How Afghanistan Ends
How Afghanistan Ends:
A Political-Military Path to Peace
by Linda Robinson
Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends
This paper presents a scenario for resolution of the Afghan conflict in a manner that achieves U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This scenario takes the current U.S. approach as the starting point and adds 1) a more detailed theory of the conflict that highlights the political effects that must be achieved; 2) emphasis on bottom-up measures that can produce momentum in the short term, and 3) a political diplomatic strategy embraced and pursued in concert by the Afghan government, the United States and key international partners. Finally, the paper identifies requirements for a smaller follow-on military force to pave the way for a long-term advisory and assistance effort.
Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends
Linda Robinson served as Senior Adviser to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at US Central Command in 2009-2010. This paper draws on open-source research and over two dozen interviews with current and former officials from Afghanistan, the United States and other countries and organizations, as well as South Asia and functional experts. Special thanks are due to Clare Lockhart, Michael Semple, Simon Shercliff, Mary Beth Long, Michael O’Hanlon, Jim Shinn, Adib Farhadi and John Nagl.
Munzur, This is a completely incoherent reason on which to base such a far-reaching policy. Is Pakistan a person who will run into the outhouse if the main house is being “invaded”? Why would India invade Pakistan in the first place? What is the plan that is thought to lead to an Indian invasion? This is NDC-level bullshit allowed to become national policy. That is exactly why we need adult supervision of the armed forces..
Pakistan wants some place to run, if India attacks them again. You know what happened on 16 December 71, India took her revenge in the shape of dismemberment of Pakistan and we got independence.
India is a “revisionist state” and that Pakistan understands well. When Pakistan says strategic depth, it is mostly due to lack of finding a proper words. Actually they want to avoid a TWO FRONT WAR in future!
I will have to agree with Carl. I think Robert, like many good people, really cannot believe that all those smartly turned out officers could possibly have had the ideas I think they actively pursued for years.
The eye cannot see what the mind does not know…
In my version of events, matters were not in equilibrium in 2000. A significant jihadi network was being incubated and activated all across Pakistan and beyond into Afghanistan and India. It was hosting some of the craziest terrorists in the world. If 9-11 had not happened, some other attack in Russia, in China, in India, in Iran, in a dozen other places, could easily have happened and been traced back to Pakistan and Afghanistan. At that point, the “equilibrium” would have shifted, one way or the other..
Robert C. Jones:
We are going to have to acknowledge our point of fundamental disagreement and leave it at that. I believe Pakistan is in the mess it is in because the Pak Army/ISI’s machinations led them to this and it will only get worse. You believe that the mess is because we forced the Pak Army/ISI to change their carefully thought out scheme. So be it. I would add though that we forced them to do something (temporarily) they didn’t want to do because one of their clients had just killed nearly 3,000 Americans. I would add also that Pakistan’s stability is probably not our primary concern in all this, a concern, but not the primary one.
I would be obliged though if you could elaborate upon how Afghanistan provides, in a practical way, strategic depth for the Pak Army/ISI.
Carl,
Is Pakistan more stable today than it was before the U.S. created the conflict of interest by changing our position by 180 degrees on the Mujhadeen?
In 2002 I was struck by the words in a report from our guys present with the first Pak military push up into the FATA:
“I was working in the basement of the Pentagon, and a large portion of my duties were to read the daily reports from our deployed Special Operations Forces, distill key points, and capture them on PowerPoint for the Senior Army Leaderships morning brief. The words of an elderly Pakistani village leader will haunt me for the rest of my life. An element of the Pakistani military had left the relative security of the Indus river valley, and had pushed up into the fiercely independent and pro-Taliban mountain region bordering Afghanistan. A small element of U.S. personnel was accompanying them, and the team leader captured this sage observation from the village elder, “We do not like the government forces coming up into our territory, you understand, for they have no purpose here. You Americans, on the other hand, we do not mind. You are here for revenge, and revenge we understand.”
We did not understand the dynamic of the problem or the region, so we pushed for a “US/western” solution of forcing Pakistan to exert their sovereign duties as we defined them. We see the results of that today.
Robert C. Jones:
I agree with the first paragraph in your post of 0832. However as far as foreign policy goes, the Pak Army/ISI is effectively the government of Pakistan and they should be held accountable. That is why I am always careful to say Pak Army/ISI rather than Pakistan or the Pakistani government. The Pakistani man on the street and the civilian gov. don’t have much to do with it.
As far as your second paragraph goes, is it your position that the United States should endorse the desire of one sovereign country’s army, Pak Army, to use a neighboring sovereign country, Afghanistan, as it sees fit whenever it feels like it? That seems a bit unreasonable to me, maybe to some Afghans also who may not be so keen to see the Pak Army free to use their “turf”. It also seems unreasonable that a desire not to see that happen is viewed as de-stabilizing Pakistan. It seems unreasonable to me that standing in the way (or pretending to, we haven’t been very good at it) of this Pak Army/ISI ambition is seen as having picked India over the Pak Army. We haven’t reduced mil aid to the Pak Army. We haven’t imposed any important sanctions. We haven’t pressed them hard about Mumbai and we haven’t complained when they all but pull the trigger themselves on our forces in Afghanistan. It seems to me we have bent over backwards in a way that future historians will marvel at in an attempt to keep them happy.
You mention our triggering an nuclear war with our meddling. I don’t believe occasionally refusing to be lap dogs for the general sahibs constitutes meddling. The Pak Army/ISI’s position in this respect reminds me of a criminal holding a gun to the head of a hostage and telling the negotiator “If you don’t do what I want, I’ll kill this person and you will be the one responsible.” No. That isn’t how it works. The criminal is responsible. The Pak Army/ISI is telling us that if we don’t let them do the kookie things they want to do we will be responsible for the consequences. That is a criminal talking.
Please cite your reference for Mullah Omar being willing to give up OBL. I just checked my Rashid book and all I could find was that MO refused for years prior to 9/11 to give him up and refused after 9/11. In fact Mr. Rashid suggested that the ISI urged MO not to give up OBL. Given the history of the last more than a decade, I find it impossible to believe Taliban & company nor the Pak Army/ISI will give up OBL.
As Omar said, the most perfect constitution imaginable will not protect itself nor enforce its provisions. This is Afghanistan we’re talking about here. Seven year old boys are hanged. People get stuffed into shipping containers. Girls on their way to school get acid thrown on their faces because they are on their way to school. The guys who do all these things are not likely to be restrained by a sense of Afghan civic duty, no matter how good and representative the governance is; not to mention the Pak Army/ISI hovering in the background, jealous of their “strategic depth”.
Speaking of strategic depth, I’ve asked this question several times in the past but have yet to receive an answer. How exactly would this strategic depth be used? Who and what would employ “Afghan turf” if there were a conflict with India? What would they hope to accomplish there? When would they go there? This has never been explained beyond saying the Pak Army/ISI needs strategic depth because they need it. Why?
My basic point, lost in the midst of all of those excerpts, is that despite having “full” strategic depth in Afghanistan during the time period of the Kargil War, a conflict occurred between the two.
I was so intrigued by the comments made in this thread that I have decided to break my promise of no longer commenting on it.
I think the question of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is a complicated and interesting one.
On the other hand, us packing up and leaving India to watch the current store behind us is a recipe for Nuclear War. – RCJ
I don’t disagree. It is one possible scenario. However, there are other plausible scenarios. And does the history of the region support the above assertion? Out of my depth on this.
