Comments
One more quick thing which is not news to any of you, I'm sure:
From Carl Prine's site, an interview with a Pakistani journalist (brave, brave, brave souls. My admiration is immense):
<em>ISI is widely misunderstood. Its not rogue.
In fact, its a fit unit who has learned the art of maneuvering. Its obviously run by its separate directorates but acts on the policy guidelines of the Pakistan Military Chief. If you need to understand the working of ISI, I will give you one example -- a section of the ISI is deputed to protect Mullah Omar and another is working with the US to catch him.
That is ISI for you.</em>
I have more references but that is the fastest one I could find.
So I understand that some in DC are worried that a split in relations will keep the CIA and military from acting "behind the scenes" to keep us safe. I get it. I really do.
What I am cautioning is that maybe that is the very behavior that gets us in trouble in the first place, and that the desire to do short term things for tactical purposes makes us less safe over the long term.
Are you really sure "your" guys are in charge of the nukes and keeping them out of the hands of the radicalized? Really? Just because you bond with them and like them personally?
Well, I suppose I can never know.
I get that some of you are told different things behind closed doors. But what if that is part of the con? What if the people you talk to think they have it under control, but don't?
I guess I'm saying: just don't fall in love with your <em>own</em> proxies and make them into something they are not.
Now I've strayed very far from small wars but the precedent of dealing with a nuclear armed country like Pakistan is not going away any time soon, I'm guessing. Where there is a will....
Some of you will be deployed in very creative ways in the future, I'd bet.
Take care all. As usual, I learn so much from this site.
Madhu's suggestion, Mr. Jones, is simply for Washington to have a consistent policy and stick to it. That is what Pundita, whose suggestion it really was (sorry about the confusion) is saying.
We give mixed signals because there are too many cooks in the kitchen. CIA, State, the military. Everyone is on a different page for domestic and personal reasons, and it is counterproductive.
Let me show you all an example:
<em>The incidents are expected to feature prominently in conversations between Pakistani officials and CIA Director Leon Panetta, who arrived in Pakistan on Friday. The U.S. argument, one official said, will be: "We are willing to share, but you have to prove you will act. Some of your people are no longer fully under your control."
U.S. officials said Panetta would also carry a more positive message, reiterating that the United States wants to rebuild a trusting, constructive relationship with Pakistan. Immediately after bin Ladens death, some administration officials and lawmakers argued that the al-Qaeda leaders presence in a suburban Pakistani compound was reason enough to withhold U.S. assistance from Pakistan. But the prevailing view has been that the two countries need each other despite their problems.</em>
Does anyone see a problem? Mixed signals and mixed messages do not a useful policy make. But this is not a military discussion and I'm sorry I brought it up here.
Backwards Observer:
The lead international story in today's Washington Post tells of how the US gave Pakistan the exact location of two bomb making factories in North and South Waziristan and when the Pak Army forces showed up to check them out, both locations had been recently evacuated.
I wonder if the Washington Post knows they got scooped by the Onion.
Carl- seems we agree on maybe more than we thought we did.
And, I too agree with using the other route and that forcing us to fix our force structure.
As for the proxies "helping" us- yes, many times it is a sub-group they don't like, and there are even times their proxies attack themselves- but that is just it: the norm seems to me to be consistently one of back-biting, back-stabbing, and political maneuvering by ALL involved: GIRoA, ISI proxies, Pakistan proper, Afghan Taliban, Pak Taliban, Iranian proxies, Indian proxies, NATO, SMU proxies, ANA, ANP, etc.
Arab Spring is the best possible thing that could happen for the future of US influence in the Middle East; IF we are smart enough to recognize it for what it really is (long suppressed populaces seeking a liberty and governance of their own design, rather than one chosen or frozen for them by outsiders)
Here is an important perspective to consider. While no one source is "the truth" it is my assessment that there is a lot of truth in this:
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/06/20116107594657997…
Thoughts on the Arab Spring as an additional, possibly more important strategic consideration for pulling out of Afghanistan earlier or later:
a. Earlier Pull-Out Argument:
Advent of the Arab Spring requires that US forces and capabilities be freed up for possible use in this more important enterprise.
b. Later Pull-Out Argument:
With the coming of the Arab Spring, it becomes even more important to ensure that Afghanistan cannot become a base/sanctuary/haven for Al Qaeda.
