security forces. Finally, my boss sent me to school to study small wars. I studied rebellions around the world, worked drug/gang problems in Salinas, CA, and tackled wicked problems ranging from education to water rights.
So, a lot happened that I’m still absorbing. I’ve had good and bad leaders, easy and rough physical and human terrain, and complicated problems of various size and shape, but as much as I learned, as much as things were different, as I reflected and continue to ponder, the fundamentals taught to me as tank platoon leader training in the Kuwaiti desert persist.
So, I am proud to be Armor. I love tanks and understand that we need heavy units, but we must adapt and adjust in order to grow. I’ll stop my long-winded post with that, and hopefully, the discussion will continue. And, I’ll continue to consider why our best may be jumping ship. But, I wouldn’t worry too much about us losing the Big Brains. We’re still here :).
v/r
Mike
Mike F;
Me too and I am proud to be associated with armor leaders like you, Reggie Allen, Mike B, Niel Smith and so many, many others. To be sure your comments were thoughtful and I took them in the spirit of lively debate as I do your always worthwhile remarks as well. Beers at Fiddlers Green would be great sometime; although sadly the last time I was there a number of years ago Fiddlers Green had been turned into a sports bar.
Also, Reggie thanks for the clarification that you still have your tanks and have trained on them but as you say have not turned them in “yet.” This of course is part of the larger problem of either what is happening or what soon will happen to the armor corps. I would respectfully say though, Reggie, that as fine as it is that you were able to train your tankers and scouts on their Brads and Tanks, that focus of effort might prove fleeting as your troopers return from their upcoming deployment and move back out into an army where I have tried to argue that the Armor Corps as an intellectual state of mind is no more.
v/r
gian
Ironically, my writing on the wall said something totally opposite.
I just put a 4187 to go from Infantry to Armor.
Since we’ve gone from one extreme to the other, I’m hedging my bet that there will be a need for Armor again in the near future and I want to be a part of the preservation of that art.
HRC denied my request.
I believe that there is a problem, but Im not sure we are all talking the same language or have the same sight picture. I agree with much of what Col. Gentile says, but Im not sure we should assume a natural connection between combined arms, the existence of an Armor Branch/corps, and tanks on the battlefield. Im inclined to believe that the existence of an armor corps is a “mindset” issue. From what I see, the Army takes Tanks, infantry, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, etc. and really operates them with different flavors based on different missions and balances of forces/weapons (for instance, Cavalry, Mech Inf, Armor, etc.). As a Marine, I was brought up with Combined Arms ingrained in my thinking, but it had more to do with close integration of ground and aviation (both rotary and fixed wing) capabilities, as well as the combined arms resulting from different ground combat capabilities. I would assert that we are doing “combined arms” in current conflicts, but that the balance and mix of capabilities is different than how doctrinally “Heavy” armored and mechanized formations were designed to conduct. As Mr. Owen outlined in his recent “Toyota Horde” article, combined arms is not the sole province of a Bradley-Abrams force mix. Thus, I think we should move the conversation away from decrying a gap in combined arms training and capability and get to specifics that would be more useful in advancing the issue and developing solutions.
Repeating myself, where I see the importance of an armor corps is in a certain mindset. Beyond the immediate tactics of fighting a tank, the armored community has a mentality and approach to organizing and employing the combined arms force that is arguably different than other Branches (or services) who have the same or similar capabilities. Im intensely interested in our capability to fight in higher end conflicts against more capable foes. My concern with the focus on COIN, and COIN vs. Conventional debate, is that it has placed “conventional” into a single category as an “other”–only referenced as what isnt COIN (and implied as what isnt relevant). We are not having the necessary debate about what those higher end capabilities really need to look like and how they should be employed. Is it the Tank-Mech mix we have had since the 1970s? Should it be a broader mix? What about the Marine Corps model of General Purpose infantry that can be mechanized, airmobile or footmobile, supported by tanks or not, and relies on close support by aviation? How could you integrate lower end capabilities/operations in the same battlespace where higher end combat is ongoing?
Im not convinced that the Hizbollah model of hybrid warfare is actually the likely model of future opponents, but it does provide an interesting challenge to design the force against. I also think we should be careful of basing the perceived relevance of our “conventional” capabilities on wars (Desert Storm, OIF I) in generally open terrain with 5th rate armies. We havent had to fight a competent for in Asia in a number of years. Our lessons may be different there. In any case, I would welcome the thinking and debate that moves beyond COIN vs. Conventional.
“Ironically, my writing on the wall said something totally opposite. I just put a 4187 to go from Infantry to Armor… .HRC denied my request.”
JP- After two years of rote memorization, indoctrination, and disciplined regurgitation of the Serenity Prayer, I just have to compartmentalize this action into the box of things from the creator that I will neither understand nor control. This box is broad to include the perpetual inefficiency of bureaucracies, desk jockey lawyers rules of engagement that will not allow warning shots to save lives, Army Generals preaching non-violence to West Point cadets, distinctions between theory and practice of life, and Fiddlers Green turning into a sports bar.
