Kilcullen on COIN "Persistent-Presence" vs. "Repetitive Raiding"

Carl:

Interesting how the COIN debate over Kilcullen gets overwhelmed by reality on the ground with the article questioning COIN released just this morning.

I would suggest that if in fact the "conflict ecosystem" had been the driving force behind very robust intel efforts then in fact we would have thoroughly understood the Taliban and related groups and then working via SOF/FID we would have been a very long way down the road.

Not currently standing at the end of a very long plank that we have been walking down and wondering do we get shoved or do we jump?

The entire debate concerning Kilcullen or others has been a smoke screen as no one on the ground really had any ideas on what to do instead of settling in on a long term strategy and following through on it---no strategy survives constant changes.

Kilcullen had the strategy via the "conflict ecosystem" it is just many did/do not fully understand it-strange how things written in 2004 come back to haunt one.

<b>Outlaw 7:</b>

You've just summarized the flaw in counterinsurgency with a very, very valid quote:<blockquote>"To defeat the insurgent one must become the insurgent"</blockquote>You added:<blockquote>"...-just not so sure many are ready to do that."</blockquote>You've got it.

I very much agree that the adaptation is necessary for success. However, many -- most -- people are not at all ready to do that. That is not a totally bad thing if you think about it but it does always seem to really confound the relatively small number of those that <i>are</i> willing and ready to do that...

That small number needs to realize that the bulk of mankind is not going to 'become the insurgent' for a variety of good and bad reasons. Those who believe the COIN foolishness need to realize the truth of your quote and the truth of my provided counterpoint.

On a simpler level and as I'm sure you know, SF is great at it but even everyone in SF cannot or does not do it well.

<b>Carl Prine</b> has it right:

<i>"... if you're wrong, you can always blame a lack of resources, or will, or soldiers who just didn't "get it."

This also seems to be an age-old reality of these murky irregular wars."</i>

Carl:
"Why should we assume that that similarities exist across COIN environments? The journalist, the anthropologist and the historian likely will find more interest in the differences, not the similarities."

The journalist, the anthropopogist, and the historian while having more interest in the differences are not the individuals fighting and dying trying to understand the "similarities" and every bit of understanding that they can get is invaluable in keeping them alive.

The research model I talk about can in fact provide the who, what, where, when, how, and the WHY to a large number of questions pertaining to the groups below that Kilcullen recently spoke about.

Dr. K framed this discussion around Taliban organization, the elements of which are:

1. Main Force Column. 100-300 person force who are extremely mobile. They serve in Afghanistan for short durations (4-6 month tours) and are recruited and trained in Pakistan.
2. Local guerrillas. Local actors [maybe they're accidental??] who live in one valley and wait for the main force to conduct operations.
3. Village infrastructure. Local Taliban cells - could be military and/or political.
4. Support elements. Located in Pakistan and do finance, leadership, training, etc. [I guess even insurgents need the ash and trash that a uniformed army does.]
5. Terrorist cells. These guys run parallel, but not coordinated operations with the main force. [The description made them sound like the Taliban's version of SOF.]

Kind of sounds like Kilcullen is running in his head during the discussion the Taliban "ecosystem".

Carl:

"Why should we assume that that similarities exist across COIN environments."

One does not need to assume---they do exist and it has been plain for awhile that they exist.

Why do we say they do not exist? --it gives us all a chance to argue the Pro's and the Con's and it makes us feel good and it keeps the arguments going---BUT does it solve the actual problems on the ground?

Forgot who the author of this was, but it goes like this "I have met the enemy and it is me."

"To defeat the insurgent one must become the insurgent"-just not so sure many are ready to do that.

Carl:

This came from a today from a former German diplomat who has spent alot of time in Afghanistan and the comment is telling from a COIN perspective.

"'As the Taleban are running a shadow government, we are running a parallel government and 'that does not build confidence of Afghans in their own government. (Well, the fact that foreigners still are running large parts of the show, this isnt really a secret. But it is a nice comparison!)

After eight years and all we have to show is control of 6 provinces out of 120!

Maybe if we had eight years ago paid extreme attention to the "conflict ecosystem" we might be controlling more than the current 6.

Comments from a second author written 22-4-10---reflects a deep doubt on the pop-centric view:

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is still based on the idea that many Afghans are "sitting on a fence" wondering which side they will support: the government or the insurgency. It was never a very good analogy, as most people are not really in a position to choose; they move with the currents, they duck when they can, and they fight when pushed too hard. But in Kandahar, listening, it seemed we are far beyond that now. There is increasingly no fence, no two sides. What remains is anger, over opportunities lost, trust betrayed and a country wrecked where it could have been alright.

By truely not understanding the full ramificiations of the ecosystem of the insurgency we are still swimming around trying to find the right solution and we have I think lost our way.

That:<blockquote>"Why is so much time wasted here on who is right or who is wrong?"</blockquote>Is an excellent question. I've wondered that myself as I see a lot of 'this is wrong' verbiage posted.

It's also wasteful in view of the fact that there is never one best answer.

There's always merit in multiple approaches, adherence to a single route or method will generally be dangerous. What works in one region may not work in another. People who are responsible to implement things may take inefficient and / or ineffective actions but they may also have pressures, political and otherwise, that force those bad choices.

In any event, this is possibly true:<blockquote>"An effective counterinsurgency can only be waged by an organization that is capable of committing to support only those it empowers, remains quiet until it strikes, and effectively owns the world of information."</blockquote>Unfortunately, the organization in Afghanistan is not and will not be capable on a troop density basis to support those it would need to empower; due to the nature of coalition operations it is not and will not be in large part capable of being quiet until it strikes and is too bureaucratic to ever own the world of information.