Pakistani Intelligence Announces Its Full Cooperation With U.S. Forces During Upcoming Top Secret June 12 Drone Strike On Al-Qaeda At 5:23 A.M. Near Small Town Of Razmani In North Waziristan:
<blockquote>"Make no mistake, Pakistan stands shoulder to shoulder with our American allies in hunting down those who threaten our national security," said Pasha, circling the exact location of the safe house on a large satellite photo of the town. "And we will show no mercy in targeting them, whether it be on the battlefield or, perhaps, in a bunker where the walls are thicker and offer better protection from Predator drone attacks."</blockquote>
<blockquote>"These are highly dangerous men," he continued, "who will be taken out at 5:23 a.m. I repeat: The strike begins at 5:23 a.m."</blockquote>
http://www.theonion.com/articles/pakistani-intelligence-announces-its-f…
Intheknow:
I am a simple fellow. I don't know from 3rd order effects and unfortunate fallout from regional political plays. All I know is the Pak Army/ISI kills our guys...and we still give them money. Like Pundita says, they will continue to do what we pay them to do. Maybe we should stop paying them.
There is another supply route and it can't support the present force structure like you said. But that is the beauty of it. It would force us to get smaller, a little desperate and a little desperate often means a lot smarter. You and I agree we shouldn't pay the Pak Army/ISI, Omar and Madhu too I bet. That makes four of us. The American political/military elite can continue to be stupid (no other word fits as well), but we 4 don't have to be.
Weed out the Pak Army/ISI proxies by forcing them to get out of Pakistan and live full time in Afghanistan. The Pak Army/ISI has to be convinced to do that, which is the crux of the problem. If we can get them to do that the problem is solvable, if not, it is not. That is where the supply route and the money come in. The Afghan gov very much wants a shot at the proxies of the Pak Army/ISI. If those proxies are forced to stay in Afghanistan, the Afghan gov and us will get that shot. Any left after a few months will have genuine local political support and then the politics can start.
A strange thing about all this is one thing the Afghan gov and Taliban & Co agree on is they both hate, just hate, the Pakistanis. That can be useful.
Mr. Intheknow, everything relates back to 9-11. None of this would have transpired if it weren't for that. It has been so long ago that people forget, which is why I bring it up so often. One thing leads to another.
I am a bit confused by the consistent inconsistencies part. The Pak Army/ISI can be counted upon to backstab all of the people all of the time. This results in dead Americans week in and week out, year in and year out. And yet we keep their checks coming. We are consistently stupid. We should stop.
When have Pak Army/ISI proxies fighting against us in Afghanistan attacked Taliban & Co? Taliban & Co are their proxies. Their may be the occasional snit fit between subgroups but for the most part, the important part, all the parts that comprise Taliban & Co work with each other to fight us.
Bill C.: Huh? What are you saying? Use your words.
I think what you're saying is that we need to stay in the region to be ready to mitigate the fallout of the Arab Spring. When are we going to learn the lesson that we are like a fat, drunk guy in a Speedo and high heels in a trinket shop, falling all over ourselves and knocking crap over and stepping on it and breaking it whenever we try to do anything? Everyone talks about "what we can do" and how we can "mitigate" things and our "levers" and such, but geez, why do we continue to give ourselves such credit? First, we are just too big, too open, too bureaucratic, too nationally uninterested, and too driven by short political timelines to really follow fine foreign policies through to their conclusion. But more fundamentally than that, the "levers" and "means" we (or anyone for that matter) have at our disposal are far less precise, agile, and useful than our rhetoric would make us believe. Our most energetic efforts at mitigation often only make things worse. I'm not advocating complete isolationism. I just think we need to be more realistic in what we can actually accomplish and a lot less apocalyptic in our risk assessments. If we got as worked up about the far greater risk of driving period, let alone drinking and driving, as we do about the fallout of events in the Middle East that have a far lower propensity to reach out and touch us, we'd all be walking around and mumbling to ourselves instead of driving the fam cross country on a summer vacation.