Many moons ago, back when I was high speed and low drag unabashed, unafraid, and oblivious, we were playing rugby on a pitch just south of COL Gentiles PhD alma mater in a village called Santa Cruz celebrating a day of remembrance for the honored, revered patriarch known as Saint Patrick. This village, emphasized by their Banana Slugs mascot, is an amalgam of artistic and creative cultures venturing far from the values taught to me at the South Hudson Institute of Technology. After the game and festivities at the home teams fraternity house, we made our way back to the National Guard barracks where we were staying. Having tried to integrate and immerse with the indigenous culture, I consumed my fill of Guinness and Dewars. Needless to say, I was spent. As I prepared to rest, my teammates barged into the room waving a newspaper proclaiming, “Dude, you gotta see this!!!” Through the cloudiness of the fog that covered my eyes grasping for sleep, I stared at the paper. It was the Santa Cruz Times, and the headline was “Baby Killers come to town.” Directly underneath the headline, a picture showed an Army rugger running through three defenders. The article went on to describe how the graduates of West Point would go on to kill women and children in foreign lands. I was unimpressed.
“Dude, Mike check it. Thats you,” exclaimed my teammate. So there I was, twenty years old having spent my life in academics, sports, and church, and now I was generalized as a baby killer. My mother still has a copy of that article. I realized that sometimes, no matter who you are, no matter what you do, people are people constrained by conceptual blocks and limited understanding and trapped in their own limiting norms, values, and beliefs.
So what? WTF does this story tell us about the death of Armor or the rise in interest of small wars? Paradoxically, nothing and everything. The challenge for us as Army officers is to transcend these limitations. We must force ourselves to see the world as it is not as we wished it to be.
COL Gentile, Phil R, Mike B, PatMC, Ken White and others across the SWJ world attempt to do that every day. As Emerson reminds us, the Creator, in his infinite wisdom, will show us solutions in his own time of war, science, mathematics, and nature. We just have to listen.
v/r
Mike
Good comments above. Short comments:
1) For its size, Armor is driving the COIN discussion. Gentile, Nagl, Chiarelli, McMaster, McFarland – all Armor background. Legions of more junior officers. Cav and Armor leaders remain some of the most forward thinking and adaptable we have, and are contributing to these discussions at a much higher rate than any other branch for its size …
2) Armor has proved its COIN utility over and over in OIF. Thunder runs, Sadr City, Najaf, Kerbala, Diawaynah, Al Kut, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Ramadi, etc. etc.
3) Canada brought 20 LEO II’s to A-Stan and have written several articles on how they markedly increased their effectiveness/mobility in RC-S.
4) Armor branch is failing to make the case for Armor as not only relevant to major war but also to the full spectrum of combat. Case after case demonstrates Armor is highly useful in COIN and urban environments, yet somehow a myth gets perpetuated it isn’t despite the huge stack of historical evidence to the contrary.
5) Armor isn’t dead, but we’re making some serious WTF decisions, especially on the Cav end, and failing to make the case for Armor’s utility full-spectrum. Many wonder who is advocating for Armor in the force design debates.
Niel
Funny, for us Canadians Afghanistan has seen the rebirth of our Armoured Corps, with new (much needed) MBTs being purchased and our tanks being employed on the battlefield for the first time since the Korean War.
Infanteer
Good comments Niel. I was wondering when you were going to show up. I guess there’s nothing like a war to shake up some of pre-conceived notions and beliefs. As a young commander, I used to joke that I have to teach my 11Bs to get in the trucks and my 19Ds to get out of them.
Existentially, different branches are having the same “come to Jesus meetings.” The real debate is over the fight for our soul. Who are we? What is our purpose? Where is our fit? Artillery, Intelligence, and SF have all struggled with identity so now it’s our turn.
Following COL Gentile’s provactive title, from a biblical perspective, one must start with a figurative death in order to accept the Creator’s grace. So, maybe the Armor mentality of the 1990’s is dying. If so, then I think that can be a good thing.
My experience in big wars and small wars made me a better leader period. So, maybe that’s a start point. From St. Vith to Ramadi there’s a time when we say a quick prayer that the tanks show up. In those times when hope can become forlorn, there is just something psychologically uplifting to feel the ground quake and the whine of the turbine engine coming up to give you some help.
But, we as Armor officers cannot limit ourselves to such specialization. As Niel highlights, we have a comparative advantage in deep thought, critical analysis, and big ideas. We learn to think broadly as we train to move over long distances and secure areas in short periods of time. Additionally, we are extremely competent in reconnaissance and surveillance.
