Does The United States Still Need USSOCOM? (Updated)
Does The United States Still Need a U.S. Special Operations Command?
How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?
by Yasotay
Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?
The establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 with the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1987 was designed to fix the problems with Special Operations that were brought to light after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980. Congress did what the military establishment would not. This legislation provided unity of command and control for Special Operations Forces and elevated Special Operations to a near peer with the Services giving it “service-like” responsibilities as well as a little used Combatant Command authority.
However, in 2009, perhaps it is time for Congress to review their handiwork. Of course many outside the military establishment are enamored with the myth and romanticism of Special Operations. There are so many “groupies” among staffers and in academia that it is hard to see Special Operations for what it really is and what it has become. And within the military, Special Operations has been “hijacked” by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul — Special Forces – has lost its way. There are so many in and out of the military who claim ties to Special Operations that it is unlikely that there will ever be a critical look at USSOCOM and what it has become.
There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces, including from across the spectrum: the hyper-conventional Special Mission Units including the Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, as well the SEALs, the Air Commandos, the MARSOC Marines and the intellectual, indirect approach experts in Special Forces such as Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have made tremendous contributions to the United States’ fight against terrorists and insurgents. However, it is important to note that they have done this working for the Combatant Commanders (formerly regional Commander in Chiefs) and Ambassadors and not under USSOCOM.
So let’s take a broad look at USSOCOM and specifically focus on its headquarters and what it has done for our nation since 9-11 and what it has become. Congress might want to delve into some of these issues and ask some hard questions.
Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?
Yasotay was a Mongol Warlord and fierce fighter who marauded all over Asia aggressively vanquishing any foe by any means. The author is a patriotic American who has been associated with Special Operations in Tampa for more than 20 years. The views he expresses are as a frequent observer of SOF and they are a distillation as a result of numerous conversations with SOF operators at all levels.
Update:
Abolish SOCOM – Herschel Smith, The Captain’s Journal
Does The United States Still Need a USSOCOM? – Professional Soldiers discussion forum
Well…
Since I am a Marine and have been nominated for a Joint Tour at USSOCOM, I now feel like I am walking into oblivion…
Ken—your comments concerning both sides of the fence are highly correct—even today at the NTC they still cannot get the two to interact in a fair fashion and see how they can both contribute to a success instead it is constantly who can get the credit at the next briefing.
I do not know how many times a SF CWO MI OB type would troll through my interrogation shop in Iraq asking for anything new but when we asked back for their side of the story-stone silence.
When there was conflicting intel on the same subject and we asked for further clarity just to deconflict-stone silence.
But if they were targeting something then it was like we need everything from you all and we need it now–in Diyala they tended in 2005 to focus on Baathists as it was as they quoted like “fishing in a barrel”, but when we indicated we were onto a Salafi insurgent group and could use some support–stone silence.
Catching Baathists made the kill or capture charts look great.
Argh. That was me, Outlaw 7.
Sheesh…
Ken—the 1969 event was not a really dumb action as it was in reaction to the loss of a number of MACVSOG teams and a major security breach by the triple agent.
What was typically dumb was then Titel 50s response to SF on how to handle the situation.
Titel 50 is still making those same mistakes with triple agents ie Afghanistan. Do they ever learn?
You can see still the issues between big Army and SF for example at the NTC where during say a BCT rotation the BCT will often take targets away from SF and vice versa or the simple fact that the CJSOTF is not co-located near the BCT to foster a better flow/exchange of information.
Outlaw 7:
Actually, it wasn’t SOG but some GAMMA teams that were being hit. I have no qualms about what was done but it was dumb to try to cover it up and not tell Abrams and the MACV Staff (they were far more at faulty in this than was Abrams; his mistake was in trusting his staff). The CIA bears considerable responsibility in all that; they wrongly convinced Rheault to stick with cover story even though non-SF MI types were deeply involved in the fiasco and the MACV IG (A former SF Master Parachutist who’d been on White Star) knew the whole story. As usual, lies ruled, some good people got burnt, an entire community got tarred — and the Agency skated…
Recall though, that the “anti-SOF” Abrams was the guy who stood up the Ranger Battalions and pushed the reorganization of the Groups in the mid 70s. He also encouraged SWC to get back to the UW roots.
All Tankers tend to be opposed to parachutes and anything special. That’s been commom knowledge since WW I. MacArthur refused to allow OSS in his theater. Abrams big gripe was that he was in charge but 5th Gp and SOG were doing things he was not aware of — Unity of Command is the problem…
So did Schwarzkopf, initially, try to refuse JSOC in Desert Storm yet he was Airborne, a Master jumper and had worked as a VN Abn Bde advisor and in MCV J-33. Unity of Command.
Look at Afghanistan. Big issue? Unity of Command…
Working with the boys from Langley is high speed and low drag — it also annoys the hell out of Army and DoD leadership because they know that if there’s a flap, the Agency will slide due to the way our laws are worded and DoD or the Army will pick up the tab for the blame.
Some SF/SOF folks are convinced they’re god’s gift to warfighting yet a lot of SPCs in the 82d have more combat experience today than do a good many SF/SOF folks. The point there is the attitude that they are the only professionals does not sit well with the rest of the Army that has to plug away for months on end instead of doing the short, sharp high profile quickies. Nor should it. As an old German Oberst once told a SMU guy, “I think that your Special Forces are not so special…” Been there, done that and I think he was quite correct.
A lot of folks really believe all that Airborne, SF and Ranger BS — that foolishness will get you killed (See Tillman, P.).
This disconnect is long term and it isn’t going away and both sides are at fault
I see examples of the disconnect every day. As someone who’s been on both sides of that fence several times, I thought it was really dumb in 1951, even more dumb in 1961 — and it has gotten no better.
Parochialism is counterproductive and terribly stupid. A lot of folks on both sides just need to grow up…
It should be noted that when SOCOM was founded and the first SOCOM Cmdr was appointed who had been SF from the bottom of his career to his appointment—there was a certain amount of pride that occured throughout the entire SF system as it had taken a major hit in 1969 due to the triple agent affair and had struggled to survive the 70s and 80s via DA.
The first SOCOM Cmdr spend a large amount of his initial time gaining funding and attempting to get equipment approved and purchased which would not have occurred without SOCOM being founded. Funding under his Command became unstuck inside big Army and fundings started flowing in previously unseen amounts.
I was privy to a very heated discussion between the G2 of the Army and the first SOCOM Cmdr over the use of SOTA teams where SOCOM spelled out to the G2 side of the Army that MI personnel had to be tabbed in his Command-this was continued proof concerning the “strained” relationship between SF and big Army MI from the 1969 event and this was in the mid 80s.