We have lost touch with reality in our foreign policy because everyone plays up the risk, whether through zealotry, salesmanship, or ignorance. This article from the Onion is one of the most brilliant satires I've ever read. Purportedly Gen Mattis saying we'll never win in Afghanistan if they don't get a pinball machine at CENTCOM: http://www.theonion.com/articles/im-afraid-we-will-never-win-in-afghani…. This is the current flavor of analysis. The sky will fall if we don't do X and buy Y. It has got to stop.
<em>It is quite simple, we pay the Pak Army/ISI to let us conduct our big war and they use the money to kill our guys.</em>
No- they would use their proxies regardless if we paid them or not. The Pak Army/ISI don't use their proxies to kill our guys- they use their proxies to counter growing Indian influence in the region. The killing of our guys on 9/11 was not a direct outcome of the Pak Army/ISI-proxy connection, but a third-order effect of another connection (AQ). The killing of our guys today (and the killing of theirs) is related to us being in the vicinity of Pakistan-Indian regional politics that plays itself out in, among other places, Afghanistan.
<em>You are falling for another false dilemma, that of the Karachi supply route or nothing. The alternative is a much reduced effort and no more money for the the General sahibs. Like Pundita says, if they don't get the money then they may listen to our words. There is another supply route you know.</em>
I haven't fallen for that dilemma- the U.S. military has. I don't think we should pay the Pakistanis anything- but that would cause us to change our strategy and our force structure- which I'm all for anyway- but the current military leadership is NOT for that. And there isn't another supply route that is viable that would meet our current force requirements.
<em>Regarding your one "either, or", I ain't so naive as you think.</em> I didn't think you were. ;)
<em>I covered how to weed the proxies from the non-proxies. I'll bet the Afghan gov would love to get a shot at the proxies if they weren't hanging out beneath the skirts of the Pak Army/ISI. Of course for that to come about we would have to change the actions of said Pak Army/ISI which is what this whole thing is about, the crux of the problem.</em>
I must have missed your plan on the weeding. I disagree with GIRoA wanting a shot at the proxies- they use them just like everyone else (or at least portions of GIRoA, depending on the month). I submit any attempts to change the actions of "said Pak Army/ISI" will be fruitless and not sure why that is the "crux of the problem"- unless you think we should be there in force until any possible threat from AQ or anyone else from that area is rendered impossible (read: forever).
<em>You might recall that the reason we got involved in all of this is because almost 3,000 Americans were killed on fine sunny late summer day, killed by people ultimately under the sponsorship of the Pak Army/ISI.</em>
I thought that was why we got involved in Iraq and the entire GWOT??? And, no- I don't ever recall anyone admitting that the reason we "got involved" in nation-building and COIN was because 3,000 folks died. We overthrew the Taliban and killed OBL because 3,000 folks died and to dissuade them from doing so again- but the other efforts being tied to 9-11 haven't sold too many people I know of.
<em>You are right about the Pak Army/ISI being consistent, dead American consistent.</em>
By your logic how would you explain their proxies targeting Afghan Taliban and others we are fighting? WAY too simplistic to describe this as them vs us. They support us as well- that's not consistently against us. They are consistent in working all sides to disrupt growing Indian influence. Far from being consistent by who they kill- this looks inconsistent if all you look at is who their proxies target...
Intheknow:
It is quite simple, we pay the Pak Army/ISI to let us conduct our big war and they use the money to kill our guys. Without that, not no war, smaller war and maybe one that has a chance of succeeding. You are falling for another false dilemma, that of the Karachi supply route or nothing. The alternative is a much reduced effort and no more money for the the General sahibs. Like Pundita says, if they don't get the money then they may listen to our words. There is another supply route you know.
Regarding your one "either, or", I ain't so naive as you think. (calling all retorts, calling all retorts. There is a straight line available for use.)
I covered how to weed the proxies from the non-proxies. I'll bet the Afghan gov would love to get a shot at the proxies if they weren't hanging out beneath the skirts of the Pak Army/ISI. Of course for that to come about we would have to change the actions of said Pak Army/ISI which is what this whole thing is about, the crux of the problem.