So, where do we go? How do we renew? I think PhilR and the Marine tankers give us a clue. The mentality of infantry first is a start. BG McMaster preached this to his cavalrymen as a troop, squadron, and regimental commander.
Finally, as Niel rightly asks, who are our apostles preaching the good news? Who among us with the necessary rank and prestige are securing our place at the table?
For the record, Im not a Marine tanker, but an infantryman (and that long ago before staff billets became my norm).
Id just highlight that I think Col. Gentile worded his title for a specific reason. Its the death of the armored corps, not the death of tanks. While there is an obvious connection, the history of 20th century major conflict shows a struggle not over the utility of tanks, and mechanized forces in general, but how they should be utilized and integrated into a combined arms construct and as derivative, how the individual systems should be designed. As a non-tanker, I found Bruce Gudmundssons “On Armor” discussion on how armored vehicle design progressed from multiple specialized vehicles for different missions (infantry tanks, cavalry tanks, etc.) , to single “multi-mission” vehicles (Abrams). He makes the case that the trend seems to be moving back towards multiple platforms.
I think that finding effective uses for tanks and other armored vehicles in COIN, and in every conflict for that matter, is good and correct (and it should not take much searching to realize that tanks can be a key part of the force in COIN). However, I dont think this equates to the “mindset” or philosophical approach that an armored corps provides the Army. For an analogy, I look at the difference in outlook and employment between the individual tank battalions attached to infantry divisions in WWII, and the armored divisions. Same tanks, different employment concepts and philosophies.
To my mind, the armored corps is about understanding and emphasizing the value of shock, rapid maneuver, and overwhelming firepower at the point of attack. If armored officers have some advantage in adapting and innovation, it possibly has to do with the relative speed of action which they are conditioned to leverage, as well as their understanding of the fundamentally psychological impact of their operations (which many times can outweigh the immediate tactical physical effects). There could be obvious downsides with this approach in a COIN environment, but Im talking generalities. Just a guess, however, from a guy who walked a lot.
“or its size, Armor is driving the COIN discussion. Gentile, Nagl, Chiarelli, McMaster, McFarland – all Armor background.”
Yes, those of us in the infantry gave you the luxury of navel gazing about COIN while we went out and did it.
Yes, I’m kidding.
PhilR-
Hi sir. Your insights and wisdom, along with others like COL Gentile, Ken White, and John T. Fischel, continue to remind me of the great experience and foresight of SWJ that Dave Dillege, Bill Nagle, and Robert Haddock have provided.
This is our modern day version of the private talks that CPT Robert E. Lee and Gen Winfield Scott had in Mexico City and the discussions of CPT Dwight D. Eisenhower and GEN Fox Connor had in the Panama Canal Zone.
SWJ is complimented by the academic heat and prominence of guys like COL Michael Meese and the SOSH department at USMA and the Gordon McCormick’s and Defense Analysis Department at NPS.
Back on point and more to the point which you stated well.
“To my mind, the armored corps is about understanding and emphasizing the value of shock, rapid maneuver, and overwhelming firepower at the point of attack. If armored officers have some advantage in adapting and innovation, it possibly has to do with the relative speed of action which they are conditioned to leverage, as well as their understanding of the fundamentally psychological impact of their operations (which many times can outweigh the immediate tactical physical effects).”
Conditioning and leverage…Seems to go back to Ken White’s paradigm of METT-TC, personnel, and training.
v/r
Mike
Well, MikeF, you get to the heart (if not the mind) of my quibble with Gian’s essay, too.
As a j’accuse, provocative thesis it makes a statement, but I guess I want more than a statement.
I want him to back it up with empirical investigation beyond mentioning some concerned but anonymous cav officers.
Moreover, when he raises the issue of a “culture” of warmaking in the branch, he should make some attempt to define what he means by that.
As for the supposed brilliance of armored officers in the COIN game, I’d like to see some actual competence they bring to winning wars within, say, a decade or so.
If they prosecuted combined arms operations as they do so often COIN enterprises (substituting unproven doctrinal mumbo-jumbo cribbed from texts now a half-century old), with the middling results to show for it, they would be sacked as rank incompetents).
Too often we assume that rank, credentials and a supposed expertise substitute for results on the battlefield. As a democracy, perhaps we should be rid of the armored officers who have so brilliantly guided our COIN efforts, lest they continue to guide them into the next century.
Now, Gian, how is that for provocative?
Quite provocative, Carl. I agree with what you say about competence and winning the wars we are in. However, I am sure the Coin Experts would just roll their eyes and say we are doing that but of course these kinds of wars are generational endeavors where we will not be pulling the Champaign out of the frig anytime soon.
But seriously your post does bring to mind a thought that I should have brought out in the piece that Bacevich has written on lately: the fact that the American army has lost the sense of military victory. Nowadays military victory is subsumed under a never ending process of Counterinsurgency operations. Military victory in this sense has become the operation and its existential, never ending nature.
