Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

Bob,

I am with you on this. But I would still argue that if we had a strategy, from that strategy would (or should!!) come priorities (and not the every exercise in every country is a priority) that would (could or should) mitigate the pain you (and all of us) have suffered. And of course in PACOM we remained in a kind of time warp because as you know many of those exercise requirements fillers came from CONUS units and staffs before 9-11 (and I remember back prior to 9-11 in the 1990s organizations fighting to be force listed on war plans to participate in exercises because that protected force structure andtheoretically meant more funding). I think we continued to think that way in PACOM, not accepting the fact that many of those organziations that previously wished to play and send augmentees, etc were otherwise decisively engaged in other theaters.

Bob,

I am with you on this. But I would still argue that if we had a strategy, from that strategy would (or should!!) come priorities (and not the every exercise in every country is a priority) that would (could or should) mitigate the pain you (and all of us) have suffered. And of course in PACOM we remained in a kind of time warp because as you know many of those exercise requirements fillers came from CONUS units and staffs before 9-11 (and I remember back prior to 9-11 in the 1990s organizations fighting to be force listed on war plans to participate in exercises because that protected force structure andtheoretically meant more funding). I think we continued to think that way in PACOM, not accepting the fact that many of those organziations that previously wished to play and send augmentees, etc were otherwise decisively engaged in other theaters.

As an aside, I do have a personal bias that I must confess: As the Director of Operations for SOCPAC at a time when OEF-P was in full swing and we had dozens of GWOT related SOF activities we were attempting to implement accross SEA and SA (while the vast bulk of SOF were 100% committed to CENCOM and we were also being attritted of key capabilities regularly as we filled requests for a range of critical SOF capabilities from our meager stock to make the rich richer) I had to also support exercieses.

Every Commander wanted to check the "SOF" block in his exercise, so wanted at a minimum a JSOTF staff and a task force of SF, SEALs and SOF aviation. My boss was a 2-star. But PACFLEET Commander has 4 and is heir apparent to PACOM (plus every squid on the PACOM staff wants to make the guy happy so he'll either rescue them from PACOM or at least be favorable to them when he comes up the hill some day). So, pull guys off ops to support the Fleet. Same for USFK and USFJ. Pull more troops off of missions and send to support exercies. Now, they never got what they wanted, and I was happy to be the point man pissing off the J7 (and often the J3 and 5 as well).

Standard argument was that "You can't tell a 3/4-star commander no." True. So we pull guys off of the main SOF effort to send to serve largely as window dressing to a range of other projects all rated as far more important by guys with far more rank. Here's an idea, if you think "Learning how to work with SOF" is so important, how about sending some of YOUR assests to go support the SOF guys???

Maybe in the big picture they are right and I will see that some day. Until then, I admit to having a bias.

Confessions of a TSOC J3

Dave,

(Realizing I should stop while ahead having received a gold star on my homework from Ken)

All true. And that new strategy for NEA needs to nest within a new global strategy as well. I will even risk my gold star and suggest that that new global strategy should not be threat-based and negative as "Containment" is; but rather should be based on not requiring someone else to play the role of opponent for the whole thing to work. (A proposal for which I have written, and should be published soon...)

We also need to recognize that military-based deterrence made a lot of sense when no one in the region had an economy, now with the economies of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan being the engines that they are, perhaps other means could be far more effective for encouraging proper behavior (keep the big stick, but hold it behind your back rather than over their heads). There is huge strategic power in what I simply call the Donald Trump rule: "When you borrow a million dollars from the bank, the bank owns you. When you borrow a billion dollars from the bank, you own the bank." BLUF: We don't need fancy new planes, missiles and ships to scare the crap out of China, just one shakey economy and a tremendous debt.

But it all needs to start somewhere. I haven't seen many proposals for reducing flag positions coming out of the Pentagon lately, so I thought I'd toss that on the table to get conversation started...

Bob,

I agree that we need a new straetgy for the Korean Peninusla. I outlined as much in a thesis I did in 2004 - "A Long Term Strategy for the Korean Peninusla Beyond the Nuclear Crisis" and a summary of it was later published as an article in Military Review.

