Two good reads at the US Army War College's
Organizing To Compete in Political Terrain by Dr. Nadia Schadlow.
In this analysis, the author identifies some of the continuing obstacles to
achieving civil-military integration in war. She argues that there are continuing
disagreements about who should lead the shaping of the political landscape in
war and that while doctrine has advanced in this area, good doctrine does not
guarantee the effective execution of governance-related tasks. Sound operational
approaches are required as well.
Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is and Why We Need It
by Dr. Anna Simons
Moving beyond "unity of effort" and "unity of command," this monograph identifies
an overarching need for "unity of vision." Without someone at the helm who has a certain kind--not turn, not frame, but kind--of mind, asymmetric
confrontations will be hard (if not impossible) to win. If visionary generals
can be said to possess "coup d'oeil," then unity of vision is cross-cultural
coup d'oeil. As with strategic insight, either individuals have the ability
to take what they know of another society and turn this to strategic--and war-winning--effect,
or they do not. While having prior knowledge of the enemy is essential, strategy
will also only succeed if it fits "them" and fits "us." This means that to convey
unity of vision a leader must also have an intuitive feel for "us."
Both works are well worth a look. They're eminently relevant to current
issues and the broader practice of small wars, and are written by authors we respect a
great deal.
Comments
<i>Does this mean that you agree that (1) much of our foreign policy -- today and for the future -- is focused on COIN and nation building and (2) that these efforts are being directed at and/or contemplated for rogue, weak, failing and/or failed states (these being the "mouthfulls" of stuff that we can't possibly chew)?</i>
Not at all. When we bite more than we can chew it's generally not a result of any coherent or proactive foreign policy. It's more typically a reaction to external events, and it's often driven as much by domestic politics as by foreign policy. American domestic politics provide an odd set of mixed imperatives: American leaders are expected to respond forcefully and aggressively (rationality is not required) to events, but they are also expected to drape such actions in a sanctimonious shroud of noble and beneficient purpose. This combination often leads us to pursue objectives - like the installation of democratic governance in Afghanistan - that make no sense at all from a foreign policy perspective.
I see no reason whatsoever to think that any further such entanglement is being contemplated. It would probably take another 9/11 scale attack to conjure up such a thing, and even that might not do it.
<i>What end(s) do you see these present ill-advised nation-building/COIN efforts -- focused on "problem" states -- being directed to achieve? </i>
I'm not at all convinced that there were any coherent ends or goals... if there were, they might have been realistically assessed against probabilities of success and available resources, and some decisions might have been made.
It shoukld be noted that "problem states" generically are not the focus of any current action: we remain quite content to deter, contain, and ignore most of them. Given the general perception of the current rather impulsive excursions in Iraq and Afghanistan, I wouldn't expect those efforts to be repeated.
Dayuhan said:
"I would rather re-focus our policy-makers on the limitations of COIN and nation-building and try to persuade them not to bite off mouthfulls that we haven't the will or the means to chew."
Does this mean that you agree that (1) much of our foreign policy -- today and for the future -- is focused on COIN and nation building and (2) that these efforts are being directed at and/or contemplated for rogue, weak, failing and/or failed states (these being the "mouthfulls" of stuff that we can't possibly chew)?
If so:
What end(s) do you see these present ill-advised nation-building/COIN efforts -- focused on "problem" states -- being directed to achieve?
Regardless of the grand strategic directive received by the military services, our leaders must be able to effectively receive, refine (when necessary),develop, translate, execute and manage vision as discussed by Dr. Simons.
I do not believe it is helpful to discuss COIN and "combined arms operations" as an either-or proposition. The directives and wishes of our democratically elected leadership bound us in the military services. To argue the merits of one operational strategy (that's really what COIN and combined arms operations are) is to miss the point that the Army in general and ARSOF in particular could do a much better job identifying, selecting, and educating (notice the absence of training) officers and NCOs with the ability to receive, refine (when necessary),develop, translate, execute and manage vision. Many of today's SOF operators are not as able to develop strategic awareness and strategic estimates as they should be. The directive for our Service Special Operations Commands to improve these competencies exists in the USSOCOM Strategy 2010 and the associated Strategic Plan. Dr. Simons seems to echoing, albeit from a different vantage point, what SOCOM has already recognized and directed. Moving beyond arguments about the merits of COIN to a robust discussion regarding the efficacy of today's military officers, especially those in the Special Operations Command, is where this discussion should go. I believe that individuals unable to grapple with the concepts that comprise "vision" should not serve the Army, or any organization, as leaders. For far to long we have promulgated the lie that "everyone is a leader". We need a renewed focus on leader identification, selection, education, and utilization and I believe the focus should start with analyzing the potential leader's ability to deal with vision in a myriad of situations that run the gamut from COIN to finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy with an Infantry platoon.