Your criticisms of my piece are fair. It was a very short piece in “oped” form without substantive supporting evidence. I wrote it in response to some events I attended recently at my place of duty which suggested to me, at a visceral and admittedly impressionistic level, that the armor corps as a state of mind in the army is gone. I think I am right, and I will try to put together a more extended piece in the near future to back up this assertion with a developed argument.
But oh what the hey Carl, if Tom Ricks can write a short 500 word oped in the Washington Post last year calling for the elimination of the Military Academies and War Colleges should I not be allowed to write an 800 word piece on the death of the armor corps for the SWJ Blog?
gian
By nature, I’m interested in the facts, Gian.
If you’re going to pronounce the patient dead, well, I want to read the autopsy.
If I’m going to fault Ricks for being too brief and failing to employ empirical reasoning, then I’ve got to carry through with you.
Giving a nod to the genre and your mission (op-ed, provocative call to arms), I’m also being unfair to what you did. If you go back to the brief essays Patton wrote in the Army’s inter-war publications, one can find similarly structured pieces.
Some were prescient. Others were cranky. But it’s part of a wider genre of military discourse that I should have acknowledged.
Carl-
“If you go back to the brief essays Patton wrote in the Army’s inter-war publications, one can find similarly structured pieces.”
Good catch. I deliberately left his writings out in my last post.
“Well, MikeF, you get to the heart (if not the mind) of my quibble with Gian’s essay, too.”
Heart, mind, and soul as I alluded to in my previous comments. This is something that we’re missing whether it be small wars or TBI/PTSD. I hope to capture the distinctions in forthcoming essays.
“By nature, I’m interested in the facts, Gian. If you’re going to pronounce the patient dead, well, I want to read the autopsy.”
That’s on COL Gentile. The beauty of SWJ is that it’s peer-review. I’m sure he’s taking our comments and critiques into consideration for future publications. And, hopefully, the big wigs are paying attention.
v/r
Mike
After both Word Wars, substantial unresolved disagreements were evident that could lead to a next WW with large tank battles. The Soviet Union and its large tank reserves have disappeared. The Chinese have few quality tanks and few could envision attempting to fight tank battles in China…due to mutually assured economic destruction. South Korea is not tank terrain. The Israelis can take care of themselves and Lebanon/Syria/Iran.
You could make an argument for securing Iranian lands near the Straits of Hormuz. That is something accomplishable by Marines and Army Strykers out of Afghanistan or Pakistan, coupled with airpower/seapower. A similar force composition could support Taiwan’s security by landing air-deployed forces on the east side of the mountains prior to or during a Chinese amphibious assault. Please show me other potential threats with major armored forces requiring an armor branch as large as infantry branch.
The joint fighter community, air defenses, and stealth have rendered air combat too expensive for large threat air forces in all but a few nations. Likewise, the M1A2’s success and the number of U.S. and allied top attack and laser/radar/GPS-guided air-ground antiarmor weapons have made enemy armor short-lived. What is the point in building lots of armor that won’t survive against the U.S.
Friendly armor is looking at new threats they were not designed to withstand even at M1A2 size. An IED can take out an M1A2 just as readily as a MRAP. Top attack can kill our tanks too. Do we continue to add more armor to the M1 tank so that it cannot cross any bridge and burns more than the current 2 gallons per mile? Given the decision to abandon Mounted Combat System and its three 120mm guns air-deployable per C-17 in contrast to one M1A2…the prospect of air-deploying and logistically-supporting large armor contingency forces is diminished.
Army aviation has proven its ability to support both high-and-lower-end combat. Armor requires a makeover to achieve similar versatility. Stryker BCTs are probably on the right track to a different mix of armor and infantry. A two Infantry company/two Armor company combined arms battalion no longer makes sense from a threat, logistical, and deployment standpoint.
The Marines are designing smaller, more independent units based on Infantry. If the Army wants armored forces to be more relevant, it might consider smaller mechanized company “team-plus” task forces based on a tank platoon, two Stryker or GCV or M-ATV platoons, an armed aerial scout/UAS platoon, a “special troops” platoon with engineers, GPS mortars, HIMARS, NLOS-LS, signal, and MI; and a sustainment/medical section. Tailor it to a pre-planned number of C-17 sorties and Joint High Speed Vessels. Preposition other equipment sets near forward deployed airstrips for “battalion-plus” air-deployable task forces.
But the Armor community must learn to recognize that warfare is no longer a game of “Stratego” where seizing the enemy’s flag is sufficient. It was not “mission accomplished” following OIF I or OEF I. It was not “mission accomplished” following Desert Storm. Initial battlefield success is a short-lived victory with much longer stability operations to follow. Armor must make itself more relevant in that context.
