Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has ordered a thorough force structure review of the Marine Corps to determine what an expeditionary force in readiness should look like in the 21st century.
There are questions about the mission of the Marine Corps, Gates said. Before World War II, the Marines very successfully conducted "small wars" in the western hemisphere. The service also developed the rationale and logistics needed to conduct amphibious warfare.
During World War II, the Corps was wholly dedicated to landing on the beaches in the South and Central Pacific. America's first offensive of World War II was when Marines landed on the beaches of Guadalcanal and began the campaign against Japan in August 1942. Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa are just a few of the landings Marines made.
Since then, Marines have fought on the beaches, mountains and trenches of Korea, the highlands and rice paddies of Vietnam, and the deserts of Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. Although many of these operations saw Marines initially projected from the sea, "they soon turned into long, grinding, ground engagements," Gates said.
The nation does not need a second land army, Gates said, but rather forces that can deploy quickly and sustain themselves for a short period of time.
Also see Gates: Time has Come to Re-examine Future of Marine Corps by Kevin Baron of Stars and Stripes and Defense Chief Gates Orders Review of Marines' Role by David S. Cloud of The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
I said I can't make an argument that we don't need a Navy. I'm sorry, that was a poorly constructed sentence. I consider the Navy the most important service, by far. I think the Air Force and the Army are just as vulnerable to discussions about their existence as the Marine Corps. The Navy is the only one who needn't worry, as the need for a strong Navy is obvious.
Xenophon, which service do you suppose has been enforcing the Carter Doctrine, and keeping the sea-lanes open for commerce which includes the free flow of oil (always in play) all these years to date?
It may be in the background unnoticed, overshadowed by land events in Iraq and Afghanistan, but none the less, an important strategic mission for the U.S.
Semper Fi
Looking at it from a financial perspective, it was only a matter of time before Secretary Gates would turn his focus on the Marine Corps. Much like he did with the Army's Future Combat System and the Air Force's F-22, he's continuing to look at where he can initiate budget costs in keeping in line with his public statements of lowering DODs portion of the budget. He rightfully questions the future role of the Marine Corps to include its force structure and whether or not amphibious warfare will continue to be central to the Marine Corps mission. Reading between the lines, it seems like he has set his crosshairs on the Littoral Combat Ship program. Much like he did for the other service's big ticket items mentioned previously, in order to further lower DODs future budgetary requirements.
With a formalized and burgeoning Navy Expeditionary Combat capability, a better link between the Sea Services may now occur.
It bears serious viewing at the significant force multiplier NECC units (riverine, maritime CA, expeditionary logistics, etc) could provide the Marines. As mentioned above, not just the littorals, but inland waterways.
To echo a point made above: until roles and missions are sorted out, the force structure question cannot really be answered.
It may be worth mentioning that BCT and modularity concepts appear to be attempts at a AGTF (Air Ground Task Force) for the Army. Hmmm I wonder where this was implemented successfully in the last 30 years... MAGTF?
After the drawdown and (if) things settle down, the Army will need to refocus on the growing conventional threats. I see the Corps once again being the functional manager for MOOTW and contingency operations.
"If the United States Marine hasn't earned his keep as a fighting man after almost 234 years, he must go."
I don't think that anyone is contemplating the dissolution of the Corps or the disappearance of the US Marine.
However, do we need to maintain 200k+ Marines with the current structure, equipment, aviation, and focus? I love my Marine Corps. We Marines can either view this as a threat and retreat into well-worn phrases of appealing to emotion and previous bravery, competence and sacrifice, or we can use this as an opportunity to adapt ourselves for the future. It will likely be a time of hard choices, but our history is replete with them.
The Marine Corps is the only service that one can make a strong logical argument that it is not needed. We exist at the seams of sea, land and air (to paraphrase the latest Marine Operating Concepts document). Our own knowledge that our existence is tenuous has made us one of the more politically adroit and paranoid military cultures over the past century. In large part, I think this has been a good thing in driving new ideas and new concepts, not only in the Marine Corps, but in the other services.
In a joint world, we should be the service that understands joint above all as we cant get anywhere without the Navy, and we cant operate for long on land without the Army (and everyone really needs the Air Force to enable the whole spectrum of air operations). Our dependency should drive a realization that we need to work well with others and really work to take advantage of their capabilities. Our concepts should be as parasitic and support oriented as possible:
-Heres how we contribute to sea control and maritime security from the landward side of the littoral.
-Here's how we can leverage operating in the littorals to assure access and accomplish joint objectives (another nod to the Marine Operating Concepts).
-Heres how we can support the Armys long-term land campaign with sea-based access (access that spans the range of operations from COIN to High Intensity to Hybrid, or whatever's next) designed to enable and facilitate their specific capabilities and needs; etc.
Semper Fi
<b>scholes:</b><blockquote>"...with the army commited to the brigade concept and modularization they dont even think about divisional operations which is a big mistake."</blockquote>Why so?
Other than WWII in North Africa, Desert Storm and parts of OIF 1, all of our wars have been fought by Brigades or Regimental Combat Teams, to include the Civil War and most of WW II outside the desert.
