Topics include:
1) Pakistan's game,
2) Are overseas bases worth the risk?
Pakistan's Game
Of all the players in the Afghan game, Pakistan is running up the highest score. For several decades, Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan has remained largely unchanged, regardless of who was running the country. That policy is to support Afghanistan's Pashtuns in their seemingly genetic resistance to outside control (outside in this case extends to any government located in Kabul). By supporting Pashtun autonomy, Pakistan establishes for itself a security buffer zone on its northwest frontier, which comes with a friendly auxiliary army -- the Afghan Taliban -- as a bonus.
For nearly nine years, U.S. officials have pleaded with Pakistan to suspend support for the Afghan Taliban and allow Afghanistan to unite under a central government. Pakistani officials have provided a variety of verbal responses to these entreaties but have not changed their policies toward the Afghan Taliban, whose military capability inside Afghanistan only seems to grow.
The United States cannot achieve its goals in Afghanistan while the Afghan Taliban's sanctuaries in Pakistan remain open. The Pakistani government refuses to close or even isolate those sanctuaries. Yet the massive U.S. foreign-assistance pipeline to Pakistan remains open. Why?
U.S. policymakers have seemingly concluded that they have more options and less risk by engaging Pakistan. They tried isolating Pakistan and found that course was neither wise nor sustainable. As a result, the Washington has opted to shower Pakistan with aid and hope that persistent persuasion will eventually result in greater Pakistani action against the Afghan Taliban.
The result has been a spectacular strategic success for Pakistan. Development aid from the United States has never been greater. The United States will deliver long-embargoed F-16 fighters to Pakistan and is providing other upgrades to Pakistan's armed forces. Along with this has come a de facto U.S. security guarantee against the perceived threat from India. Pakistan's diplomatic leverage over the United States has given it a free hand to work with China to upgrade its nuclear complex. Meanwhile, Pakistan's proxy forces in southeast Afghanistan are successfully defending the security buffer zone. Pakistan's dominant position has forced Afghan President Hamid Karzai to virtually sue for peace. This could result in an ethnic partition of Afghanistan that would secure Pakistan's main objective in the conflict.
With its winning position, Pakistan's current task is to arrange a stable end-state that avoids a backlash from the losers. Pakistan and the United States are in a largely zero-sum relationship over Afghanistan. Pakistan's leaders must fashion a settlement (however temporary) that allows the United States to save face, that maintains the U.S. aid pipeline, and that keeps the de facto security guarantee in place. U.S. officials should hope that Pakistan manages the endgame as well as it has managed the rest of the match.
Are overseas bases worth the risk?
As a country with global security responsibilities, the United States depends on an archipelago of overseas military bases to assert its presence and project power. Having benefited for so many decades from the access these bases have provided, U.S. military planners have established design specifications for weapon systems and fashioned military strategies under the assumption that access to these bases is hardly in doubt. But are these assumptions wise? Over the past two decades, political disputes have forced the Pentagon to retreat from many overseas bases, resulting in greater concentration and risk attached to those bases that remain. More closures at critical but politically vulnerable facilities cannot be ruled out. The potential for disruptions to the remaining basing archipelago calls into question the Pentagon's foresight regarding the weapons it plans to buy and its plans to project power without the base access it has become accustomed to.
The Defense Department has a long history of adjusting its overseas basing posture. Changes since the end of the Cold War have been particularly dramatic. Some have been intentional. The vast drawdown of Army and Air Force units in Europe has resulted in the closure of scores of installations. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld deliberately shifted or brought home many units to make them usable for global rather than just regional contingencies.
The Pentagon has coped with involuntary ejections from overseas bases with varying degrees of success. U.S. Southern Command adjusted to its removal from Panama and Vieques, Puerto Rico by moving to Florida and building up relationships elsewhere in Central America. More recently, Ecuador tossed out a United States counternarcotic patrol base and the United States responded with an expanded presence in Colombia.
By contrast, the expulsion of the U.S. Air Force and Navy from their large bases in the Philippines has resulted in heightened risk due to greater reliance on the remaining large bases on Okinawa and Guam. And in spite of the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama over his mishandling of the Futenma base dispute, the local population's opposition to U.S. bases on Okinawa continues to boil. Defense planners cannot rule out the possibility that local political pressure will remove U.S. forces from the Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, opening a huge hole in the Pentagon's Pacific defense plans.
Writing at the Stimson Center's Budget Insight blog, Alexander Cooley, an associate professor at Columbia University, discussed some political strategies U.S. diplomats can employ to ward off local political opposition to U.S. overseas bases, especially in frontier developing countries. Cooley recommends extending U.S. diplomatic outreach to include a variety of domestic actors and sectors and not just top central government and military officials. Cooley notes that this is the technique Chinese diplomats are successfully using as they gradually expand their relationships around the globe.
The Pentagon could gain control over its own fate if it reduced its spending on weapons that require vulnerable overseas bases and increased spending on naval power and global long-range strike capabilities. For example, it could cut by half the planned purchase of short-range F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and redirect the $100 billion or more in savings on accelerating and expanding the Air Force's Next Generation Bomber program and the Navy's long-range carrier-based strike drone project. Directing the Marine Corps to refocus on the amphibious assault mission -- a power projection capability less dependent on overseas bases - would in some cases provide a hedge against the potential closure or disruption of overseas Air Force and Army bases.
Do Pentagon planners assume that their bases in the western Pacific, Central Asia and around the Persian Gulf will always be there? They undoubtedly have alternate plans on the shelf. But these workarounds could be less risky if weapons systems and strategies were designed from the beginning to be less dependent on these bases.