The concepts of reconnaissance and security also need to change from the traditional armor/cavalry/recon squadron standpoint. A short-duration reconnaissance/patrol seldom finds enemy disguised as civilians or hiding in complex terrain. They wait until you pass…then wreak havoc. Two-man OPs and single-vehicle OPs are seldom feasible in a casualty-averse urban/complex terrain battlefield. The enemy masses on your undermanned OPs or plant IEDs on what they think is your mounted patrol’s return route that kill civilians even if they guess wrong. How do you sneak up on anyone in a large diesel and metal-track vehicle?
Surveillance assets have the potential to revolutionize both ground and air security/reconnaissance using unmanned assets. Armor should embrace control of unmanned ground vehicles…a niche in which armor could retain greater future relevance and force structure.
Just my personal views.
To reiterate I do firmly believe that my impressions are correct and that the armor corps–or armor state of mind–in the American Army is dead.
Again, for many readers of this blog, I am not dreaming of Fulda, sending secret letters to General Dynamics asking them to build an M1A8 (main battle tank) and viewing everything that Russia does today with its foreign policy as evidence of a future attack on Munich.
To be sure the American Army needs transformation. But as I have argued in numerous places that transformation needs to be based on a reasonable amount of specialization of branches (without stove piping) and more importantly competency at combining those specialized branches with other arms to create an army built around all-arms integration. Doug Macgregor’s model I still think is the most appealing as a goal for the army to transform toward.
I am suspect, though, of this notion of a “jack of all trades” army. To be sure and back in the day when I commanded a tank company in Korea I think it was accepted that any infantry or armor officer worth his salt, if called upon, should be able to command either type. But we would never go so far, nor should we today, to think that maneuver officers could easily command a more specialized unit like artillery or signal. Moreover in this regard we should be worried when we have artillery officers command infantry companies as captains, or artillery field grades as operations officers for cavalry squadrons since they will be missing out on learning at any given level the key and essential functions of their branch. This was one of the essential points made by the three colonels a few years ago in their piece “The King and I.”
So if we are not careful in so calling for a jack of all trades army we end up blurring the lines between specialties to the point where we have no specialization at all. Now for missions like passing out humanitarian supplies in Darfur or nation building in Iraq perhaps these lines dont really matter.
But in the face of a sophisticated enemy who fights beyond three to five man cells laying IEDs and ambushes those lines of specialization might in fact prove very necessary. For folks who think that the future holds only irregular warfare amongst the peoples of the world with no combined fighting above platoon level, I think they are misguided just like one of Stalins Generals who told him in the late 1930s that there was no future in mechanized warfare. I am not saying the future holds world war III with China, but we can imagine a future where the American Army will have to deploy and fight. To be sure it will do many other things as well, but we better train, organize, and optimize ourselves for combined arms. I would rather take risk in not optimizing our army for other forms and types of operations and conflicts. But my assessment of risk is based on the idea which runs counter to many Coin experts that just because an Army is built on combined arms and the integrated use of firepower does not make it prone to fail in Coin and irregular warfare. Such notions have become stock thinking among some historians and intellectuals who have used irregular warfare as a bludgeon to force change and transformation on the American military, especially its army.
Every study that I have read on the Israeli Army in summer 2006 acknowledges that one of the significant problems that led to their drubbing on the ground was the atrophied state of their combined arms competencies.
Here is a link to the white paper The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillerys ability to provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders by Colonels Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields and Jeffrey Snow.
“So if we are not careful in so calling for a jack of all trades army we end up blurring the lines between specialties to the point where we have no specialization at all.”
You give everyone a black beret; call everyone from the kid lubing the Stryker to the 11B shooting final protective fire a “warrior”; and, when they die umpiring an endemic civil war somewhere far from home, send them off by naming them “heroes,” each one with a bronze star and a flag for mom.
It’s not a shared misery, but it’s a shared decision to lump them together. Not for efficiency. Not even because a small coterie of influential current and former officers believes the nature of the war has evolved to COIN.
No. It’s because of human vanity, the compulsion of the powerful to bring to their crypt like a sick pharaoh all their beautiful possessions, human and material, together, within clutch.
The complexity of branches, the leveling hands of fickle war — all these must be disregarded so that the few might proclaim the rectitude of their hubris, gussy it into policy. Finally, or still, the best of the class at USMA.
There are cultures within the branches, but no one seems to want to explore the culture of those who decide their fates. Who are these generals, and how do they order this world? Do they do so in their own image? Or does their image depend on their ordering?
Gian:
Fear not, I’ve lived through two deaths each of the Marine Corps and Cavalry and three of Armor … ,)
Carl:
Good points all, Tanks. :^)
SNLII:
I think you’re wrongly blaming the Generals for ills of the society from which they and their Army spring.