Ideally, none of those facts would be the case. Practically, they are reality.

Looks like SWJ needs to revisit the General Flynn intelligence article concerning intel failures and the discussion on Kilcullen's "conflict ecosystem" needs to get even deeper instead of which author is right or wrong. Why is so much time wasted here on who is right or who is wrong?

Is it impossible to get agreement and then to discuss ways to fix it---maybe that is the real argument around Kilcullen-at least he is saying "do something". Looks like as well after the dust settled on Flynn's article that all his efforts at influencing the USAISC, Ft. H have also been for nothing as well as those of the COIC/JTCOIC-what a waste of time and money.

A Counterproductive Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency methodology which is currently being employed in Afghanistan is not going to lead coalition forces to victory in this war.

The idea of "counterinsurgency" appears to be a viable way for success on paper. Military units, along with NGOs [non-governmental organizations], the Department of State, GIRoA [the Afghanistan government], and other government agencies work together to emplace the clear, hold, build strategy in key areas of the battlefield. Like communism, however, counterinsurgency methods are not proving to be effective in practice.

Counterinsurgency methods must make quick and effective use of information. However, the joint environment of the theater of operation makes it difficult for efficient information dissemination. Coalition units are still apprehensive about distributing information to consumers who do not wear the same uniform -- and many units still have major breakdowns in following guidance directing the flow of information up to higher decision-making elements; or down to the soldiers on the ground. The result of stove-piped information sharing channels maximizes the amount of time that insurgent forces have to seek out coalition vulnerabilities and exploit them.

The passive approach taken to reintegrate the enemy is also proving to be ineffective. Coalition forces who are using the idea of projects and Provincial Reconstruction Teams to pacify local insurgents are experiencing long delays in getting their recommended courses of action approved, funded and then complete. Additionally, there is often a poor hand-off from kinetic [read: military] forces who relinquish control of a previously hostile area to non-kinetic groups who are empowered to "win hearts and minds." It is evident that there is little attention to ensuring that the local population is prepared for the transition of combat troops occupying their home one month and then smiling faces knocking on their doors the next. Additionally, coalition participants are not yet capable of recognizing the human terrain of their area once they assume control of it.

The human terrain layer of the battlefield is a necessary component of mission planning and success in a counterinsurgency environment. Coalition forces have become aware of the utility of understanding it but have failed to quantify their efforts in exploiting it. The fact that insurgent groups are still integrated within the population of areas that have been under coalition control for long periods of time is indicative of their ability to more effectively exploit the human layer of the battlefield and mitigate the effects of a counterinsurgency campaign. The adage still holds true today that "we have the watches, but they have the time." The enemy still has the discipline to outlast our commitment to the area.

As if the breakdown of communication and process methodology in place isnt enough to negate the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations, we must also contend with the effects of the media, and a world population that cringes when it is witness to overt aggression and the marginalization of people. In this response, the leaders of this campaign have taken too many precautions to ensure that everyone is content with the tact taken. An effective counterinsurgency can only be waged by an organization that is capable of committing to support only those it empowers, remains quiet until it strikes, and effectively owns the world of information. Once it is capable of identifying the vulnerabilities in core infrastructure before the enemy is able to exploit them--and strikes with precision to seal them up, the enemy will dissolve and we will find the war is won.

MikeF:

"Untrue. No systems analysis, anomie, acephaleous, or otherwise, can forecast what decisions men will make. People are too fickle, constrained by emotions, norms, values, and beliefs to rely on rational thought and action."

Some current quantum models can in fact reach a range of accuracy that allows for the human to work with and in fact could give cause to rethink a particular COA--depends greatly on the datastream feeds.

The ecosystem model I am referring to has been a six year project and the results are extremely interesting-without going into massive analysis;

1.Our unified model of modern insurgent wars (1) agrees with state-of-the-art data collected for a wide range of wars, (2) challenges traditional ideas of insurgency based on rigid hierarchies and networks, and (3) bears a striking similarity to models of crowd behavior of financial markets (hinting at a possible link between collective human dynamics in violent and non-violent settings).

2. The difference between these "old" and "new" conflicts is that the majority of conflict today is "asymmetric" in nature, meaning that one side is much stronger and better resourced than the other side. When a small/weak group of people take on a much stronger opposition, they have to find an organizational structure and strategy that will allow them to compete. It turns out that there are only a small number of possible solutions to this problem, and if an insurgent group does not adopt one of these solutions, they generally do not survive. NOTE: results were furnished on the organizational form the groups tend to take.

3. i.e. the various insurgent forces (in the 11 studied insurgencies) are beginning to operate in a similar way regardless of their underlying ideologies, motivations, and the terrain in which they operate

I agree with Kilcullen when he alludes to the need to go (2004/2005) in this research direction or is everyone on this blog satisfied with the current state of affairs in the results provided by the current level of "social network analysis"?

I didn't realize the global insurgency concept was generally accepted as an accurate assessment of the situation.

Who is/are the insurgent(s)?

What is/are the political entit(y/ies) being challenged?

"I do firmly believe that one can now with a recent quantum focused ecology model-- at least begin the process of systematizing irregular warfare as the science is at the point of allowing that conversation."

Untrue. No systems analysis, anomie, acephaleous, or otherwise, can forecast what decisions men will make. People are too fickle, constrained by emotions, norms, values, and beliefs to rely on rational thought and action.

When that happens, we'll be living in Starbuck's Star Wars and Terminator land, and I'm going into Red Dawn mode.

For now, all the scientist will continue to do is add continued layers onto the system, and we'll get causal loop diagrams such at this

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/the-whole-enchilada/

or the need for money to support more research into reviving the Effects Based Operation study such as this

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/mission-assessment-in-complex/

As Ken has said, life, war, and peace, are an art undisturbed by the science and theory. Now, if the science becomes art, a way of expressing life and better understanding, then that's a different matter all together.

