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Enhancing the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force to Satisfy the Needs of the Uncertain Global Security Environment
by Major Vincent A. Ciuccoli and Dr. David A. Anderson, Small Wars Journal
Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The USMC is prepared to be the solitary architect of this force; however the proposed employment of the SC MAGTF is a bold unilateral endeavor. A regionally focused security cooperation force is the ideal employment construct for the Department of Defense (DOD) but it must sufficiently integrate United States government agency capabilities and incorporate joint force multipliers. This paper analyzes the potential requirement for a specialized DOD security cooperation force and determines whether a joint and interagency venture will further enhance and legitimize the US Marine Corps’ current employment concept. The aim of this paper is to develop a significant contribution to the format of the SC MAGTF in order to ensure its success and permanent establishment within the regional civil-military arsenal.
Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)
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Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos
by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal
Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos (Full PDF Article)
The United States has always had mixed feelings about our relationship with Central America, so when the Honduran Army sent President Manuel Zelaya packing last week, we joined with a chorus of regional leaders, including Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, in condemning the soldier’s putsch.
But now that we’ve exercised our moral indignation, we ought to step back and take a deep breath. As reports continue to come in, it appears that it was Zelaya, not the army, that was most egregiously breaking the law. The president was apparently involved in his own takeover, against the courts and Honduran Congress, and was about to stage a Chavez-style “referendum” on ballots printed in Venezuela and looted from an army warehouse where they were being safeguarded. The army’s move was legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court and applauded by the Congress, which has appointed a stand-in president until regular elections this November.
Certainly we deplore military coups, just as we deplore sin. But in the tangled web of Central American politics, Honduras has long been the U.S.’ most staunch ally. Among the four states from Nicaragua north, it has tried hardest to convert from a military-run banana republic to a constitutional democracy and, until just the other day, with some success. It supported U.S. trainers in the Salvadoran civil war. It houses an American military joint task force. At our request, Honduran soldiers fought in Iraq. So while the verdict must be that military takeovers are bad, surely in this case there are extenuating circumstances for a faithful ally, particularly since the bottom-line issue seems to have been the survival of its constitutional form of government.
From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats
The Coming Revolution in Civil Military Relations
by Dr. Tony Corn
From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats (Full PDF Article)
The irrelevance of International Relations theory to the conduct of foreign policy has received renewed attention since 9/11. Though lamented by a few, this state of affairs has been on the whole lauded by a profession by now unreflexively committed to evaluating the degree of “originality” of any academic research on one criteria only: its degree of policy irrelevance.
Much less has been written on the irrelevance of civil-military relations theory for the conduct of military policy – and for a good reason: outside of military circles, few people are even aware of the existence of this obscure sub-field which has been an intellectual backwater for the past generation. If you like the proverbial insularity of IR theory, you have to love the intellectual in-breeding permeating a field cultivated by two dozen practitioners mono-maniacally obsessed with the “civilian control of the military,” and who keep plowing their ever-shrinking plot seemingly unaware of the law of diminishing returns.
In the academic pecking order, specialists of civil-military relations rank toward the bottom - somewhere between sports sciences and gender studies; yet, over the years, this little-known academic tribe has managed to yield a disproportionate influence on military culture through its role in the equally little-known domain of professional military education (PME).
The Navy’s Gators
An Endangered Species?
by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, Small Wars Journal
The Navy’s Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)
For over five decades the nuclear powered Aircraft Carrier has been the center of naval strategy and policy for the United States of America. In the 1950’s the big guns of the gray-hull battleships had been America’s capital ships since the Spanish American War. In the six decades that the battleships ruled the seas they brought the United States from a regional power to a global leader in the bipolar world of the Cold War. The Carrier and its embarked air-wing have dominated the oceans, littorals, and near-shore, taking the United States to its current position as the world’s lone Superpower. In the post-Cold War world, filled with asymmetric threats, a global war on terrorism, and the prospect of mounting regional stability operations, it is time for the Sea Services to re-evaluate what they consider their capital ship. In the 21st century the busiest and most important naval vessels, and therefore our capital ships, are the Amphibious Assault Ships, known affectionately by their Sailors and Marines as The Gators.