India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Contemporary Asia in the World) by Ganguly and Kapur.
From the Amazon review:
“Ganguly and Kapur are scholars who disagree about whether nuclear weapons have stabilized or exacerbated the long-running tensions between India and Pakistan. Ganguly, representing the optimist camp, argues that because both India and Pakistan now possess nuclear weapons, recent flare-ups over disputed territories (the 2001-02 crisis, for example) have stopped short of all-out war in large part due to the familiar cold war logic of nuclear deterrence. Strategic pessimist Kapur claims that holding nuclear weapons actually functions as a shield of sorts, escalating regional disputes by permitting the parties (Pakistan in particular) to take especially aggressive actions that would otherwise provoke stronger retaliation.”
http://www.amazon.com/India-Pakistan-Bomb-Stability-Contemporary/dp/0231143745/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1292453022&sr=1-2
And the following book examines the Kargil war from American, Indian, and Pakistani points of view (from the description, I have not read it.)
http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetric-Warfare-South-Asia-Consequences/dp/0521767210/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1292453143&sr=1-2
“The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States….”
I’m sorry if this detour is a bore for some of you. I still don’t understand how one knows for sure. The arguments are based on what data?
Robert, I don’t want to sound shrewish, but I think you are missing some points made by other commentators.
You are saying that the region will become more peaceful if the Pakistani army (not “Pakistan”, the interests of the two are not necessarily synonymous) is allowed to revert to its policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. You are also implying that the policy was entirely defensive (a hedge against Indian domination of Afghanistan) and helped to maintain peace. I think you have not studied the policy and especially its background assumptions, in depth. Or you fail to see what is perhaps obvious to a person with a more devious mind. The army’s zero-sum conception of relations with India and its determination to change the status quo in kashmir by force is itself the destabilizing factor in the region.
For the background, may I suggest that spend some more time with paknationalists.com (not a fringe website, but the intelligence agency approved source of pro-army views in Pakistan, supported by an entire web of publications, websites and news agencies, all notable for being willing to change their views on anything except absolute loyalty to the current occupant of GHQ); see:http://criticalppp.com/archives/30628)
I suspect that to a conventionally-tuned and reasonable American or Englishman, the thought that smartly turned out men in creased pants may really believe this insane crap probably seems ludicrous. But I assure you, many of them believe it while the rest seem to recognize the usefulness of maintaining this mindset. Some may indeed be ready for change, but that change of heart may not survive the victory celebration after the Americans leave.
A better constitution in Afghanistan would be great, but the constitution will not protect itself. The state has to have enough of a monopoly of violence to maintain such a constitution. As the late lamented Chairman Mao (wrong about many things, but maybe not about this) said: Power grows out of the barrel of a gun….The people with more guns and more will to fight will not let a constitution stand in the way of victory…
Carl,
First, I refuse to participate in the dangerous practice of looking granting governments amnesty for the acts of “rogue” elements of the government (Pakistan and the ISI/Army; Lebanon and Hezbollah; etc.). Such thinking creates functional sancuaries for bad actors and relieves weak actors from their responsibilities. I am far more likely to excuse a nation for the acts of a rogue government (Iran, NK).
By destabilizing Pakistan with our actions in forcing the government to turn on their Pashtun agents; by denying Pakistan of the confidence that they could always employ Afgan turf in a conflict with India; by bringing Indians (like a trojan horse) into Afgahanistan to help us with our efforts there; WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN A SIDE. We have place Pakistan in a very tough situation, and then we publicly abuse them for the not dealing more effectively with the mess we have put them in.
This is more than just Afghan and Pakistan insurgency, and AQ CT at stake here. There are also two nuclear armed traditional enemies sharing a common border in this mix, and we act like that is the least important element that just needs to “get over it” and support our COIN/CT agenda. We risk triggering a nuclear war with our meddling, and need to keep that idea on the top shelf, not hidden in some drawer in the basement.
As to Afganistan and the Taliban, it is my understanding that Mullah Omar was quite open to throwing AQ under the bus given the opportunity. The problem was that we had our blood up and wanted, needed, to kick some ass; and it was far easier to do that on Afghan dirt than Saudi or Pakistani dirt.
The world has changed a great deal over the past decade. Including the Taliban into the Northern Alliance-based government we created and protect is smart. Neither side will like it. Hell, our own Democrats and Republicans don’t like sharing either. A good constitution keeps any one party from neutralizing the other; and protects the populace from the government as well. This is the COG in Afghanistan. A good constitution and shared governance that represents the entire populace. The rest well fall in place.
On the other hand, us packing up and leaving India to watch the current store behind us is a recipe for Nuclear War.
Bob
Robert C. Jones:
You made the following two statements in various posts above.
“That the US best achieves it’s stated “vital interest” of a stable Pakistan by leaving them well enough alone. They have a system that works for them.”
“…that the Taliban will work with us (hell, we should offer them Karzai just as he offers them us) and deny AQ sanctuary; that Pakistan returns to stability once we stop disrupting their internal dynamics to support our CT operations; all of this will settle down to “normal” Afghanistan.”
What I basically understand these two statements to mean is get out of the way of whatever the Pak Army/ISI has been doing or wants to go back to doing and all will be well. For whom? The system that works for them does not work for the rest of the world. Afghanistan will continue to be a warring mess with all the suffering that entails for the Afghans. India will still be subject to Mumbais. The people of Pakistan will still be thralls to misty eyed visions of the generals and we will have subordinated our national interests to a bunch of senior officers who “get this”. In addition, by deferring to the General sahibs (Omar, I like that phrase so much I take every chance to use it) we would basically be choosing sides between India and Pakistan. I don’t want to choose sides, but if we are forced to, I say again, if forced to, we would be fools to choose Pakistan over India.
Also, what evidence of any kind is there that the Taliban would deny AQ sanctuary? We went into Afghanistan because they wouldn’t give up AQ. They perceive themselves to be winning. AQ has helped them in their efforts and are ideological soulmates. Where is the evidence they would turn AQ out?
Ryan, you too seem to think that Pakistan army’s bright idea of using Islamist terrorism to advance foreign AND domestic policy objectives is understandable and even acceptable as long as there is no new catastrophic attack on the US. This seems to me to be a short-sighted policy. Even if you think that the the US routinely uses terrorism or whatever for its own purposes, it is better not to regard this as justified practice for all nations. The correct thing would be for the US to stop using such tactics AND discourage its putative allies from doing the same.. Accepting it as “part of the game” is a short-sighted policy.
r.bryan
Well put. I like how you have blown away all the philosophical and mental gymnastics and cut to the chase.
If A-stan is to be stable, it takes a measure of security. We are not even close. We may NEVER get it. This is a tribal “country” and never had a strong central gov. Karzai is corrupt, a thief, erratic, and the only game in town. Bringing the less radical elements to the table is possible, i do believe the SF raids are giving the hunted second thoughts? You come to the table or you die. This has been a real push, a surge that has to be taking its toll on talibs/AQ. We need to bring these people into the fold somehow. Omar, we would not be there if it wasn’t for Mullah Omar’s refusal to hand over OBL. I know the custom for guests so thats a negative. Its also pretty obvious P-stan is helping the talibs, its their strategic reserve against India. Pakistan has spawned a terror network bent on “jihad”. IF there is another catastrophic attack on US soil, and if its traced back to “Jihadistan” the consequences are scary. This kind of “zealotry” combined w/ WMD may end it for all of us.