Divisions fight well in large open spaces. Given average terrain, they're too large and unwieldy for effective employment and they have the disadvantage (as we found out in both Korea after the line stabilized and throughout Viet Nam -- dare I add today...) of providing an oversized staff and a few energetic Generals with way too little to do in any thing other than full bore MCO.
We need to sort out the CS / CSS problem a bit better but the Division isn't really necessary; a Corps or decent JTF can control 5 to 10 Brigades.
If, of course, they let Brigade Commanders do their jobs...
the marines have had to justify there missions for many years. pres. eisenhower wanted to disband the corps after ww2. what needs to happen is for the corps to have specific missions, where they are the primary service that commits to that particular mission. the expeditionary role should still be number one mission for coastal and island operations. the army airborne corps would be the reinforcement unit. they should work together constantly.one of the problems though is the marines doesnt like to abdicate to the army if a larger force is needed. really, the way interoperability is flaunted around why would any body expect them to. with the army commited to the brigade concept and modularization they dont even think about divisional operations which is a big mistake.
I the think the Marine model prior to 9/11 is more relevant now than it was in the 1990s. The ability to base a credible combat force off troubled shores anywhere in the world as a show of force, with the viable option of commiting forces if required was always a USMC unique capability, whether it was used for supporting stability operations, non-combatant evacuations, humanitarian relief efforts, or limited combat operations. I can't imagine any Geographical Combatant Commander wanting to lose that capability, and he probably wants more of it. Secretary Gates is clearly focused, and with good reason, on preparing our forces to perform better in counterinsurgency efforts, but that is simply one mission out of many we need to be able to perform, and the excessive focus on COIN appears to be blinding us to more likely environments where we'll employ our forces.
All condescending silliness aside, George is indeed correct. With the exception of the ARNG, the likeness of our modern US Army, like income tax, is grossly unconstitutional. But here we are in a 2010 that the Framers would have never envisioned.
The important thing that we must not forget is the sheer versatility of the Marine Corps. Remember the motto "The Worlds 911 Service"? This motto embodies the very nature of the future Corps. The bottom line is that the Corps must be able to project power from mobile sea-based platforms to serve as contingency and theater reserve assets. The MEUs are the traditional and ideal model to build upon. With equal emphasis on air assault/heliborne, amphibious, and special operations the Corps should strive to be a smaller and more versatile force.
On a side note, the Corps enjoys a certain amount of political and bureaucratic freedom that the Army will never see due to its size and conventional mission. This allows the Corps the ability to invest more into less or choose quality over quantity in many areas. Ultimately, this allows the individual marine to accomplish the gamut of potential missions more effectively, which is all the better for the desired end-state: a reliable contingency force.
Anonymous, concerning the leather neck protection? The leather stock was more likely for when a sentry nodded-off on duty, his head would be held-up erect, thereby giving the appearance of alertness. However, you might be on to something as concerns killing pirates (can we still use the word kill?).
Toujours Fidele
George,
By referencing the Founder's vision vis a vis the Constitution, you are correct. Given this perspective, the Marines should refocus on the mission they had in 1775 and prepare to board enemy ships with small arms (swords, leather neck protection, etc) after a good broadside. Much cheaper too!! Certainly an irregular warfare mission, killing Pirates and such.
The Constitution (remember that document) is specific concerning Congress' authority to raise an army (as needed) but that no appropriation for that army may be for more than 2 years.
Next sentence is that Congress will maintain a navy. The Marines are a Constitutional necessity, the army is the duplicate service.
Unless we are complicit at throwing the Constitution under the bus.
Ultimately," said Gates, "the maritime soul of the Marine Corps needs to be preserved." And well it should, for it is part of America's soul!
I would like to remind one-and-all, least the land army of land lubbers forget, America is a maritime nation involved in the world's globalized economy. An economy that involves three quarters of the world's population, roughly eighty percent of the world's capital cities, and nearly all the major routes of international trade being located in the world's littorals.
For that very reason our nation must have the ability to project power ashore in support of our economic, security, and humanitarian interests in order to prosper.
The Corps experienced much the same issue after WWII and survived. SecDef Gates has carefully screened and ultimately recommended Gen. James Amos to assume the helm as the next CMC to articulate the Corps' future role and what its mission statement will be, and will carry-out a review of what is needed to accomplish it.
I anxiously await the final outcome in these times of uncertainty, for surely whatever is daring and dangerous is theirs to do.
... and that's the irony. We, as a nation and defense establishment, have never undertaken a real start from a clean sheet of paper analysis of what we will require our Armed services to do in the future. Within the DOD we bring too much legacy baggage to the table in such efforts as the QDR. So much so, we now need an independent QDR-like effort to tell us what the QDR didn't. Seriously, we need a clean slate to begin with and SERIOUS national and defense strategies as the starting point.
Here comes the force cuts talked about in the DoD study which it seems has in fact become the defacto instrument of force/cost reduction and in which few outside the study group which were business types had any input---strange way to do business?
But hey he is a Republican in a Democratic administration so he feels he can do no wrong.
One of the articles terms this as a "Force Structure" review. The other terms it as a "Review of the Role of the Marine Corps". Which one is it? Both are needed, but a review of the Marine Corps role needs to come first and be completed to provide guidance for a force structure review.
If there is no guidance about what the Marine Corps should do in the future, then no good decisions can be made about what it should look like.