In some aspects the Ranger side of the SOF world was being more favored than SF in the 80s as big Army has always been more comfortable with Ranger style SOF than the SF form of operations. This thinking is still happening in the age old internal debate of tank on tank vs. UW/FID as regular Army would love to get back to tank on tank which is why the son of the former Cmdr of MACV Gen Abrams has been reassigned from the CAC to the NTC.
This I believe inherently goes back to the dislike of SF by the senior leadership of big Army starting in 1969 with General Abrams and still I feel continues until today as a number of BCTs in Iraq had problems working with ODAs in their AOR during the period 2005 through 2007.
Yasotay is the name of a Soviet Spetsnaz Major who is a major character in Stephen Hunter’s 1989 novel The Day Before Midnight. Maj. Yasotay ends up fighting both conventional and special U.S. forces in his bid to take over a U.S. missle silo.
It is likely that the author of the USSOCOM piece chose the name Yasotay for the same reasons Mr. Hunter chose it for his character back in 1989.
USSOCOM was established to get JSOC trained, resourced and on target. It was not set up for Unconventional Warfare. USSOCOM/JSOC came about to counter Mid-east terrorist organization in the 1970’s. Since then our organization have grown and spent alot of money. Those Mid-east terrorist organizations have been elected to power in certain countries. Who has understood the LONG FIGHT better? A Special Operation and Unconventional Warfare operation are two different things Black helicopters and ropes does not make the mission a UW mission.
NOMAN, while I can see why you may “feel” that way, those are not the facts. The USSOCOM was the idea of our civilian leadership in Congress who could plainly see what DOD could not, and that was DOD was underinvesting in capability and capacity to respond to a growing demand for what was then called low intensity warfare (now IW).
Terrorism was only part of the LIC problem, as there were also numerous communist sponsored insurgencies, the drug war and other other problem sets where SOF skills were in high demand. Correctly in my opinion the immediate focus (not the only focus) was fixing our ability to execute a successful OPERATION EAGLE CLAW like mission. However, that doesn’t mean the rest of SOF was not invested in. You can argue that the money was invested may not be in synch with the mission demand, but it is incorrect to say that SF and other SOF organizations didn’t receive significant benefit from the formation of SOF. From an Army perspective, I can tell you SF was grossly underfunded by the Army, and “probably” would have remained that way if not for SOCOM. Bill
Just a comment from a former SF VN veteran and someone who came back into the 10th SFGA CBTI during the creation of SOCOM;
1. SF was always up to about the period where big Army tried to disband them both white and black SF ie the CIDG program/MIKE force programs vs say the Roadrunner, Omega, Delta, and MACVSOG. It should be noted that even during Vietnam SF was grossly undermanned as it is today-nothing has changed there.
2. SF was deeply black together with Title 50 (from 1952 through 1974) ie the King of Jordan mission in Sept 70 where half the group had never worn the tab but were wearing the beret so there is a history of working nicely with Title 50 except for the incident in 1969 concerning the killing of a triple agent where Title 50 let SF hang in the wind.
3. SF Det Europe (Bad Toelz) and Det A had up through 1973 a very long track record in UW and the training of many of the NATO units in UW. We could teach UW and conduct UW in our sleep. It should be noted that on both my teams one in BT and one on Berlin 80-90% of the teams were original members from the period 1952-1957. And several had been White Star members.
4. Part of the internal debate inside SF up to about 2008 was that of DA vs FID/UW because it was DA that kept SF alive and is definitely more glamourous that the daily grind of FID/UW.
5. It should be noted that there has always been tension between SF and Joint even during Vietnam–not sure how one changes that tension.
What I see happening from the view where I am currently is that most of the SOF community is fighting for their own history and dollars and doing FID/UW is easy to sell to the higher Commands, even MARSOC had to stand down and retrain after their “problems” in Afghanistan.
SOCOM and SF itself needs to “sell FID/UW” as their core expertise and only they can conduct that core expertise—get back to the CIDG/MIKE Force concepts and SF will never be threatened with disbandment.
Outlaw 7:
Actually, GEN Lindsey spent a great deal more time in the 82d than he did in SF. He spent only a little time in the 77th.
It is also noteworthy that Shy Meyer, another big Army guy, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army did more for SF and for what became JSOC than did many so called SOF Flag Officers — and that was before USASOCOM was activated. It should also be recalled that the big nay sayer to SOCOM was not the Army but the CJCS at the time — an Admiral. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, Barbwire Bob Kingston and Dick Scholtes were able to sway Congress…
You are correct in stating the 1969 affair had a very adverse impact on SF. it was also a really dumb action.
Regardless, today, there are significant parochialism faults on both sides of the divide and those who participate in that divisiveness aren’t helping anyone.
Some senior SOCOM leaders have made terrible decisions that were service parochical (getting rid of the MH53s), short sighted, and damaging to the force. They have thrown SOF investment out of balance, and it is true that SF is under resourced on the battlefield, which is inexcusable this long into the war. Congress provided ample funding, but they didn’t provide sufficient oversight to ensure it was invested correctly. We all know it easy to wow a crowd of Congressional aides who know nothing about the military with a sexy show of consisting of fast rope and fancy shooting. Just like the G.I. Joe video games, but it is real. Hard to make real SF work look sexy, so they’re not going to win anything bikini contests, but if they could just get a serious date it would be clear they’re actually very sexy in their own way.
Despite the frustration with some leaders in SOCOM, the flaws of a few do not erase the goodness that SOCOM has brought to the SOF community over the years, nor the potential of what SOCOM could bring. Getting rid of SOCOM is the wrong answer.
While SF provides a fantastic capability for our nation, and it isn’t simply their ability to conduct UW, but rather their ability to live and work “effectively” with indigenous personnel, regardless if the mission is security cooperation, UW, FID, COIN, peacekeeping, etc. Their focus on deploying small, capable teams that combine the skills of teacher, warrior and diplomat creates a very effective tool for any GCC Commander.
However, SF leadership also needs to become a team player withing the SOF and larger joint community as a whole. When they’re admiring themselves in the mirror, they need to look to the right and left and notice their other SOF brothers who also provide capabilities that are just as critical as SF to the warfighting commanders. All these capabilities were developed because they were needed, and they all cost money to develop and sustain, and history has demonstrated that the services will not provide that funding, so yes we need SOCOM. Just because you’re mad at Mom, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t love her.
As this article made its rounds around the cubicles of USASOC I happened to be visiting during one of the discussions it created. As the discussion began I quickly perused the main points and then gave my .02:
– Regardless of the possible accuracy of any of its points the article will do little outside of SF to endear anyone towards its arguments. Which is too bad because some of the points had merit.