Carl:

"The other thing that's bugging me, Outlaw, is your apparent belief that we can systematize COIN to such a point that it might be scientifically used by commanders in these murky irregular wars. This is something that defied even the authors of the original Small Wars Manual and the wonderful C.E."

I do firmly believe that one can now with a recent quantum focused ecology model-- at least begin the process of systematizing irregular warfare as the science is at the point of allowing that conversation.

How you ask can it be done due to the following?;
1. irregular warfare is just that irregular
2. open source warfare as dismissed by this blog and few former Booz/Allen and CIA analysts challenge it as "pseudo social science", but surprisngly it is surviving as a concept in a number of critical research centers still today
3. humans are complex creatures so we cannot model human interactions
4. human cultures are so different it would be impossible to model-ie the current failures by Human Terrain
5. there are simply to many different features that make up an insurgency it is absolutely impossible to model

I could go on for another 6-10 points.

NOW I feel you are right Lawrence was on the verge of wanting to do something similar as I am 200% sure he saw something that was common across the entire effort he was driving--that something was in fact a standardized ecology that you and many would claim does not exist.

I would also challenge you that as you indicate a large number of jounalists, researchers, writers have all probably seen the same indicators, maybe even mentioned it in passing or in short comments in articles, but they did not take the next leap--namely actually stating there is potentially a common thread.

NOW just what if by chance after inputing thousands of reports (thousands with a big T) concerning 11 totally different insurgencies and then you sit back and via quantum physics challenge the data and surprisingly you start to see common indicators across the 11 conflicts what would the initial response be?-- "can't be". Detractors of the research say over and over there cannot be a common thread between all conflicts---but nature shows us all the time that there are common features seen in multiple different types of ecologies.

The IC is strong on indicators and if you see the same indicators over and over even if testing the data from multiple directions what are you left with?

The model for this type of challenging is now available, but it now being called "psuedo social science"--I tend to call this "institutional resistance". Some of the critics blast away at the overall concept, but there has not been a single challenge to the results of the data--and the researchers response to the critics is "well if you think the model is broken what is your model"---conversation usually at this point ends.

I have spent way to much time of my life in training, arming, leading UW forces including 18 months of it in VN, spent time in Jordan during what some may recall as "black September", spent time training select personnel in the fight in Greece with 17 Nov, had a number of students in my German university days go on to lead Baader-Meinhof/RAF/2 June and I spent way to much time following the German anti bomb movements and then lately I have had literally hundreds of hours of face time with an extensive range of Sunni insurgents.

Guess what-I even saw similarities and the indicators were apparent to me and I have no physics background. But as with everything in the military-sometimes what you actually see day to day has no actual explanation because if there was an explanation it might change/challenge the whole environment.

THIS is what Lawrence was seeing-shame he did not get it to paper as I would not be surprised to see really any difference between his observations and Kilcullen's views of "conflict ecology".

The suggestion here to place the leading thinkers in one room and open up the conversation would be the best of all worlds-will not happen though as egos tend to get in the way.

By the way there is a fairly large amount of actual "ecosystem" training going on in some corners of the irregular warfare community-but due to"institutional resistance" it is a rather quiet effort.

Further METT-TC and better training sayeth not...

Ecosystem is an oxymoron applied to warfare. People are too variable to form 'systems' in any true sense and the fool who believes she or he has all or even most of the answers is dangerous.

War is not a science and never will be. It is an art -- and the number of Artists is limited. I have watched attempts by the US Army to make command in war a quantifiable activity for over 60 years. All in order to place square people pegs in round Personnel holes. They've all failed miserably while adding undue complexity to the job for little benefit...

Carl:

By the way you are right some have written extensively about ecosystems, but from a biological perspective that fits perfectly to the model envisioned by Kilcullen.

EXAMPLE---written in 1988

http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/page57.html

Competition and co-operation
Aggression is best regarded as a form of competition, which, as we shall see, takes a slightly different form as we move up from one level of organisation to the next. At each step, it plays a bigger role, and can become more violent, i.e. can resemble more what we call aggression, without thereby bringing about social collapse.

Undifferentiated individuals competing for the same ecological niche cannot co-operate in any way. They can only compete with each other. It is only when, as a result of competition, they have been forced to specialise in such a way that each one learns to exploit a different sub-niche, that co-operation becomes possible and the competing individuals are transformed into a viable social unit. It is only by competition therefore that conditions are established in which co-operation can occur.

Competition does not establish just any type of organisation, but that which best satisfies environmental requirements, i.e. that which is most adaptive. Thus, in a social system that earns its livelihood by hunting, the position of an individual in the hierarchy will depend on hunting ability. In a society in which the main activity is warfare, war-like qualities will be determinant.

It is important to note that the basis of a hierarchical structure will change in accordance with its adaptiveness. Thus any important change in environmental conditions will call for a modification in a system's behaviour pattern which can only be ensured by a reorganisation of its hierarchical structure in such a way that a premium is placed on the new qualities which the society must display in order to adapt to the new conditions.

_____________
My comments:
The interesting idea here is that an insurgency might evolve from inter-group competition for specific niches in the environment. Then when these have been found co-operation between the groups can occur.

Example: I compete to be the main provider of unexploded ordinances for IED cells - once I have staked out this niche, then I can co-operate with other groups to supply the unexploded ordinances to them.

Example: I become so proficient on producing military training videos and releasing them via key jihadi websites that I now "control" jihadi paramilitary training globally.

