Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards

I forgot to mention two thoughts on the conference notes:

1- Since 9/11 various groups within the government and military have advocated that we work together more, train together, etc. OGA and military, State and military, SOF and Conventional, etc. This conference took place during the 10th year of our efforts post that date. It must be a "bridge too far" because other than hearing every year we need to do it- I see no action or leadership on the issue. In fact, some leaders have said publicly that there is enough now- and explaining that the more interagency, etc. training done, the less time for "other activities" there is (time is finite). Leaders set priorities, and I would submit that our leaders haven't made interagency and other types of combined training opportunities a priority. Maybe instead of repeating we need it, we need to articulate what it should replace that we do now.

2- I am very surprised at how overt we are as to our "need" to sell the country and politicians on the "requirement" to continue "COIN". I knew it existed- but we are openly admitting to it more and more. Isn't that backwards? If we have no mandate to do what we think is necessary- what does that say about our efforts?

I fear this effort to sell we are undertaking is getting dangerously close to undercutting our public's trust in us. We may increasingly be pressured to support short-term metrics, "spin" messages, and not really tell the "whole" truth. I submit we should stop being advocates so much for COIN or continuing efforts- and just rely on explaining in an objective manner what we recommend and possible outcomes to different courses of action. At what point does "convincing politicians to continue to fund COIN" become the military driving the train as opposed to the political?

While I agree with the sentiment above, learning organisations on their own are not a solution - by definition they find their own path and without strong leadership and direction they can just as easily take to to the place you most don't want to be: where the micro-managers, bureaucrats and risk-averse prove to be the better and faster learners...

I would place more emphasis on 'the mission' and warfighting and less on bureaucratic compliance, and using learning organisation techniques to support that...

The last task- develop a learning organization- would arguably both cover all of the other tasks and be the most difficult to implement. Although the Army talks much about becoming a Learning Organization- or arguing that we ARE one already, I think most people are referring to learning in the abstract, as opposed to Peter Senge's characteristics of a "Learning Organization"- a term coined by Senge and his colleagues.

The "Learning Organization" is a concept with explicit characteristics: systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning. The Army as a whole- and to a mixed extent at lower levels- fails attaining most, if not all, of Senge's "disciplines": the characteristics mentioned above, therefore we are perhaps as far from being a "Learning Organization"- as defined by the term's founder- as possible.

To do so in my opinion would require fundamental change in the US Army- not the least of which would be our personnel system. Currently we do not: require systems thinking education, reward (or even substantially encourage) personal mastery, instruct on mental models, attempt a shared vision (it is usually the commander's vision only), or ensure the development of team learning (very different concept than simply working on a team). I'd speculate that less than 1% of the Army have even heard of these characteristics, much less understand them.

While the US Army does many things very well- "facilitat[ing] the learning of its members and continuously transform[ing] itself" is not something I think we can honestly say we do- at least not in the way Senge envisioned: which was a business which had to constantly change and adapt IN ITS ENTIRETY to better anticipate changes in the marketplace... or die.

One way we might be able to encourage Learning Org characteristics is to encourage its development at the battalion level and somehow ensure that authority is pushed down to the lowest level possible- punishing micromanagers and risk-averse commanders. One of the major results of incorporating Learning Org disciplines into an organization is that eventually only one thing counts: "the mission"- and thus bureaucracy is sought out and destroyed. I fear this is the opposite direction much of the Army is currently going in.

By the way, I had some trouble finding the sub-tasks, does anyone have a link for them?

Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
The comments above are the author's own and do not constitute the position of the DoD or US Army.

