Small Wars Journal

19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare

Mon, 03/30/2009 - 6:16pm
19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare

by Dr. Geoffrey Demarest, Small Wars Journal

19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare (Full PDF Article)

Irregular warfare (insurgency, low intensity conflict, etc.) is said to have a generally different character than conventional, maneuver warfare. So be it, but it does not necessarily follow that classic military strategic principles are inapplicable. One of the best statements of classic strategy comes from a British barrister writing before the advent of airpower. His expression reminds us that the important lines in linear warfare are not the fronts, but the lines of communication. This considered, the notion of 'non-linear warfare' can mislead. The line of retreat is especially highlighted, helping us place Mao's teaching more closely to Jomini's.

19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare (Full PDF Article)

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Comments

Ken White

Mon, 03/30/2009 - 10:19pm

Interesting article. It contains four great truths that bear repetition:<blockquote>"...Avoiding defeat is hardly a new idea. If prolonging a war helps the insurgent avoid defeat, it is no help to the counterinsurgent that he or she concedes the length of the war by way of doctrine...

...To counter, the United States should put the question of enemy lines of communication back at the center of operational military strategic planning, and revisit ways by which anonymity can be denied the insurgent enemy...

...Doing so depends inevitably on ending insurgent anonymity and thereby the obscurity of insurgent movement routes. Accordingly, the calculation of resources should be heavily weighted to that end from the outset of operational strategic planning...

Among Maguires favorite teaching points was the need for more dedication to the study of geography."</blockquote>

I've railed about the fallacy of the first point for years. That "long time" and "20 counterinsurgents per thousand of population..." are both myths that will not die for some reason.

The intelligence implications of the next two are obvious. The last is almost always sadly neglected -- usually to our detriment.