Example: I am the first to display the RKG-3 anti-tank grenade and produce a training video on the grenade (AQI) and it's use against an US vehicle and then another group (IAI) produces a series of RKG-3 battle videos depicting a large number of different styles of attacks (TTPs) and now the entire ecosystem is on one specific attack process.

Carl---see how easy it is to understand eocsystems of insurgencies? The difficulty is getting that into quantum physics so one can get into predictions in the 90% ranges thus giving it the ability to doublecheck Commander decided COAs (research project has already entered into this area).

This is exactly where Kilcullen is coming from no more no less---I think people tend to read way to much into his writings and get hung up on egos-use the KISS system.

Carl:

"Do you forgive that because 20 years after others were writing about complex ecosystems he mentioned it in passing here at SWJ?"

1. in 2004, Kilcullen published his theory of conflict ecosystems in "Countering Global Insurgency" (with what about 20-30 pages on the ecosystem concepts?)---by the way the article was not in passing in SWJ as you alluded to

2. in 2006, he publishes "Counterinsurgency Redux" where he takes the concept of ecosystems a step further in the following;
... today's insurgencies differ significantly from those of the 1960s. Insurgents may not be seeking to overthrow the state, may have no coherent strategy or may pursue a faith-based approach difficult to counter with traditional methods. There may be numerous competing insurgencies in one theatre, meaning that the counter-insurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy. The actions of individuals and the propaganda effect of a subjective 'single narrative' may far outweigh practical progress, rendering counter-insurgency even more non-linear and unpredictable.

2. in his SWJ article in 2007 he takes the concept a step further with the term "conflict ethnography" which some mistook to use as an excuse to start the misguided Human Terrain efforts;
The bottom line is that no handbook relieves a professional counterinsurgent from the personal obligation to study, internalize and interpret the physical, human, informational and ideological setting in which the conflict takes place. Conflict ethnography is key; to borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a "close reading" of the environment. But it is a reading that resides in no book, but around you; in the terrain, the people, their social and cultural institutions, the way they act and think. You have to be a participant observer. And the key is to see beyond the surface differences between our societies and these environments (of which religious orientation is one key element) to the deeper social and cultural drivers of conflict, drivers that locals would understand on their own terms.

4. I would suggest that he has taken that further in his latest writings.

So Carl--can you please provide the list of authors that have focused as intently on the subject in the last 20 years as Kilcullen has--I would argue that many have assumed and or thought about the connections, but I challegene you to provide any name of any author that has provided such depth to the topic in any of their books, articles, writings.

I would even go as far as to state his writings have built off of each other since his first one "Complex Warfigthing" in 2003 where he initially discusses; complexity, diversity, diffusion, and lethality.

Recent researchers have now taken his concept into a simpler definition which follows and have in fact produced the first complexity science based ecosystem model focused six year research project which in fact validated the concept of the ecosystem and open source warfare. I am guessing that once you have read the new definition you will be able to plug in example after example taken from the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ecology of an Insurgency:

The scientific study of the way that living "organisms" in this case "organism" is defined as an insurgency cell, group, or organization interact with their environment and predators (the counter insurgent).

Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

• The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups wont leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
• The ecosystems features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
• The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
• An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).

Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isnt possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).

Carl---while I might agree on some of your comments there is one of your sentences that shows you where I am coming from.

"The problem is that one can't declare his theories successful, or even merely persuasive, unless we really agree on what caused the drop in violence."

I would argue that in fact Kilcullen was onto the right assumption with his theory of "conflict ecosystem", but in fact the entire intelligence community while parroting the concept over and over simply did not understand it, but it sounded good, nor did they collect information that would support it or deny it and stayed with the tryed and true methods and thinking resulting in the complete missing of the reasons of the violence scaling down. Notice I mention nothing about "surge wins"---it is about the scaling down of violence as violence is what an insurgent ecosystem uses to express itself. I would in fact argue that there were plenty of indicators that in fact point to why the violence dropped off, but that would entail accepting the concept of "conflict ecosystem"--see the catch 22?

EXAMPLE: the IC is hell bent that the theories of "social network analysis" using the Carnegie Mellon tools ORA/DyNet are the be all end all of insurgency targeting. For my part I assume that SNA is simply 1D and provides absolutely no understanding of what one is seeing in the activities of an insurgency, nor why the insurgency is acting the way it does. Great when one wants to see linkages, but very weak on the "whys". Again since there has been no interest on the part of the US academic/military researchers to even look at the concept of ecosystems there is nothing to stem against SNA with-another catch 22.

Again not wanting to beat a dead horse, but Kilcullen's ecosystem concept was about ten years ahead of itself---but WE view it as being in the past and old thus not warranting any further considerations when in fact it is WE who have now caught up to it and are looking for answers that the current methodolgy is not providing. It is WE who then say "why should we revisit it as it made no sense then and is from the past".

EXAMPLE: I could give you a HARMONY document number of a hand written journal(started two days after we entered Iraq until late Mar 2005) which was alledged to have been written by the leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) (who we still have never captured) that if you read it-it would in fact literally explain the ecosystem and their thinking for over two years and would if fully translated confirm Kilcullen's theory. The names mentioned in the journal were literally the Who's Who of the Sunni insurgency and the IC felt that it was not important enough to fully translate the document. The IC had the answers they just did not understand the theory of "conflict ecosystems".

Granted he is not a Sun Tzu, but when it comes to the first mentioning of the "conflict ecosystem" and pushing for the need for a new paradigm "complexity science research" I would bet he is darn close to being a Sun Tzu.

Carl:

"Let's leave this antiquated world to him and his book, and move on."

