by Vegetius
I Can't Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)
"The greatest threat to the Afghan government is the Afghan government." This was the conclusion of a report on the Taliban compiled in the 2005 by the Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) for the Department of Defense. The report further went on to say that the Taliban are the slow learners of the Islamic fundamentalist world. The report predicted that, if the Karzai government did not reform itself, and if the Taliban ever became a learning organization, the Afghan portion of the Global War on Terror could get very ugly indeed. It is 2009; the Karzai government has not reformed, but the Taliban have. We should not be losing this war, but it now appears that we are losing. One is reminded of John Lovett's Michael Dukakis character in a Saturday Night Live sketch during the 1988 presidential election. The faux Dukakis listens to an inarticulate pronouncement by Dana Carvey's faux George H.W. Bush, and exclaims, "I can't believe that I'm losing to this guy." That is a fair analogy about where we are in Afghanistan today.
This war is not lost, but we need to make some major changes if we are to turn it around. This was the clear message sent to President Obama by his commander in Afghanistan in August and leaked by The Washington Post on September 21st. General McChrystal was making a clear case for more troops in his report, but lost in the uproar was a strong statement that the Karzai government will have to mend its ways. All the king's horses and men will not help in Afghanistan if the Taliban are allowed portray their equally flawed governance approach as a viable alternative to the increasingly corrupt kleptocracy that the Karzai government has become.
As this is being written, there are reportedly several options on the table as alternatives to General McChrystal's recommended approach of sending more troops and fully employing the counterinsurgency doctrine that worked in Iraq (FM 23-4, Counterinsurgency). Some of these proposed alternatives are good supporting tools, but they won't work by themselves. McChrystal is right; there will not be an easy way to end this war. If the war is worth fighting, which the President said it was during the 2008 campaign, it is worth fighting properly. This piece suggests some specifics for turning it around in the manner that McChrystal suggests.
I Can't Believe We Are Losing To These Guys (Full PDF Article)
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JT, I appreciate your comments. I find this article a very interesting read about reducing the corruption in the Karzai led government of Afghanistan.
My thoughts after spending some time in the region and learning about & attempting to gain some understanding of the people, I realize that many of us view the world through our western sunglasses.
In an ideal world we do not accept any corruption. We do not live in an ideal world, nor will we. Look at our own system of democracy. We must take a step back and realize that some of our local governments are running/thriving and they have corruption within them as well...Chicago, IL and some parts of Louisiana to name one or two. While I believe this author has some valid points in providing Afghan officials with some form of advisory teams/governance training, I do believe we should not presume to be so arrogant that we know what is best or the only solution for the people of Afghanistan.
One last statement: We will most likely be in Afghanistan, if we want them to succeed for many years to come.
Many good points, thank you Vegetius.
Elric has it right: in counter-insurgency, we MUST start from the local level and work to the provincial and, finally, the national level. Insurgencies, like politics, are LOCAL. As the article and several comments state, we could and should be doing a much better job learning the culture and politics of each particular AO and then figuring out what it will take to swing them to our side. While it will look different from area to area, the first, basic, common-denominator will be security. The Locals, whomever they be, will not even think about siding with us unless and until we show them that we can provide protection against the Taliban thugs. The Marines in Anbar and now in Helmand are showing that they get this; they know how to work with the locals and build local security.
So, rather than waste more on the central government, let the Karzais and the rest of the kleptocracy keep their titles and office space while we direct the real money where it will do the most good: into the hands of local Marine and Army commanders who can use this discetionary fund like they did in Iraq to win friends, influence people and show the LOCALS that there is far more to be gained on the U.S. side than the Taliban. Incentives work.
But it will take more troops on the ground.
Nor should we be shy about building local and largely autonomous governments that work for the LOCALS. Afghans are largely self-sufficient people and if the people have jobs, education and decent health and irrigation, that is enough. Tim Lynch over at Free Range International blog has shown that the LOCALS will provide the security against Taliban attacks when they are behind the project and it is clearly benefitting the community. There is no need at this point to worry about the national government. Let it travel to the UN and make speeches and think it is important but, for God's sake, keep it AWAY from the LOCALS and away from any, real money.
