Not So Big of a Tent

OK, I accept the factual correction that military historian Fred Kagan did not attend the February 2006 Fort Leavenworth Coin conference. I am somewhat skeptical of the notion that there were no links between the primary writers of FM 3-24 and the architects of the Surge (both military and civilian). Narrowly defining links to mean something like "direct coordination" between Surge planners and doctrine writers then it is fair to say that those types of links did not exist. But certainly within the milieu of the primary FM 3-24 doctrine writers and the Surge architects allowed for sharing of ideas through conversations, emails, etc. I do not think it just a coincidence that the operational method behind the Surge looked just like the printed counterinsurgency doctrine in FM 3-24 when it was published. Moreover there is the undeniable direct link in the most personal way with General Petraeus as a primary intellectual force behind FM 3-24 and his latter position as Force commander in Iraq and the executer of the Surge. Undoubtedly, both the writing of the new doctrine and possible changes to strategy and operations in Iraq were on his mind in 2006.

But history will work these things out in the years to come. As Malcolm X once said: "time will tell."

I think that FM 3-24 is fundamentally flawed because it is based on a narrow use of historical lessons learned and a singular theoretical construct of counterinsurgency war. I have made these arguments in more detail in other places. Dr David Kilkullen has pointed out two theoretical constructs for counterinsurgency war: population centric and enemy centric. Clearly FM 3-24 is based on the population centric theory which is the manuals tragic flaw. Since FM 3-24 is population centric then the derivative principle emerges that the population must be protected. From this derivative principle then comes the necessary operational method that calls for large numbers of troops dispersed throughout the population to protect the people. It is in this sense that FM 3-24 has driven us to dogmatism in how we interpret a given security problem and how we devise operational plans of action. In other words because of FM 3-24 when we see a problem of insurgency popping up our dogmatic response will be to send in lots of troops, disperse them amongst the people in order to protect them. Clausewitz tells us that a center of gravity in war is something to be discovered. FM 3-24 has done the discovering for us and hence placed us in a non-creative box.

The influence of FM 3-24 on the new FM 3.0 is clear. I will be forthright here; I believe that we are making a serious doctrinal mistake by equating stability operations on the same level with offense and defense. I think that the ability to conduct stability operations flows from the essential capability of conducting conventional combat operations that primarily involves fighting. This process does not work well in reverse. If an Army Lieutenant or Captain sits down to read the new FM 3.0 it gives him/her instruction on how to occupy, not how to fight. We should be worried.

I cringe at narrowly defining the future security environment of one primarily of insurgencies. The dustbin of history is full of people who wrongly proclaimed that these kinds or those kinds of wars are things of the past. A senior Soviet officer had told Stalin in 1939 that mechanized warfare "represented a dead end." Stalin listened. What a shock it must have been when late June 1941 rolls around.

Fred Kagan is certainly correct in his statement that he "did not play any role in the formulation of 3-24." He did not attend the Fort Leavenworth COIN FM conference in February 2006, and did not contribute intellectually to the concept and principles behind FM 3-24. I can state with some degree of certainty that none of the core members of the FM 3-24 writing team were involved in the development of the "surge" concept. In fact, to my knowledge there was no link whatsoever between the writing of 3-24 and the development of the "surge" plan; FM 3-24 was substantially complete by the late summer of 2006. I claim no intimate knowledge of the development of the "surge" concept, but believe it to have come later in 2006, while FM 3-24 was undergoing final revisions.

FM 3-24 is certainly a flawed document. One of my primary criticisms is that it does not properly account for changes in the nature of insurgency in a globalized world. Another is that it does not pay enough attention to the role of information operations in countering modern insurgency. Whatever its flaws, it has the merit of being the best counterinsurgency doctrine currently available to our Army and Marine Corps.

Joint COIN doctrine is currently being written with an eye toward correcting these shortcomings. The process of writing NATO COIN doctrine is also under way. These projects, and the ongoing debate over FM 3-0 and 3-24, are in my eyes evidence of an ongoing effort in our military forces to adapt to the realities of warfare in the 21st century--an age of persistent conflict that, sadly, is likely to look a lot like insurgency.

Good comment, SWJED. Insuring that no doctrinal publication gets excessive emphasis (or neglect) is indeed a leadership problem, pure and simple.

Years ago at Leavenworth, the introductory spiel from the department of Tactics was something to this effect:

"<b>What we are going to tell you is designed for gentle terrain on a balmy and clear June day in ideal conditions when the enemy is fairly passive and all your units and equipment are fully functional. In any other conditions you will have to think and adapt.</b>"

They may still do that. If they do not; they should. No doctrine is or can be a total solution to combat requirements.

Steve, your comment - <i>What you describe is the normal doctrine process: a fairly small group of people sketch in the general outline, but then it changes significantly over the course of its development, as literally hundreds of people have input. Joint counterinsurgency doctrine is currently in that early developmental stage as well</i> - is my experience as well with many doctrinal and conceptual military publications. As far as FM 3-24, even in my far flung corner of the doctrine empire (day job), I had many opportunities (read invitations) to comment on the draft at various stages - as did many others associated with the US Marine Corps.

In my mind FM 3-24 is a doctrinal publication that addresses pressing needs not met elsewhere. Ensuring FM 3-24 "stays in its doctrinal lane" is a leadership, education and training problem; not a deficiency in the doctrine or its intent. Moreover, <i>Counterinsurgency</i> should be viewed as a guide on how to think about and not what to think concerning COIN. The FM is up-front in stating that its intent is to provide guidelines not addressed elsewhere and encourages users to assess information from other sources in deciding how to apply COIN doctrine to specific circumstances. In short, the FM enjoins and encourages COIN students and practitioners to be constantly learning, flexible and adaptive - accepting nothing at face-value in a dynamic and difficult environment.