1. not so sure the Iraqi insurgency is as dead as many would like it to be-refer to the constant and increasing bombing campaign--and yes insurgents have campaign plans much as we do and they even give them names as we do

2. not so sure the Taliban would agree with much of the main stream media that they are on the losing end right about now

That is it seems to be a problem in the critique of Kilcullen. It is as if are many are applying the "old hat-been there done it and it does not apply anymore" type of attitude to his work. Reading his book does not necessarily mean one has to agree with it.

I would actually throw out that if in fact there had been a more thorough research conducted and published on his "conflict ecosystem" and in complexity science maybe our actions in Afghanistan (towards the Taliban and related groups) and towards the remainder of the AQI/Sunni groups might actually have quieted both areas down.

It is amazing that the simplicity of ecosystem and what it can tell us is grossly overlooked both by those in the field and Us based researchers. Reminds me of the comment posted here awhile ago concerning "open source warfare"---quote-cussed, discussed, and found to be of no interest--unquote

Kind of reminds me of the outbreak of the terroism research in the US in the early/mid 70s and the same wheel being reinvented by a new generation of researchers who are failing to give credit to the old theories and then build forward on the "old".

Anon:

No, disagree. A sustained argument can be made that Kilcullen's book is "a-strategic" because as I said and even acknowledging his sophisticated argument of disaggregation of the global counterinsurgency when you read what his solution is to disaggregate it is centered on attacking links. And at some point--like Afghanistan--such links require armed nation building at the barrel of a gun. But that is the only choice in attacking that link that he offers. There is, for example, no other possible way for him in Afghanistan other than armed nation building. My point is that when it comes to putting boots on the ground in attacking these links it always falls back for him on societal "rewiring." The guts and methods of societal rewiring are of course his 28 principles of Coin. And it is in that sense that I say it is "a-strategic" because it offers no other way, no more limited use of precision military force to attack links. Nor does it offer the possibility of the US adopting a strategy of attrition against this global insurgency that actually allows for "repetitive raiding" on a sustained basis. For Kilcullen, the answer in the end to win against the global insurgency is global nation building; or global societal transformation at the barrel of an American gun. I do agree that we face a global insurgency; I just dont think that that United States has the wherewithal to fight it in the way Kilcullen suggests.

Just because somebody makes a "contribution" does not mean that it is shielded from criticism. I am sorry that you think that our criticism of Kilcullen has been unhelpful and lacks usefulness. I disagree, and think that in a very small way they have been useful.

Ken, thanks for that post. Just to clarify a bit more the Vietnamese sources that I am talking about are not just those from communist North Vietnam but those of South Vietnamese rural folk based on interviews and other primary documents. Historians David and Mai Elliot's important work in this area over the past ten years has been truly groundbreaking because they have written histories that allow for a view from the side of the Vietnamese people involved in the war.

gian

What is interesting is that the Kilcullen article "Countering Global Insurgency" with an extensive explanation of his "conflict ecosystem" and a plea for new research using Complexity Science was actually some of his best work and it has since been proven to be correct. Although no one took up the challenge and built new information into the ecosystem and or built complexity science models until just recently.

The problem is not too many people can get their heads around the concept of ecosystems or complexity science (quantum physics).

The time since that article has in fact clearly proven that the academic and research worlds are doing their best to avoid addressing his concerns of "conflict ecosystems" and complexity science as they had signed onto the be all end all role of "social network analysis" which has in the meantime really hit a wall.

Why do I say the academic and research worlds are not addressing the two items---just had a leading researcher who is tied into a number of other "terrorism" academic researchers/universities recently state that ecosystem research and complexity science are really "pseudo social science" as it does not have years of research behind it.

At least in his early writings Kilcullen was willing to challenge-he definitely had an opinion and he defended that opinion.

Instead of critique--simply challenge the book--something the academic/research world is unwilling to do when new ideas or concepts do not fit the norm.

<b>Gian:</b>

<i>We</i> are free to chooses <i>our</i> histories of the Viet Nam war as <i>we</i> wish? ;) Agreed.

Of course history is not neutral nor perfectly objective. Agreed.

I do not <i>want</i> to label the nature of <b>history</b> as "bias. Nor do I -- However, I do contend that some <u>historians</u> are lax in allowing their various ideological biases to overcome the objective historian aim. They're usually easily spotted...

Military history is always difficult for all the obvious reasons. Viet Nam, as war history, is particularly difficult as almost anyone who studies or writes on the topic will have biases that are politically and not militarily induced. The war is too fresh in too many minds and the political divisions it engendered both domestically and internationally still fester. That said, I also agree that much current scholarship counters some earlier scholarship. I believe some of that alternative view is valid and benefits from North Viet Namese sources. I also believe some of it is agenda driven and thus is less valid. Either way, that does little to change the reality on the ground and all that's only marginally if at all relative to my point:

No one has all or even most of the answers. No one.

That said, COIN works. Kilcullen's suggestions like those of many others have merit, METT-TC dependent and IF a COIN effort is required. No question about that. What is very questionable is the also METT-TC dependent net value and cost-benefit ratio of missions entailing COIN, FID and the like.

Other than peripherally, no one seems to want to address that aspect...

Surprisingly, that last seems to include thee... ;)

Gian,

Yes but this is how your underlying argument is actually attempting to work, with regard to Kilcullen in this instance but it's all too familiar.

1. You argue separately that the problem with COIN is that its all tactics, no strategy.
2. You argue separately that COIN theory is based on a misreading of history and has been overtaken by 'more recent' scholarship.
3. Kilcullen releases a book on COIN.
4. Both the book and he personally are therefore astrategic, ahistoric and outdated.
5. Carl can then chime in separately with some florid, derogatory prose that casts aspersions on Kilcullen's work and character (just to add a touch of class).