I want to give my SWJ Comment of the Week Award Nomination to Dayuhan for saying this:
<i>If we keep choking on what we bite off, that might mean we need better ways of biting and chewing, or it might mean we need to pay a little more attention to what we try to bite. If it's a steak, by all means bite it. If it's a shoe, don't. I think we bite way too many shoes.</i>
(I hope this html thing works this time)
<i>
This would be fine, if we did not have 3 billion new emerging capitalists to provide for.
Problem is, how does one (1) "indirectly rule" with such boundaries as these and, with these restrictions (2) transform various societies -- such that these societies might (3) adequately provide for the needs of the expanding global economy?</i>
None of these things are even remotely necessary.
We don't need to provide for 3 billion emerging capitalists. They will provide for themselves.
We don't need to indirectly rule anyone. We need only to manage direct armed threats to us or - to the extent that our interests demand it - to our allies.
We don't need to transform anyone. The few remaining rogue, failed, and failing states pose no threat or obstacle that can't be managed by deterrence and containment.
Gian, re this...
<i>I would rather re-focus our Army and its leaders away from Coin and back to combined arms competencies. This doesnt mean ditching the lessons of Counterinsurgency and nation building over the last eight years and in fact they must be integrated fully into the institutional and field force.</i>
I would far rather re-focus our policy makers on the limitations of COIN and nation-building, and try to persuade them not to bite off mouthfuls that we haven't the will or the means to chew.
If we keep choking on what we bite off, that might mean we need better ways of biting and chewing, or it might mean we need to pay a little more attention to what we try to bite. If it's a steak, by all means bite it. If it's a shoe, don't. I think we bite way too many shoes.
From the "Better Than COIN" article by Anna Simons; at the link given by Ken White at his 4:50 PM comment above:
"The grand political bargain we propose is that: America will guard its sovereign prerogatives, responding to violations of sovereignty with overwhelming force, in return for which it promises other states that it will not infringe on their sovereign prerogatives, including their rights to cultural integrity, national dignity and religious freedom."
This would be fine, if we did not have 3 billion new emerging capitalists to provide for.
Problem is, how does one (1) "indirectly rule" with such boundaries as these and, with these restrictions (2) transform various societies -- such that these societies might (3) adequately provide for the needs of the expanding global economy?
(This need to transform societies -- so as to provide for the expanding global economy -- stems from the 21st Century requirement to provide for such great and rising powers as China, India and Russia, as they, themselves, attempt transformation and, thereby, bet the fate of their nations, the fate of their 3 billion-plus populations, and the fate of the currrent great power peace, on capitalism and markets. The stakes? If these great and rising powers fail in their attempts to transform along capitalist/market lines, then we get the "worst case scenerio," to wit: catastrophically failed great and rising powers with massive amounts -- and diverse kinds -- of "loose" WMD.)
Thus, in the 21st Century it is required that:
a. Not only "rogue, weak, failed and failing states" be transformed to meet the needs of (more than?) half the world's population, but also that
b. Such great and important powers as the United States, the EU and Japan, likewise, be somewhat transformed -- so as to meet these emerging giants massive new needs.
Due to the potential/probabilty that such, world-wide, transformations will entail some infringement of the rights of all concerned (those in China, Russia, India, et al; those in the United States, the EU and Japan, etc.; and those in the "rogue, weak, failing and failed states"), then does anyone NOT see the need to (1) bolster the capabilities of one's institutions and military and police forces and to (2) otherwise prepare and plan for massive amounts and various kinds of anger, resentment and rebellion?