– Where it disappointed me the most was where it mentioned the SMU commander getting command of CFSOCC-A and depriving an SF officer of a command. Since the article pointed out the problems associated with being politically correct in making sure all branches got their fair share of benefits- turning around and complaining about a command benefit that should be reserved for the branch with the preponderance of force seemed a little conflicting.
– An alternative solution to killing SOCOM- at least to solve some of the article’s identified problems- would be to establish a higher-degree-producing center at either SWC and/or JSOU in order to educate SOF officers, warrants, and NCOs at the senior level in how to command, control, and employ SOF at the SOTF, CJSOTF, and CFSOCC/TSOC levels.
This would give the SOF community a cadre of highly-educated soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines that would be able to employ SOF from all branches. Today we resort to arguing that a command with one predominating force should be commanded by a commander from that force. Unfortunately this does not guarantee that all SOF in that entity will be employed effectively- it only means that most of the forces will be (assuming the force mix doesn’t change).
It is true that SF and UW are misunderstood by many at SOCOM and outside of SF. But, in my opinion, we will not solve this problem by demanding SOCOM reward SF officers with more commands and become more UW friendly.
Instead, SF should do what they are known for: infiltrating, building rapport, and making SOCOM safe for other snake eaters and- more importantly- “snake-eater ideas”. We will only win the intellectual battle if we co-opt the other services to think like us. If our goal is simply more commanders wearing green berets then we will probably be disappointed: I doubt the entrenched powers will give up control anytime soon.
Of course, first we need to start speaking “joint” better instead of only 5.56 and 7.62…
Well, this one is sure to stir up a firestorm. There is much to quibble about in this piece but I would have to start by reminding the author that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are not “in” Special Forces. The active duty CA and PSYOP are part of Special Operations Forces.
As a former 7th SFG(A) officer who has been away from group for several years, I find it interesting to talk to my contemporaries who, upon returning to group, find that SF has indeed “lost its way.” I’m not sure who is to blame, but it seems as if Army SF is focused on DA at the expense of UW. After 9/11, Army SF filled a void that General Purpose Forces (GPF) could not regarding DA missions. However, now, 8 years later, the GPF have developed the capability to do all but the most complicated DA missions. Therefore, it is time for SF to do what SF was created to do; conduct missions that the GPF cannot. We need to refocus on the hard stuff, read UW, before we lose our institutional knowledge. Great article on some of the hard questions Army SF and the Special Operations community in general needs to address.
All for this. Good stuff. I am especially concerned about the lack of rigour and knowledge that the civilian staffers and academics bring to the party. We need some folks to stop “cuddling the snake eaters” and actually do the job they are paid to do, which is ask the tough questions.
“Does The United States Still Need a U.S. Special Operations Command?
How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?”
One could fairly ask the same questions about all of the Services as well. But the fact is, that the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, like USSOCOM, are all force provider headquarters, and not warfighting headquarters.
After being waist deep in QDR this past year (usually standing on my head per the old joke), my assessment was that actually it looks like SOCOM is going to continue to evolve to become much more “service-like” and that to the converse, that the Services were likely to become much less omnipotent. Time will tell.
SOCOM has plenty of faults, and it has had its fair share of action officers who perhaps sometimes get confused as to their role in the world. It happens. But who will keep the services from tearing apart the tremendous SOF capability that we have built over the past 22 years that SOCOM has existed?
SOCOM, for those not fully aware, has two missions: Force provider for SOF; and to serve as a global synchronizer for GWOT related activities. That’s it. Absolultely ZERO warfighting responsibility rests within its ever expanding walls.
So, if one thinks that SOF is being employed ineffectively for the GWOT, or that SF has been some how hijacked or kidnapped, I suggest you walk down the road from USSOCOM a couple blocks and knock on the door at USCENTCOM. After all, they are the warfighting headquarters.
Yasotay,
You are a bitter man. Probably an SF tabbed 0-5 that got passed over then became a contractor and not doing so well. Never made it through ranger school did you…
You are crying mostly because you think the SF teams are being shut down by SEALs and Rangers(McChrystal, Olson) You really are mixing up a few things about what the HQ does and what the TSOCs do. SF is choosing its own path as well as the other COCOMs. You must not have deployed in a while either or you would know half of what you say is dribble.
I for one will go to the gates of fire with Olson or McChrystal and many others, they are leaders and they are unmatched.
We are not perfect, we make some mistakes and learn from these mistakes and drive on.
They will move away from DA into IW/UW, read the book “Bear went over the mountain”. DA is what works in this area of the world until the the right time then you can move into UW/IW and asymetric warfare.
You really need to gather some facts, mud throwing, cheap thrill BS your spouting doesn’t help anyone except the enemy.
-caveman
Caveman—-Wow! It seems that Yaostay is not the only bitter guy on this thread! Regardless, the inter-SOF squabble that seems to be developing here is in no one’s best interests—all too often, we in the community eat our own.
True, SOCOM does have its issues. I am particularly concerned about the increasingly bureaucratic, top-heavy nature of the command, and the byzantine, convoluted procurement process for individual kit (at least that’s how it appears for theater SOF). However, SOCOM does provide 4-star top cover for the teams vis-a-vis big Army—-who I believe would dismantle ARSOF in a heartbeat if given the chance.
As for SF “losing its way”, I respectfully disagree. Anyone currently in the mix knows that ODAs are doing what we pay them to do—-that is, building host nation capability while simultaneously dismantling terrorist/insurgent networks through precision, intelligence-driven operations.
De Oppresso Liber,
RT
What I think the article and some of the discussions both on Small Wars Journal and a few other blogs illustrate is that we still do not understand the nature of Special Operations and Special Operations Forces very well throughout even our own military and in the interagency and obviously not in the public (e.g, how they should be employed and by whom). There is more emotionalism involved in discussions of Special Operations than there are facts. Title 10 USC does not really explain Special Operations – just lists the activities and some command and organizational guidance. We have a lot of doctrine and a lot has been written but perhaps we need to look hard at how to educate people about SOF.
Again, I really think that the article and discussions demonstrate we still need more education throughout our PME institutions and other venues to provide better understanding of the nature of SOF and how, when, where, and by whom it should be employed (even though all that can be found in doctrine!!). And of course what is required for all military forces (and all elements of national power) is a sound National Strategy (writ large, not SOF specific) and a good campaign plan in order to employ and apply the right forces for the right missions (apologies for continuing to beat that dead horse)
Maxwell is right. Most people are talking out their 4th point of contact when it comes to to SOF – and that includes even many SOF people.