A.H.S.P:

Thanks for pointing out the mistakes in grammar and the typos. I rechecked the copy that I sent to the SWJ editors and the mistakes were mine. Thanks to the SWJ editors for correcting my regrettable mistakes.

Fred:

Most of the free world certainly labels you and the American Enterprise Institute as such. But OK, if you prefer not to be referred to in that way if I make reference to you again in published writings I will do my best to refrain from doing so. I did not explicitly say you were involved with the writing of the manual but the "outcome" of it. In this sense I think my choice of words were correct in suggesting that while you did not actually participate in writing the FM you surely contributed intellectually to the concept and principles behind it. The development of the Surge plan seems to have gone almost hand-in-hand with the writing of the FM. As one of the intellectual architects of the Surge plan you were clearly linked in with the actual writers of FM 3-24. As I understand it you also attended the conference at Fort Leavenworth in February of 2006.

I wrote this blog piece because while scholars like Steve Metz are correct to point out that there were many individuals involved with the writing of it, it still did not get a thorough vetting from the army like FM 100-5 did in the early 80s. In my piece I acknowledged why this was so and at the end of it I thanked the writers of FM 3-24 for their service in producing it.

But I still believe that there are problems with FM 3-24 and would like to see it seriously and widely debated throughout the army; just like I would like to see FM 3.0 debated in the same way. My friend LTC Paul Yingling agrees with me in this regard.

gian

Thank you Sock - corrections made... Now back to the regularly scheduled program.

Of course you're a "neo-conservative," Frederick. The Wikipedia link to which LTC Gentile binds you concludes that you are, and if Wikipedia says it is so...

Some housecleaning: Petraeus is spelled with an "e" after the "P," and not with an "a."

"The American Army and Marine Corps" combine to form a plural and require a different tense of verb.

These blue pencil suggestions are not intended in any way to belittle LTC Gentile, but rather to give him (or the SWJ powers) the chance to fix his prose as he would want it to be preserved online.

Steven, I read part of the rough draft, too, but I certainly would never consider myself part of the brain trust that confected the original or final product.

What might be mentioned is that it wasn't received without some controversy, and I hope you discuss that.

A key point of departure for some: It was too reliant doctrinally, at times, on examples from Vietnam and other Maoist struggles (which some of us thought OIF didn't well resemble), and other times on best practices discovered during the Tal Afar campaign, which others of us fresh from OIF thought wouldn't work as well in Baghdad or, especially, Anbar.

What also is going unmentioned is that FMs and other doctrinal documents on COIN written by those with a bent toward the USMC and Joint usage also were being penned. These and the FM being discussed weren't created in a vacuum, and there was, as a botanist might say, a great deal of cross-fertilization.

For those who don't know about Professor Metz, his recent publications concerning counter-insurgency more closely mirror my views than does FM 3-24.

He didn't link to it, but a handy -- and essential copy -- is available for free here:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB790.pdf

Steven,

Right with all that. What I'd like to explain was that Cullen Nutt had the difficult task to shed light on two different narratives:
PRIMO: FM 3-24 is essentially the product of a few people.
SECUNDO: the process that led to its writing has involved many people from differing organizations and with different agendas.
Theses two point of views are not opposite ones.In fact, Cullen Nutt (with whom i exchanged e-mails on the subject) had done a very nice piece. But it was a too short one :)
By the way, I'm sure John NAGL would agree with what you say about the complex process that gave birth to the manual. But I repeat myself: these two points of view (a few people at the beginning of the project that shaped its essential form AND a process of writing that involved many more people) are not opposite.
Cordialement
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: i hope you understand what i mean. I'm actually sick and, furthermore,please remember that english is not my mother tongue :)

Only one point: i think NUTT is well aware of the fact that the COIN Manual was the product of a few people, mainly NAGL (intellectually) and PETRAEUS (institutionally). If you read his article more carefully, you'd be struck by it.
Cordialement
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: and as usual please forgive my flawed english :)

I find it interesting that in both the previous post, and the comments there is little discussion on how broad the 'tent' <i>should</i> be. If Frank Kagan were involved, and I too have not heard that before now, this is a broader discussion than heretofore thought. Nonetheless, I would like to cast a vote for as broad a discussion as possible for several reasons. Most importantly I would like to include the types of people that are found on this forum, specifically anyone who is interested. The reasons for this are numerous:

1. As has been noted in many other forums, they military in general, and the Army and Marine Corps in particular, has been hemorrhaging leadership at the lower levels. Including those people, people that got out as Staff Sergeants, or Captains and who are not usually included in the 'Council of Colonels' that usually decides such things at least ensures that their institutional knowledge is not lost.

2. There is structural inbreeding in the military. Bringing in people who have never set foot in the military has the advantage of including people who don't have the built in preconceptions that those in the military don't even realize the have.

3. On the flip side of that, those people do have preconceptions of their own, and those preconceptions are usually a function of the society which they come from and therefore the society at large which the military is increasingly not a part of. By including as many people of society in the writing of doctrines we have a chance to create a doctrine that is known at large, and accepted by the civil society which the military is there to protect. This has the potential to overcome the disconnect between society and military operations that currently exists and can be seen every night on CNN (or any other news network for that matter). Basically, no one can complain that the military is not doing what it should be because everyone was in on the discussion, and knew the general doctrine (in and ideal world).

There will always be problems with doctrine, and the best doctrines can still lose wars, without proper application. Also, doctrine may need to be more fluid, since as far as I know Al Qaeda and Hamas and debating doctrine, they just change it whenever they feel like it.

Perhaps, we should start a "WikiDoctrine" page here, and see what we come up with.