If you want to understand why our high-tech, risk -avoidance tactics do not work, then a good place to start is the articles in the Asia Times by Syed Saleem Shahzad. A good example might be "How the Taliban keep their coffers full." Why is it so hard for the powers to be to understand that it is humans not hardware that will ultimately win or lose in asymetrical warfare??? Culture and religion are huge factors that we have not used effectively.....
I agree that clarification of the "role of the central gov't vis a vis the provinces" needs to happen. Comparing Malaysia and Iraq/Afghanistan, the British were able to leave Malaysia AFTER the population was secured AND the population had decided on a form of government.
We seem to have missed an opportunity to develop public support by ramming a central government onto Iraq/Afghanistan, instead of building Provincial governments first.
Omar -
Karzai is stuck, where he is, because the US Government has funded the crooks, criminals, warlords and drug dealers, while underfunding his government.
In other words, Karzai is weak, because the CIA and other government agencies (and NGOs as well) have both made and kept him that way.
It is hypocrisy to now blame what he is forced to do and be on him, or the Afghans. It's our monster, and we can either fix it, or just scapegoat the Karzai government for it.
The current political environment has made scapegoating apparently in fashion.
I very much enjoy Small Wars Journal-- but sometimes the articles are in need of an additional round of edits. Very often I find minor typos, occasionally I find grammar errors (tense shift or similar, usually a remnant of a previous draft), and today I found this:
<i>Reform in the Provinces. As a start, the top levels of the governments of the five worst governed provinces in <b>Iraq</b> should be replaced. Again, this should be our call, not <b>Karzais</b>.</i>
SWJ is an excellent forum. The ideas you discuss are crucial. Your readers depend on you for solid information. Although typos and other errors do not necessarily devalue the information that you provide, they arent professional. SWJ isnt Craigslist, and your editing should reflect that.
Spot on about the need to reform the Karzai govt ASAP. I dont mean convert it into some miraculous modern state, just fix obvious problems that everyone agrees need to be fixed. what sovereign state? Karzai would probably be hiding from the DEA in Dubai if it wasnt for the US embassy. This appearance of drift and inability to impose needed reform is approaching criminal negligence. The point is not to organize some kind of coup. Its to do whatever intelligent things need to be done without acting all paralyzed and helpless. This appearance of drift and paralysis is a serious problem (no matter what is going on behind the scenes; and i guess much more IS going on behind the scenes)..
Thank you Laconia, I've corrected the essay. Bill is right; we don't like typos and blips either. I guess we'll stop the 3 AM before the day job and late night after the day job and anything we can squeeze in on our lunch breaks editing and posting and go to a once a year mega-edition of the SWJ. Besides, we need some time to spend all the bucks we are raking in here anyway. - Dave
Yes to more troops; yes to more diplomats; no to more technology; no to a US solution.
Afghans love a winner too. Lets give the Afghans something that they can identify as a winner! What we saddled them with as a result of the Bonn Loya Jirgas is the real problem. Our efforts in Afghanistan to this point are akin to building a house on sandy ground that is below the highwater mark for the nearby river. Why would anybody do such a thing?
In combination with more troops, we need an Afghan solution...which means revisiting the Bonn process and hammering out a realistic constitution that defines the role of the central gov't vis a vis the provinces and Islam's role within government. The current constitution doesn't define these two 'minor' aspects of Afghan life. Conduct a Loya Jirga and let the Afghans come to grips with these questions.
If the US follows the authors suggestion and becomes the defacto gov't, then we own the Afghan gov't and stand accountable for every misdeed to both the Afghan people as well as the international community. We need to put the spoon back in that grenade and drop and choke ourselves for even considering such a step.
More technology - the US tax payers are getting raped by gov't contractors. There is no magical technological solution - embrace it. Yes, technology can be helpful but nothing beats a thinking soldier or marine on the ground. I believe the return on investment for a lot of the 'good ideas' out of the defense industrial complex is just not there and we are teetering ever so close to making Eisenhower's warning about this entity a reality.
Finally, I am for the involuntary retiring government civilians who refuse to carry out their duties to achieve our national objectives! These non-supporters need to be sifted out and replaced with people who are willing and able. If need be, give them large monetary incentives to deploy...but lets put some capable people against our problems!