You might recall that the reason we got involved in all of this is because almost 3,000 Americans were killed on fine sunny late summer day, killed by people ultimately under the sponsorship of the Pak Army/ISI. You also might recall the Mr. Rashid reported that said Pak Army/ISI encouraged MO not to give up OBL after that fine late summer day. And you might also recall where Mr. Bin Laden was found lately. You are right about the Pak Army/ISI being consistent, dead American consistent.
Strained analogies about beer companies and Myrtle Beach notwithstanding, they kill our guys.
Carl-
I agree with most, if not all, of what Bob posted. If 99% of all 82nd Airborne deaths were from drinking and motorcycles and the HQ decided to hold All-American week at Myrtle Beach during Bike Week- then I wouldn't hate the beer and cycle companies...
The nexus for much of the region's power plays happens to find a home in Afghanistan today- especially as we have inserted ourselves into it with money, troops, attention, and politics. The ISI had a relationship with the Taliban long before 2001, did you hate them when they fought on "our" side? I got you- they're killing Americans, but maybe we should blame our own politicians for putting our troops in the situation with a muddled, ill-thought-out strategy instead of the ISI- who is only remaining consistent...??
The issues with pundita's solution are that it- like most other concepts- lacks details.
- "clear out all the Taliban fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan on behalf of Pakistan's military"- yeah, okay- gee- I guess no ISAF commander ever had that as a goal... How does one actually DO that??? Especially since GIRoA isn't going to cooperate with you...
- "EITHER start a war with Pakistan OR continue to put up with the protection its military affords Taliban groups it finds useful". Huh?? It is actually quite simple: we pay Pakistan to let us ship containers through their country. Without that: no war. All the other junk is just fluff. If you really think our politicians expect Pakistan to do what they say- then either you are naive or our politicians are ignoramuses. Sometimes, I know it's hard to believe, politicians aren't saying publicly what they really think...
Mr. Jones:
Lets take your paragraphs one by one.
First paragraph: I don't care that stuff. The Pak Army/ISI are killing Americans. That, I do care about.
Second paragraph: You distinguish the proxy Taliban from the others by forcing the proxies back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Then six months later you see who is left. The ones still alive can probably be negotiated with.
Third paragraph: The Taliban did indeed come into being because Afghanistan was in chaos. Unfortunately the Taliban cure was for most people as bad or worse than the chaos. You might recall that most Afghans were glad to be rid of them 10 years ago. The current Taliban activity really began to take off when the Pak Army/ISI grew some nerve back because we didn't keep up the scare and because we flummoxed around for years and years.
Fourth paragraph: Agree with your first sentence. Our flawed appreciation is well outlined by Pundita, we have talked ourselves into false dilemma. I am not surprised that you see little validity in Pundita's view if you believe in the false dilemma. It would be best for the Pak Army/ISI if Afghanistan were left to them but that ain't gonna happen.
I find it curious that you say about us "but the problem is that we always want to shape outcomes to suit us." as if that is a bad thing. But in your first paragraph you say "Yes Pakistan conducts UW to leverage the Taliban to support Pakistan interests in Afghanistan. This is what states do." as if that was just one of those things that we must understand. I don't get it. We shape things to our advantage and it's bad, the Pak Army/ISI shapes things to its' advantage (killing our guys in the process) and it is just one of those things. Like I said, I don't get it.
Reference to no paragraph: I will never understand your apparent strong sympathy with the Pak Army/ISI. They kill our guys.
Yes Pakistan conducts UW to leverage the Taliban to support Pakistan interests in Afghanistan. This is what states do. EXACTLY like the US and Pakistan did in concert when the Soviets were supporting a puppet regime instead of us. Key for Americans to appreciate is that Pakistan did not change teams or priorities, the US did.
How does one distinguish between this "proxy" Taliban and a nationalist taliban?????? I don't want to shoot the wrong one. While this flirts with an important point, it misses it. What we are really talking about is the REVOLUTIONARY insurgency among the Taliban leadership taking refuge in Pakistan (and yes, that the government of Pakistan covertly supports and leverages to serve their own interests; as does AQ. When fighting a team backed by the US you take all the help you can get). Then there is the RESISTANCE insurgency among the people and rank and file fighters in Afghanistan that we focus so much of our effort against. The problem is that the more one pushes against a resistance, the more it pushes back. An additional problem is that a Revolution is largely political, and our military leadership won't touch it. So we avoid the main effort issues and instead pour our soul into tackling the supporting effort. This cannot work.