Another argument for increased engagement by Major Jim Gregory at EUCOMversations.
As the Special Operations Command Europe Public Affairs Officer, I often consider the value of communicating about what we do within the world of special operations. Sure, many of the missions assigned to SOF are secret. In fact, even the mention of specific personnel or units assigned within the community can be considered sensitive. Still, I believe it is important to communicate our value to the public. Doing so informs those who pay our bills (our taxpayers) and those who make key decisions (our government leadership) about where that money goes.
The rationales are generally the same whether were talking about SOF or conventional forces. Beyond the U.S borders, where I currently reside, its important to convey how and why we are building international military partnerships and working with our many allies to build and maintain global stability and security. Effective communication also informs our enemies that we are prepared to defeat them in any environment. Within my community, evidence of a lack of communication exists in the form of two recent blogs: Does the United States Still Need USSOCOM?, which appeared in the blogsite Small Wars Journal just this week and another post on a separate site that was influenced by the SWJ post, entitled Abolish SOCOM. Although I dont agree with the authors assessments, I am confident that some senior decision makers read those two posts… and were influenced by them…
” SOCOM? Yes we need them. The consequences would be severe without the 4 Star weight. We must not forget why it was created and how important it has become globally. Each service benefits from having the political and international influence of a relatively small organization and would suffer to the hands of non-SOF if it did not exist. Look at it from a money perspective, can a service afford to have its SOF organizations and afford the ongoing growth? Some would believe that the extra money that would exist if not for SOCOM existence would be divided equally among the services and that would solve the finance issue. Do we truly believe that the services will see SOF as equal? There is still a divide among SOF and conventional forces and without a heavy hitter like the USSOCOM CDR we would lose the fight against conventional wisdom. I agree there are issues that need to be addressed within SOCOM and I firmly believe that Green Berets need more influence in that HQ and we are working on that piece. The SOF Generals are capable of working out the issues and it is up to everyone else to keep the faith. Emotions run high on this topic but if we all study the roles of each SOF element and hold their feet to fire on their duties and responsibilities then we will begin to understand one another. Green Berets go to school for a long time in order to understand UW and it takes years to truly understand the entire spectrum. No other service is educated like a Green Beret to conduct UW. Green Berets want to do that mission but we also enjoy all of the other “stuff” we do. UW is the number reason why we were created and it will always be a necessity to have as we move forward in our country’s future. I can only speak from a Green Beret perspective and that is not a great thing in my own eyes. I challenge us all to learn about SOF elements and understand their key roles and functions and apply them to the fight appropriately and stop thinking we all can do everyone elses job that we are not trained for. I guess the heart of this issue can be just a misunderstanding of why we exist independently and jointly. A smart man once told me to master the basics and you will be exceptional. Maybe SOF needs to get back to that cognitive approach.
Maxwell,
Yes, you are right.
Pot shots don’t help from any direction.
Many other valid points, even yasotay had some good points.
The truth is in the middle.
-caveman
USSOCOM’s downward departure began after an Air Force One Star decided to be politically correct by deciding that “we need to get the SEALs into the fight.” In the process of removing Army special operators out of the mountains in Afghanistan and inserting SEALs, SOCOM lost a few operators and a couple of CH-47s. No one was court-martialed for this debacle. As a minimum the assistant Commander at JSOC and the SEAL commander in Afghanistan should have been court-martialed because even a private in the 101st Infantry Division knows that you dont fly a CH-47 on to the high ground to insert troops. Meanwhile back at SOCOM you had MacDill Gate (hiding $20M from Congress) and staff officers running around trying to please General Brown. Brown was determined to get General Holland (Air Force) out of the command as soon as possible. Holland for some unknown reason decided to tour the world in his last four months of command while the Headquarters was trying to resource the war. When Brown took over (instead of LTG Tagney), there was a mass exodus of Colonels and Captains out of the SOCOM headquarters as Brown set out to modernize the rotary wing fleet with his hand selected Army Colonel Bob Richardson who retired and went to work for Boeing. Then you have the Tillman episode and Brown again escapes the responsibility. The Acquisition part of SOCOM fell apart when Harry Schulte took the money from Raytheon leaving Colonel Spellissy, PEO for Special Programs as the only guy standing up to Brown to continue to R&D and procure soldier systems. Spellissy was asked to retire by Brown and then charged with bogus charges which he is still fighting. Holland brought the Marine Corps to SOCOM while all the real operators did not want them, however, they didnt tell Secretary Rumsfeld this. The CV-22 was not supported by one SOCOM aviator but they went to the Hill and smiled and eye winked Congress for fear of pissing them off. The SOCOM headquarters should be abolished and let JSOC take care of themselves which they are more than capable of doing.
Greetings & Salutations to all the Operators, Brass, SOF folks and support personnel out there.
This is surely one of those internal issues that most of the military, politicians and certainly few civilians will even get, much less appreciate. But it’s a necessary one and a painful one if we’re truthful with ourselves. So, I’ll throw in some thoughts, maybe helpful, maybe not.
Bottom line is that it is 100% true, SOCOM was needed once upon a time and did many a good thing. Like Unions, they were vital for a time, but then, they became more of an obstacle than an obstacle remover.
It is also a simple fact that everyone and everything needs to do self analysis and be assessed by external sources occasionally, too. Now seems a good time, since we’re at a turning point as a nation and as the global economy makes everyone take stock.
I’m coming from the SF background, since ’82, SFC & CPT type, AD & NG, so, there will be obvious bias, please take with a grain of salt.
BRASS
The facts are true for those in the know, that the politics that come with all that high brass, whom have, upon occasion protected us, and have just as much, if not more often, sought to accomplish their own political agendas. That means each service has wanted a piece of the pie in terms of budget and action, even if they were not the right tool for the job.
NOTE: Every single one of our SOF elements are supreme experts at what they do. As SF we know we can do it all, but we are not the best at any of it except our bread and butter which is UW. We only do the other jobs either to teach them because we’re primarily teachers. Or we need to be able to do them in a pinch as often, we’re the only ones in remote places where the other skills of say, PJ’s would for sure be the best for the task.
UW
The tricky bit here is that this GWOT is uniquely suited and primarily a UW type mission, and there in lies the rub. To try an make a PJ a UW operator is like trying to make a Ferrari into a Farm Truck, it just makes no sense and there’s no need.
Can’t blame anyone for wanting to fight and their leaders get kudos for getting their teams into it. But that is a political agenda at service level that has not necessarily been in our best national interests.