However, I would take slight exception to your solution because I think you fall into the same trap as those you are criticizing (although I agree with your criticism). I think we have organziational and structural issues where we perpetuate organizations and structures not only because they have existed for a long time(though perhaps in varying forms) but because as you allude to they provide career positions for personnel. In an oblique way our personnel (promotion and assignment) system is a part of the cause. We want these ranking positions because they provide justification for numbers of GO/FO and supporting elements, etc.

However, to simply reduce the level of ranks for these positions just puts a new coat of paint on a rusting hulk. I agree we need a strategy and we should focus on that and once we have a workable strategy (meeting all the FAS erquirements) then we can determine the force structure and deployment posture we need to support that strategy.

But our strategy has to recognize that there is a potential on the Korean peninsula for a nexus of complex threats (criminal, illicit activity, WMD, proliferation, instability and spillover, civil war and its potential spillover, insurgency, terorism both direct and support to other organizations, and even war on some scale) that will have global economic impact and security implications it they come to fruition. I would submit it is in our national interest and those of our alliance partners to develop a strategy that can mitigate those threats as well as to be prepared to deal with what may come.

Bill,

NEA may well be the #1 overseas area where US National interests lie. I just don't think those interests are well served in clinging to Ways and Means established largely prior to 1955.

More than any other corner of the globe the US has put itself in positions where it can be dragged into major war against our will and our interests in NEA. Old redlines, old agreements, old policies, old rationale. All are still set in ways that could get thousands of young soldiers, sailors and airmen killed by actions that can be set in motion by others. All putting tremendous US influence at risk. Few offering more than the ability to do little more than re-set the conditions of failure no matter how successful we are in our execution.

Tremendous interests yes, but our policies and associated plans fail the common-sense test when weighed against the world we live in today.

Navy Interests and Airforce Interests should not outweigh National Interests; nor should the interests of an obsecene number of 4-star commanders that do nothing but focus on NEA; but in this region one has to wonder sometimes if that is true when one sees the positions coming out of PACOM, or those addressed in key forums such as the QDR. Part of that blame lies at the feet of our requirements and programing processes; but it's not just the game's fault, the players are equally culpable.

Reducing Korea and Japan and 7th Fleet to 2-star billets and PACFLEET to a 3-star would be a good start in bringing balance to NEA perspectives.

Bill M.

In the law, one of the primary enduring principles is the "Rule Against Perpetuities." While this key bit of common law was developed and has been applied over the years to what is broadly seen as the most just way to determine the controlling interests of property in an estate; those some principles of justice apply very well to foreign policy as well.

Some of the phrases/rule employed to explain the rule against perpetuities are:

1. Property should be controlled by the living, not by the "dead hand."

2. "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, no later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."

Now, I will not argue here that this rule must or should be applied rigorously to matters of foreign policy. I argue only that it came about because the logic of it was inherently just; and that there is great danger in retaining a political agreement beyond its period of relevance.

Certainly most of the U.S. positions in North East Asia were written by "Dead Hands." While we are not at the point of generation plus 21 years; I highly doubt that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower intended to bind children born 60 years later by their decisions any more than they felt compelled in 1950 to adhere to decisions made in 1890.

The fact is that the major treaties and associated war plans in North East Asia stand on facts and conditions that have not existed for some 20 years. There is no dishonor in having the wisdom to create new positions based upon current and emerging facts and conditions.

I believe that the key factor for the U.S. is "influence." In shaping smart new policies and treaties the U.S. retains initiative and can build influence. To simply cut and run will cost influence; to be forced to abandon long held positions by others will cost even more influence. To be sucked into a costly war on the Korean Penninsula or off the coast of China that we have little interest in, by others we have no control over, will cost us far more than influence, and are avoidable tragedies. It is time to be proactive.

The work of "dead hands" is persuasive, but it is not the controlling argument on the table.