The title of Ms. Robinson’s 1991 review of Stephen Kinzer’s book “Blood of Brothers” — re: the 1980s conflict in Nicaragua — is “The Sandinista Decade.”
If today Mr. Kinzer were to write a book about the current conflict in Afghanistan, Ms. Robinson might easily entitle her review of this book “The American Decade.”
In her 1991 review about the Sandinistas efforts in Nicaragua, Ms. Robinson noted the following:
“Yet Mr. Kinzer’s own critique of what he calls the regime’s “colossal misjudgements” suggest that the Sandinistats policies were not just tactical responses to outside aggression but reflections of their deep political convictions.”
Can the same not be said re: American policies in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the less-integrated world, to wit: that these policies are not just tactical responses to outside aggression but reflections of our deep political convictions?
If so, is the potential for “colossal misjudgment” also possible re: our similar approach?
Could an understanding of this problem allow us to approach crafting a political solution in Afghanistan from a somewhat different perspective?
Robert,
I think you are completely mistaken about the dynamics of the civil war within Pakistan. It is NOT a pakhtoon versus punjabi civil war at all. For 20 years (starting in General Zia’s time) the army leadership connived in the creation and sustenance of multiple Jihadist organizations (not just in the pakhtoon areas, in fact, more in rural punjab..tribal areas were used as suitable bases, but recruitment was heaviest in Punjab, look it up). I am from rural Punjab and I do not know of ANY village from which boys did not sign up for jihad. The largest organizations were headquartered in Punjab as well (LET in Muridke near Lahore, JEM in Bahawalpur and so on). Many of the training camps were in Mansehra and Kohistan, well away from the tribal areas. It was this network that was partially shut down starting in 2001, under American pressure. But every step was grudging and half-hearted and the network survives. Sanctuary in the tribal areas was a natural choice. Those sanctuaries are now being targeted in some fashion (I incline towards thinking the targeting is real, my Pakhtoon friends are 100% convinced its a show). The “civil war” is between those loyal to the full jihadist agenda (no longer considered compatible with foreign aid by the enlightened high command) and the army. This war has obviously heated up (and started in the first place) because of American pressure, but it will not stop with American withdrawal, EXCEPT if the army revives the full spectrum military-jihadist alliance (in which case the civil war damps down, a purge of liberals will be carried out and then the problem of what response is launched by India, NATO and even China to increasing jihadist activity will have to be sorted out).
You are paying too much attention to what the “senior Pakistani officers” are telling you and not enough attention to some of the glaring inconsistencies in that picture (of unfortunate loss of “equilibrium” due to American intervention). Having said that, I will agree that the US has shown itself incapable of interfering to positive effect and should pull out and play with these theories in war colleges and war games instead of trying to make sense of Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of “pakhtoon autonomy versus punjabi settled areas”….My apologies for being a bit irritable, but that is how it looks to me.
PS: I urge you to think again about why jihadi militants were raised in such numbers all over the country, why the networks of “activists” were planted everywhere, what social and political agenda they were supposed to serve (forget about kashmir, this is not about kashmir, it is about social and political transformation IN Pakistan…it was about Kashmir for “secular” (and moronic) army officers who paid no attention to the other dimensions of their brilliant force multiplier strategy, but the jihadist faction was ahead of the game and knew what they were up to and they still do)
I do not believe the term “civil war” is appropriate for the current state of the historic friction between the largely Pashtun tribes in the mountains, and the largely Punjabi people of the Indus River.
My understanding is that historically there was an unwritten agreement, that the Punjabi government of Pakistan would stay primarily in the valley and allow the Pashtuns to be largely atonomous and self-governing. Along with this, there was certainly official, yet covert, leveraging of Pashtuns to support Pakistan national interests in regards to India. This included promoting instability in the Kashmir and in Afghanistan. This is my understanding.
What I then see is the US disrupting this balance by creating a conflict of interest for Musharraf. He had one interest of maintaining good relations with the US, particularly with the growing relationship between the US and India. He also had the interests of his Pashtun allies in keeping Afghanistan from becoming a stable, independent state, but rather one that Pakistan could exert influence over. We created the conflict of interest when we demanded that he go after his own covert operation and their popular base. This, I think, is the primary source of the current level of instability.
It is my belief (and my expertise is not on Pakistan, but rather on this dynamic in general) is that once the conflict of interest is resolved, the old tenouus stability will return. That the US best achieves it’s stated “vital interest” of a stable Pakistan by leaving them well enough alone. They have a system that works for them.
(Additionally, every senior Pakistani military leader I have had the opportunity to talk to has routinely demonstrated a far more sophisticated understanding of insurgency than any US peer that I have worked with. They get this, its not new to them, it is a matter of day to day survival and has been forever.)
From Linda Robinson’s 1991 New York Times book review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Blood of Brothers” (link at my last comment above):
“Early on, Mr. Kinzer saw that Sandinista policies were alienating ordinary Nicaraguans … in trying to transform (the political and economic order of Nicagarua) … so completely and so suddenly, they (the Sandinistas) were underestimating the deeply ingrained conservatism of the Nicaraguan peasants.” (Items in parenthesis are mine.)
Is the United States today, in its similar zeal to “transform” Afghanistan — and various other states and societies of the world — likewise underestimating the deeply ingrained conservatism of the Afghans, the Pakistanis, etc., thereby, as in the case of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, jeopardize its (the United States’) mission to establish a new political and economic order throughout the less-integrated world?
Ms. Robinson asks us, in her re-focusing comment above (Dec 10, 1:22 PM) to concentrate on addressing ideas re: a formula for a political settlement in Afghanistan/Pakistan.
Accordingly, and in consideration of those matters addressed immediately above, should we not start such a discussion by acknowledging the potential fatal flaw in our approach, to wit: that:
a. Just like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
b. Likewise with the United States initiative to transform various states and societies (establish a new political and economic order therein),
c. We have focused much too much on our (seemingly) self-serving and enthnocentric ideas (“universal values, etc.)
d. And much too little on the “realism” of societal and cultural conservatism in the less-integrated world?
I must add that as an American, I would have to say “so what” to the Pakistan scenario I sketched out. It looks like win-win for America. No money or men to waste in Afghanistan and no money to waste in Pakistan either (aid cutoff would presumably kick in the day after the last troops leave Afghanistan).
There is no constitutional requirement for the US to pull Pakistani liberals and leftists ass out of the fire..
Robert, I would agree with all you say about Afghanistan but disagree about Pakistan. I think an American withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to renewed vigor on the part of Pakistani Islamists and the civil war inside Pakistan will get worse OR, the army will switch sides and go back to the full-spectrum mullah-military alliance, in which case there may be no civil war (some purge of “westernized anti-Islamists” will no doubt occur) but external relations will take a definite hit. You underestimate the seriousness of the Islamist/Jihadist project in Pakistan.
But then I have the thought “I know Pakistan quite a bit, I dont know Afghanistan at all, and I am agreeing with you about Afghanistan and disagreeing about Pakistan…this sounds fishy”..
Welcome to Afghanistan. Karzai is a bit of the odd duck in the current Northern Alliance mix anyway. He may well think he can do better by bringing the Pashtun dominated team. What he may be miscalulating is if his body will end up on a stake on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad or not in the transition. I can only assume he intends to play his relationship with the US as his hole card in such a transition.