Such must be seen as being part and parcel to hand that we have been dealt. (Or, maybe better put, to the hand that we have dealt ourselves.)
Dr. G.,
Stilwell, MacArthur -- I don't think they would have called what they did COIN or anything other than trying to win Asia back from the Japanese.
The point of having someone with 'vision' devise THE plan (a la Mr. Gill and The Gill Plan) is to NOT fall into a label trap, which is where we wallow today. The aim instead should be to find the key that unlocks the conflict so that you (meaning we) can prevail! Combined arms, yes. But that hardly precludes familiarity with those we're up against -- as proved critical with the Japanese, and I'm pretty sure with the Nazis and even the British once upon a time.
The fact that there's so little consensus, and so much wrangling of the either/or variety, simply highlights the problems we've got.
To be clear, 'unity of vision' does NOT require that we fight in a particular style or by some specific means -- or that everyone get trained in anthropology. If so, neither George Kennan nor Gandhi would have been cited as exemplars. But -- what they came up with was pretty effective, wasn't it?!
Hope this helps,
Anna
<b>A Muslim:</b><blockquote>"This is just more bluffing."</blockquote>Not really. More like calling someone else's bluff instead of foolishly trying to counter theirs with one of our own...<blockquote>"The insurgents will always ride out the storm and wait for you to leave."</blockquote>What if we were smart enough to drop in rapidly, rain total death and destruction and just leave rapidly, no stay intended. None... :D
At the risk of diverting the thread, note what <b>Anna Simons</b> wrote:<blockquote><u>"Better than COIN</u> would be this:
http://faculty.nps.edu/asimons/docs/the_sovereignty_solution.pdf" (emphasis added /kw)</blockquote>Lady after my own heart!!!
Good thinking. That'll work. It does not cater to our nominal opponents strengths as our current approaches do. It is not COIN and it doesn't require a massive Army -- merely a good one.
We can do that...
P.S.
Liked the book when I picked it up a few years ago. <a href=http://www.amazon.com/Company-they-Keep-Inside-Special/dp/0380731274/re…;.
What if there are more things to do out there than just Coin, Dr Simons? If we produce leaders as you suggest what happens when the US Army confronts a foe that fights beyond laying IEDs and small arms ambushes?
Me, I would rather re-focus our Army and its leaders away from Coin and back to combined arms competencies. This doesnt mean ditching the lessons of Counterinsurgency and nation building over the last eight years and in fact they must be integrated fully into the institutional and field force. But we should not be overcome by them to the point where we are placing such attributes as "cross cultural" expertise above a given leaders ability to perform in his or her basic branch and at higher levels of command the ability to integrate and synchronize all arms.
It is combined arms competency, as General McMaster has said, that should be the ticket for the US Army to get into any kind of operation that it may conduct be it Coin, hybrid, Hic, stability, whatever.
It seems to me that your recommendations for a brave new batch of army leaders--schooled and practiced in the arts of cultural anthropology and social connections--potentially puts our Army and the nation in strategic peril because it takes our eye of the ball that is most important: combined arms.
gian
Ms. Simons:
You write well, but many of these ideas are not practical.
If you want to police the world, don't think that quick and huge military action is going to keep everyone in line, if you don't have the army to fill every major city of the world for eternity.
This is just more bluffing.
The insurgents will always ride out the storm and wait for you to leave.
<snip>
Everyone needs to read more non-Western history, or more history about non-Westerners engaging in what everyone calls COIN. Sigh. No one I mention in the piece wasn't willing to be ruthless! (Okay, except for Gandhi who was ruthlessly non-violent.)
Given that COIN is the current coin of the realm, we might at least want to do it better.
Better than COIN would be this:
http://faculty.nps.edu/asimons/docs/the_sovereignty_solution.pdf
They say tread quietly and carry a big stick.
The Americans don't tread quietly, and it doesn't matter what type of stick they choose to invest in...the enemy will always be ready with the appropriate shield.
If you lose COIN competency, the enemy will attack you asymmetrically. If you lose conventional skills, the enemy will attack you symmetrically.
In other words, if you refuse to tread quietly, you will always be in the precarious situation of having to be ready for any enemy, using any number of strategies and tactics.
