The United States faces three primary existing and emerging strategic challenges that are most likely to preoccupy senior decision-makers in the coming years:
- Defeating both the Sunni Salifi-Takfiri and Shia Khomeinist brands of violentIslamist radicalism;
- Hedging against the rise of a hostile or more openly confrontational China and the potential challenge posed by authoritarian capitalist states; and
- Preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.
Addressing these specific challenges should be at the forefront of the incoming administration's strategic calculations, particularly during the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which will help shape US defense strategy, planning, and force structure over the next twenty years.
Comments
Cross posted from the Small Wars Council Discussion Board.
As has been said, an assumption is the mother of all foul ups and here are three of them early on in the monograph that state a vision for the future:<blockquote>"The United States currently faces three major strategic challenges that will dominate its defense policy over the next decade or longer: defeating Islamist terrorist groups, hedging against the rise of a hostile and more openly confrontational China, and preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers."</blockquote>The first two are questionable at best while the third is correct.
Why war? Is there perhaps a better way? That is not to preclude military action; it does raise the question of <b>what kind of action, when and where.</b> I think those things need to be considered. No sense in a war if it can be preempted and stopped before it starts. Why do we have to accord the opponent the right to initiate action?
Is China confrontational or just single mindedly pursuing its interests? I doubt the author can answer that question, I certainly can't and suspect no one outside the politburo in Beijing can answer it...
This statement:<blockquote>"For a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of preparing for both irregular and conventional conflicts, the Army has continued to place its institutional center of gravity squarely in the area of conventional warfare.</blockquote> is I believe incorrect on two levels; such preparation need not be difficult; the simple fact is that we have not done it, preferring to keep our world War I and II Draft-filled Army training and personnel models instead of adapting to the professional force that we have. I also question the use of the tag line 'center of gravity' in this context and I'm not at all sure the Army has done what he suggests. Too early to tell, I think.
While the monograph proposes some fixes to those things, I doubt it's sweeping enough to make much -- enough -- difference.
The idea of 'Security Cooperation Brigade Combat Teams (SC BCTs)' is not a good one. We cannot afford the specialization suggested and to train to a specific capability is to insure that capability is employed. That is breeding a self fulfilling prophecy...
A prophecy that will consign us into a series of conflicts of a type wherein our very strength is an impediment and that plays to the opponents strengths. This is smart?
In discussing personnel strengths and problems, this statement is made with respect to Viet Nam:<blockquote>"...itself compelled to adopt accelerated promotions to fill shortages in the NCO ranks. The widespread promotion of enlisted soldiers (sometimes referred to as "shake-and-bake" sergeants) unprepared to handle NCO responsibilities played a major role in the breakdown in order, discipline, and unit effectiveness during that war."</blockquote> It is partly true -- it need not have been, had the training on those NCO Candidates been better (not longer, just better) it might well not have been true.
Point is, the monograph equates that to today's rapid promotions and the shortfall in NCOs -- and I suggest that by extension, it could apply to Officers. Part of the problem then and now was that the perception of need; i.e. one MUST have a CPT and a SFC to fill spaces designated for a CPT and a SFC; drove and drives too many actions. The real issues are (1) the level of competence at which the task must be performed; and (2) the competence of the individual selected to do that job and (3) the appropriateness AND thoroughness of the training for the job. We do not do that at well. His or her rank is immaterial. Or should be. In an Army that is over Officered and which has experienced significant NCO grade creep, raw numbers and ranks do NOT tell the whole story. Far from it.
In addressing the future, FM 3-0 Operations is cited:
<i>"For maximum effectiveness, stability and civil support tasks require dedicated training, similar to training for offensive and defensive tasks. Likewise, forces involved in protracted stability or civil support operations require intensive training to regain proficiency in offensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large-scale combat operations."</i>
I think two points in that statement require considerable thought. Is 'maximum effectiveness' truly achievable? Far more importantly, is it necessary (and sustainable given US unit rotation policies and necessities)? The second issue is 'intensive training.' I submit that IF we did a far better job of training new entrants in all ranks using outcome based training instead of the archaic standards based system system we now use, 'intensive' would be an unnecessary word. I mention this to point out that the current Army techniques of mellifluous as opposed to dry military-speak invite using the Army's apparent rhetoric against the institution.
All in all, the monograph is quite questionable. Given the comparison of its prescriptions to those recently seen here in the briefing prepared by COL Macgregor; I'd support the latter as more realistic and more visionary.
Added after viewing the slides:
In those slides accompanying the monograph, LTG Metz is quoted as saying <i>"We argued in those days that if we could do the top end skills, we could do all the other ones. I have had to eat a little crow."</i> LTG Caldwell is quoted as saying <i>"There will be people who naturally will say, "If I can do high end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations." What we have found through seven years [of war] is that is not the case."</i> I agree with both Officers. Mr. Krepinevich uses these quotes to reinforce his his position that specific training for the lower end of the combat spectrum is necessary.
I disagree. What's required is <u>better</u> training on the basic skills of soldiering for all new accessions, Officer and Enlisted. We also need better training of NCOs and Officers in PME courses. We simply do a mediocre job of training people and expect them to pick up the fine points by osmosis in a unit -- that does not work. We have proven that for a good many years.
As is to be expected, Mr. Krepinevich makes many excellent points and shows light on some glaring problems. Unfortunately, he has chosen the wrong solutions. Creating a specialized force and having two training regimens is potentially hazardous.
Persistent irregular warfare need not be a given in our future. Nor do we need to seek it -- which is effectively what is inadvertently advocated here. As has been said, we if forced to fight irregular elements can lose. That's embarrassing but not a threat to national survival. A major conflict lost could be more than threat to national survival...