The Taliban came into being to clean up the mess of Afghan governance that emerged when the Soviet supported team collapsed. The current Taliban insurgency began to grow once the US picked our man to run the country, put him into office, allowed him to form a government solely of Northern Alliance members, codify it in a Constitution that bans any legal challenge by any opposition party; and then dedicated our national wealth and military power to protecting the same. I know it's a big pill to swallow, but we need to gulp that down all the same and reassess.
The current appreciation of the problem and approach to resolving it is a mess. I see little better in Madhu's suggestion. Perhaps best for us all to just let Afghanistan and Pakistan sort this out on their own. If we were smarter we could facilitated a less bloody resolution, but the problem is that we always want to shape outcomes to suit us.
Yes Pakistan conducts UW to leverage the Taliban to support Pakistan interests in Afghanistan. This is what states do. EXACTLY like the US and Pakistan did in concert when the Soviets were supporting a puppet regime instead of us. Key for Americans to appreciate is that Pakistan did not change teams or priorities, the US did.
How does one distinguish between this "proxy" Taliban and a nationalist taliban?????? I don't want to shoot the wrong one. While this flirts with an important point, it misses it. What we are really talking about is the REVOLUTIONARY insurgency among the Taliban leadership taking refuge in Pakistan (and yes, that the government of Pakistan covertly supports and leverages to serve their own interests; as does AQ. When fighting a team backed by the US you take all the help you can get). Then there is the RESISTANCE insurgency among the people and rank and file fighters in Afghanistan that we focus so much of our effort against. The problem is that the more one pushes against a resistance, the more it pushes back. An additional problem is that a Revolution is largely political, and our military leadership won't touch it. So we avoid the main effort issues and instead pour our soul into tackling the supporting effort. This cannot work.
The Taliban came into being to clean up the mess of Afghan governance that emerged when the Soviet supported team collapsed. The current Taliban insurgency began to grow once the US picked our man to run the country, put him into office, allowed him to form a government solely of Northern Alliance members, codify it in a Constitution that bans any legal challenge by any opposition party; and then dedicated our national wealth and military power to protecting the same. I know it's a big pill to swallow, but we need to gulp that down all the same and reassess.
The current appreciation of the problem and approach to resolving it is a mess. I see little better in Madhu's suggestion. Perhaps best for us all to just let Afghanistan and Pakistan sort this out on their own. If we were smarter we could facilitated a less bloody resolution, but the problem is that we always want to shape outcomes to suit us.
Madhu:
I guess Harvard and Stanford did you more good than harm because your 0923 post is about best most plain spoken outline of the problem and solution I've read. I'll second (there I am in the back going "Me too. Me too.") that by going small but not going away you could actually really honest to goodness pressure them.
Go smaller, but don't go away and don't leave too quickly, I think. But I don't know.
This is outside a strictly military discussion, but for discussion purposes anyway:
<em>1. Set aside all talk of an 'insurgency' in Afghanistan. Proceed on the forest-thinning principle; i.e., first clear out all the Taliban fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan on behalf of Pakistan's military, then see how much of a genuine insurgency is left to deal with.
2. Recognize that the greatest obstacle to winning the war isn't the Taliban or even Pakistan's regime; the obstacle is that Washington has reasoned itself into a false dilemma regarding Pakistan's sheltering of Taliban that wreak murder and mayhem in Afghanistan.
3. State the dilemma in plain English to see how silly it is: EITHER start a war with Pakistan OR continue to put up with the protection its military affords Taliban groups it finds useful.
4. Reflect on how the Taliban came into being, and how certain among them became useful to Pakistan's military, to understand that Washington has made a mountain out of a molehill and called this a dilemma.
5. Admit the dilemma is an illusion after considering this simple example:
Say I provide much of your material support, then I see you engaging in behavior I consider not only destructive but also an attack on me. I repeatedly warn you to stop the behavior but each time I do so, I give you $1,000.