While I totally agree with your sentiments in that quote assuming that every item is pejoratively cited, all those things are a result of the Baby Boomer Self Esteem and Personal Agrandizement Enhancement Movement that overtook this nation in the 1970s. We haven’t been the same since. The nation or the Army…
I also agree that the COIN delusion is dangerous. It is one of those myths that will not die, just as socialism will not. Both in spite of all evidence. Adherents to both share the delusion that “If only I were in charge, it would work.” It won’t. Fortunately, none of them are in charge. Yet. We can only hope it stays that way.
As do we all, the Generals have their flaws but they are truly captives of a society and a Congress where very few have really seen war and rely on the terribly ignorant media and the even more ignorant entertainment and TV news folks. This in a nation where the Football Awards Banquet at your local Elementary School makes sure that all students receive something. An indication things will probably get worse before they get better…
Luckily, as the current 20 somethings who’ve been to see the animal mature, things will likely get better. My sensing is that they, in and out of uniform and unlike the Boomers, will not go quietly into hedonism. Some of those who stay in may realize that Armor tactics are as important as Table VII and maintenance…
This is a good thing.
It is common knowledge that we train for the next war still planning conditions of the last. Whether it be human nature by simply embracing what we know, it has undoubtedly cost the nation many lives and resources. The French planned the defense of the German border based on the premise of conditions in 1914-1918. Their lack of agility and poor communications led to their overwhelming defeat. The United States Army, headed into Vietnam still planned and conducted operations as if it were 1950 on the Korean peninsula; once again, hard lessons had to be learned. Before September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army still trained as if we were going to meet the massive formations of the Soviet Army or the Republican guard on a barren and civilian-free battlefield, away from major cities. We learned the hard lessons of the first years of this conflict, and have somewhat successfully adapted to meet the challenges.
We must maintain the ability to adapt, innovate and defeat ANY enemy wherever we are called to battle, and yes this must include heavy forces. Light and portable anti-armor weapons have their role to fill on the battlefield, but if we rely on these weapons to meet every potential threat, we are leaving ourselves open, once again, to the hard and costly price which would have to be paid to meet the threat. Armor has its advantages and disadvantages, no doubt. But to assume that the next war will be fought on the same terms as the current conflict is ludicrous and dangerous.
This discussion is fascinating and I would like to thank COL Gentile for the thought provoking article — one of many he has penned.
First, I grew up in the infantry, both light and mech. My complaint with the mech world was the total focus on fighting the BFVs to the exclusion of the squads that they carried. Admittedly, that may have been a fault of the leadership. However, that suggested a tendency among mechanized types to see the solution to every tactical problem as the application of more firepower. In my limited experience, that tendency can also be imputed to armor leaders.
If this what is meant by the “armor mindset”?
That tendency, by itself, is not a bad thing in certain circumstance. It is the way wars are won, if by war we are talking state-on-state conflicts. I am not under any illusion that such conflicts have disappeared for good. There is and will remain a need for the ability to conduct large scale, combined arms operations. As has been said, these types of operations require a lot of expertise.
The problem is that this is not the type of conflict in which we are now engaged, and such a conflict is not on the horizon. The types of conflicts in which we are now engaged do not require this type of operation. I would argue that the “armor mindset” (if I understand it properly) is not suitable for these types of conflicts.
Here is the rub. How do we maintain an organizational ethic with a tendency to apply overwhelming firepower as the first option when our army is now operating in an environment where that ethic is not simply not needed, but is actually harmful to our efforts?
I, for one, think that there should be a separation between infantry and armor so that armor can retain that institutional experience in conducted large scale combine arms operations. But I am not sure that serves either the army or the armor branch particularly well either. In the current climate, armor then becomes the red-headed step-child of the army. Besides that concern is the fact that the whole army needs to maintain that mindset to some degree.
It is not easy for an organization to turn on and off a particular mindset. Look at the recent history in Iraq and Afghanistan — it took us years to rethink the way we fight those wars, to refocus on fighting an insurgency. And there are still many in the military who continue to argue that the best way to conduct these wars is through the application of the overwhelming force.
I just don’t think the problem is so easily solved. On the one hand, maintaining the “armor mindset” is not helpful for the types of conflicts we are in now or will likely see in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the mindset is critical for success in a more traditional force-on-force conflict. Unfortunately, it is not easy to switch the mindset of the army at the start of an operation depending on its character.
I guess that is why the professionals who have posted here above have these discussions. I look forward to following this discussion in the future.
Great discussion and good points made by all! It is refreshing to see somebody finally talking about this problem.
As a former Redleg and vet of two tours in Iraq, I have seen firsthand the deterioration of combat skills in the Field Artillery and Armor branches. But it is not the actual lack of technical skills that concerns me. They can be recovered through good leadership and a clear training regimen. Field Artillery, like Armor, is a team sport. No one tank or artillery piece is effective by itself. They must work together as large teams, spread out over vast areas. Like most teams, they cannot be formed overnight. It takes years of training and working together to build a cohesive team. If that team is to win the Super Bowl, it must train together. This is nothing new. It is not a new revelation. We as an Army understood this for years. It was built into our institutional memories and culture through years of bloody conflicts.