Karzai is smart. He is not noble and selfless, but he is smart. He grabbed the US bandwagon, and jumped on board to end up in the ultimate power position in the new Northern Alliance-based government. He then manipulated the development of a constitution that places him personally at the pinacle of a new centralized, national patronage system in which he controls all favors and reaps the cream of all transactions. He also holds the US and the Coalition by the nose to keep us in place to protect and resource his little ponzi scheme. Very smart.
Once the US realizes that we have no exestintial threats in Afghanistan; that the Taliban will work with us (hell, we should offer them Karzai just as he offers them us) and deny AQ sanctuary; that Pakistan returns to stability once we stop disrupting their internal dynamics to support our CT operations; all of this will settle down to “normal” Afghanistan.
We control our own destinies, we merely need to reach out and do so.
The below article from the front page of the New York Times referenced Karzai’s quoted comments.
He apparently would select the Taliban at this juncture. IS THIS HOW AFGHANISTAN ENDS?
How can any strategy succeed under the current Afghan government…it cannot!
Put yourself in the place of Soldiers who ruck up everyday knowing full well that the Afghan government supports the enemy…FUBAR.
Monday, December 13, 2010; 12:00 AM/New York Times front page
**************************************
KABUL – Afghan President Hamid Karzai had heard enough.
THE STORY:
***********************************
For more than an hour, Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry and other top Western officials in Kabul urged Karzai to delay implementing a ban on private security firms. Reconstruction projects worth billions of dollars would have to be shuttered, they maintained, if foreign guards were evicted.
Sitting at the head of a glass-topped, U-shaped table in his conference room, Karzai refused to budge, according to two people with direct knowledge of the late October meeting. He insisted that Afghan police and soldiers could protect the reconstruction workers, and he dismissed pleas for a delay.
As he spoke, he grew agitated, then enraged. He told them that he now has three “main enemies” – the Taliban, the United States and the international community.
“If I had to choose sides today, I’d choose the Taliban,” he fumed.
**************************NOTHING FOLLOWS
Ok, did it again… comment above is mine. It’s early morning in my time zone, sort of an excuse!
RCJ:
Also, remember we did not create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, we enabled a transition from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. There is a significant difference.
We enabled a transition in nominal authority, not a transition in power. Not the same thing at all. We may have put the Northern Alliance in nominal authority, but power remained with us, and we will eventually leave. That leaves power up for grabs.
One of my major take-aways from my time in Afghanistan is the black and white / all or nothing nature of power and patronage. This is Afghanistan, and I suspect it has always been this way. Is it arrogance to think we can break this cycle? Perhaps. But the world is changing, so perhaps not.
I agree completely on that… and I don’t think we can break that cycle. The Afghans can, but I’d expect it to take generations. If we see that there is internal momentum building toward that kind of change we may, at certain points, be able to help, with a very light touch (anything else would likely do more harm than good)… but to think “we” can simply break that cycle in our interest at a time of our choosing is, yes, arrogance.
But at least we must recognize and appreciate this cycle, and if unwilling to break it, we should get out of the middle of it. There are no existential threats to the US in Afghanistan; and the oft named vital interests of defeating AQ and a stable Pakistan can best be achieved without the anchor of “fixing” Afgahnistan around our neck
Again, agreed, except that I see it as a matter of capacity, not will. I don’t believe that we should ever have tried to govern Afghanistan, directly or by proxy.
Bill C:
efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life — and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life — this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.
This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss “the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency.”
Where is anyone being asked to give up “central tenets of their way of life”? As long as people don’t attack us or our allies or shelter those who do, nobody anywhere cares about their way of life. Even where such attacks have produced intervention, the way of life is simply not an issue… nobody is trying to shove globalization down anyone’s throat.
In most of these marginal states the “traditional way of life” is in any event long gone, a casualty of war and intervention. Traditional tribal governance structures are under pressure from local warlords, foreign meddlers representing government and non-government actors. There are very few places left where populaces are fighting to hold their traditions, more often the fight is over power and the position to exploit power to gain wealth. Do you really think the populaces of Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, or the DRC are desperate to sustain their current way of life?
Robert,
I think you missed my point. My point was NOT about the Islamist ideology used by Afghan insurgents against foreign troops/Northern alliance. That, to me, is the low-church end of the process. I think you are missing the higher order (more sophisticated, more ambitious, better resourced) force that supports the insurgency from outside and steps in to keep it on the straight and narrow if they go wobbly. That does not mean there are no local factors or that local factors are not more important tactically. They are. But there are ambitious people with higher order aims who will step in if local factors seem to be heading for compromise. And they will stop any such compromise because it takes less to upset the apple-cart than to pile it up in a nice looking pyramid.
I am not saying such ideologically committed people are still in charge in GHQ/ISI. It is possible, even likely, that GHQ is sincerely trying to bring them under control. But GHQ is hampered by its own blind spots (mostly, India and a highly centralized vision of Pakistani nationalism) and it does not seem to have the will or the ability to act against the Jihadist faction in a manner that will decisively break their link with state institutions. I am willing to consider that it may NOW be beyond ANY Pakistani state institution’s ability to make such a total break. But whatever the reason, given that the break has not happened, I do not think the Taliban are in any position to compromise even if they wanted to (and right now, there is no reason to think that they want to). For as long as that break has not happened, they have a sanctuary and a network of supporters and a steady supply of manpower. Why would they want to compromise? Time is on their side.
Good governance in Afghanistan will certainly help the govt of Afghanistan to counter this threat, but the kind of peaceful “everyone gains” transition in which almost all the taliban join a legally constituted modern-ish state on fair terms seems out of reach even then.
About the seriousness of the jihadist scheme, ask yourself this question: During the nineties, the army trained a nationwide network of jihadists (half a million by Arif Jamal’s count), helped them set up multiple front organizations, protected them from the police and civil authorities (allowing them to be, literally, above the law). Why would they do this? What was the long-term aim WITHIN Pakistan?
But of course, I am no expert. I will be the first to admit that I do have doubts about my own version and am occasionally tempted to believe the experts. And then, something like this happens: http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/12/doctor-arrested-for-blasphemy-police.html
This English language news item does not give details, but in this case the doctor was hauled up on this obviously ridiculous charge and police were about to let him go when “activists of banned organizations” showed up and surrounded the police station and forced the police to register a case and arrest him. My point in this case is that this is exactly why these “activists of banned organizations” were raised in every nook and cranny of the country. Somebody knew what he was doing….though i am sure people like Musharraf had no idea what they were going to get when they recruited these “activists”..Musharraf would be the perfect example of the kind of clueless General who did the jihadist’s dirty work while imagining that he was just creating “strategic depth”, “unconventional force multipliers” or balancing the “complex strategic threat from India”….such phrases work magic on army officers trained in American designed defence colleges.
And I think Americans who “understand” why the army felt the need for these unconventional force multipliers, are acting, unfortunately and unknowingly, as enablers.
On April 7, 1991, in a New York Times book review of Stephen Kinzer’s “Blood of Brothers,” Linda Robinson noted that the book described “a graphic account of a country torn in half over the Sandinistas’ effort to build a new political and economic order” in the country of Nicaragua.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE3D91F3CF934A35757C0A967958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
Today, it is the United States that risks seeing areas of the world being “torn in half” as it seeks, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the less-integrated world, to establish a new political and economic order.
As Ms. Robinson noted in the case of the Sandinistas initiative in Nicaragua, and as might be similarly discerned in the present case of the United States in Afghanistan et al, efforts which require that a population give up central tenents of its present way-of-life — and adopt central tenents of a foreign way-of-life — this, by its very nature, tends to alienate the population.