How, then, how would you read my words? As a warning to stop the behavior? Or as encouragement to continue the behavior -- encouragement that for some reason I don't wish to clearly articulate?</em>
http://pundita.blogspot.com/2011/06/how-us-can-win-afghan-war-in-eight…
Bill M.- as usual, good points. Agree to most.
Charles- I too, like Peter, challenge your logic. To assume us pulling out will throw the region into any more chaos than it is in now is, I'd argue, an invalid assumption. Many can and have made the argument that things are more chaotic with us in there.
The bottom line is "Afghanistan" is bigger than just the country- and yet we are playing like minor-leaguers in the "New Great Game". These guys (China, India, Russia, Drug traffickers, Pakistan, power brokers in Afghanistan, Iran, the Stans to the North, and even NATO to a certain extent) are playing us like a cheap fiddle. China has to be laughing at our juvenile attempts at strategic effect as we bankrupt ourselves (in toto- not just in Afghanistan or militarily) in an area that they stand to gain more from being stable than we do. For crying out loud- do you really think Pakistan's actions with respect to the support of the Haqqani Network are anything other than regional politics? With India moving more and more into Afghanistan- are we really that naive and ignorant to think Pakistan will ever really help us like COMISAF purports to want them to? Wake up!!! Populations are not altruistic and we really are mentally-challenged if we think anyone in the region gives a hoot about our interests or stability.
But let's say, for the sake of argument, that the region <em>will</em> implode if we leave, and that that implosion <em>will</em> be terrible for us in some way. I still challenge anyone to make the argument that we can keep that from happening or that we are keeping that from happening by staying there. The logic is flawed, I'm afraid. I submit that even if we stayed there a hundred years like McCain wants to and build schools, pressure the president of GIRoA to fire district governors, demand women be educated and get jobs, train police and army, and keep spending like there's no tomorrow- at the end of the day we'll still have a country that is unable to add to any regional stability. Simply put, the logic of our stability ops and COIN doctrine is flawed: those lines of effort/lines of operation templates for "success" are not how a stable nation emerges.
Terrorism has deepers roots in that part of the world than the anti-Soviet jihad, although the money and expertise that flocked to Afghanistan and Pakistan grew it and nurtured it and mutated it. It was kept on by the Pakistani state institutions for reasons of regional strategy and internal power politics. Afghanistan is meant to be a client state of Pakistan and now we Americans have decided, no, <em>our</em> client state. You are too much trouble, former Cold War client state. You were only supposed to kill your own people, not host groups that kill ours.
Then the mutated intellectual virus traveled back to the West through our immigrant flows and the internet.
I'm not in the military but I understand a little (everyone has a different experience) about how it is to live as an immigrant in the West: the emotional push and pull with the new culture, the awed and sometimes irritating remembrance of the old, the old country ties closed and re-opened, the guilt at not being properly American, or properly Indian, or properly Pakistani, or properly whatever.
This is the emotional sea that the fish swims in to use a pseudo-Mao analogy.
Cell phones - tools of communication and ideology - are everywhere in AfPak, with an emphasis on the Pak, that curious country whose real and complicated and important history is to be ignored for the fictions built up in our military institutions - it seems to me, as an outsider - over the decades of the Cold War and following.
Curious phenomenon.
So a lot of this is not a military fight, per se, as many of you have stated.
The Pak Army is already radicalized (and this partly by its own intelligence service - the ISI) against the Americans and Indians, and we are paying for their increasing armament against India. Under the security umbrella we provide (always easy to game an American with the "we're scared" tripe) the Afghans will continue to be viewed as a client state. As long as this occurs, "afpak" will be one of the unique and special places people will go to acquire expertise and emotional satisfaction at properly fulfilling an ideological role. People are drawn to certain places and certain people and certain ideas.
It IS a clash of civilizations, but not in the Huntington way of describing it. We are all learning to live with one another in a globalized and highly mobile world with large scale immigration and capital flows and haven't yet figured it out.
So we try Western development theory through the UN or the World Bank or the IMF or USAID or, even, invading countries and armed nation building.
Sometimes people poke back in an appropriate way - hey, why does the head of the IMF have to be European? We protest....