Bill M: your concern is shared. These new publications are updates and additions to complementary to the original works. You will find that these texts update and bring the intellectual thought into the 21st century hopefully without compromising the great work that has already been done by the past SORO. These new publications will remain true to the past work but provide a useful academic tool and historical reference for use in school as well as to provide a historical and theoretical foundation for development of future concepts and doctrine. We are definitely not throwing the baby out with the bath water but we need to add select revolutions and insurgencies to the existing historical and theoretical work that was done up to 1965.

COL Maxwell, I have to admit I'm a bit apprehensive about the projected updated Human Factors Considerations book that will be released next year, due to the wide spread impact of political correctness in our academic world (encouraged by our government). I really enjoy reading many of the older texts where the author's had more academic freedom to state their findings without worrying about possibly offending a particular interest group. I also think we'll see a push for the new version to endorse FM 3-34 because it is the current rage in group think.

Bob, I think you made several good points, and I agree it is a fools errand to try to contain VEO ideas, especially by employing large military formations to wage war against a people (you can't kill ideas with guns, so we're fighting the people who don't view the world the way we want them to). It seems the harder we try we try to do just that we in fact facilitate the spread of their extremist ideology.

Call me a naysayer, but we will not deny safehaven to terrorist groups (they'll simply adapt/evolve to whatever the new security environment is, and meanwhile we're still focused on eliminating the overt training camps with monkey bars we have all seen in the films. Many of the terrorist groups have already moved on to more clandestine training approaches, and the others will when they have to. We also will not eradicate their ideology through offensive actions (both military and counter-narratives). It is too late to contain their ideas, and they not only reside and grow in so called areas without effective governance, but they grow in throughout the West in universities, prisons, on the internet and in mosques. We really need to take a hard look at what return we're getting on our investment with our current strategy. There is an old economic theory that 20% of what you do results in 80% of your return, so assuming there is some truth to that let's figure out what 20% of the activities we're doing are actually making a difference and then consider dropping the remaining the 80% and maybe investing that money back into our nation's economy.

As for being over invested in Afghanistan, maybe or maybe not, but if our policy is to radically transform the country (to what end I don't know), then I would argue we're under invested. We can all debate the policy endlessly, but assuming the current policy is going to hold, then we need to do more IMO. I would also sumbmit that we need to define clearly what winning even looks like (we haven't yet), then build consensus, and then just do it. Right now we're still swimming the muck of our own conflicting policies and ideologies.

I don't think North Korea is so much about containing communism anymore, but more about honoring our treaties and protecting our reputation/influence in a very important region of the world. The real national interests in this case are not humanitarian or securing the WMDs (they're important, but those are short term interests), but maintaining a viable influence long term in NE Asia for both economic and national security reasons. If we bow out because there are no longer any short term interests for us, I think we do so at great risk to our longer term interests. As we the world watches the raise of the rest, they'll be watching the U.S. closely to see what role they'll play in the new world, and if they're a dependable partner.

Mac,

For your SA, Johns Hopkins (for USASOC) is updating Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Special Operations Research Office of the American University, 1965). It will be out next year sometime. Soon another 24 case studies in Revolutions and Insurgencies will be published to build on the original 23 in the Case Study book. When published we will ensure widest dissemination to all PME and interested civilian institutions to include electronically on the web.

This is the problem with ideologically driven containment strategies. Containing "ideas" has never worked well. North Korea was our first big experiment with that idea (prior to the fall of Nationalist China we were had a more realist approach, preventing Soviet expansion into western/southern Europe. The harsh wakeup call that China was not content to be our little buddy was a real strategic kick in the ol' Jimmy for our policy guys.

This led to a bit of Quixotism as the idea we dedicated ourselves to containing was adopted by several populaces struggling to take advantage of the post WWII upheaval to shake of European/US Colonialism.

Containment is remains more idealist than most would like to admit. In addition to those problems that came into the containment fold under communism we now add those we have adopted in the effort to somehow contain Islamism. Ideas cannot be contained, particularly when they are carried like a battering ram by a popular mob seeking break through the barrier of an oppressive, illegitimate government.