This, I beleive, is what we should focus on when we discuss “the root cause of the rebellion and/or insurgency.”
It would seem to be less important to discuss (1) what methods and (2) which actors might make this initiative, to fundamentally, rapidly and radically transform a society (especially against its will), more easy to achieve.
Dayuhan,
I appreciate your concerns, but I believe this can work. Certainly current approaches of simply seeking to defeat the enemey and please the populace while ignoring the problem of the central government are unlikely to succeed.
Also, remember we did not create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, we enabled a transition from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance. There is a significant difference.
One of my major take-aways from my time in Afghanistan is the black and white / all or nothing nature of power and patronage. If a guy is in power his tribal/family affiliates get all opportunity and roles in governance, and those from the other tribe are relegated to the sidelines of society. Good farmland is taken from one and given to the other; good jobs are taken from one and given to the other. Poppy is eradicated in fields of one, but grows unmolested in the fields of others. The rule of law is imposed agaist one, but not against the other.
It is on this “Afghan sideline” that outside forces conducting UW find ready teams to join their cause. It is where the Soviets found their team; it is where Pakistan found their team; it is where the US found its team. This is Afghanistan, and I suspect it has always been this way. Is it arrogance to think we can break this cycle? Perhaps. But the world is changing, so perhaps not.
But at least we must recognize and appreciate this cycle, and if unwilling to break it, we should get out of the middle of it. There are no existential threats to the US in Afghanistan; and the oft named vital interests of defeating AQ and a stable Pakistan can best be achieved without the anchor of “fixing” Afgahnistan around our neck, because currently the only thing “fixed” is us, physically to this hard and fascinating land.
Cheers,
Bob
RCJ:
What we all need to keep in mind is that what the Taliban could get away with 10 years ago when few people cared about what went on in Afghanistan and what they could get away with if allowed to legally compete for participation and even leadership in the government of Afghanistan today are two very different things.
Do you really think the Taliban have any interest at all in being allowed to “legally compete for participation for participation and even leadership”? They don’t acknowledge any such legal framework in any event, or anyone’s right to “allow” them to “compete”. They want power, the same complete power they had before, and the only way they can get it is to seize it. Legal competition isn’t really an option for them, because if they have it, so do others. That’s not what they want.
The challenger did not create the conditions of insurgency. The issue is how good or bad the government is, as they are the ones that create the conditions of insurgency in the society.
I don’t think how good or bad the government is matters at all. What matters is who the government is. The Taliban leadership will fight any government that isn’t composed of them and only them, no matter how “good” it is. I doubt that they have any interest at all in peacefully or “legally” competing for power or sharing power.
At the core of the problem is the Constitution. Fix that first and the rest will begin to fall in place.
I wish I could believe that, but I don’t. I don’t think any Constitution would make a difference. A document is a good starting point, but it’s only a starting point, and governance needs a whole lot more. Any system and any structure can be corrupted.
I really wish I could believe that the Taliban and all the other Afghan factions really want to have a peaceful and orderly competition for power and a nice western-style system of protections and checks and balances, and if only we could install the right system everybody would fall into line and be peaceful. I don’t think that’s the case, though.
We removed the Taliban, creating a power vacuum. We declared that vacuum filled by the Karzai government, but that declaration was pretty much irrelevant to those being (rather nominally) governed. Groups of people are fighting to fill that space, and they will keep fighting until one group or another wins. The winner will take all. They don’t care about good governance or bad governance: all governance options are bad, the contending parties want bad governance by them and in their interest. None of these groups care about the populace. Whoever wins will proceed to squeeze the populace for all they can and stomp whoever objects. The populace doesn’t see itself as the arbiter of victory, they’re trying not to get shot and trying to avoid being on the wrong side of the eventual winner. No document or system of government is going to change this.
Not a pretty or orderly picture, but it’s what I suspect is there.
I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions. – Grant Martin
Everything in your comment makes perfect sense. Sadly.
@ Carl, Omar, others:
I’ve taken my comments on this thread too far off of the main points, so I will stop after this (really):
From Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 by Sumit Ganguly:
“It is virtually an article of faith among members of the global and, in particular, the American nuclear non-proliferation communities that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have made the region more prone to war. Indian and Pakistani decision-makers, on the other hand, have, with almost equal force, argued that the likelihood of full-scale war in the region is now highly unlikely specifically because of the emergence of a crude form of nuclear deterrence.
Both propositions are open to question.”
Kargil represents one “data” point to study – and a complicated messy one at that. How to interpret the event, especially given that there is a lot of fuzziness around it?
1. Outside powers intervened to prevent the thing from going further because of fears of the use of nuclear weapons. Is that deterrence?
2. The presence of weapons didn’t stop an aggressive action. Is that an example of failed deterrence?
How to interpret such events?
Interesting how a conversation about a specific “small war” has morphed. Perhaps those that say “war is war” are the most correct. Every single thing is irritatingly connected (at least, it seems so to this easily confused layperson.)
Thank you to all of the commenters for the insights.
Dayuhan,
From your post:
“What exactly are the issues that you see driving that leadership to revolution?
Do you really think they want “full participation in opportunity and governance”? Or do they just want to rule, as they did before we intervened? Do you believe that if we had installed a “better” government they would have simply participated, rather than fighting to regain the power and position they lost?”
Of course they want to rule again, just as in America the Republican Party wants to regain the presidency. The difference being, that in Afghanistan the regime we enabled Karzai to establish completely bans anyone from competing for participation, let alone leadership, that he chooses to ban.
What we all need to keep in mind is that what the Taliban could get away with 10 years ago when few people cared about what went on in Afghanistan and what they could get away with if allowed to legally compete for participation and even leadership in the government of Afghanistan today are two very different things.
As you know, I speak of “good governance” and have defined four key components under broad headings of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect, and Hope. COIN doctrine is more focused on “Effective Governance.” Perhaps a better term for what is needed in a stable society is “Respective Governance.”
That Taliban don’t believe that the Northern Alliance’s claim to govern is any more legitimate than their own. (Recognizing that both had external help in gaining and holding power). But so long as they are denied legal venues to compete for roles in governance; so long as they believe the Karzai regime to be illegitimate; so long as they believe there to be little justice in the rule of law and inequity in how Pashtuns are now treated (not to imply at all that they are/were better at any of these things. They are arguably worse at most), they will have causation to continue to challenge illegally through insurgency.
This is the point, the issue is not how good or bad the challenger is, the challenger didn’t start this. The challenger did not create the conditions of insurgency. The issue is how good or bad the government is, as they are the ones that create the conditions of insurgency in the society.
Those who overly focus on the ideology employed by the insurgent are distracted from what is really at issue. The people of Vietnam did not challenge French colonialism because they wanted to be communists, they adopted communism to motivate a movement because they wanted liberty from foreign oppression and the illegitimate governments imposed upon them.
Similarly Muslims who embrace strict Jihadist, Islamist ideologies do not become insurgent because of their ideology; it is merely the tool to motivate the disenfranchised to act. So, Omar, I believe I appreciate the role of Islam and how Salafist versions are employed currently as insurgent ideologies as well as most non-Muslim westerners do. I also believe I understand insurgency better than most scholars on Islam do. My position as a student of both is that:
A: Conditions of insurgency grow in a populace based upon their perceptions of the domestic policies of their government.
B: Insurgent leaders and organizations will emerge from such populaces, and if denied effective legal venues, will act out illegally to challenge that governance.