But at other times, people who want to rule and want to be in charge and want their own ideology to win out (the way we want ours to win out) kill.
I don't suppose anyone will listen, though.
*You have all the answers. And so it is.
*"You" being the elite and decision making institutions of the West. I did my time at Harvard and Stanford, if briefly. Brilliant people who don't listen when data contradicts their precious theories. Washington and the DOD are probably like that, too.
Bill,
To clarify, "Terrorism didn't arise out of Afghanistan." Period. No "because" need come after that.
Terrorism arose out of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and a number of other places. It MIGRATED to Afghanistan because some of the members of AQ had experience and relationships there from their time supporting the Muj as foreign fighters, and because the Taliban offered them hospitality under Pashtunwali.
As you point out so well, the safehaven requirements for terrorism, for a non-state political organization not foucsed on the defeat per se of any one government, but rather political/behavior change among many govenrments, is something that can be found almost anywhere. Anywhere.
The problem in AFPAK is horribly inflated and miss-defined. Tragically so. When people talk of the "vital interests" or the "sanctuary" issue I am ceaselessly amazed by the terms they describe them in.
Bob
The safehaven argument while valid to a point has been taken to the extreme. The safehaven requirements for terrorists (different than training hundreds of insurgents) are actually minimal, and while large training areas are obviously desirable for weapons, explosive and physical training the fact is a home, a basement, a rural area etc. can and has sufficed as a safehaven to train for and plan terrorist attacks. The 9/11 attacks didn't require the safehaven of Afghanistan, they could of (and partly were) conceived in Germany, Malaysia, etc., and much of their training (flight and martial arts) was conducted in the U.S.. We need to target the terrorists and those who support the terrorists (funding, other). Dreams of "stablizing" the world are beyond are ability and I believe if we continue to pursue this strategy we will bankrupt our nation, and basically defeat ourselves chasing our foolish shadows. Stabilizing Afghanistan in the long run will do little to prvent further attack attempts on the West, but good global intelligence, AT and CT will.
We also need to question the whole concept of stability and how it is achieved. We can force/coerce compliance if we develop sufficient security forces that remain loyal to the State (big if), but that is a forced/coerced behavior that will only last so long. Stability is an artificial condition that is expensive to maintain, and we can bleed out our entire piggy bank trying to enforce it in one small place in the world like Afghanistan and if we achieve it, was it really worth the cost? The rest of the Stans are instable, Yemen is instable, much of African is instable, Mexico is instable, etc. Instability normally indicates the need for change, so the last thing we should do is lock a bad system in place by pouring out our national wealth to develop an Army to hold it in place. Our first priority must be protecting America, and we have wrongly in my opinion assumed that means stablizing every little crap hole in the world.
Terrorism didn't arise out of Afghanistan because the Taliban provided safehaven. Terrorism emerged in that part of the world due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in a jihad that we facilitated/encouraged, and it didn't stop when the Soviets left.
We have a lot of half baked ideas floating around masquerading as intellectual insights that guide strategy. They are simply red herring that have taken the follow me crowd down the wrong path.
I don't completely disagree with those who claim that instability in this region is bad for the US, but that doesn't address my real question, which is do we really have the capacity to change the fundamental problems that are causing instability. I'm far from convinced we do. We've already committed to a strong central government, which doesn't have a strong historical basis in Afghanistan and which has been pretty ineffective (to say the least) from a governance and development standpoint.
Really I'm at a loss for why the military thinks we have the expertise to do governance and development. I got it that the State Department hasn't done a great job of it either, but that doesn't magically make the military qualified to do it.
Also, the whole "we can't afford to lose" argument to me seems to be incredibly unhelpful when dealing with the Afghan government. If we truly can't afford to lose/leave, then GIROA has all the leverage in negotiating what we can and can't do, since we've recognized them as a sovereign government.
Last, the idea that we can sustain a SOF type CT campaign by itself is false, not just in terms of our capabilities, but in terms of what GIROA will tolerate. The very operations that draw the greatest resistance from President Karzai are night raids and air strikes. Someone has to explain to me how we will operate a CT campaign without these options, because if there's no governance or development (i.e. money) then there's no chance that Karzai allows us to continue SOF Ops as we conduct them now.