SOF
Rangers and Marines are super at what they do. But often, there is the Ranger way or no way. SF is about almost every way and any way, as long as it works. This is a fundamental difference of philosophy that manifest in tactics. So the Ranger mindset is superior when applied as it was intended, but to win hearts and minds, ain’t it. Kicking ass and taking names, send the Rangers and Marines!
Same for the SEALS. Facts speak for themselves. Highest number of casualties in both theaters, lowest number of operators. I think the fact that the desert is not an amphibious environment seems to have been forsaken in order for everyone to get in on the action.
Seems there is a huge global piracy issue, perfectly suited for the SEALs to shine and do what they do best, kick butt on the water, yet, that problem seems to be lacking for someone to tend it.
Leaders
Same for all the Officers, they are trying to look out for theirs and that is a part of leadership, to be sure. But also, they are the big picture guys. And too often, they get into the weeds and get wrapped up in their own politics, somehow losing sight of the bigger picture along the way. Easy enough to do, I say. And this is why SF is asking this question.
SF
For those of you who don’t know, or don’t get it, SF has had to change alot of it’s doctrine and training to accommodate the forced SOF attendance in their traditionally SF schools. This has been to the denigration of the SF force to many of the old timers.
For you young SF guys, don’t get your hair up, we love you guys. You all joined knowing you would fight and you’ve done well. you’ve all met and overcome every challenge set before you. We are talking about bigger picture stuff that effects the whole force and the whole fight on the long term, big picture scale.
SOCOM
I’m no history major and don’t want to be. But It would seem that SOCOM came when needed, did great things and then, became something else. For the brass that defends SOCOM as a staff and not a warfighter, sure thing, but… if SOCOM forces policy changes in doctrine, training, staffing, supplies, communications and command, then in fact, they are indirectly effecting the fight in what some might say, is the most important way. I for one, tend to agree. Maybe someone needs to review SOCOM and decide if we still need them or if we need to simply re-direct or maybe even stay on course and accept what we are doing.
But we need to ask the question, “Does the US need USSOCOM?” and we need to answer it, for SF, for SOF and for America.
I was taught not to complain unless you can provide a better way.
It might not be better, and it might not even work, but maybe it is time for SF to get back to being SF and let SOF be SOF. We do have different missions, for different needs and we need to focus on our different missions.
So, why not let there be an SF CMD that is equal and independent of SOF CMD, let the SOF do what they do, keep their power base and let SF do what they do, and not lose the benefits of having had the brass to look out for them over the years.
I for one think the whole military should be fused into one service.
Air, Land & Sea branches, all in the same uniforms, same R&D, same procurement, etc. But it seems, we’ve only gone on a more diverging path, rather than a more unified one. So, why not continue that and consider separating the SF from the SOF?
This way, every one wins, no one loses.
That’s all I have to say about that.
Salute out to all those who have fallen, are serving and will serve.
No one of consequence sends
Nobody / No one of consequence sends:
Can I call you ‘No?’ 😉
Good post, good and accurate comments. If we do not rein in the bureaucracy endemic throughout DoD and start breaking some rice bowls, we’re going to be in trouble.
Congress bears considerable blame for much of the problem but senior uniformed folks could and should stop taking advantage of Congressional dysfunction for parochial purposes.
The Shooter / SF dichotomy is only going to be resolved by separation as you suggest and the Strat recon piece is yet another separate function.
The misuse of SEALs just to get a piece of the action is borderline criminal with the results you noted being an indictment for several people — now retired, of course…
The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill.
Well, since none of the AFSOC folks have jumped in yet (as far as I know), I’ll throw in my .02 cents and let ya’ll see an air opinion on this whole thing.
As a career SOF rotor-head who first started out flying Hueys in the 1st Fighter Wing under the old TAC (now a basketball conference), I can state with total confidence that ‘Big Blue’ aka the conventional USAF, knows absolutely nothing about training, equipping or employing aviation SOF assets. And there is no desire in the Big Blue leadership to change that. So that is definitely one reason NOT to throw AFSOC back under ACC or AMC or whoever would get tagged if SOCOM went away.
Reason number two would probably be money. The USAF is broke and getting broker. The aircraft are too old. They got rid of 40,000 airmen two years ago to save funding for F-22s (I know, I couldn’t believe it either, one of the bigger WTF? moments of my career). So, with all the Air Force money being blown on F-22s and F-35s, the only people that will pay for AFSOC training and procurement are sitting in Tampa.
Now, are there good reasons to get out Air Force units out of SOCOM? Sure there are, here are my favorite two.
Reason to Leave #1: Thanks to Doug Brown and Dell Dailey, USSOCOM now has 40 fewer heavy lift helicopters than it had 7 years ago. It wouldn’t be an understatement to say that the 160th SOAR hates Al Qaeda only a bit more than it hated the Pave Low helicopter. They spent 25 years trying to kill the 20th SOS and they finally got their wish in 2008. Goodbye MH-53s, hello SOF rotary wing shortage white papers. If AFSOC is ever going to get out from under Big Green (SOCOM is really spelled A-R-M-Y, as the old joke goes), escaping SOCOM mismanagement of air assets is definitely the first step.
Reason to Leave #2: AFSOC has been trying to grow and expand its Aviation FID unit since 2001 (yes, it has ONE company-sized unit to do world-wide Aviation FID. Go figure). Unfortunately, as the paper above points out, if an AFSOC unit isn’t supporting DA, SOCOM ain’t interested. Hence, tons of money and growth for ISR platforms and CV-22s. Not so much for Hueys, Mi-17s or maintenance sergeants that speak Arabic or Spanish. I honestly don’t know if Big Blue would take the FID mission more seriously than SOCOM but at this point, it would be hard to do worse.
Finally, I see a lot I agree with in the comments. USSOCOM started out in the 80s for an excellent reason. Like all established organizations, though, it gradually turned into a top-heavy bureacracy that is getting further and further away from it’s original concept. At this point, I think the choice is whether to reform or start over from scratch. Of course, I’ll be retired in two years, so I’ll probably miss that part (thank god)…
Well, that was interesting reading… Where does one start with this?
Having a relook at USSOCOM is not a bad thing, as long as there is an associated relook at USASOC and down. However returning elements to their parent services is not the answer either.
A better argument would be to continue the discussions regarding Title 10/Title 50.
While the author points out some significant problems (e.g. the apparent USSOCOM/JSOC seamlessness), a better job of articulating specifics would better serve the discussion.
Bear with me, just a couple items related: the over-reliance on the CT charter to rationalize USSOCOM/JSOC intervention into all theaters; and hyper-conventionalism of the headquarters.