C: Any such movement requires an ideology that speaks to the target populace to motivate them to cross the line from law abiding citizen to law breaking citizen to challenge this poor governance.
D: Sometimes selfless leaders and noble organizations emerge, sometimes selfish, ignoble organizations emerge. Sometimes non-violent tactics are adopted, sometimes violent tactics are adopted. All of this is a matter of who responds, not a matter of what the causation is.
C: Religion is often the basis of insurgent ideology because it works.
Bottom line is that we are just too damn threat-centric in our approaches. Look at the AFPAK COE where Ms Robinson worked at CENTCOM. Is it in their J5 and driven by strategy and policy? No, it is in the CENTCOM J2 and driven by the DIA.
We have to break some pardigms if we truly want to evolve. Various tweaking of tactics won’t get us there; and neither will efforts that simply ignore the Karzai government and attempt to build good governance down at the local, District or Province level. I do not argue that Afghanistan needs a strong, central, Western-style government; I argue that the causation for the current insurgency radiates out from the national-level central government.
At the core of the problem is the Constitution. Fix that first and the rest will begin to fall in place. But it must be an Afghan fix, and it must include strong representation from that segment of the populace currently supporting the insurgency.
I think its time the International Community (IC) stopped talking in terms of invalid assumptions. No-one I know who is looking out to 2014 seems to entertain contrarian views, but here’s an attempt:
In 2014, I assume:
– Entities within the Pakistani government will continue to support the parties they support now for all the reasons everyone knows about: obsession with India, regional politics, historical ties, personal/parochial interests, etc.
– Several groups of insurgents will still operate along and across the borders of Afghanistan and contribute to instability within Afghanistan
– Insurgents cleared from areas will continue to migrate to other areas or go underground, waiting for the main effort to move and then return. Short-term success in RC-S/SW and in key terrain districts will not be sustainable after coalition forces leave and Afghan forces back-fill
– GIRoA continues to disagree with the way IJC/ISAF is prosecuting their COIN. As ISAF transitions to GIRoA-led, these differences will become very apparent and either ISAF metrics will take a dive, or the Western Press won’t notice since Coalition soldiers aren’t dying anymore- and then the West’s politicians just won’t care that metrics are worse.
– The majority of Afghan forces will continue to be non-Pashtun, making it impossible to connect with the people in those areas once Coalition forces leave. The police in those areas will do what they have to to survive- and this will result in negative metrics for ISAF.
– The Afghan government will still operate to some degree in a corrupt system (individuals will have to operate corruptly to survive), and no amount of progress towards doing away with corrupt figures will translate into less insurgency (legitimacy of the government does not equal less insurgency in Afghanistan).
– Less corruption will translate into weaker individuals and systems in the current climate, and that will not change by 2014. In essence, Western anti-corruption efforts will de-legitimize Afghan officials and cause them to lose influence in the current system and most likely be replaced by more corrupt individuals.
– In many (most?) areas of Afghanistan, the local insurgent/warlord/corrupt police chief/mullah/chief elder, etc. will continue to have more legitimacy than the central government and although that may result in bad metrics for ISAF, it won’t necessarily mean more instability/insurgency perceived by those on the ground.
– Negotiating with the Taliban, while perhaps feasible in some instances, will not be a magical bullet that solves all problems and ensures Afghanistan never again becomes a safe-haven for terrorists. This negotiation, while encouraged by some, will be anathema to the Kabul government.
– The IC will continue to shy away from attempting to influence too much a sovereign national government. Any attempts to may actually backfire and cause the government to be seen as more of a puppet of the West than they are now.
– Continued military operations by forces foreign to the local areas (Coalition and Tajik-heavy forces) will only enable forces who would profit from instability. In the short-term ISAF’s metrics may improve, but nothing long-term will be gained.
– There continues to be no obvious connection between anything ISAF or GIRoA does that translates into long-term stability. Stability will be a locally emergent event that small teams of outsiders with diverse skills may be able to enable in a small way, but most times it will be internally-driven and many times look like a “bad metric” to ISAF.
– Development will happen when security is established- and most likely, like in our own country, without government/international community (IC) direction.
If some or all of these assumptions are more valid than the ones we are currently tracking, then I think we have some problems if we think working towards “transition” in 2014 will work. The problem as I see it is that I don’t think we are willing to question any of our assumptions- so even if some or all of these assumptions I have listed are right, we’d never be able to admit it.
I’m still not really sure why that is, although one theory is that we are so bureaucratic that we are an “irreversible momentum” unto ourselves of invalid processes and systems that cannot do anything differently once we get going (i.e.- we are the furthest thing from a “Learning Organization” as possible as defined by Senge).
Grant Martin
MAJ, US Army
NTM-A/CSTC-A
The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, the US Army, ISAF, or DoD.
Omar,
Excellent points that I largely agree with. I certainly agree that most of Afghanistan is what I call “self-governed space,” and in these spaces the populace cares little about what happens in Kabul, and expects little in terms of governmental services. Approaches to develop our way to victory miss this point.
But I do see the insurgency as a two-tier insurgency. A Revolutionary top tier that drives the movement and is represented by the Quetta Shrua and other senior insurgent leaders in Pakistan. This is a revolutionary movement as these are the leaders from the segment of populace excluded from full participation in opportunity and governance by the current Northern Alliance based government. This is the target of Reconciliation, and if the ISSUES (not the men or groups) driving this leadership to revolution are addressed, we will turn the corner on the overall insurgency as well.
The lower tier are the rank and file, apolitical, rural Afghan people who are paid and encouraged certainly, by the upper tier leadership; but more importantly are largely a resistance movement that simply do not want foreign armies on their lands and directing their leaders. Several times last year I would see reports where SF guys would go into some region off the beaten path and the people assumed we were Russians. The point being, we berate the Russians for their abuses of the people, but for a proud people who simply want to be left alone by Kabul and all foreign interlopers, there is simply no difference.
We reduce the causation for the lower tier by reconciling with the upper tier (getting the horse in front of our current cart to use an example in Ms. Robinson’s paper) and by reducing our presence.
Less is more, more is less. Currently we are applying more, and while it makes sense, it is counterproductive to an end of Afghan stability.
Cheers,
Bob
Slap,
I didn’t realize you “spoke Pashtun”. You remind me of a story I was told about Matiullah Khan (who I have met, like and respect) that I believe to be true. I will not recount that story here, but let’s just say it involve a handful of Taliban who thought it would be wise to get on the radio and disparage Matiullah’s mother from up on a ridge overlooking route Bear. Matiullah’s men scrambled up the ridge, grabbed these guys and brought them to him. One carried the message out to advise others to be a bit more repectful…
“Matiullah’s men scrambled up the ridge, grabbed these guys and brought them to him. One carried the message out to advise others to be a bit more repectful…”
Posted by Robert C. Jones | December
Bob, thats our whole problem IMO….Rodeny Dangerfield syndrome…. we don’t get no respect!
Also,good for Matiullah Khan!
RCJ
Re this:
This is a revolutionary movement as these are the leaders from the segment of populace excluded from full participation in opportunity and governance by the current Northern Alliance based government. This is the target of Reconciliation, and if the ISSUES (not the men or groups) driving this leadership to revolution are addressed, we will turn the corner on the overall insurgency as well.
What exactly are the issues that you see driving that leadership to revolution?
Do you really think they want “full participation in opportunity and governance”? Or do they just want to rule, as they did before we intervened? Do you believe that if we had installed a “better” government they would have simply participated, rather than fighting to regain the power and position they lost?