Only problem is that none of the points in 4. are true if you actually assess Kilcullen's work on its merits and intent (i.e. the book serves to draw together pieces he has put out over the past several years in different venues) rather than through the broader prism of decrying the abominations that COIN has wrought on the American national security establishment.

Like I said before, I preferred it when the two of you made useful criticisms in these forums. Polishing the same old formula of negative critique whenever anyone tries to make a contribution (right or wrong) is less than helpful.

Ken:

Of course you are free to chose your histories of the Viet Nam War as you wish and of course history is not neutral, nor perfectly objective. If you want to label the nature of history as "bias" so be it.

I agree with the highly problematic notion of the idea of drawing "lessons" from history.

I was only saying that the majority of current scholarship on the Vietnam War does not support the version of history of that war that Kilcullen drew on in his book.

As to the point about Vietnamese sources I only wanted to point out the fact that much of the newer scholarship includes it whereas the works of Nagl, Krepinevich, Sorley, et al did not. In the study of war it of course is always good to draw on sources from both sides which is the value of the newer scholarship.

gian

Everyone's work of Monday is outdated by Friday...

Kilcullen, as did Gallula, Kitson and others, frames things within his own experience and biases -- we all do. No reason not to read them but adequate reason to only very thoughtfully and if applicable heed them.

Apply Monday's lesson to Friday's problems, works sometime, sometimes not. Every day, like every war, is different. Got to be careful with 'lessons.' For example:<blockquote>"...This strand of analysis (developed in the early 80s ...) has really been quite effectively overturned by much newer scholarship that relies heavily on Vietnamese sources.</blockquote>Not that the Viet Namese would have any interest at all in skewing history...

Or that some 'scholars' might have biases...

<i><b>No one</b></i> has all or even most of the answers. No one.

That said, COIN works. Kilcullen's suggestions like those of many others have merit, METT-TC dependent and <u>IF</u> a COIN effort is required. No question about that. What is very questionable is the also METT-TC dependent net value and cost-benefit ratio of missions entailing COIN, FID and the like.

Other than peripherally, no one seems to want to address that aspect...

Look, I think there are serious problems with the book. That is how I read it. I also think that since Kilcullen has taken on a narrative form in the book where he mixes his analysis as an expert with his personal experience as an operator is also fair game and open for criticism. In fact that seems to me to be the essential problem with the book (just as it was with Accidental Guerilla) that it becomes difficult to separate Kilcullen the S-2 (metaphor for Kilcullen the analyst) from Kilcullen the S-3 (metaphor for operator). And it is in that mix where the book I think essentially falls short, especially when Kilcullen's experience as an operator seems to determine how he sees the future of global counterinsurgency.

I think Carl is right that Kilcullen's work is becoming increasingly outdated. Case in point in this newest book is how he uses (or abuses) the history of the Vietnam War when he argues that better Coin tactics and the development of CORDS had actually won the insurgent war in the South only to have it lost conventionally by a NVA conventional invasion. This strand of analysis (developed in the early 80s by analysts like Krepinevich and then further developed in the 90s by Nagl, Sorley, et al) has really been quite effectively overturned by much newer scholarship that relies heavily on Vietnamese sources.

I use this as an example to support Carl's point about the outdated nature of Kilcullen's new work.

I state again the acknowledgment that Kilcullen has provided over the past years some important and innovative thinking on counterinsurgency. But that record, in a true intellectual environment, should not predetermine how we view his present work nor certainly should it mean that we avoid criticism of his newer stuff where and when it is needed.

I used to consider Gentile and Prine valuable counterpoints to the mainstream dialogue on COIN. It is unfortunate to have seen their commentary deteriorate into petty, paranoid ramblings that take the legitimate work of others and cast it into their own biased narrative (about an allegedly biased COIN triumph narrative, no less) regardless of that work's actual merit or intent. It is a sad waste of two good minds in a time when we need all the quality thinking we can get.

Carl.

"Actually, there has been some dispute about this."

I got nothing for that. Maybe sometimes naively, I assume that people are truthful in their academic approach. From my viewpoint, Kilcullen builds off of McCormick and Rand. In his conflict eco-system, he acknowledged their contributions. If he has embellished his own observations, then shame on him.

Hi Jim,

Im doing well just fell behind on our latest deadline due to getting distracted :).

If you didnt see it, then Id highly recommend that you check out COL Joness latest contribution in SWC. He is on the cusp of building or creating another SOF truth in small wars- Know your place.* Hopefully, his latest article on the subject will be published soon.

Recently, I was trying to compare and contrast your writings with Craig Mullaney. Craig is one of the brightest guys that I know. Would I seek his advice on command? No. He chose not to command in combat, to pursue other paths. His book serves as a great story for those that would consider attending USMA or a young cadet preparing for commissioning. On the other hand, your collaboration with Steven Pressfield and Chief Zazai has helped capture what many of us commanders learned on the ground that could possibly change the approach, strategy, and policy. Different motives, different effects.

COL Gentile,

"But what is needed now in the American defense establishment is not better Coin tactics but better strategy: the former cannot rescue the latter if it is failed."

Concur.

I think John Meacham nailed it on the Daily Show the other night while paraphrasing the Newsweek founder**.

"Journalism is the first rough draft of history." -Phillip Graham

And when they get it wrong...

"Does it have to be so rough?" -Phillips wife

v/r
Mike

*http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10301&page=3

** http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-may-5-2010/jon-meacham

Mike:

Kilcullen's book, try as he might to make it seem otherwise, is still trapped in the tactical straightjacket of population centric counterinsurgency. And that Coin straightjacket is reinforced with supercharging effects in the book by Kilcullen's training as an anthropologist and his zeal and faith in the possibility of coercive programmatic societal change at the barrel of a gun.