As Dave Maxwell correctly stated we have a problem within USC Title 10. Frankly, UW does not fit well into that bit of writ. UW by its nature can only be prosecuted over a long period of time, of which, secrecy will shroud most aspects of that campaign. Who on the executive side, as well as, who on the congressional oversight side would go for an executive “finding” allowing DOD to execute a secretly declared unconventional war? Not happening. Folks, real UW is executed by someone else. Like it or not.
Thus, the only real operational spectrum all of us non-DA SOF types comes through openly debated and openly resourced Title 10 programs. So is it the fault necessarily of congress that USSOCOM and JSOC are seemingly out of control? Nope, that damn CONPLAN and CT Charter provides a perfect framework for that situation.
The joint planning cycle, be it Deliberate or Crisis Action planning is a tool that all echelons clearly understand. Everything that USSOCOM/JSOC does fits well under the joint planning umbrella. They plan and execute just like an infantry centric JTF. Hence the hyperconventionalism
SF stuff on the other hand, well that is a bit more cerebral. Where does an area study that is continously updated fit into the current planning process? It doesn’t, and remember we weren’t going to ever do things that would be construed as “intell” collection ever again when there was a separation between “Black” and “White” SOF. So the best we had to hope for was FID, and there isn’t enough of us to do that now.
So the title 50 warfighting efforts trumps us. Additionally, how can an unconventional war be properly resourced when you have personnel requirements such as NCOES, CGSC, JPME, career moves for senior individuals every two years or so? Etc, etc. And the author points to USSOCOM/JSOC hyperconventionalism….? Pot calling the kettle black…..
GEN McCrystal and the USSOCOM/JSOC nexus are looking to capitalize on the environment and conditions that were established to support a “national force.” The national force framework allows for forming a AF/PAK center of excellence, where individuals from that “national force” architecture can stay in place to prosecute operations for years. We don’t have that on the SF side.
Conceptually the “national force” framework fits very into the Title 10 environment. USSOCOM/JSOC has command of the operation language, they have significant resources and they have the initiative.
How many officers wearing crossed arrows working in the SF groups put foward a similar concept? (Count how many were involved in GEN Patreaus’ COIN doctrine efforts…) Not too many. One has to ask why?
Carping on about USSOCOM does us a disservice. Quite frankly, with all the JSOC warts, USSOCOM has served us well given the current DOD arrangement.
The above was not supposed to be “Anonymous”, I wrote the above. My apologies.
Just my take:
1. Of course we need it. To the extent is the question. Should it dominate todays operations and take an enormous piece of the pie?
I would say that it is far too large now. The very things that made it great, such as de-centralization, separation from the bureaucracy etc., have enslaved it.
My thoughts are that we need to bring back the Light Infantry Divisions of President Reagans day (badly needed).
I also think that regular units should either be trained on Manuever warfare or COIN and have a corresponding mission.
Then again, I have never been accused of being a smart guy!
And, salutes the operators in question. There is a great quote by Teddy Roosevelt about the guy in the area which very much applies here.
Happy holidays all.
If some of you really believe that life in SOF would be better without SOCOM, all I can say is that you really do not have a good holistic understanding of what SOCOM does and does not do. Life would be unbearable without SOCOM…believe me!
SOCOM GO, All,
We truly are a fair and balanced site here at SWJ – we stand by to publish any well written and informed rebuttal to the original article.
Dave D.
1. The reality is SOCOM is here to stay and it should. They are years ahead of the COCOMs and if anything needs to be ‘Restructured’ it is the Geographic Commands to align more with the inter -agency environment. I hear a lot about the DOD bureaucracy but we have already had a major shift with the Goldwater-Nichols act and yes maybe we do need another modern day reincarnation of this but it first needs to start with DOS and secondly the Geographic Commands. DOD beau racy; Hmmm! I wander how we became so big, you don’t think it was because there was a lot of grey-space and agencies primarily like DOS couldn’t, wouldn’t step up to the task! Hmmm!
2. I get tired of “Tab Protectors” talking about we do this and that. SOCOM has evolved and it is the only DOD entity that has evolved and continues to do so. The current environment at SOCOM finds ARSOF, NAVSOF, and MARSOF (SOF Ground Units) and let me inform you all they all have the same core tasks and mission sets to include UW! There are a finite number of special operators and more RFFs than bodies and the high priority environments just keep increasing. SOCOM used to be so divided along those ARSOF/NAVSOF and now MARSOF Mission sets but we have evolved past that and in my opinion there are two sides to SOCOM; the white SOF and black SOF.
Do you really want to start throwing darts at every SOF event and what went wrong; I was in OEF when those helos went down, and yes maybe some people should have been fired but there is a whole lot more to the story— SEALs should only do Maritime (Piracy), piracy could be defeated in less than 30 days, the problem is not the execution of the mission but where those ECs are going to go; into Yemen or Somalia Court System and then back on the street and this issue is still plaguing the international community. Please, SOCOM has evolved; SF this, MARSOC this and SEALs this; no I think SOCOM is in the right direction. Every SOF element in SOCOM are executing UW and carrying out COIN, yes; DOS needs and should have a bigger role after you change their culture and yes, the inter-agency environment will continue to expand because there are just too many tasks and it has to be a “Joint-interagency-one team fight.”
Tab Protectors with your cold war mentality, dont change please! Environments change and so is SOCOM; dont be surprised if SOCOM becomes its own branch one day.
SOCOM GO:
May I repeat Dave’s invitation to rebut the article with more detail. As an SF soldat long ago and far away — prior to Barbwire Bob standing up USSOCOM, before the Beret and with Teal Blue guidons and Unassigned brass — I’m very curious as to just how unbearable life would be without SOCOM.
I will grant that in the early days of SOCOM, good things were done — but then Parkinson’s Law did its thing. So please, tell us just what SOCOM today brings to the fight…
Citizen Warrior:
That implies that you believe that the Cadillacs that are SF and the tricked out Dodge Pickups that are the Ranger regiment and JSOC are all equally adept at the same things. Possible but that certainly was not true before I retired and folks, both SF and shooters, tell me it is decidedly not true today.
Really? Amazing statement. I see examples of evolution in all the services almost daily…
Ah, yes — but do they all do the same things in that UW environment…
I work side by side with them all and they do! It’s hard to give up the past and move on to a new reality isn’t it? Hmmm
Citizen Warrior:
Nah. It’s not hard to give up the past, been doing it every day for almost 80 years. Did it in and with the Marines and Army for 45 of ’em, millinery and sillyvillian. Learned something new every day. Still do. Some from various relatives including kids and grandkids scattered about, all working for a living.