I wish I could believe that, but I don’t.
Fair enough Dave.
I just felt compelled to respond to her accusastions of personal slander against her, of which there were none.
mission complete
gian
Dayuhan,
I agree with you there. I think Robert is missing the Islamist element here. Not the low-church Islamist notions of the ordinary Afghans, but the modern, high church Islamist project in Pakistan. The project appears so ridiculous to most sane Westerners that they discount it as the ravings of a few lunatics in caves. It is not that at all. It is a very ambitious (too ambitious) but sufficiently serious project. And you dont have to send in some James Bond or Richard Sorge to ferret out this secret plan. They talk about it all the time. I have heard bankers and generals and journalists in Pakistan say (in all seriousness):
1. Western civilization is at the end of its tether.
2. China is rising and we have an alliance with China.
3. India is a hollow nation and will fall like a ripe apple into our hands once the time is right.
4. The West and China will fight a world war, destroying both parties.
5. Islam will emerge to mop up.
6. This is a long war. Temporary setbacks happen.
A slightly saner version of this animates the “modern Islamist” section of GHQ and ISI (look up brasstacks, paknationalists, daily mail or moin ansari and spend a jolly afternoon reading all about it).
Afghan taliban may have simpler ambitions, but they are also meant to serve as tools in the hands of more sophisticated people. And if they go wobbly, there is always Haqqani sahib.
No amount of “good governance” will change that….
And they are serious. I mean really serious. Having said that, I have no doubt that good people will think I am raving.
Omar:
I don’t think you are raving. I think you’re right. That’s the reason I asked the question about the ISI giving up OBL and the rest of AQ in Pakistan. If they did that it would solve all their “strategic thinking”, “strategic depth” problems because there would go our primary reason for being in Afghanistan. Realpolitik would demand that they do that-“Off you go Osama old buddy. Just business.” But the Pak Army/ISI don’t do that which, to me, is very strong supporting evidence that ideology, Islamist ideology, is the, or at least a very strong, driver in this whole thing.
There. Now there are two of us raving.
R.C. Jones, I would get list of Bill Laden’s relatives and start working my way through them with a .45 until I got the answer to the question “Where’s Bill?”
Robert, your description of banana republic coin is very good, but your description of the insurgency in afghanistan may be a bit off. This seems to be a popular notion (bad governance in Afghanistan creates the setting for an insurgency, people are revolting against bad government) but in my opinion (and the opinion of my afghan and pakhtun friends) this is a little off. In most of afghanistan, there is very little governance to be had, good or bad. Rural Afghanistan is not revolting against an evil government. The taliban do provide a just but bare-bones governance in terms of law and order and delivery of justice, but nothing else, they are true Republicans (without the welfare for the rich and the wholesale corruption). For most Afghans, NO govt provides any governance, they govern themselves and they agree to cooperate with whatever higher order organization seems likely to win. Its the “likely to win” that really truly matters and that is the taliban’s best weapon.
Everyone who thinks a modern democratic Afghanistan is not a good medium term aim is right. But a real government can exist in the cities and can find its own way to compromise with local bosses in the rural areas and foreign intervention is not really a help in that process. Without Pakistani support, even the Taliban will have to compromise. Though there are, by now, truly extreme Islamists on the ground who will compromise with absolutely no one. They will also not compromise with each other. They will be a source of violence and chaos for years to come. They will not get to rule though. Even if the taliban win, NATO leaves, Pakistan reetablishes pax pakistania in most of Afghanistan, it will take only a few months for these nuts to get out of control and start blowing things up. From a harsh realist point of view, that may actually be the best thing to do. Leave the place, let India and Russia and Iran arm the Northern alliance, let Pakistan arm the Taliban and let the Arabs fight everyone.
Gian,
As I commented earlier here, I made a judgment call when I removed your post. It’s basically OBE now as the issues you raised have been restated in subsequent commentary.
In fairness to Linda Robinson, prior to her post above I told her that I removed two posts that I thought were personal attacks. One was yours and another by an anon. I take responsibility for that and the issues those deletions raised here. I think enough has been said concerning this. If you’d like to take it offline that is fine.
Dave D.
“Second, and MAC made me think of this; what if the ISI did something completely unconventional and put OBL and every AQ person they could get their hands on into gunny sacks and then delivered them to the deck of a US carrier.” by carl
Sounds good to me!
Slap,
The Quetta Shura would be who I engaged to achieve such a result. Santuary rests in the people of the FATA, and once the Pashtun populace agrees to deny sanctuary AQ would have to leave.
If merely the ISI/Pak government (we don’t do ourselves any favors by separating the two, it is not a matter of which controls which, they are both “Pakistan”. We play the same game with LH and the Govt of Leb. as well, btw, and it cripples our approaches to holding both governments fully accountable. But that is another topic) agreed to evict AQ, AQ would simply go underground from them as they do from us. Burrow deeper into their sanctuary of the Pashtun people.
An achieveable event, but it would be tied to reconciliation efforts and would be facilitated by the Taliban, not the ISI.
For what it is worth, what is typically lost to the perspective of those on the government side of the insurgency/COIN equation is that while insurgency is typically waged among the populace, it is won or lost in the Capital.
US efforts to dates have avoided putting hard pressure on the Karzai regime to actually fix the fundamental aspects of his government that fuel the insurgency. We instead protect and enable the very governance that feeds the flames of revolution; and then surge in foreign forces for that mission, thereby feeding the flames of resistance.
It is all well to work to protect the populace from the insurgent, but who is working to protect the populace from the government??
We have picked a side, and that corrupts our efforts and blinds us to realities of what must be done to bring stability to Afghanistan and her people. This has led us to a “strategy of tactics” as we run about the countryside working our asses off to manage the symptoms of the insurgency.
It is time to shift our perspective. Insurgents do not cause insurgency. Ideology does not cause insurgency. Governmental domestic policies cause the conditions of insurgency within a populace that are then exploited by those who step up to lead change. We attack the flames rather than the source of fuel, and that is no way to fight a fire or an insurgency. It is time to focus on the fuel, and that fuel is the structure and policies of the Karzai regime.
It is growing vogue to simple put that in the proverbial “too hard box.” Jim Gant declared it too hard and said focus on tribes. CNAS and the Barno/Exum team have declared it too hard and said focus on the provincial/district level government. Both are well intended approaches, but both miss the root source of causation. Until we have to moral courage to focus on fixing the Karzai regime (beginning with the constitution that ensures insurgency by its very structure) we are doomed to managing symptoms. Efforts to bypass are no answer.
Either take on the root cause head on, or go home. There really is no middle ground. Trumped up claims of “existential threats” don’t hold water, and should not hold us hostage to this mission either. Identified “vital interests” of “disrupt, dismantle, defeat AQ” and a “stable Pakistan” are both better served by a smaller footprint in Afghanistan rather than a larger one.
We have a COIN doctrine that is solidly rooted in European Colonial COIN and US Banana War COIN (colored by a few years in Iraq) that was all about exerting control over a region and populace for economic reasons through the vehicle of establishing and sustaining an illegitimate government. The world has changed, the mission has changed, we must change.
It is time to move forward from debating how to do the wrong thing better, and get to how to do the right thing, even if poorly at first.
Cheers,
Bob
Ms Robinson,
I dont pretend to be an expert here and certainly dont have anywhere near the experience of many of the contributors to SWJ, however, Im struggling to differentiate your arguments.