So, what exactly are US interests in Afghanistan? I would argue none, really, and that we are significantly over-invested, lured in by this confused concept of ideological containment. Iraq? Certainly more interests there. GWOT never justified going in, but those interests do justify staying and getting the job done right.

Korea? Well, clearly the ideological driver of communism has largely expired. What we are left with is a populace that has been contained in a virtual stone age in the midst of some of the most robust, developed economies in the world. For the military, it must be prepared for the worst case so long as we cling to our historic position there. It must be able to fight and win a major fight, and also go in as the initial lead for what is likely to be a long, hard stability operation.

Meanwhile we really need the policy types to update their work. Old solutions to old analysis are no longer good enough. Its inappropriate to the world we live in today, our current role in that world, and it exceeds our budget for such a problem when appropriately weighted by where it should be prioritized based on our national interests.

My recommendation is that we empower China as the lead on the North Korea problem (staying engaged as a major party ourselves); and offer that in exchange for them stepping up in that regard, we will back out of our literal defense of Taiwan posture for a treaty that commits them to no coercive efforts to regain control of Taiwan for some period, say 30 years. Keep the hammer of massive punitive targeting of Chinese economic infrastructure, closure to US markets, and perhaps even cancellation of US Debt if they violate that treaty.

Bottom line is we need to evolve. Everyone else is. Our interests have not changed much, but where and how they are best served has changed considerably.

Correction to above, we had a compelling need to bring both Germany and Japan, not Afghanistan into the anti-communist fold.

Find myself rushing thru these posts lately, before the site craps out on me.

MAC and SPJONeill, I think we all agree that are several variables in these complex undertakings, and we only choose to highlight a couple each time we post, while fully realizing it much more complex than are simple posts indicate.

I think another variable that may have influenced our much greater success post WWII compared to our recent adventures in OIF and OEF-A, was the Cold War, and although I don't think it offically started until 1947, our national strategy was already focused on containing communist expansion, especially the USSR. We had a compelling need to bring both Germany and Afghanistan into the anti-communist fold, and we invested a substantial effort to make it work.

Today I think we're still struggling to develop a national strategy (we have a strategy that based more on values than national interests), and I suspect if you compared the investment we made in real dollar value (1945-1950) compared to what we invested in both OIF/OEF we have signficantly underinvested in the effort today (over the long run we may spend more, but we started off relatively cheap, and suspect this is one of the reasons we didn't surge troops until 2007). We have some fuzzy goals of establishing stable, market based, democracies that will deny space for terrorists to operate in. The goals are debatable, the process we're using to achieve them is debatable, and as GEN McCrystal once said, we're operating in a culture of poverty (paraphrased, but he was refering to ISAF under investing in the effort).

Long ramble to point out one differnce may have been the clarity of our objectives based on a very real threat, so it was easier to unify the various actors and justify investing substantially to ensure it succeeded?

Going back to the 1st sentence, I realize there is a lot more to it, just offer this as one possible variable that made a difference.

"...We did not defeat and humiliate our opponent in Iraq and by doing good encouraged bad men. We totally defeated and humiliated Germany and Japan... this is why social systems change worked... blank slate so to speak... ..."

A bit simplistic...in Germany and Japan, we also did not totally gut their security forces and bureaucracy, they same way we did when we disbanded the Iraqi Army and police force and banned Ba'athists from government...post-WW2, as much of the civil infrastructure as possible was retained and provided a firm foundation on which to build. Had MacArthur ground in 'defeat and humilation' in Japan, it's unlikely it would have reconstructed as quickly or as well as it did. Ditto in Germany, although the spectre of the Russian was probably a pretty good motivator for the (West) Germans as well...

In terms of nation-building and reconstruction, we could learn a lot of 'how to' lessons from the immediate post-WW2 period, and a lot of 'how not to' lessons from the 'post-war' phase in Iraq...