I'd suggest that the lack of a revision to, or rewrite of, FM 3-24 does not reflect an organizational unwillingness to embrace accumulated experience, knowledge, lessons, or that this reveals a "darker side" of our Army. Rather, it reflects that there is a certain saturation point at which the Army can absorb the doctrine it produces. As mentioned, there have been a number of doctrinal publications that have advanced some counterinsurgency thinking beyond what is contained in 3-24. Among these are the Joint Counterinsurgency manual, JP 3-24, FM 3-24.2, "Tactics in COIN", FM 3-07, "Stability Operations", FM 3-07.1, "Security Force Assistance", and the in-progress ATTP 3-07.5, "Stability Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures" to name a few. The force's learning also has been enabled by in-theater COIN and Stability (as in Iraq today) academies that adapt to changes within their respective operating environments, supported by CALL, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and other organizations focused on getting specific TTP disseminated quickly.

Is FM 3-24 in need of revision? Yes it is.

Does it need to be revised within a context reframed to better account for operational environments and situations that are neither classic colonial or post-colonial interventions? Definitely.

Is the U.S. Army so consumed with the current operational framework of COIN that it is resisting change? One could argue that the Army's drive to rebalance its full-spectrum operations capabilities and reinvigorate its major combat operations capability has already diverted some focus from current COIN tendencies and challenges.

Is the benefit of a revised counterinsurgency manual worth the potential opportunity costs to the development and dissemination of other critical doctrinal efforts (such as Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security within the new FM 3-0, Operations)? Not so clear. And how rapidly would the goodness of a revised COIN manual influence the force on the ground? Unknown.

None of this is to suggest there is not a need to advance our thinking on counterinsurgency, or more broadly, on operations amongst the people against hybrid threats and irregular challenges in an environment heavily influenced by complex transnational dynamics. Absolutely there is (and we need to do so by better leveraging non-military disciplines as well as through improved collaboration with our civilian and multinational partners). But simply noting the shortfalls of one field manual and upon its flaws making a case that the Army's dark side reveals itself seems a bit much.

A final point I would offer is that no doctrine should be viewed as containing all the answers; it should however, be a useful starting point upon which to develop relevant and insightful questions. In this area, FM 3-24 seems still to be serving us fairly well.

R/
Dan

Changing the title to 'Force Generation Standards for OIF' would add a more appropriate context to these documents as opposed to the implication that they are generic COIN Qualification Standards (without wanting to peel the scab off the 'each insurgency is/is not unique' wound...)

On a rewrite/update of FM 3-24, it is probably well overdue, noting that both JP 3-24 and the even more recent NATO equivalent could be considered semi-updates. Before a rewrite, perhaps a retitling is more necessary to better set FM 3-24 as the gameplan for one insurgency (Iraq) and less as guidance for other insurgencies (caveat above still in effect)...

It is not that we have learned something new in the past 4 years that compels us to make changes to FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. It is that FM 3-24 was never about "counterinsurgency" to begin with, and actually a collection of several hundred years of European and US Colonial Intervention (we'll call that little 'coin')experience.

This is a very different mission than COIN. (COIN is domestic, and is far more a matter of civil emergency than warfare) Also hindering the value of this manual is that it is based also most solely on a study of colonial intervention in locations where the locals are rising up in insurgency against their puppet regimes and in guerrilla warfare against the colonial power. So it is lacking a balance that comes from also studying the insurgent/guerrilla's side of the equation. I also lack the balance that comes from studying peaceful situations, or situations where non-violent tactics were employed to effect change.

This leaves us with a very biased, one dimensional look at a multi-dimensional problem.

Further complicating this is that the recent advances in information technology have made some of the standard tactics of such interventions (most notably, "separating the insurgent from the populace") impossible.

So, it is not that we need to add a couple years of lessons learned, we need to reframe the entire context of the manual.

Bob

I read this report with interest, but came away with the moderately sarcastic thought of "so this is where the phrase 'self-licking ice cream cone' comes from."

Dan and his guys do good work, no problem with the profesionalism of product, it's just that we approach this far too much like a military organization (no surprise there). The boss sets right and left limits, and we have freedom to operate and think within those parameters. Personally I believe it is time to begin coloring outside the lines a bit more.

This a good summary though into what people are thinking in theater.