Throughout the United States Navy’s 233 year history strategy and policy have dictated what vessel was the focus of our nation’s shipbuilding plans. The early Navy was based around the strategic concept of guerre de course, and its missions of commerce protection and commerce raiding. The result was an American Navy based around Humphrey’s Fast Frigates as the capital ship. As the nation left the age of sail and the littoral warfare of the Civil War behind us, and began to move toward the world’s stage, it became clear that a blue water fleet was required. Visionaries like CAPT A.T. Mahan helped lead to a fleet dominated by battleships and the battlefleet. After years of struggle against the “battleship mafia” by men like ADM Moffet, World War II dramatically demonstrated the importance of the Aircraft Carrier. The struggle against the Soviets placed it and the Air Wing as the central vessel of the time. American naval strength throughout history has been ensured by the ability to recognize when new strategic challenges present themselves. It is time to consider what asset best accomplishes the strategic missions of the new century as a guide to identify today’s capital ship and shipbuilding priority.
The Navy’s Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)
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The People in Arms
A Practitioner’s Guide to Understanding Insurgency and Dealing with it Effectively
by Colonel G. L. Lamborn, Small Wars Journal
The People in Arms (Full PDF Article)
Since Clausewitz’s day, many thinkers, military and civilian, have written about the problem of insurgency or, as Clausewitz put it, “the people in arms.” Unfortunately, on the one hand, many of these works were written at the level of the political scientist or sociologist, and were therefore largely theoretical, and thus of little interest to the tactician. On the other hand, many works were purely tactical in nature – useful to the man at squad or platoon level, but lacking any broader theoretical context to explain why what is observed exists. These tactical manuals thus became “formulaic” – “in such and such a circumstance, do this.” But explanations of why a particular insurgency came to be, or its specific dynamics or vulnerabilities, have generally been given short shrift or ignored entirely. Thus, many tactical books are long on how to conduct “kinetic” activities, but woefully short on what really matters about dealing effectively with insurgencies. The theoretical books are long on what ought to be done, but often lack an operational perspective that would provide some idea as to how to go about doing what is recommended.
Clausewitz himself admits (Chapter 26) that his understanding of “the people in arms” was limited, though he states that the importance of this form of conflict would grow with the passage of years. Clausewitz evidently did not understand that “the people in arms” was to become far more than merely a useful adjunct of conventional operations, such as the partisan or resistance movements in Napoleon’s day or in Nazi-occupied Europe. From peasant uprisings and relatively unfocused tribal warfare in remote areas of the globe during the nineteenth century, irregular warfare has evolved into a distinct species of conflict with its own “rules” and dynamic. Unfortunately, many senior Western military officers, trained in the strategy and tactics of conventional warfare, are slowly (sometimes very painfully) learning that the “rules” of conventional warfare as taught at Sandhurst, West Point, or Saint-Cyr do not necessarily apply to insurgency.
The author has been a student and observer, and sometimes a participant, in various insurgencies since his “initiation” in Vietnam in 1969. What is presented in this work is a distillation of those experiences and studies gathered over approximately forty years on four continents, to include some firsthand experience with the contemporary American struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as some experience in working with insurgent movements in the 1980s. This short work is intended to give the reader an understanding of the true nature of insurgency and a glimpse at the reasons why we have not always dealt with it effectively. If the reader gains some insight into insurgency, and can apply his knowledge intelligently, Jimmy Doolittle’s wish will come true: we will start fighting more from the neckline up – and less from the neckline down.
Turkey’s Border Porosity Problem with PKK
by Berfu Kiziltan, Small Wars Journal
Turkey’s Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)
The porosity of the border between Turkey and Iraq has been a pressing issue in combating PKK terrorism. The fact that the PKK has moved considerable material and personnel support through that border is undisputed, as is the fact that absent such support, the PKK would pose a far less menacing threat to the safety of the Turkish people. Since it took arms in the 1970s, the PKK has used the mountainous border area between the two countries to establish bases of operations from which it has launched attacks. It is estimated that the loss of lives within the Turkish army is higher than 6.000 in fighting with the terrorist group, PKK. In order to decrease casualties and build an effective system of border monitoring utilization of UAVs is a must. While employing UAVs has several limitations as well as disadvantages, their advantages outweigh its drawbacks.
Border porosity could be broadly defined as the high permeability of a land, sea or maritime border to illegal trespassing or hauling of personnel or material as a result of inadequate or inefficient border security and monitoring. UAVs are defined as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or nonlethal payloads.
In combating PKK terrorism, border porosity should receive increased attention chiefly because the PKK keeps the bulk of its forces and resources in hideouts in Qandil Mountains, which lie further south of the border. The choice of Qandil Mountains is no coincidence, as it is relatively more secure for the PKK than the immediate vicinity of the border, and because the rugged terrain rarely provides a ground for operations for the Turkish military. In addition, Turkey faces several political challenges both at home and abroad while conducting cross-border military operations against the PKK, and in this regard, the fact that the Qandil Mountains lie south of the border provides the PKK practical as well as tactical advantages. Before we can eliminate the PKK completely, we should first deny the organization’s access to Turkish territory through the border. Once that is accomplished, the raids on Turkish military outposts along the border will dramatically decrease in number, and the majority of the PKK’s resources will be confined to the Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq.