A close friend of mine in the 10th Mountain Division told me that one of his artillery battalions will be deploying to Afghanistan again without their guns. Now obviously the commander of this battalion will spend 90% of his precious training time at home station training on the tasks that he will be expected to conduct in theater. These don’t include delivery of fires tasks. Instead they include critical COIN tasks that will save his soldiers lives and accomplish the mission. Unfortunately, this particular battalion is full of officers and NCO’s that have never pulled a lanyard or written a fire support plan. Worse yet, they have never worked closely with their infantry and sustainment brothers.
At the heart of this issue is the eternal problem with armies: TIME and MONEY. Who do we train to fight? If the leadership of this nation wants us to prepare for all the conflicts laid out in the Spectrum of Conflict, then the Army needs the TIME and MONEY to train for these conflicts. With that said, the Army will have to act as a jack-of-all-trades force, but could sadly become a master-of-none. Unfortunately, as history has proven to us time and time again, conventional wars need large armies with all supporting arms working together as one team. These teams cannot be made overnight. If they are deployed into a conventional fight unprepared and untrained, many young men will go home in body bags and make Iraq and Afghanistan look like picnics. Task Force Smith in Korea comes to mind. And the Army in 1950 was only 5 years out of WWII and full of combat veterans! It took the Army over a year to get its collective head out of its ass and get back to the basics needed to defeat the North Koreans and eventually the Chinese. This all happened of course at a great cost in lives.
In closing, we must give this matter a lot of thought. All Army officers know that you only have so many days to train and limited budgets but are expected to perform to standard regardless. So where do we focus our finite training resources? COIN or conventional warfare? Or everything in between? Something has to give. My point is that conventional wars are far more costly and require large teams; infantry, armor, artillery, air, and sustainment, working together as one. These teams are not made overnight and they are not cheap.
V/R
Andy
Andy,
Great points, this is exactly what I was attempting to allude to in my broad post above. There is a historical perspective that can, and well should, be looked at before decisions are made. This issue is nothing new at all. As you referenced TF Smith, the same cry was made during the 1960s during the Vietnam conflict, that Armor was dying. Well, we all know that Armor did not die.
As you have noted, and I fully agree, the issue at hand is time and resources. Individual skills can be kept honed to some degree, but the ability to move, communicate and place effective fires on an objective in adverse conditions is not easy to orchestrate, and is a highly perishable skill. While others have noted here that war as we once knew it is no longer relevant, I beg to differ. Just as we were caught off guard in 1941 and 2001, we can be caught off guard today. We should possess the wisdom to have learned the lessons paid for so dearly by our comrades who paid the price.
Thanks,
P. Arnett
I find myself saying “uh, huh” to many of the comments. I read back through again asking, “What is the Armor Mindset?” For every ten commentators, there are ten different answers each bounded by our direct experience, personal background, beliefs, norms, and values. In truth, maybe there is not a standardized mindset, but as SNLII noted, “a collection of cultures within the branch.” That’s one reason why many find it difficult to label hearts, minds, and souls to social groups, organizational structures, and open systems- People are people.
To be sure, there’s light and heavy, wheeled and tracked, dismounted and mounted, and calvary and tanks. But, also, one would find many differences in tank companys from Camp Casey, Fort Stewart, or Fort Hood. Unit lineages, cultures, and mindsets are derived from the collective history, the terrain that where they train and fight, and the current leadership. Even in uniform, we look different ranging from stetsons, spurs, mustaches, sideburns, crew cuts, and jump boots.
So, again, what is the Armor mindset? I’m not sure if such a thing exist, but I know something is there. I saw the audacity of COL David Perkins and LTC Eric Schwartz sending us up to Baghdad to “take a look around” during the Thunder Runs, I talked to the 3ACR boys in Uday’s palace right before COL McMaster sent them up to Tal Afar in his COIN classic presentation, and I saw my own uba duba 19D’s find some solutions in Diyala back during the “Surge.” So, something relevant is there. I’m just not sure what to call it.
Maybe we’re just a big tent branch.
Maybe a better question is, what is Armor’s role in Big, Medium, and Small Wars? If we can answer that one with direct funding, training, and resources, then maybe the other questions will fade away.
Armor State of Mind is a Maneuver State of Mind
1. Comment Background: Infantry (ABN / MECH) and South Asia FAO.
2. While serving in a South Asian Staff College, I noticed that the students from Armor Regiments intellectually grasped DIV / CORPS operations faster than those from Infantry Regiments. My guess is that, from their first days of service, they had to think in terms of space / time / effects = the beginning of maneuver thinking. The Infantry officers understood terrain retention and enemy attrition.
