By Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas P. Odom, of
Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism
By James D. Kiras
Published by Routledge
In Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism, James D. Kiras offers a strategic framework for analyzing the use of special operations forces (SOF) and special operations (SO) to achieve strategic effects as part of a larger conventional war. In doing so, Kiras defines both SOF and SO in a limited sense, excluding elite but more conventional forces by requiring a selection process to decide what makes SOF and SO "special". His strategic framework for analysis is bipolar. On one extreme Kiras offers "annihilation" strategy and reviews it in its many forms. On the other he expounds attrition-based strategy, expanding it to the point where it becomes a near catch-all of strategic thought.
Understanding the differences between annihilation and attrition is central to this monograph. Simply put annihilation theory posits that an enemy can be forced to surrender if struck in a certain way that paralyzes his ability to make war. Think of it as the "silver bullet" or "brass ring" approach to strategy, one that has great attraction to military and political leaders alike. Shoot that silver bullet into an opponent or pull a particular brass ring controlling his war making capacity and his will to fight on will evaporate along with his capacity. Attrition, on the other hand, is not so elegant for attrition means that one accepts war as a contest of morals and materiel, inextricably woven together, that requires time, will power, and blood to achieve victory. Annihilation strategy is therefore seductively attractive, especially when tied to technological advances such as the tank or airpower or the use of SOF against particular vulnerabilities.
Kiras contends that SOF are best used to complement a measured strategy of attrition. He largely dismisses annihilation strategy's quest for strategic paralysis of the enemy as a paralysis of thought. His critical question is what does using SOF in a particular SO achieve in the larger context of an attrition-based war? Kiras uses two case studies to illustrate what he means in asking that critical question. The first is the British effort to collapse the German war-making capacity by "busting" the Ruhr Valley dams. Kiras classifies the dambusting effort by 617 Squadron as a great but costly raid that fell far short of its intended goal to bring the German war machine to a grinding halt. His second case study is the helter-skelter tactical employment of the Special Air Service (SAS) brigade in conjunction with the invasion and liberation of France. Kiras contends that while a coordinated SAS campaign could have greatly assisted and perhaps accelerated the liberation of France, convoluted command and control, personalities, and poor planning meant the SAS paid a heavy price in lives to achieve little in the greater scheme of things. Both case studies are therefore offered as examples of how not to use SOF or mount SO.
I would say Kiras' monograph has great strengths and a few weaknesses. First of all, for the reader looking for a quick review of strategic thought, this book is a real find. Annihilation theory comes across as a bumper-sticker approach to strategic thought. I found his discussion of John Warden's 5-ring model useful, fair, and ultimately damning when judged against the reality of war. Second Kiras offers a broader explanation of attrition-based strategy than one typically hears, especially today when bumper stickers are quite popular. Placing SOF and SO in the context of annihilation and attrition strategies was clearly Kiras' main goal and he did so quite effectively.
As for weaknesses, I would offer but a couple of comments. First of all I would say the book is British-centric in its case studies and in some ways its analysis. Operation Chastise and 617 Squadron were purely British efforts. The SAS brigade's effort in France went through British chains of command until it reached Eisenhower. Secondly and perhaps this is an extension of the first weakness, Kiras is more convincing when he discusses airpower-related subjects than he is on SAS operations. He rightfully criticizes the inflated claims concerning the dambusting effort. Then he makes what I would call inflated hypothetical claims of what might have happened in France had the SAS been properly used. I believe he would have been better served by letting a reader make such leaps alone.
Overall I believe this monograph has great value to policy makers and soldiers, conventional and unconventional. As the author rightly points out, policy makers and SOF warriors have often struggled with the issue of best use. Both have, on occasion, gotten it wrong. James D. Kiras rightly cautions that such use must be governed by a rule of sustained value added to the overall effort of an attrition-based strategy. That certainly is nothing new to students of conventional warfare. Kiras is, in my opinion, warning that SOF and SO must be used in a coherent, comprehensive, and strategic version of combined arms warfare. He is correct and that is what makes his book valuable.
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Colonel Odom retired in 1996. He was a Foreign Area Officer on the Middle East-North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa for 15 years. His last 30 months on active duty were as US Defense Attaché in Zaire and then Rwanda. A historian, Colonel Odom authored Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda, Texas A&M University Press, 2005; Shaba II: the French and Belgian Military Intervention in Zaire in 1978, Combat Studies Institute, 1993; and Leavenworth Paper #14, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964-1965, CSI, 1989. Colonel Odom was also co-author of Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War with then Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Johnson.
Comments
Ben,
Kiras did not say that muddled C2 was the only problem with the SAS brigade's use in France and neither did I. He points to C2 as part of the problem, and yes, that went through 21st Army Group. But where it really got confusing was subordination of the SAS in 1st Airborne Army and Boy Browning. Other factors Kiras points to included over-expansion without corresponding selection, poor planning against tactical tasks, and subsequent poor employemnt with heavy losses.
My only criticism of his book in this area is that I think he took the "what if" too far in describing possible outcomes had the SAS been better employed.
Read the book. I think you will like it. I did.
Best
Tom
Did Kiras really say that, "The SAS brigade's effort in France went through British chains of command until it reached Eisenhower."?? I've not read this book, but if that's what he states then its not quite the whole story.
The command and control of the SAS in France was a muddled affair that sometimes was exercised through 21st Army Group (the British force commanded by Montgomery). But if their mission was to work with the Resistance, then command of SAS was exercised through Special Force Headquarters or later the HQ of the French Forces of the Interior. Furthermore, the SAS that worked with the resistance was, toward the end of June 1944 and for the rest of the operations in France, commanded by French General Pierre Koenig, commander of the FFI under Eisenhower. I've got the SHAEF Directive on this signed 24 May 1944 by SHAEF Chief of Staff Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith. It is a great example of how muddled the C2 can become within a coalition operation. But in effect, the British SAS (and by the way there was French SAS too!) might report to SFHQ and later the French HQ of the French Forces of the Interior or it might work for the 21st Army Group. (HQ FFI's modern day equivalent would be a CJSOTF.)
See...., simple!
SAS certainly suffered high casualties, but the fault of it can not, in my opinion, be singularly traced back to their muddled C2. I think it has more to do with their employment methods as anything. In other words, doctrine matters.
Thanks for the review. I appreciate it very much. I'll have to look see what else he says.
Ben