Turkey’s Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)
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Counterinsurgency
Is “Air Control” the Answer?
by Major Angelina M. Maguinness, Small Wars Journal
Counterinsurgency: Is “Air Control” the Answer? (Full PDF Article)
Within the last few years, many airpower theorists advocated for the creation of a more air-centric approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. They point to modern airpower successes as the central component in military strategies, such as the successes in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1998, and in the air policing operations conducted over Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Other airpower proponents decry the lack of “air-mindedness” and the short attention given to airpower in the 2007 United States (US) Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. They call for a truly joint COIN doctrine that recognizes and leverages airpower’s combat capabilities instead of relegating its use solely to support for ground forces.
Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower’s emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies. Airpower, however, is not a cure-all in COIN, as demonstrated by Britain’s foray into colonial policing from 1919 to 1939. These lessons are applicable today, as military leaders continue to explore alternatives and supplements to existing American COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is no doubt airpower plays a prominent role within COIN strategy, airpower’s most prudent use should not be as a primarily offensive weapon but as a component within a restrained combined arms approach.
Counterinsurgency: Is “Air Control” the Answer? (Full PDF Article)
Common Analytic Standards
Intelligence Community Directive # 203 and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence
by Lieutenant Colonel Von H. Pigg, Small Wars Journal
Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)
On 21 June 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), signed and implemented Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203, “Analytic Standards,” governing the production and evaluation of intelligence analysis and analytical products. ICD 203 articulates the mission and commitment of all analytic elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) to meet the highest standards of integrity and rigorous analytical thinking. The DNI, via ICD 203, established doctrinal requirements designed to improve the quality, relevance of and confidence in the analysis and conclusions of intelligence products produced for policy makers and military commanders. As the Marine Corps’ service component intelligence agency and member of the IC, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) at Quantico adopted the promulgated analytic standards, along with a required self-evaluation program. Rigid application of the standards, combined with critical self and other IC evaluations will ensure MCIA and the entire USMC intelligence apparatus consistently produces timely, objective, multi-source based intelligence products resulting from sound analytic tradecraft practices. The purpose of this article is to examine the reasoning and rationale for prescribed IC Analytical Standards and how MCIA is implementing the standards and overcoming implementation challenges for the purpose of improving intelligence support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Task Force(s) (MAGTFs), USMC supporting establishments as well as the IC at large.
Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)
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The Seven Deadly Questions
How to Think about Mexico and Beyond
by Roger Pardo-Maurer, Small Wars Journal
How to Think about Mexico and Beyond (Full PDF Article)
Quick Quiz
By the beginning of the new counterinsurgency strategy and arguably a turning point of the War in Iraq (late 2006 - early 2007), which country after the United States and Great Britain had the next largest combat-related loss of citizens in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
The answer is - Mexico .
Blood is indeed thicker than water, or at least thicker than the Rio Grande. If ever proof were required of how our two peoples have become intertwined in ways we can hardly begin to imagine, one could hardly do better than to point to the fact that Mexico, or rather, the people of Mexico, were in effect an invisible member of the Coalition.
A Country Taken for Granted
Since the Spanish-American War, the grand strategy of the United States has been to rely on stability in the Western Hemisphere in order to pursue its interests in Europe and Asia. If Mexico is not already our most vital strategic relationship, it will become so over the next generation: as a trade partner, as a source of demographic and cultural renewal, and as a pillar of our strategic worldview so taken-for-granted that it is difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise.
Thanks to Greg Smith for making available his October, 2008 pre-deployment interview with Brigadier General John Nicholson. BG Nicholson is the Deputy Commander of RC South. Greg is a freelance journalist and research consultant.
From the introduction:
The interview was originally designed to be an emphasis on leadership, actors, and COIN operations. With a very small bit of reengineering what materialized is a candid and up to date snapshot of the intricacy of COIN operations in southern Afghanistan. The intricacy is still very much alive and this interview is now available for public consumption.
Read the full transcript of the interview.
Some recent news interviews quoting BG Nicholson include:
U.S. Military Works to Bring Stability to Remote Afghan Areas at the PBS Online News Hour, June 9, 2009. (BG Nicholson quotes are toward the end of the piece)
Top U.S. General in Southern Afghanistan Optimistic More Forces Will Turn Tide by Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, May 11, 2009.
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