3. Thus, the armor “state of mind” is a maneuver state of mind. Similarly, I would guess that COL Gentile’s concerns reflect a loss of that “maneuver state of mind” within armor branch. Fighting combined arms warfare is not easy, and it gets rapidly complex at higher levels. Given the COE, the Army is preaching the “COIN state of mind.”
4. The skillsets, such as maintenance and gunnery are much more amenable to correction than a mental mind-set, and are thus less important. Furthermore, that mental mind-set is harder to change, and has a greater effect on operations, at battalion and higher levels.
5. As with many other posters, I think platforms are less important than the mental mind-set. Having said that, platforms are still very important. Imagine yourself an insurgent – plan an attack against a tank platoon compared to a Styker MGS platoon.
P Arnett,
Let’s look at other old and recent history and older/newer technology simultaneously:
– There was ample warning about Germany prior to 1941, and armor did not help much in the Pacific…nor would it today in defense of Taiwan or South Korea due to the time to sea deploy and the terrain. Proper interpretation that planes approaching from the northwest on new-fangled radar were NOT expected American B-17s coming from the mainland, might have resulted in a different 7 December outcome
– Germans ran out of fuel with their heavy tanks and some say that, and use of horse resupply was what led to Blitzkrieg to finish fast. We nearly ran out with smaller tanks and truck-mounted infantry were it not for the Red Ball Express that could have been sabotaged using today’s insurgent and stay behind tactics. Did superior armor protection help the Germans or did we simply have too small a gun? Did superior German armor help beat WWII Soviets?
– Tanks/APCs and fighter aircraft cost far more today than in WWII or the Cold War accounting for inflation. How many threat nations have the defense budgets to finance large standing armored armies and high tech air forces today and in the next 20 years?? Even if China and Russia attacked neighbors ala Georgia, how could we stop them with heavy armor months away? Would we so attempt that intervention with heavy armor given the fait accompli?
– Weren’t light M113s and other medium armor just as critical in the OIF I Thunder Runs? Did M113s not lead, and save one tank crew that got an RPG in the engine?
– Was Ghost Troop at 73 Easting a primarily tank unit or primarily mech with medium armor that still managed to acquit itself quite well? Was there heavy loss of moderately armored Bradleys in OIF I or Desert Storm?
– In the march to Baghdad, did 2nd Brigade need to turn around on marshy dikes because its armor was too heavy? Did LTC Marconi’s Objective Peach armor unit nearly have trouble crossing bridges at two locations due to tank weight?
– Did lighter Marine armor not make it to Baghdad? Did heavy AMTRACS get stuck at An-Nasiriyah? If heavy armor and no technology is the answer, then why are Marines so invested in F-35B, V-22, EFV, a LAV replacement, and lighter JLTV alternatives?
– Did a armor company team out of Germany not airland by C-17 in northern Iraq with nearly the combat power of the airborne BCT that accompanied it? Did we not fly a BCT of Strykers from Diego Garcia to landlocked Afghanistan?
– Much is said about ISR technology not finding the enemy…which is true if OIF I is used as an example since a fraction of the UAS were available that exist now…not to mention current and future unmanned ground vehicles and other sensors. JSTARS still managed to find enemy units in a sandstorm, just as SAR/GMTI on UAS can detect change while flying above the clouds. Valiant Angel and bi-direction OSRVT are coming to disperse combat information to warfighters. Apaches/Kiowa Warrior and manned-unmanned teaming have been responsible for upwards of 70% of enemy kills in Iraq.
– Sensors are getting better everyday. Perhaps radars used for future active protection could feed grid coordinates to mortar units for automated fire solutions. XM-25 lasers could similarly feed fire solutions and on-board lasers on GCV and UGV could do likewise. Isn’t automation of fire solutions and automated embedded simulation a means of circumventing training shortfalls due to lack of time and resources?
– Is reliance on adaptive leaders and heavy armor any less subject to uncertainty given IEDs and top attack than reliance on layered ISR and other technology? Can adaptive leaders not benefit from technology?
– Israel/Lebanon 2006 resulted in about 120 dead Israelis and 500-600 dead Hezbollah fighters. Does that mirror the types of unacceptable casualty rates, terrain, world-class enemy, lack of deployment, and short sustainment and maneuver distances the US would face nearly anywhere else? Can an M1A2 be made into a troop carrier with its rear engine?
– If Israel had Apaches and Predators/Army MQ-1C and Reapers flying its borders in 2006 it could have flown overwatch for numerous battles just inside the Lebanon border that caused numerous Israeli ground casualties, while avoiding killing UN troops. Gaza is 4.5 to 7 miles wide at most and only 25 miles long…hardly worth many lessons learned. Lebanon distances are not impressive by OIF I or OEF I or any other American contingency standards either.