Comments
How to resolve the difference? I wish i knew it. There is so much trust deficit between the two. For which i hold both Pakistan and the US governments responsible. May be transparency of actions. But i wonder we can afford that during the prevalent situation i.e. WAR in Afghanistan.
US is blaming Pakistan and Afghanistan; Pakistan is blaming US and Afghanistan; and Afghanistan is blaming US and Pakistan. What a bunch of losers are we. Is this how you fight a war?
Though i tend to disagree with most of what Friedman has written (except the Chinese part) in his op-ed; yet, his suggestion that the US should disengaged from Afghanistan to atleast reduce its bets, needs attention.
Fida,
My health and my family are doing well. I pray that yours are doing the same. I believe that y'all have an Urdo saying that "a daughter is a day brightener and a heart warmer." I find that to be absolutely true.
I was giving some thought to your comments on the recent polling trends in Pakistan over opinions on the United States. IMO, your comments are intertwined with what Mr. Haddick wrote about. I tend to agree that foreign aid is non-productive unless it is done on the micro-level in the rural areas in fields such as schools and loans. But, even then, our "help" shows the lack of effectiveness of your central government so there is backlash. I saw the same thing with our civil affairs in Iraq. The Sunnis were very upset and frustrated that they were unable to build the schools for their children by themselves.
To you're main question, Why won't US companies invest here? They won't unless the opportunity cost is sufficient for profit. In simple terms, the threat of violence must be low enough that a corporation does not assume unneeded risk. For now, as some in your government make deals with radical Islamist (or miscreants whichever term you prefer), then you are probably unlikely to see major investment.
IMO, that's unfortunate. Pakistan's middle class has a significant intellectual capital. Y'all are smart :). Plus, we share many traits in entrepreneurship and dreams of making the world better for our children. As you will find out, the United States is not all Baywatch and American Idol.
The question is how to resolve the differences?
Mike
Fida,
I haven't seen the Chinese methods first hand just from afar as a curiosity. I particularly like watching the China-Google showdown. China appears to be working another type of indirect approach that's resource driven. Similar to our banana wars and expansion post-WWII, but they are not as concerned with whom is governing as long as the raw materials flow.
On another note, Thomas Friedman should start dropping some footnotes :).
The Great (Double) Game
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/opinion/01friedman.html
Mike
The game played by the Pakistani Army/ISI has resulted in the tactical gains mentioned by Mr. Haddick. They are probably quite pleased with themselves. However part of that game is a policy of continually provoking a neighbor that gets bigger and bigger and bigger. That is not wise. We may have given them a de facto security guarantee but of what value will it be if they boot us out of Afghanistan? India may not be willing to see the place go back to 2000 and they might not care what a feckless US wanted.
The Pakistani Army/ISI has created and unleashed a takfiri monster that they may not be able control; especially if that monster were energized by booting the Americans out of Afghanistan. Where that monster would turn next, who knows? Part of it has already turned on its' creator. All of it hates India. If the Indians thought the monster had even a small chance of getting to the nukes there would be quick hell to pay.
The game the Pakistani Army/ISI has played has put the country of Pakistan in grave danger and has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Americans and tens of thousands of Afghans. For us to hope that the Pak Army/ISI "manages the endgame as well as it has managed the rest of the match." is like hoping the incompetent engineer gets to finish the bridge.
Mike, China has a lot of interest in the region but, is benign! Actually, i just missed out its name. Thats the beauty of chinese, they are involved w/o attracting much attention. Have you ever visited a place where chinese are working? Always maintain a low key.
Anyway, thanks for correcting me. China is "in".
Robert,
Nice analysis. But this presents only one angle of the story - predominantly the Indian mindset. Pakistan has its own interests in Afghanistan. It cannot survive with Indian on one side and hostile Afghanistan on the other side. Recall, US uneasiness over Soviet influence in Cuba.
Pakistan and the US are not in zero-sum-game over Afghanistan. International relations are never a zero-sum-game. I totally disagree with this assumption. There is a lot of common ground between the two, which both the countries should exploit. Then, the US has certain incentives to stay engaged with Pakistan. I believe, any effort to take a tunnelled view of Afghanistan's situation will be counterproductive. See Afghanistan's bigger picture with Iran, Russia, UK, India, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in view. The conflicts outcome is not reliant upon the good intentions of two countries.
As for now both Pakistan and the US should concentrate on not what they are fighting against but, what they are fighting for i.e. peace.
Robert,
Excellent contribution.
Your detractors may take issue with looking at the AfPak conflict as zero-sum between US and Pakistan interest. Their argument is that traditional Int'l Relations of state v/s state are too simplistic to describe the conflict b/c Pakistan has various internal actors (Gov't, ISI, Army, Elite Upper-class v/s Peasantry, Radical v/s Moderate Muslims, etc).
I think that you're both correct. On the strategic level, the policies are zero-sum; however, when you dive down into the meta-game, the operational/tactical level of specific contests, the environment and the games are much more fluid.
I'll attempt one analogy before I explain further. During the Cold War, the Guatemala Civil War and greater Central/South America revolutions became proxy wars between the Soviet Union and the United States vying over communism versus democracy. However, in Guatemala, the conflict was over equal rights, land rights, and other socio-political issues.
So, while the big picture can be seen as zero-sum, on the ground and day-to-day, we are more likely to see posturing, bargaining, bluffing, hedging, games of chicken, and deception in which each move is used as an attempt to gain a comparative advantage in the larger struggle.
To operate in this environment, a practisioner would be wise to learn the rules of the game. As COL Jones and others have pointed out, the rules start with understanding the basic tenants of insurgency theory.
Mike