Charles,
Define how regional instability is going to "cost us a lot more." This is the big myth (I would argue) of our current policy. How does it cost us a lot more? I'd agree, if we pull out and stick our heads in the sand, something may reach out and touch us, however it could just as easily reach out and touch us from Yemen, Somalia, or Mexico and we're not trying to unf#$k those s#$tholes with massive and massively inefficient injections of national might. Define the logic. I'd argue there is no logical reason why we need to be there. The Pak nuke question makes things different in the region, but our being there does not make a Pak state collapse any less likely.
I agree with the comment above about finding the focus of this operation. However, I still believe that a hasty exit will do nothing to bring stability to the region or the US. We can argue money all we want but if this region is unstable, it's going to cost us a lot more that the current bill.
I'll admit that I'm no expert when it comes to Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the surrounding areas. However, I don't think the stability issue is hindered by our presence. Maybe I'm way off and truthfully I'm going more on my gut than anything else. But, I feel a hasty withdrawal is going to be bad.
Nor is it helped by ISAF's refusal to question any of the possible invalid assumptions that drive its ops and actions. It is a religion- and they go to the temple every day and nod in agreement to the sermon of "irreversible momentum". And yet perhaps nothing we are doing is sustainable by the Afghans (or even by us, for that matter).
Staying indefinitely- or a little bit longer- means continuing to insert our forces into an internal (civil war?) fight between tribal entities who are being used by internal and external parties in a complex regional power play that is something we'd rather ignore as too distasteful and below us to get mixed up in. And so we are reduced to being used ourselves.
Making sure our country is safe from AQ and staying in Afghanistan with conventional fighting forces are two wholly and separate things. Our people know that- its time we listened to them.
This whole situation isn't helped by ISAF's continued foot dragging on presenting their preferred course of action. I suspect that's because they know there's no political appetite to maintain the status quo and the dirty truth is we haven't succeeded in changing the strategic equation enough to pull out of any contested districts without significant degradation in the security situation.
To me the economics demand serious discussion of the long term sustainability of the ANSF and the infrastructure we're funding now.
Peter, I tend to agree with you with the stability part. I don't think we're addressing (nor can we) the factors that lead to instability in Afghanistan. Our answer is to throw a lot of money and effort at building security forces in hopes they'll be able to hold something in place (stability), but something will more than likely be non-functional, and the stability will be forced rather than a natural stability that is sustainable. Stability operations can be counterproductive when they delay needed and desired social and political change.
We won't see economic and social progress until the conflict ends, and that means either someone needs to win, or both sides tire of fighting and agree on a negotiated settlement (temporary stability, but still better than forced).
Downsizing will not necessarily impact our ability to conduct operations against AQ and their trannational affilitates who seek to harm the West(whose numbers are relatively small). We can still leave the hunter-killer teams in place and secure them well enough to facilitate operations against the really bad actors that intend to attack the U.S. or Europe. We need to decide if attacking the insurgents is really in our long term interests.
If we have other objectives in Afghanistan like a long term presence in the region to influence Iran, China, Pakistan, etc. then that is another issue, but let's not confuse our COIN and stability efforts with anti-AQ operations.
Whatever the decision is, let's be honest about what we're trying to accomplish and how we plan to it, and then do it. The status quo IMO isn't acceptable.
I can't imagine how things are going to get that much better by staying there only for a little bit longer. No matter what, the reality is that we're leaving far sooner than required to leave the place as a stable entity (which would be a far longer time than anyone cares to commit), so what is the difference? I think the dire predictions for U.S. security are overblown. It will be chaos in Afghanistan for a bit, but none of these states are any more likely to produce threats that reach out and touch the U.S. than any of the other failed and failing states around the world. The logic for sticking it out a bit longer just doesn't add up when you admit that we're pulling out soon one way or the other.
If we depart, how long is it until Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan all pose serious, serious risks to US security? One could argue that close proximity of US forces serves as deterrent. One could also argue that it doesn't matter where US forces are until we match our bark with our bite.
I think an expedited withdrawal is an awful idea. I can't imagine how things get better by simply calling it quits.