Dave Kilcullen, Senior COIN Advisor MNF-I and SWJ Blogger, holds a blogger roundtable. You can read about it at the Weekly Standard, Blackfive and Austin Bay. A transcript should be posted here in the near future.
Bing West on CSPAN's Washington Journal discusses the current situation and outlook for Iraq and why we have to stay for a decade (and how to do it) at Slate (with Owen West).
Bing's SWJ Iraq trip report in the North County Times - What's Working, What's Not, and the Way Forward for U.S. and Iraqi Troops.
A must read by Huba Wass de Czege - Lessons from the Past: Making the Army's Doctrine "Right Enough" Today.
An excerpt:
No doctrine is perfect, but getting it "right enough" is strategically important. Dire consequences followed for France in the spring of 1940 because heavy investments in its high-tech Maginot Line failed against the German Blitzkrieg. French doctrine was based on flawed post-World War I interpretations of technological change and its impact on the nature of war. We also have learned from recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq that operating without applicable doctrine can have strategic consequences, and that the intuition of senior generals is of little value in the councils of state today. The quickly submerged November 2002 public dispute between Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz about the number of Soldiers required for the coming invasion of Iraq is often recalled to vilify the civilian side, but no one can claim that the resulting campaign violated accepted joint or Army doctrinal precepts. In fact, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted according to widely supported emerging concepts within the Department of Defense (DoD). We should take little comfort that events are proving the former Army Chief more right than wrong. Politicians are more likely to respect the intuition of senior Army leaders when they render judgments backed by a sound body of doctrine, especially one that is also respected and supported by the other services...
ZenPundit -- Mil Theory Goes Mainstream.
It's rather nice to see the esoteric theory topics I kick around here in conjunction with sites like The Small Wars Council, DNI, Tom Barnett and John Robb's blogs and the circle of related bloggers, are penetrating the mainstream press. Some recent examples:
William Lind in UPI.
Max Boot citing the Small Wars Journal.
"War without limits" by Christopher Shea in the Boston Globe (hat tip to Dr.Ralph Luker).
Thomas Barnett's frequent appearances in columns by David Ignatius going back several years.
The Belmont Club - "The Total Blurring of Crime and War".
The Small Wars Journal (Robert Bunker and John Sullivan) describes 3rd Generation Gang Warfare. Iraq may lead, but Latin America and parts of the USA are following hard behind.
Whether or not the Small Wars Journal article is overstating the case, the fact remains that traditional tools of statecraft such as the United Nations, foreign aid, diplomacy and even armies have proven very ineffective against this mode of warfare -- if warfare it is. But given the potency of subnational groups like Hezbollah which squared off against the IDF, or Hamas which threatens to take over Gaza, or al-Qaeda which aims to devour the world and actually attacked Manhattan or even Ansar al-Islam which is rampaging in the Lebanese refugee camps it would be Jesuitic to split semantic hairs...
Jules Crittenden on "Non Cents" at his Forward Movement blog.
Frank Hoffman at Small Wars Journal shoots down USAF Gen. Charles Dunlap as Dunlap attempts to execute a strafing run on ground forces engaged in counter-insurgency. Hoffman reckons its a fit of pique over air power being relegated to a supporting role. Great mudwrestling at SWJ as always, though I disagree with both Dunlap and Hoffman on the idea that a " 'traditional land component solution' ... is too costly for America, and is far too late for Iraq."