The answer that he always comes to in the book is just that, societal change or "rewiring" in order to disaggregate the connected parts of the global counterinsurgency. And it is in that basic element of the promise of societal change that his book is still in the straightjacket of Coin and more importantly never, ever reaches into the more important realm of strategy.

I agree that Kilcullen has provided over the past few years some important and innovative writings on how to do population centric counterinsurgency at the tactical level of war. But what is needed now in the American defense establishment is not better Coin tactics but better strategy: the former cannot rescue the latter if it is failed.

COL Gentile,

Sir, if youre viewing Dr. Kilcullen in terms of impact on policy and strategy, then I can concur with you. I prefer Andrew Bacevich, COL Robert Jones, Jeremy Kotkin, and Ken White.

However, in the realm of tactical innovation and impact, I have to disagree. He reminds me of the French General Marquis de Lafayette and the Polish General Thaddeus Kosciuszko- foreigners that came to advise and assist the American Army in the current fight. Five years ago, most of us could not spell COIN. He, and many others, helped remedy that on the ground providing instruction and giving guidance.

Are his books all about him? Yes, they are his observations, but as I read through them, I can nod my head and say, "Yes, thats what I saw. Yes, I did something like that, or why didnt I think of that?"

In the Vietnam War, we created Ranger school as a means of institutionalized training in patrolling and survival. The adaptations in this war were more ad-hoc: Asymmetric Warfare Group, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Intelligence Fusion Cells, etc... Some worked well, some not so well.

Coincidently, this week while Dave D. asked us to describe the impact of SWJ, I had an exchange with Dr. Gordon McCormick over his impact on my own development. My education into the theory and history of small wars came from 10th SFG and NPS.

While Dr. Kilcullen may not be the reincarnation of Sun-Tzu, I think it is important to acknowledge the impact that he has had as well as give the credit to the others involved.

Just an opinion to consider.

v/r
Mike

For those that think the concept of "ecosystem of insurgencies" does not exist read this para from a 1988 book and think about it---any number of Iraq or Afghanistan experienced intelligence types/ground commanders can list any number of examples taken from a daily basis that fit this paragraph.

Example: Currently there is one leading Sunni insurgent group led by al Duri that has established itself as the leading producer of military styled training videos and releases them monthly on leading jehadi web sites---thus a form of specialization.

AND none of this seems to match current COIN theory.

http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/page57.html

Competition and Co-operation
Aggression is best regarded as a form of competition, which, as we shall see, takes a slightly different form as we move up from one level of organisation to the next. At each step, it plays a bigger role, and can become more violent, i.e. can resemble more what we call aggression, without thereby bringing about social collapse.

Undifferentiated individuals competing for the same ecological niche cannot co-operate in any way. They can only compete with each other. It is only when, as a result of competition, they have been forced to specialise in such a way that each one learns to exploit a different sub-niche, that co-operation becomes possible and the competing individuals are transformed into a viable social unit. It is only by competition therefore that conditions are established in which co-operation can occur.

Competition does not establish just any type of organisation, but that which best satisfies environmental requirements, i.e. that which is most adaptive. Thus, in a social system that earns its livelihood by hunting, the position of an individual in the hierarchy will depend on hunting ability. In a society in which the main activity is warfare, war-like qualities will be determinant.

It is important to note that the basis of a hierarchical structure will change in accordance with its adaptiveness. Thus any important change in environmental conditions will call for a modification in a systems behaviour pattern which can only be ensured by a reorganisation of its hierarchical structure in such a way that a premium is placed on the new qualities which the society must display in order to adapt to the new conditions.

_____________

Why is it that so many are "claiming" a victory in the surge phase in Iraq.

The last time I looked it was no one's COIN theory or pushing for more troops that "won" the surge it was an element of the "open source warfare" theory put forward by John Robb that AQI violated that lead to a "surge" victory.

Here is a quote from John Robb that does more to explain the "surge" victory that all the recent COIN publications to include Kilcullen's recent book. I really wish that SWJ would promote a thorough and detailed analysis of this period especially around the Sunni insurgent ecosystem that was then and is still now in place---last I read AQI is still alive and well in Iraq.

STANDING ORDER 6: Don't Fork the Insurgency
There is a tendency, among subgroups in an open source insurgency, to increase local cohesion at the expense of whole. Usually this is done by disrupting social networks to create antagonism between member groups. The order is:
...don't fork the insurgency...

Social network disruption is nearly as easy as disrupting physical networks, but it can be very dangerous. Social network disruption should only be used if it cleaves the nation-state into non-cooperative centers of gravity without sacrificing open source cohesiveness. In contrast, social network amplification is almost always good.

NOTE: This is grand strategic mistake of al Qaeda in Iraq (unlikely to be repeated). As I mentioned in my 2005 NYTimes OP-ED entitled The Open-Source War: "there are few visible fault lines in the insurgency that can be exploited." That was true until attacks on Shiite civilians and ultimately the Golden Mosque attack forked the insurgency.

THEN the Sunni insurgent groups excluding AQI ran to the US Army for protection from the Shiite death squads.

Maybe if more effort by leading "COIN" specialists were focused on the actual ecosystems of insurgencies we would be further along and just maybe we would understand the Taliban and their related groups in Afghanistan.

What I mean is that if you understand the definition below one can literally find hundreds of examples taken from Iraq and Afghanistan to fill in the blanks---this is not rocket science, but to understand open source warfare and the ecology of an insurgency does require one to wrap their head around it and challenge/go outside the box which in fact might actually challenge current COIN thinking.