That is, of course, if your projected power is based mainly on a bluff.
The title of Dr Simons's piece is "Got Vision," but what happens if the US Army winds up in a conflict resembling what the IDF faced in 2006 against a foe that fights and sticks and requires combined arms competencies at all organizational levels? The operative question then becomes "got combined arms skills"? And the troubling answer after so many years of doing, writing, and analyzing Coin and Culture would be NO.
I get it, in a very narrow future of Coin which is what Dr Simons writes about the quest for leaders who can connect, are mavens of linking social groups, who have "cross cultural" expertise are all necessary leader attributes. But what happens when that given brigade or division commander has to move beyond cultural conflict into combat and the need for combining arms? History suggests some serious problems when armies have become so focused on small wars that they had lost the ability to fight against an enemy who knows how to do the same: e.g. French Army against the Prussians in 1871; British Army in Second Boer War; ARVN in Vietnam against the NVA; and the IDF in Lebanon in 2006.
Alas, we still seem to be in the grips of anthropologists who seem to see present and future war as nothing more than better cultural understanding. Yet even Coin wars at their essence are about death and destruction and combat. What happens when we have produced a bevy of colonels and generals who understand cultural conflict but are not able to combine all arms in their organizations against a foe that fights? Then what are we left with?
Cultural understanding to be sure is important, but it should never eclipse the absolute necessity for our Army and Military to be able to fight and kill the enemies of the US through all arms integration: that fundamental attribute should be the ticket to get into any show of present and future conflict and operations. Even, dare I say, if that means selecting our future leaders with the essential, requisite skill of combined arms competencies--OVER--cultural understanding.
gian
A Muslim,
Let's continue the lovefest as long as we can. I concur with Michael Bloomberg.
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/08/03/mayor_bloomberg_…
To me, that's strategic communications, Psychops, Psychwar, MISO, or whatever you wish to call it. Personally, it falls into Facta Non Verba.
Mike
Mike,
This is what happens when you refer to someone of the opposite gender by her first name... if you'd called her "Dr Simons" no housekeeping would have been needed! People jump quickly to conclusions...
My first reaction is that the it's not possible to unify strategy with policy unless you have a policy, ideally one that pursues a clear and achievable goal. Probably shouldn't comment until I've read the piece, though... download in progress.
A Muslim,
I don't think we disagree too much as you and Ken have sorted out.
I think Anna's main point is, "This monograph is not meant to challenge current conventional wisdom so much as push beyond it."
That's past the deuling strawman debate of enemy versus population centric COIN and onwards towards policy and strategy that are post-colonial and post-GWOT.
As a minor housekeeping point, she's not my lady friend. She was my professor in anthropology of conflict and a seminar on combat advising. As you can read from her extensive biography, I'm the last one that she needs affirmation from :).
Mike
<b>A Muslim:</b><blockquote>"It's all about the narrative and methodical prioritization."</blockquote>Agree on the latter but one should take great care putting any real trust in the former. Reality has a habit of intruding on narratives which work until the masses realize they're just that, narratives...<blockquote>"...and not theoretical ability a.k.a. bluffing) it can thrive."</blockquote>Agree.<blockquote>"If there were to be a hegemonic state that provided a different claim for legitimacy (other than the UN and Geneva conventions for instance) it would have the ability to both conquer (in the real sense of the word) as well as win hearts and minds."</blockquote>Heh. I doubt it. History says not. Sic transit gloria mundi...
The problem being that worldly people are involved, thus positively insuring that any glory -- or hegemony -- will be transitory.
With respect to the conquer, numbers matter. One should <i>never</i> forget that. Surprise and skill can often lead to wondrous feats but those advances can rarely be sustained for long in the face of superior numbers. Math works...
With respect to hearts and minds, that's a myth. Most people will never give a cause, any cause, more than a small portion of either their heart or mind and that only for a limited time. Anyone who expects more will be disappointed...
As I have stated here before, I believe the Mongol approach (as we are calling it here, although I don't really like the "real" mongol approach) only doesn't work in these times because of the new "modern" system of sovereignty/nation-states/secularism/nationalism/etc.
