(2) | " (9) | ' (2) | 1 (1) | 3 (1) | 8 (1) | 9 (1) | A (202) | B (75) | C (137) | D (77) | E (34) | F (56) | G (33) | H (39) | I (114) | J (8) | K (8) | L (34) | M (67) | N (24) | O (41) | P (71) | Q (2) | R (64) | S (110) | T (382) | U (35) | V (15) | W (89) | Y (7) | Z (1) | ¿ (2) | (1) | (4)
The authors propose implementing F3EAD methodology, which has met with success in the SOF community, across the force.
Over the past year, the vitality of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s insurgency has waxed and waned but the group has still managed to define Pakistan’s security landscape.
Developed to streamline and expedite the orders process, the CONOP has forced leaders to expend time, effort and energy to push the CONOP through the approval process from the lowest to the highest...
The perhaps-unsurprising second- and third-order effects of VSO and ALP.
Fear and Loathing in Waziristan Al Qaeda Propaganda by Major Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article) The purpose of this paper is to discuss the myth that...
Fighting a Small War during The Great War British Strategic Planning and Operations in Central Asia, 1917-1919 by Frederick Dotolo, PhD Download interim version of article as PDF
Fighting Fire with Fire: Texas Rangers and Counterinsurgency in the 1847 Mexico City Campaign
Fighting for a Narrative: A Campaign Assessment of the US-led Coalition's Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan by Oleg Svet Download the Full Article: Fighting for a Narrative...
The insurgents have adapted in their ability to deny space to the adversary; rather than settling to eat soup with a knife they attempt to recast the knife as a spoon.
“Narco Cultura,” a documentary by Israeli photojournalist Saul Schwarz, is billed on as “an explosive look at Mexican drug cartels’ cultural influence on both sides of the...
This article proposes a positive vision for how disruptive junior officers and established senior officers should advance the discussion about improving their services.
What is operational art? An example from the Normandy breakout in WWII.
Population-centric COIN should only mean you understand the people—not that you necessarily do anything for them.
Finding Strategic Balance: How Should the USAF Balance Continuing Irregular Requirements with High-end A2/AD Requirements?
The types of information needed by the military to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan shares little in common with intelligence used for lethal targeting.
In the first of a three part series, Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado Almada describes organized crime in Mexico and lays a basis for his "five Ps" proposal to reduce violence...
Guillermo Almada offers the second in his three-part series on reducing violence in Mexico.
Guillermo Almada offers part three of his series on how to reduce violence in Mexico.
Five very intricate questions as to how we should look at the challenges at hand.
As a law enforcement officer with over 20 years of experience, I led many Community Policing efforts and observed firsthand the impact of bringing order to crime riddled neighborhoods.
The uniformed analytic community largely lacks institutional expertise and struggles to provide commanders with meaningful intelligence products.
Fixing Intelligence... Again by Matthew Collins Download the full article: Fixing Intelligence... Again Winter was a cruel season for the US Intelligence Community. The Christmas bomb plot and...
Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy? by Sergeant First Class Morgan Sheeran, Small Wars Journal Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy? (Full PDF Article) The United States and her allies are in trouble...
Will Flynn exercise some disruptive thinking at DIA?
Complex operations require complex mental models.
The lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem
A Civilian's Comprehensive Critique of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual...In 5-6 Pages by Braden Civins Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique The U.S. Army...
In his review of the updated FM 3-24, Bing West has some harsh words about the manual’s academic tint,  Charles J. Dunlap is also unimpressed.
Danish philosopher Kierkegaard noted almost 200 years ago, “There are only two ways to be fooled.  One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true...
Force Structure for Small Wars by Andrew C. Pavord, Small Wars Journal Download interim version of article as PDF Since 9/11 the armed forces of the United States have paid a steep price to acquire...
Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models by Clinton Watts, Small Wars Journal Download interim version of article as PDF Currently, debate focuses on two...
Examing small wars in Indonesia, East Timor, Sudan, and Kenya to see what lessons apply to Afghanistan
A Foucauldian approach to military history exposes 4GW as a crock.
The U.S. Department of Defense and supporting intellectual communities are abuzz with discussions about assessment and how it is conducted.
Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq by Norman Ricklefs, Small Wars Journal Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq (Full PDF Article) These thoughts were initially penned on my way to RnR, while stuck at...
Despite the media hype, the Druze and Alawi communities are not likely to seek rule of minority cantons in the south or west of the country, while the Kurds are likely to retain de facto control...