Dynamic Evolutions of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2008)
by Thomas Renard and Stéphane Taillat, Small Wars Journal
Between Clausewitz and Mao (Full PDF Article)
Insurgencies are dynamic, not static. The idea of dynamic insurgencies was previously developed by Mao Zadong. In his book, Mao described guerrilla warfare as a pyramidal process divided into three linear but not definitive phases - from propaganda to conventional warfare - which means that the guerrilla must follow the order of the different phases, but maintains the possibility to move back and forth between them.
Mao's dynamic guerrilla, due to its linearity, explains only partly the tactical shifts adopted by insurgents. Therefore, in order to mirror the real dynamism of modern insurgencies, we propose a second model of dynamic insurgencies based on three operational poles: the terror pole, the guerrilla pole, and the conventional warfare pole. The three poles create a triangle of tactical possibilities, in which every insurgent action takes place.
Concretely, this means that a group closer to the terror pole will mainly rely on acts of terrorism, while maintaining a more or less pronounced aspect of guerrilla warfare, or even of conventional warfare, depending on its proximity to the other poles. This is to say - most groups do not rely on a single pole.
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I would highly encourage reading Dr. Porch's assessment of our fetish with Galula, Kilcullen, etc.:
http://atlcom.kantenklaresite.nl/ap_archive/pdf/AP%202010%20nr.%208/Por…
IMO-SAMS Grad,
As a dvout pupil of COIN I too felt that way about Galula. It was only when I dedicated myself to becoming a "devout pupil" of insurgency as a whole, however, that I was able to put Galula and other works into a more proper context. You are on the right track, but I encourage you to expand your focus to that of the entire dynamic of insurgency to get to the next level.
Cheers!
Bob
Bill,
I can buy that an insurgency, to achieve its goals, must "exhaust" the government. Wear it down to the point where it either finally makes the concessions that it has been unwilling to make or provide legal venues to address; or simply be pushed aside as irrelevant when both unwilling to change and unable to resist any longer.
I have a problem, however, with applying "attrition" as the strategic framework for dealing with an insurgency. One can certainly suppress an insurgency by putting sufficient attrition on both the guerrilla fighter and the shadow government that represent the much larger segment of the society these two organized bodies emerge from and represent; but this in no way gets after the root grievances within the populace that caused these organizations to emerge in the first place. Like an iceberg, this is the much larger body and is made of the same material as the surronding sea. Attrition will defeat the insurgent, but I believe in most cases it only serves to make the insurgency stronger, driving the roots of governmental causation deeper into the broader society under said governance.
If it is a resistance insurgency to our invasion of some land we hope to make our own, then sure, attrition works. Defeat the military, force surrender onto the government, then finish up by attriting those members of the populace who continue to resist. Make the entire state know that it is defeated and under new management. This is a continuation of war and warfare. This is what Napoleon faced in Egypt and Spain and was never able to finish off that third component. It is what Hitler faced in so many places in WWII. It is what we faced in Iraq and continue to face in Afghanistan, but with a twist: We have no intention of making either a 51st state, so we straddle the fence between the type of insurgency we cause, and the type of COIN we wage. Mixed results are to be expected.
But revolutionary insurgency is a very different thing. It is that internal conflict between a government and its own populace, and it is much more a high end of civil emergency that it is a form of war. I don't believe attrition is the proper strategy for countering revolution. More Mitigation and Reformation. The government must mitigate the violence with a security force led supporting effort (which will include some degree of CT, CG, increased policing, etc), balanced with a decisive effort focused on governmental reform. Governments tend to forget about the decisive effort, or convince themselves that due to the legal status of the parties (government is always legal, insurgent is always illegal), that simply enforcing the rule of law, and not working to improve the law is enough. History tells us such governments are both common, and wrong.
So, yes, attrition for resistance when one seeks to conquer completely; but mitigation and reformation for revolution when one seeks to achieve enduring, natural stability. What is proper for foreign intervention such as we perform? FID, in clear subjugated support to the host nation in dealing with what is 90% revolution in most cases. Increasingly I believe we need to be prepared to balance this FID campaign with UW, engaging the populace as well as the government to help guide the situation quickly to a natural stability by working both ends of the problem, rather than simply taking sides based on which we think will serve us best. We tend to guess wrong.
The concept of dynamic insurgencies is well known, but poorly understood. I enjoyed the article, although I disagree with the authors use of three poles (terrorism, guerrilla, conventional) to describe the spectrum of insurgency, it is much more complex. However, the take away is that foes can and will adapt to one another, especially a conflict with irregulars.
The relevant take away for the military is to develop better situational awareness of the ebb and flow of irregular warfare, and not to elude ourselves into assuming that tactical victory in battle is significant, yet if we lose a tactical battle (the wrong perception from Somalia) it is a strategic set back for us far from the battlefield.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan we were slow to adapt an appropriate strategy as we transitioned from conventional conflict to irregular warfare, which made us vulnerable and allowed the insurgents to develop a strong base of coerced or willing support.
Terrorism, guerrilla tactics and conventional maneuver are tactics that can be applied unilaterally or in combination as required to achieve their objectives. A wise foe will adapt his tactics in response to our tactics to exploit any weaknesses; then we adapt; thus the so called Red Queen effect (co-evolution). Defeating their ability to conduct guerrilla warfare through increased security measures may prompt them to conduct more terrorist acts, or to go further underground and focus more on subversion while waiting for security conditions to relax; then the cycle starts again unless we neutralize their underground organization.
Were waging a war of attrition and theyre waging a war of exhaustion. To effectively attrite the enemy we need to not only defeat his visible forces (fielded forces of guerrillas and terrorist operators), but more importantly we need to defeat his (which is often invisible) underground political apparatus. This requires understanding that it exists, developing the appropriate intelligence structure to identify it, and then applying the right mix of tools to eradicate it ranging from overt / covert operations to neutralize key personnel to implementing appropriate security programs, civil development and PSYOP programs. Failure to neutralize the insurgent political apparatus will allow the insurgency to continue to ebb and flow tactically from subversion, terrorism, guerrilla tactics to conventional maneuver in their pursuit to exhaust us. I am a strong advocate for studying the pacification program we implemented in Vietnam. It was highly effective, despite the misinformed media comments to the contrary, which unfortunately has skewed our historical documents as well. The war were fighting now is more complex, the political apparatus in many cases may be another country or countries. Our goal is to understand it, identify it, and neutralize it.