If there were to be a hegemonic state that provided a different claim for legitimacy (other than the UN and Geneva conventions for instance) it would have the ability to both conquer (in the real sense of the word) as well as win hearts and minds.
The problem comes in when that hegemonic state bites off more than it can chew. So long as it only conquers according to actual ability (and not theoretical ability a.k.a. bluffing) it can thrive.
It's all about the narrative and methodical prioritization.
<b>A Muslim:</b>
The former.
That situation also tends to focus a lot of disparate leaders into a form of singular vision. It leads to a unity of effort...
The latter statement, while also correct, is the Mongol approach I believe most populations will no longer tolerate. However, when it comes to raw survival as opposed to expansion, ideology or policy, not necessarily swimming but survival, just not sinking -- one can never be sure that solution won't be pursued. That's when raw numbers will trump even the best visions and unified efforts...
Ken:
Can you elaborate on the condition that the war be existential.
Do you mean that the population has to be placed in a situation of sink or swim before it will actually start kicking and splashing in an appropriate rhythm?
Or are you referring to the conquered population? I.e. if the enemy is completely wiped out it doesn't matter much whether or not you capture their hearts and minds.
Or, did you mean both?
<b>A Muslim:</b>
Not implied, I flatly said it, so yes, we agree on that. ;)
Yep, it is a castle in the sky. One that is only built, for warfighting, in existential wars -- no society will really tolerate it short of that. Then, as I said, numbers and not visions or intentions will make the difference.
Academics exist to give us ideals. She has done that and to try to do what she suggests would be an improvement over not trying. Unfortunately, too many politicians seem to hew to those ideals without a pragmatic assessment of what can really be done...
Also Ken...
I think you implicitly agreed with me when you said that no matter how good the guy on top is, and no matter how great his vision, it is bound to get screwed up along the way to the bottom.
That is my point exactly.
To go ahead and throw in there, as a solution, that all of the people from the top guy to the squad leader have to all be on the same vision and that they have to be perfect leaders is a castle in the sky.
I'm trying to say (pardon my 'SWJ speak') that I can't really figure out whether she is trying to tell me that it's all about 1) focusing on the top with an overarching vision...or 2) about focusing on the bottom squad leaders' ability to be pragmatic.
If its both, then who needs an article to tell them that the key to winning is to do good things and not do dumb things?
<b>A Muslim:</b>
I'm pretty sure she has it right and her claim isn't fallacious. Not at all.
However, I agree with your contention that there really is no real way to "do Coin." Short of the Mongol solution, that is...
The problem is not in finding or identifying those leaders, there are a lot of them about. The problem is getting them into the positions best suited for their talents, keeping them there and thus obtaining that unity of vision -- and effort.
Human processes will insure that the best vision from the top gets fragmented, diverted and twisted as it passes down through other 'leaders' that do not support the top and who have subordinates who in turn do not fully agree with either leader. The Mongol solution applies in that also. <b>None</b> of us can use those techniques today...
The bureaucracy of organizations or entities and human nature combine to insure that only rarely short of an existential war -- and then the numbers rule -- will the right person be in the job where they can be most effective.
The laws of probability thus mean that due to almost absolute inability to invariably select, appoint and retain the best persons for specific jobs, both sides in that COIN fight will have successes and failures resulting in the historical messy draw...
Well the vision thing had me, until I found out the whole point of the article is 'leader-centric Coin.'
I came out with the conclusion that there is no real way to do Coin, it's all hit and miss, and it requires a bunch of independent thinking pragmatic squad leaders....??? So where is the issue of a unified vision from up top?
There is a claim in the beginning of the article that having a good leader will cause everything else to fall in place. I immediately decided that this claim is completely fallacious, but before I could throw up the flag, I find out that the bases are already covered with the bit about world class squad leaders.
Sorry to dis your lady's work Mike Few.
All,
I would encourage everyone to take the time to read these monographs. Dr. Schadlow and Dr. Simons are helping the theory catch up with the practice. In doing so, they help explain the "rules of the game." For a young company commander, that difference in understanding can be the difference between mission success and failure. Yes, I am a little biased. Anna is one of my favorite anthropologists, and I'm glad to see her finding her voice and stride.
Mike