MAC,

I concur with your points about the requirement to first defeat the enemy before smoothering them with carrots. We should only use carrots with our friends (with the understanding that the enemy can become our friend only if they quit being our enemy). It's really quite simple, and yet our approach is contrary to this and in my view it is clearly off track, yet we continue to promote this soft glove approach as the accepted doctrine.

In reality it is a blind faith doctrine because there is NO evidence our carrots for all approach works now, has ever worked, or ever will work. I was amused by some of the comments by wanta be experts regarding the Sri Lanka /LTTE conflict, "we'll yea they won, but they didn't do it right", so in their minds a forever war that follows our soft touch doctrine would be more humane than using an effective strategy that more quickly leads to a victory and subsequent peace (relative peace).

I think the ROK Army that participated in the Vietnam conflict was a very different army (and different ROK government) than the one that exists today. Hopefully the ROKs have a plan to minimize U.S. interference so they can do what is necessary, but I worry they may have incorporated our doctrine for phase IV activities, and that would probably be a recipe for disaster.

Wow, never turn your back on the ocean. Or the SWJ... :-)

If you all ever met my mom you would understand completely why I may seem a bit hard headed. If you ever met my dad you would appreciate the commonsense approach behind that tenacity.

And for the record (forgot to say that once, and lost a trial for failing to prove that the witness identified the defendant), I never got paid by the hour. The life of a prosecutor is one of dashing from courtroom to courtroom, and often literally being handed case files in route and grabbing witnesses (cops drawing overtime as they sleep on a bench in the hallway of the courthouse) along the way. Slap is probably upset at some DA for waking him up. DAs need a better union, Cops have a better union.

That said, I agree completely that we need to prepare the framework more effectively that we want the inevitable changes in North Korea to occur within. This links right back to my comments on policy and strategy; and getting China into more of a leadership role. The US probably presumes reunification with the South, but have we asked the South if that is what they want? Is that the best for Japan and China? My suspicion is that retaining a state of North Korea makes a lot of sense. Such an assurance may well help prevent key NK players from making a dangerously desperate move as well...

MAC, very interesting and informative comments on Germany reform efforts. I stand corrected on my previous view, and will accept my 5 yard penalty. Next play, I still think Iraq and Afghanistan are harder based on deeper social issues related to religion, segmented populace (tribal issues), and a largely uneducated populace.

Slapout, did you ever have to deal with a lawyer has hard headed as Bob? :-)

COL Maxwell, like the others have commented I think your article was well written and clear in its intent, but unfortunately think a lot of smart folks will simply agree with you, yet not a thing will change. Call me a cynic, but based on our previous history of ignoring issues until they're crises I see no compelling reason for us to change. I think the challenge is identifying how we're going to deal with worst cases without preparing. Something more than a 10 slide powerpoint brief, but not quite preparation :-).

Cole, unlike Iraq, there are real weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. Perhaps a minor problem compared to drug runners and foreign fighters, but.... I know it sounds like I'm poking you in the eye, but my intent is to point out that degrees of "toughness" are hard to measure (sort of like beauty, it is in the eyes of the beholder), but I think North Korea will be very challenging. Let's not forget you have a nation where much of the populace is only days away from starvation, so the ROKs will inherent this logistical and strategic communications nightmare in addition to everything else. This gets back to my comments on global norms, they seem to be established by the media, and countries integrated into the global economy can't readily ignore them, which means the mass starvation issue will have to be dealt with quickly, as will the WMD, and of course the continued resistance to occupation forces. All in all it will be a busy few weeks.

Great article COL Dave.

Compared to Iraq and Afghanistan, one thing favoring DPRK stability ops is lack of a sanctuary across the border because doubt the PRC would put up with it and everyone else would need to swim.:) The other fortunate things missing would be foreign fighters and Islamic extremists.

Compared to Afghanistan, the ROK would speak the same language and share the same ethnicity as the population...unlike many of the ANA in the south and Taliban in the North.

Compared to Afghanistan, there would be fewer illicit drug dealers, lumber, and gem interests, and warlords interfering with stability ops. In fact, with no income or food to speak of, anything would seem an improvement.

