CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story
CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story
by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brandon J. Gorman
Download the Full Article: CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story
We were recently sent the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 21 July 2010 improvised explosive device (IED) metrics for Afghanistan report. This report illustrates a significant spike in IED activity in Afghanistan over the past year. This report also suggests that in this same period there has been an exponential decrease in the number of IEDs found by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) due to local national tips or turn-ins. Upon reviewing this report, we can understand why one might argue that the current counterinsurgency (COIN) operational design in Afghanistan is flawed and/or in part responsible for the seemingly increasing IED threat. For a variety of reasons, we discourage anyone from using this report to draw conclusions on the tactical conduct of the fight in Afghanistan today, especially conclusions about how best to counter the IED threat.
We caution against doing so because the experiences of the Marines, Sailors, and Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers that we had the privilege to serve with in southern Helmand Province from October 2009 to May 2010 completely contradict the seemingly logical conclusion that one might make from the report: IED incidents continue to grow while IED turn-ins due to local national tips appear to be exponentially decreasing; therefore, more troops and resources in Afghanistan have not led to greater security and cooperation for and among the population, but rather increasing hostility between ISAF/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan people.
Download the Full Article: CSIS’s Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story
From October 2009 to May 2010, Captain Gorman and Captain Cuomo served as Easy Company and Fox Company Commanders, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, respectively, in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The views expressed herein are their own and do not represent those of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.