However, it obviously is rather hard for some to wrap their heads around who does what and why it is or was designed that way.
I don’t know who you’re working side by side with but folks I talk to in the Groups and other places who actually go out and do things insist that they are doing quite different things. I guess when you work in an office, you can lose sight of what’s going on in the field…
Whoops, that was me… I is not anon…
Now that’s funny! You take care and keep telling your war stories!
Citizen Soldier:
That’s apparently your game.
I wouldn’t intrude for anything.
CitizenWarrior:
If everyone assigned to SOCOM is so darned good at everything, I have to wonder why Army SF is specifically tasked for the Afghan Commando and CDI training/equipping mission. Must be those evil Tab Protectors, eh? Or could it be that different entities should have separate missions and competencies?
“…SOCOM used to be so divided along those ARSOF/NAVSOF and now MARSOF Mission sets but we have evolved past that and in my opinion there are two sides to SOCOM; the white SOF and black SOF…”
That is, has been and will continue to be the problem with SOCOM.
The short-sighted and narrow view that there is “black” and “white” SOF leads too many to believe in a system built upon, and supported by, prejudice. Hence my intitial comments that SOCOM et al needs to have a significant re-look. SOF (including all the “non-DA” types) needs to be GREY. A significant policy re-look of Titles 10 and 50 wouldn’t hurt either.
Doesn’t mean we do not need USSOCOM…
“The short-sighted and narrow view”
I disagree with this, I think SOCOM is more on a level playing field then any other time in its history especially related to ARSOF/NAVSOF/MARSOF. Where some people want to keep the lines of delineation based on service, mission sets or anything else is narrow and short-sighted in my .02 cent view. Everyone in ARSOF/NAVSOF/MARSOF has the same core tasks and mission sets. UW/COIN are not rocket science and they all are executing them. SOCOM should be one pool of resources to pull special operators and their enablers out of to execute SOCOM’s strategy in support of the COCOMs. More RFF’s than bodies! Some do not like mixing and meshing of mission sets or services but this is the environment we find ourselves in. In my view it is more efficient.
ADM Olsen changes words in the UW statement and other programs we run and ARSOF gets there panties in a wad, I like there direction and all the services bring a different perspective and all are working there tails off to execute the mission!
Title 10 and 50 re-look! I absolutely agree, but that is at the Secretary level (DOS/DOD) and Congress, good luck on that one! Legislate by paralysis, how does anything get done?
Out of heated debates comes good solutions!
This is indeed becoming a very interesting discussion. From my perspective, it illuminates an unresolved question as to whether SOF are elite or special forces. An elite force is one that conducts the same missions as GPF, but more effectively due to better equipment, training, or higher personnel standards. A special force is one that conducts missions that GPF cannot. Historically there has always been tension between GPF and elite forces, particularly within the U.S. military tradition. USSOCOM was established in 1986, largely as a political reaction to the apparent diminution of U.S. capability to execute special missions resulting from the neglect of special operations forces by the services.
It appears to me that a lot of the resentment toward USSOCOM may stem from the perception that SOF have become elites, given more than their fair share of resources and attention than their missions and performance warrant. The “black” vs. “white” SOF debate seems to break down along that line. Some argue (mostly Marine Corps boosters in my experience) that GPF can do many of the same missions as white SOF, particularly with regard to COIN. At the concluding roundtable of the recent West Point symposium on IW, the panelists (which included several prominent participants in the ongoing debates over COIN doctrine) did not seem clear on exactly what white SOF was contributing to COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Which is ironic, given that they all clearly understood what black SOF was doing, even though black SOF does not officially exist.)
The counter-argument is that SOF are special, that they conduct missions that GPF cannot, and are therefore a resource that must be protected from parochial service interests. This POV seems most prevalent among ARSOF operators. There seems to be a perception and frustration among ARSOF that they are not being used properly in the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is to primarily conduct UW-style “by, with and through” missions. In Afghanistan, they are partnered with Afghan Commandos, but those forces conduct DA missions. I suspect that MAJ Gants recent plea for tribal-oriented COIN operations stems from these frustrations and represents wide-spread sentiment among ARSOF elements.
At the West Point IW symposium, Dr. Conrad Crane, one of the authors of FM 3-24, mentioned that the SOF community made little contribution to drafting the document. He explained that experts from the JFK Special Warfare Center were invited to participate, but discussions broke down over defining basic concepts. According to Dr. Crane, the ARSOF participants insisted that their definitions be used, which resulted in an impasse. He also observed that there appeared to be a battle going on for the “soul of SOF” between black and white force advocates.
So, to me, it all cycles back to the question as to whether SOF are elites or special. There seems to be little debate as to the necessity for black SOF capabilities, but are white SOF simply expensive elite forces that consume resources better allocated elsewhere, or are they unique elements needed to be preserved to conduct missions that GPF simply cannot?
We agree to disagree.
I have been around the block atleast twice. I found myself asking why certain folks show up at a “party” people like me have been prepping to pull off for years, ruin the rapport and break the place up and leave the likes of me to clean up the mess.
My points aren’t about service lines, or even mission sets drawn along service lines. That kind of division is as destructive as designating “Black” and “White” SOF. BOTH equally short sited. Nor is this about “too many RFF’S.” I know of several instances where the real players designated to a region sat on the sidelines because “black” was suddenly the pro’s from dover.
I don’t personally care which service provides the UW capability.
Now, for a dose of reality. And I will the first to admit my service, US Army. However, I didn’t join the Army for the Army, I joined it for SF and the opportunity to be involved in Unconventional Warfare as defined. When I entered service, no other service component offered anything close to what US Army Special Forces was raised and organized to do. Not the USMC, not the US Navy or USAF. And quite frankly USSOCOM doesn’t want to admit to that either.
However, I erred in my choice, ’cause real UW operations were and have been, for almost 40 years, and likely to be in the future, executed by another organization. Thats a fact. Again, Title 50 “Warfighting” as opposed to Title 10 “Defence.”
However, we have come close a couple of occasions, e.g. 264 5th Groupers and the US Air Force kind of did “UW” in Afghanistan. I digress for a short spell…
Because a Flag Officer re-words a definition doesn’t suddenly make one proficient. The argument so-called “tab protectors” make regarding UW is one based on the fact Army Special Forces have been at that skill set since 1952. A “black” designation suddenly supercedes and trumps that history? That would be like the Army maritime transport/log ship section believing they can be the proponent for surface warfare. Not happening, correct?