Compared to Iraq, there would not be three ethnicities with two being shut out by the third with a slim majority.

The DPRK troops would be happy to eat and get paid better. I do understand the argument about East and West Germany and the difficulty in getting non-capitalists to change to a market system overnight. But until the currency was changed last year, many in the DPRK had black market businesses that were generating savings...promptly lost when currency values changed.

Finally, wonder if some sort of Berlin-like arrangement could work. Emanating out from Pyongyang, if three pie sections were created with PRC troops stabilizing the north, U.S. troops the center, and ROK troops the south, and DPRK split between all three, believe the PRC would see a sufficient buffer keeping us away from their border.

The PRC would no doubt like a direct rail line with South Korea for trade. That alone would be a great incentive for a reunified Korea.

Slap,

:-) But Bob is also an SF officer. But I would not want to piss him off because I might need him to bail me out of jail -come to think of it he did bail me out of a few jams when he was the J3!! Imagine having a lawyer on an SF team - he is the get out of jail card!!!

Bob, Slap,

What I tried to get across in my paper was that we have to conduct preparation and lay all the ground work to deal with the worse case. Engage China, determine the alliance end state, conduct the influence campaign now, make the decisions on how we are going to handle the remnants of the nK security forces (even initiate a nK hands program before the crisis occurs vice 8 years after operations are initiated). I am not talking about preparing the military from a training perspective (although that is of course very important but I think our military leaders in the ROK and US can handle that). But I think we pay lip service to "shaping" and "preparation of the environment" actions and we need to do some actual preparation to mitigate the effects of collapse or post-conflict now before they occur vice just writing plans and waiting for the worse case to occur. And as I said in the paper, I hope my assumptions prove wrong and I would submit that if we do conduct effective preparation we may make some of the assumptions invalid which would not be a bad thing. But if we conduct no preparation, we are more likely to experience the worst of the effects of the worse case scenarios.

In response to Bill Ms response to my comments, I would not want to give the impression that we shouldnt learn from our current experiences (or our past experiences). Id just suggest that our understanding be more than "doctrine deep" in making better connections between what happened and why (what worked and didnt work). As we see in the discussions on SWJ, there isnt universal agreement on what exactly have been the primary drivers that have gotten us where we are in either Iraq or Afghanistan (was it our COIN efforts, was it enemy mistakes, what combination of both, etc.?). We need to keep driving at those answers if only to have better understanding of the possible cause-effect relationships at play. Id also state that the difference between irregular operations in a post-conflict Korea, as opposed to a post north government collapse Korea will be very great. The more blood that is shed on both sides will fundamentally change the dynamic.

With regards to the ROK capabilities, I find your following statement loaded with assumptions:

"Individually they're very capable, and their very capable fighters, but I think their culture and bureaucracy will hinder their ability to respond effectively to complex situations in a way that is acceptable to globally accepted norms today."

Harkening to some of Col. Gentiles arguments, are we assuming that a post-conflict, or post-collapse scenario in North Korea will be handled with an FM 3-24-like approach? Yes, the Koreans may not be able to execute as we do with a nuanced "protect the population" approach that sees its goal as a "legitimate" democratic government from the local to national level in a relatively short order--especially if the population itself is the potential adversary. I would also not assume we will have the influence we desire, nor the ability to make the ROKs adhere to "globally accepted norms" (accepted by whom?). The ROKs may choose to act in accordance with "norms" more acceptable to China in stabilizing the north and assuring the PRC that there wont be a overt conventional threat (no US military in occupation) or refugee threat from that quarter. Will north Korea be seen as an international problem or an internal Korean problem. I think the ROK will see this as an expansion of their borders. They may not be capable of executing as we would like to see them execute, but they could be more than capable to execute as they see fit and correct.

This is all supposition. However, I believe we need to focus less on simply the problem of the north Koreans and how we would like to see it addressed, and more on how the ROK approach in the north would likely occur and how we can influence it.