Ecology of an Insurgency:

The scientific study of the way that living "organisms" in this case "organism" is defined as an insurgency cell, group, or organization interact with their environment and predators (the counter insurgent).

Ecosystem of an Insurgency:

An insurgent ecosystem is a system whose members (members defined as being either an insurgent group or groups) benefit from each other's participation via symbiotic (mutually beneficial and self-sustaining) relationships.

The main goal of an insurgency ecosystem is to generate common ventures. It forms when many small and potentially diverse (origin, tribe, religious belief, etc.) insurgent groups join together to fight a common predator (the counter-insurgent or state).

Insurgent ecosystems attract and retain members (groups) due to network effects:

• The benefits of the ecosystem (shared ventures) are so great that groups wont leave it (although temporary departures to avoid targeted pressure from counter-insurgents are possible).
• The ecosystems features (i.e. immediate access to shared resources) make it easy for new groups to form and participate.
• The growth of the ecosystem results in an exponential increase in benefits (i.e. more segmentation and specialization) for all of the member groups. IE Attacks by one group creates opportunities for other groups. The buying of resources (ie small arms, explosives) creates a market for groups to sell into and makes it easier for other groups to get access to the resources.
• An ecosystem can have groups directly fighting each other through direct battles - but it can also have indirect fighting (or competition) between groups for access to resources (people, money, strategy etc).

Once an ecosystem is established in a particular region/area, it becomes very difficult for the counter insurgent to eliminate it. The presence of multiple groups means that the counter insurgent must divide its efforts. Operationally, a focus on one group leaves other groups to operate freely and success against one group yields very little overall benefit. Removing leadership does not mean that the group will cease to exist. The leadership may be replaced by other parts from the same group or other groups. Or a new group will move into the space left open by old group. Strategically, the diversity of the groups in the ecosystem (different reasons for fighting) means that it isnt possible to address a single set of issues or grievances at the national level that would reverse the insurgency (via negotiated settlement, repatriation, etc.).

Sir,

Thanks for referencing the Bacevich article - I hadn't seen that before. There are a bunch of good foot-stopmers in there but I think the money quote is: "<i>If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldnt be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaedas game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?</i>"

Like Bacevich, I think the smarter COA after the strategic review in 2009 should have been withdrawal and containment. But FWIW now, smaller, more focused STABOPS, civilian-ministry partnering, CT, and concepts like LDI should be the way to go towards full reintegration or removal of anti-government insurgents. If that can't do it, a conventional surge never will. Plus, the COIN "strategy" draws people into thinking the might of the US military is the right tool to "build....effective state structure[s]" when various HNs fail in the first place, national interest or not.

Like "Accidental Guerilla," for better or worse, the book "Counterinsurgency" is really about himself. Bacevichs hard critique of the former could easily apply now to the latter.

Kilcullens new book also conforms to the narrative structure of so many other Coin memoirs in that it portrays a new way of global counterinsurgency warfare, yet must co-opt narrative structures from wars from the past and give the reader the feel like the Bridge where Kilcullen and his handful of men become involved in an apparently desultory firefight is virtually like the lost platoon at Ia Drang. In this sense it reads very much like Mullaney's "The Unforgiving Minute," or Mansoor's "Baghdad at Sunrise."

Carl, I think your dissent is a bit premature. Indeed, something happened between 2005-2009. We unscrewed ourselves from irrational decisions made in the planning and execution of 2001-2005.

Unassuming our failed assumptions and facts described in a vacuum and a self-imposed, constrained time-line.

Maybe the counter-insurgency strategy was a reaction to failed policy, but it was required nonetheless as a less-bad resolution, a way out.

Is the outcome a victory? Was our intervention a model of future foreign policy? Is this petri-dish a case study that we would hope to force on the rest of the world?

Of course not. Only a fool would suggest that, but at least we can leave with some dignity hoping that the Iraqis can make a better future for themselves.

v/r

Mike

A few issues with the above reviews/summaries:

First, are we still buying into the premise that the US surge in Iraq was responsible for turning the tide on AQI? It's that black-and-white? The people who lap that up are the same ones that think a similar conventional surge will have the same grandiose effect in AFG where the environment is 180 degrees different. A surge is counter-intuitive to desired effects of PC COIN. Small footprint steps like LDI, planning/partnering/mentoring with the ANA and Afghan ministries such as MoI and MRRD, and CT as necessary will shape the environment to turn the tide in AFG and reconcile/reintegrate the taliban with a small "t."

Second, <i>"He concludes with a new strategic approach to the War on Terrorism, arguing that counterinsurgency rather than traditional counterterrorism may offer the best approach to defeating global jihad."</i> Really? A military led GWOT, COIN <i>or</i> CT driven, is still thought of as the panacea for the issues that turn people away from their legitimate governments in the first place? Talk about fishing for job security. COIN, PC or otherwise, is a flash in the military's 21st century pan only because world powers refuse to see and act on trends occurring around them. When they step up we can get back to focusing on what militaries are designed to do. Until then, we should only use our skills to work with the host-nation gov't to force them to apply the necessary steps that need to be taken to draw the insurgency back towards the gov't while we apply kinetic effects to 'reconcile' the intransigents. If said HN doesn't agree with the steps we think are necessary, than a strategic reassessment needs to occur as to why we think they are a vital national interest in the first place.

Finally, even just be reading the subtitle of the book, he's creating a straw-man argument. COIN will only be generated through persistent presence by the legitimacy and effectiveness of the HN gov't (not by US/Coalition forces- we only serve to help them achieve that legitimacy and strength to get into areas where security isn't conducive to outreach). The desired effect is to draw the population away from the insurgent cause. Repetitive raiding won't do this; its a different tactic for a different fight, and he knows this. Again, blatant job security for COINdinistas.