While COIN/UW do not fall into “rocket science”, both are extremely tedious and rife with long suffering. UW should never be executed around an “N-hour planning” sequence. It is a very deliberate campaign. An example mentioned before, an area study that supports a UW campaign is an item that is intergal the conduct of UW, it is just one part of a whole program. And it takes people wired and trained to be tolerant of the nuances of COIN/UW to produce a planning product like that. And people like that and who become proficient living in, working in, speaking the language of a particular region of the world come at a significant premium. That kind trait set just doesn’t pop up of the paper that designates “black” or “white.” Producing “CFT’S” that are counterfeit SF ODA doesn’t cut it. Do not kid oneself.
Again, do we need USSOCOM? Yes. Do we need USSOCOM to be down in the weeds and finding reasons over-bloat its staff in order to rationalize a depoyable HQ? Not on your life. We need USSOCOM to pry itself away from the JSOC elbow and serve the entire community.
“A special force is one that conducts missions that GPF cannot”
Is that how we should define it, or is it closer to “a force that is raised, trained and equipped for specialized purposes”?
All kinds of distinctions in between the lines of cannot, should not, might not and will not.
“So, to me, it all cycles back to the question as to whether SOF are elites or special. There seems to be little debate as to the necessity for black SOF capabilities, but are white SOF simply expensive elite forces that consume resources better allocated elsewhere, or are they unique elements needed to be preserved to conduct missions that GPF simply cannot?”
Your points are very valid and I agree with some but not all. I get sick and tired of the @#$# measuring contest and who is the best!!! SF refuses to see the future and change fast enough, MARSOC has their own internal culture war, NAVSOF; the most arrogant SOBs on the planet, but guess what they all do extraordinary jobs and in my eyes are all equal and all bring a lot to the battlespace. Too many people want to live in the past!
The elitism is present between conventional vs SOF and White SOF vs Black SOF and will always will be present to some extent. There are all kinds of ‘Haters out there (JSOC, SEALs, MARSOC… .) and they will always be there to include some SOC CGs. As I stated earlier SOCOM today in my opinion is white and black; conventional is a training ground for SOF and white SOF is a training ground for Black SOF. I think they both have to distinct missions because Black is more about hunting/killing (finish) and White is more about long-term enduring UW/COIN.
The future in my opinion for SOCOM is to become its own service based on a ground branch-interagency model and not a DOD model and throw those GB guys in there as liaisons and those case officer types will be glad to get rid of their so called knuckle draggers (SOF included in that metaphor also). Then they would exclusively work UW/COIN/Irregular Warfare environments. Too much policy maker involvement in OIF/OEF we need to move on to other high priority environments in
CENTCOM/AFRICOM/PACOM which we have already started.
After 20+ years of SOF and 45 years of life it all comes down to “Relationships” and how you work those relationships in influencing the environment. I can only influence my level of the environment; policy-makers will screw up the rest of it!
yadernye:
If by ‘white’ SOF you mean Special Forces, then they are in fact unique elements that should be preserved — even enhanced — to conduct missions that the GPF cannot do well. Missions that in fact, the so-called black SOF (by whom I presume you mean some DA elements) cannot do well. No one can do everything well. There is a reason specialization in virtually all trades and professions has developed over the centuries…
Can others do the SF mission? Of course but it has been proven time and again that they do not do it well. What’s missing in all this is a discussion of training and of psychological profiles of individuals. Some people can move in a mud hut and subsist on rice and beans for months; others hate the idea. Some people can be trained to shoot accurately and quickly under all circumstances, a great many cannot. A few people have the patience to sit in a hide for days on a deep strategic recon mission, most cannot do that.
Shooters and SF are needed, no question. Also required are deep reconnaissance elements which ideally would be selected from older, very mature individuals from the two more offensively oriented communities and be in separate organizations dedicated to that mission. All those organizations need overt, covert and clandestine elements. That’s just plain commonsense…
To add some chaos to the mix, though, we also need GPF elements tailored for strategic raids which may be required when adequate numbers of SOF types are not available — and that mission requires better covert insertion and extraction capability. The GPF must be capable of engaging in UW also when SOF numbers are not adequate. The idea that only SOF can do DA and LRS missions needs to disappear; the GPF have done that in the past and can do it . All that too is simply sensible.
USSOCOM isn’t going away, nor does it need to do so. The simple fact is this discussion is engendered by the fact that many in government and all of DoD have become overly turf protective, bureaucratic and risk averse — that’s what must be fixed.
>”A special force is one that conducts missions that GPF cannot”
>Is that how we should define it, or is it closer to “a force that is raised, >trained and equipped for specialized purposes”?
Well, that sort of depends, doesn’t it? After all, I am sure some in the Marine Corps would argue that any MEU(SOC) rifle company could perform at least as well as a Ranger company in any assigned mission, and perhaps even do most of what an ARSOF company can. They might even argue that you could take a Marine rifle platoon, give it some specialized training and equipment, and voila, you have a unit capable of executing SEAL-type missions.
I also suspect that you could find some folks who would argue that some of the more experienced Army GPF units can now do “by, with, and through” COIN missions at least as well as any ARSOF element.
Now, I am not saying these arguments are valid, but I have little doubt you would find people willing to make them.
Citizen Warrior:
USSOCOM and the subsequent ASD-SOLIC were within a gnats eyelash of being the “6th Service” in 1986 with Goldwater-Nichols. Admiral Crowe made a very compelling argument against the “6th Service” and the senate concurred. Not sure we will see that leap anytime soon, although is does cause one to wax sentimental recalling the excitement.
An example from real life: If I happen to be part of a “white” effort that has a real good LONG TERM working relation with a other nation’s force that can put a wackin’ on an HVT, why would I need to summon a “black” element to show up and “insure the capture or kill?” I have the hunters and the killers on station already and to have a “black” element show up,….well that is counterintuitive.
I have a couple of questions. 1) What is the future US Army SF is failing to see and adapt fast enough to? & 2) How would USSOCOM go toward a “ground branch interagency model”, especially given the USC restrictions in place to specifically prevent such a thing? (Remember the “finding” and secretly declared unconvential war comment a while back?) That pesky Title 10 and Title 50 stuff keeps popping back up.
Yadernye,
Hmmmmmmm USAJFKSWC experts were insistent on their definitions? I have compared some of the contemporary COIN writings to those of days of Vietnam yor… DA PAM 550-14 Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies and the new COIN academia…. Is there that much of a difference, or was the effort taken to author FM 3-24 merely an effort to rejargon and old issue? Why?
Lastly, GPF’S have always made the argument they can COIN just as well. Not a new rice bowl, squeaky wheel issue. However, its a bit early in the long war for GPF’S to make that claim.