Slap, what do we pepare for? Arguably the U.S. army today is far more prepared (trained, organized and equipped) for post combat stability operations in North Korea than it is for the combat itself. The same was probably true in 1950.

Bill, step one is to identify the problem. Step two is raise it to a level empowered to make real changes, and to convince those leaders to prioritize it so that those changes are actually pursued. As a recent PACOM J30 was fond of saying, "we are at step 3 of a 100-step process." We might not be quite that far along on this one.

Probably the main thing for the US is to be proactive and make internal changes before external factors make those changes for us. We've all seen (or been) that guy clinging to a rope or pull-up bar, unable to advance and unwilling to retreat. At some point muscle fatigue and gravity make the decision for you. How close is the US to "strategic muscle fatigue"? I don't know. That last rep has a way of sneaking up on a guy.

Bob, I hear what you're saying, but as you very well know there are a lot of "competing interests" in this region. What you're describing is the ideal solution, but how do we get there?

MAC, I'm not convinced we facilitated a radical social change in either Germany or Japan. We were very careful in Japan to maintain much of their culture to avoid unnecessary backlash, and both Germany and Japan were industrial nations with an educated population, so compared to what we are attempting in Iraq and Afghanistan, any social/cultural change we implemented in Germany and Japan was relatively minor, we really focused more on reconstruction.

Let's not forget that Germany embraced Christian (Western) values also, and Japan's beliefs were not entirely foreign either (we had to insist they refocus their warrior values into building businesses, instead of armies, but that wasn't hard once they were defeated).

Slapout: This statement is a homerun in my view, "Preparation works in environments that are uncertain"

I suspect the main question comes down to "How do be bring North Korea in from the cold"?

Dave is quite right that we are kidding ourselves if we think the North Korean populace would greet any country or coalition that defeated their current regime militarily with open arms. That just isn't human nature.

Cold War positions of Friend vs. Foe; Axis of Evil; etc are not helpful either. Strategies of containment require foes to contain to retain their relevance, and I've seen our senior leaders work very hard in recent years to attempt to force a variety of round peg problems into the square hole of our containment strategy.

Definitely the military needs to ensure that warplans include peaceplans, as they will be stuck with the bulk of that mess if it comes to that. In the meantime, North Korea is one of many transtioning problems that highlights the need for new approaches in the realm of policy and strategy.

This is a perfect problem for China to step up to the plate on and demonstrate that they are indeed prepared to act as a major regional power; and the US should not feel lessened in any way in allowing them to do so. North Korea sits geographically between four powerful, uneasy, distrustful neighbors; and in that regard I think the sustainment of a state of North Korea may well be a good thing.

Changing the nature of the debate from one of defeating or reuniting the current North Korea to one of those four powerful neighbors working with North Korea to bring them "in from the cold" would be a positive change of direction that the US should be willing to step back and support. We can always adopt a new strategy that is less dependent on dedicated, enduring roles of friends and foes...

Phil,

No one is suggesting using OIF as a model or template, because as you correctly point out that would be wrong, but on the other hand it would be extremely foolish to ignore the lessons from OIF transition from phase III to phase IV, because they very much applicable to any collapse scenario that may unfold in North Korea, regardless of who has the lead for the effort.

Having worked with Koreans for several years, I don't agree with your assessment on ROK capabilities, but I hope you're correct. Individually they're very capable, and their very capable fighters, but I think their culture and bureaucracy will hinder their ability to respond effectively to complex situations in a way that is acceptable to globally accepted norms today. Although based on their experience in OIF, East Timor and other peace enforcement operations they may have enough experience and depth now in their ranks, of course just like us the right folks need to be in the right positions at the right time.

Hopefully we'll never have to see who is right, but I suspect that won't be the case.

This is a good article. I think it needs to be highlighted that the existence of a cohesive ROK-US alliance in the face of this challenge is itself an assumption that needs to be continuously revalidated, if we are to proceed with planning. While Dave Maxwell has set out a laudable overarching policy goal, I think the devil will be in the details. I dont think its even clear that the ROK would chose to militarily deal with a collapse scenario under the aegis of CFC, but possibly choose to remain under national lines. Is it clear that we agree recognize "liberated" north Korean territory as a part of an expanded ROK? Who gets the nK WMD capability, whosever forces secure them first?