It is a sharp piece of analysis – no doubt about that. But your paper keeps jumping from local solutions to a Karzai/central command driven structure and processes. From what I saw on the ground the two are diametrically opposed to each other.
Given your influential position, I would encourage you to be even more courageous and suggest that in the West we need to accept that Afghanistan is never going to be a free and open democracy and Karzai is never going to deliver anything close to that. Go even further, and if we all take a hard look in the mirror and admit our actions and grand policies have merely protected the interests of the corrupt elite. Time and time again we have focused on protecting the people in government and not the people who elected them.
As I argued earlier, improving governance, tackling corruption, delivering security and stability is not about helping to keep the jobs of those in government it is about helping to improve the lives of those they claim to represent.
Any mandate or legitimacy was destroyed through the UN’s failure to demand transparency in the 2009 Presidential vote. This is one example of where a failure on behalf of the international community sent an unequivocal message about corruption right to the village.
Previously, I raised the example of the Speluncean Explorers, to ask if the people of Afghanistan in each village, District and Province are like their own Spelucean Societies (forget the eating part – that is not the point of this fictitious legal story). Each village/District must, as they have always done in Afghansitan, devise their own way of securing stability, that shuts out foreign insurgents. Karzai should not be part of local negotiations.
The fundamental problem for Afghanistan has not necessarily been its own doing. If we are honest with ourselves and history how much of Afghanistan’s problems are the consequence of external forces for hundreds of years?
Perhaps a solution is to allow local districts to run their own affairs and a national security force’s sole focus is to keep out any foreign interference. Sure, the international community could help with that. On a multi-lateral level we could all sign up to a moratorium on any interference at any level, including INGOs, in Afghanistan’s affairs. Zero tolerance on any foreign state or non-state actors, sticking their noses in the affairs of Afghanistan.
Ms Robinson, I only float these ideas to ask questions that try to push the boundaries and get us out of this “we must make COIN work at all costs no matter what” approach to Afghanistan. COIN may well have met its match in Afghanistan.
Ms Robinson:
There was no, NO, personal attack on you so please do not construct such a pernicious straw man. Nor was there any slander at all. I initially pointed out the possibility that there might be a conflict of interest with your work since you started off as a journalist who wrote a glowing portrayal of General Petraeus, then you worked for a major defense contractor and apparently had a hand in writing a significant piece of Coin doctrine, now you work as a senior advisor to a war fighting command. I thought that these points were important inquiry for the public interest. Other reasonable and balanced commentators on this blog (Maxwell, McCallister, Publius) thought so too.
So please, no straw men of accusations of personal attacks and slander because they did not happen.
gentile
I appreciate the robust and informative comments from the SWJ community, which is precisely why I chose to submit my paper here.
MAC, you spot an imprecision in my point that centralized security forces have never reached down to the local level in Afghanistan. True in the past, but will it be true in the future? I would hazard a guess that some local community watch or defense groups may be needed for quite some time. The current MOI-backed ALP program envisions 5 years. If these groups are tied into local legitimate structures that may be adequate “institutionalization” in the short term to prevent them from becoming rogue entities, is a legitimate concern. Over the longer term I think AFG will have to come to terms with the cost of the ANSF and how big a centralized security force it can actually afford.
I do not claim that this piece is entirely “new” thinking, but I reached three conclusions that I do not think have received sufficient attention or emphasis from the analytical community (both official and nonofficial):
1. To succeed the effort must be much clearer about what can be done in the short vice long term;
2. If one accepts that wars such as this one require political solutions, much more must be done to forge a political-diplomatic strategy and lash it up with the ISAF campaign plan;
3. It is likely to be a very complicated political solution that involves both local conflict resolution and national reforms and understandings (that inter alia address Pakistan’s core security concerns).
This last point is really the heart of the paper, which intends to spark debate rather than present the exact formula of a settlement. Some deals are better than others, and some mechanisms are better than others. I do not think that the Bonn II process provides the AFG actors enough control over the outcome, but a deal brokered by Karzai alone will likely fail to generate the needed consensus. I admit to being influenced by my time covering Latin America and in particular the important roles that diplomacy played in ending the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan wars (U.N. envoy Alvaro de Soto playing an important role in the former and the regional process led by Oscar Arias in the latter).
I would invite further critiques by suggesting how difficult it will be for the US and AFG to agree on a negotiating approach and for Karzai to embrace the benefits of a neutral facilitator. Another Achilles heel is the degree to which this optimistic scenario depends on the success of the bottom up approach. The final section does not address key questions about a small COIN structure, including its span of control. The primary observation here is that we need to think about small footprint COIN (or FID for the purists) approaches in AFG and elsewhere.
My quick sketch of what the final phase would look like – a post-COIN security and assistance program is meant primarily to argue for productive develoment assistance vice the kind of perpetual self-licking ice-cream cone that Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart diagnosed so acutely in Fixing Failed States.
Let me clarify that this paper is my own research and writing; it represents no one and nothing else. I noted my advisory affilation to the AFG PAK COE in the interest of full disclosure. (I have supported the COE in its first 18 months to help build its capacity for multidisciplinary analysis, which I see as an important attempt to embody some of the best learning practices developed over the recent years.)
I understand that personal attacks on one’s credibility and integrity are part and parcel of the internet era; I appreciate SWJ’s efforts to strike the right balance between free speech and slander. In the very unlikely event that I would ever submit anything “official” for comment, I will most certainly identify it as such. Let the debate continue!
“While Afghanistan is now and will remain for the near term heavily dependent on international assistance to achieve its state building goals, the objective is to channel that assistance into productive investments that galvanize self-sustaining economic growth, regional commerce, infrastructure, development of natural resources and investment from China, India and Russia — three of the world’s fastest growing economies. Efforts are underway to create a detailed roadmap for Afghanistan’s development and a mutually beneficial process of regional economic integration. (Note reference to Afghanistan ultimately becoming a “Modern Silk Road” at the footnotes).”
Thus, we view Afghanistan — and the solutions proposed in this paper — as representing a classic example of how we see (1) the world’s problems generally and (2) how we hope to go about solving these problems:
a. Overall Problem: Various states and societies are not ordered or configured such that they might become integrated into their regional/the global economy.
b. Overall Solution: Re-organize and re-configure these outlier states and societies such that become integrated into their regional/the global economy.
This, we believe, will cure — not only the internal problems of these outlier states and socieities — but also the spill-over effects derived therefrom; which can (and in some cases have) adversely effected both their region the rest of the more-economically integrated world.
Bill C:
Once again, like a broken record:
Nobody, anywhere, cares about integrating Afghanistan into the global economy. Afghanistan is supremely irrelevant to the global economy. As long as they don’t attack others or harbor those who do, they could stay medieval for the next 100 years and nobody would notice, care, or be in any way bothered, save the periodic twitches over the way they treat women or blow up Buddhas… but nobody goes to war over that.
How do you reconcile this thesis with the supremely evident reality that nobody, anywhere, cared about integrating Afghanistan – or having anything to do with Afghanistan – until 9/11?
Bill C. may be correct with his assertion in sub paragraph a, above. However, I suspect that view is a minority position. I certainly hope it is as the view can lead to dangerous misapprehensions, not least trying to ‘fix’ something that is not broken and leading some to arrogantly interfere with what people must do for themselves — and in their own way…
The thought expressed in sub-paragraph b, OTOH does appear to be held by a slightly larger and more influential minority — but they’re still a minority. They’re also wrong. Badly so.