Even if we do have general agreement, we cannot use Iraq or Afghanistan as our models. In South Korea, we are dealing with a very mature political system and military. While it might seem obvious, as our current junior leaders grow, with OIF and OEF hardwired into their consciousness, we must be cognizant that in this case, we will clearly not be "in the lead." The ROK will likely drive political and military decisions, from the highest levels to the local level.

While dated, its interesting to read the official Korean history of the 1950-53 war (The Korean War vol I-III, Korea Institute of Military History) . We couch the decisions to move north after the capture of Seoul in terms of MacArthur and Truman. The Koreans are clear that ROK units moved over the parallel prior to, and without any UN/US sanction. The ROK also had their own nascent occupation plan, with local leaders from southern municipalities assigned to "sister cities" in the north to provide a transitional government.

Once again, this isnt 1953, however, the ROK is a strong country with its own capabilities and, more importantly, own interests. It will require assistance, but I dont think itll take direction easily, especially in the political sphere (which will drive the military operations). So I agree with Dave on the irregular nature of the threats and challenges, but we must add that our "coalition" and "host nation" dynamic will be significantly different than what we have been used to dealing with over the last decade.

The comment in the QDR that the current focus is to win the wars we're fighting today is both logical and also extremely dangerous in my view if taken to the extreme. We simply can't afford to ignore the rest of the world while we're engaged in fights in Afghanistan and the lingering effort in Iraq that could last for years. History will not going to wait on us to move forward.

This view reminds me of our policy prior to 9/11 when we wanted our forces to be prepared to fight two simultaneous major theater wars, but after a while some defense analysts claimed we didn't have enough forces to do this, so the policy to evolved into hold the line in one MTW, and focus on winning the other MTW, and then after that fight was won, we would shift our effort to the remaining MTW and be done with it all. This seemed possible to many based on our "quick" victories in DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE, but our more recent fights have reminded us that those types of wars are the exception and not the norm.

Irregular warfare is a reality in the conflict spectrum that can be conducted prior, concurrent with, and post conventional confict, and it can drag on for years. Just as importantly it may require more forces to execute than conventional war, since our advances in lethal technology in theory will give us a staggering advantage against most projected foes (to include the North Koreans) in any conventional fight. As we all know now, that technology edge while definitely helpful will not be decisive in the irregular fight. The IW JOC identifies what capabilities we need to be prepared to "effectively" conduct IW, and again in my opinion we haven't got there yet.

We obviously don't want another Iraq where we managed to pull defeat from the jaws of victory because we weren't prepared for what followed phase III. As COL Maxwell has suggested, we need to move beyond the planning/talking and really prepare for worst case scenarios in North Korea. It is almost guarunteed we'll destroy their Army if we have a conventional war, but what happens next? How much time will we have to get right before the problem becomes intractable? Are we really ready?

If we allow the post collapse, post conflict situation situation in north Korea to escalate into an intractable situation because we failed to respond skillfully with adequate forces that are appropriately resourced, then we will have failed our country and further degraded our credibility. Do we have lessons learned, or just lessons from OIF?

Final point on this post, we should not plan on rushing in and spreading democracy to a people who will not be able to even remotely comprehend what that means. They'll need the reassurance of a strong government structure that they can comprehend. The ROKs will need to come in strong, yet benevelently to provide stability and order, and then gradually over time help them evolve into a modern society that can integrate into ROK society. We'll have to keep our idealists at bay for a few months in order to be effective, which ultimately is more humane despite the spin the media that will paint another story.

To do this effectively will require that the ROKs and their partners to make a serious investment now that goes beyond planning, to picking the right people to lead the effort and appropriately training and educating them, and identifying how to resource the effort. The window of opportunity to establish initial success if relatively narrow. There are no guaruntees that this will work, but chaos is almost guarunteed to result if we don't do something along these lines.