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Obama's War

Obama's War - PBS Frontline

FRONTLINE Season Premiere
Obama's War
Tuesday, October 13, 2009, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS

Press Release:

Tens of thousands of fresh American troops are now on the move in Afghanistan, led by a new commander and armed with a counterinsurgency plan that builds on the lessons of Iraq. But can U.S. forces succeed in a land long known as the "graveyard of empires"? And can the U.S. stop the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, where U.S. troops are not allowed and the government is weak?

In FRONTLINE's season premiere, Obama's War, airing Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2009, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS (check local listings), veteran correspondent Martin Smith (Beyond Baghdad, Return of the Taliban) travels across Afghanistan and Pakistan to see firsthand how the president's new strategy is taking shape, delivering vivid, on-the-ground reporting from this war's many fronts. Through interviews with top generals, diplomats and government officials, Smith also reports the internal debates over President Obama's grand attempt to combat terrorism at its roots.

"What we found on the ground was a huge exercise in nation building," says Smith. "The concept's become a bit of a dirty word, but that's what this is. We started with the goal of eliminating Al Qaeda, and now we've wound up with the immense task of re-engineering two nations."

The brunt of the work is falling on rank-and-file soldiers, and nowhere is it more difficult than in the dusty, unforgiving landscape of Helmand province, the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, where FRONTLINE embedded with Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment. Since the Marines' arrival in July, Helmand has become the most lethal battlefield in Afghanistan. But FRONTLINE found the Marines trying to act as armed diplomats, attempting to build the necessary trust for badly needed economic development.

"It's trying to change the culture of the organization," Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, tells FRONTLINE of the administration's plan. "At the end of the day, our best counterinsurgents are going to be young sergeants who just have an ability to deal with people. We've got to give them the flexibility to make decisions."

Even as American soldiers struggle to make progress in Afghanistan village by village, equally vexing challenges remain across the border in Pakistan. "In Afghanistan we know what to do; we just don't know if we have the resources or the time available to do it," David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency expert, tells FRONTLINE. "The problem in Pakistan is we're not really sure what to do."

When FRONTLINE confronts the Pakistani army about its reluctance to take out key Taliban leaders, the military's chief spokesman, Gen. Athar Abbas, argues that the accusations are misplaced. There is no truth, he claims, that insurgents stage attacks on American forces from the Pakistani side of the border. "They operate from Afghanistan. If somebody claims that everything is happening from this side of the border, I am sorry, this is misplaced, and we refute it."

Barred from sending troops across the border, the United States is left with few good options. No quick fix will solve Pakistan. "If we have a strategy in Pakistan," says George Packer, a staff writer at The New Yorker, "it's to build up the civilian government to the point where it can be a kind of counterbalance to the military and begin to reorient their own sense of their destiny. Is that even thinkable for a foreign power to do? Even as I say it, I think, why do we think we could even begin to accomplish that?"

Obama's War is a FRONTLINE co-production with RAIN Media, Inc., written and produced by Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith. The correspondent is Martin Smith. FRONTLINE is produced by WGBH Boston and is broadcast nationwide on PBS. Funding for FRONTLINE is provided through the support of PBS viewers. Major funding for FRONTLINE is provided by The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional funding is provided by the Park Foundation. FRONTLINE is closed-captioned for deaf and hard-of-hearing viewers and described for people who are blind or visually impaired by the Media Access Group at WGBH. FRONTLINE is a registered trademark of the WGBH Educational Foundation. The executive producer of FRONTLINE is David Fanning.

Comments (2)

CPT Pete Wilcox:

“Can U.S. forces succeed in a land long known as the "graveyard of empires"? Absolutely! Failures of past empires do not imply that the U.S. will fail in the same endeavor; to believe such a notion is to invite cynicism. General McChrystal spoke with Afghan Defense Minister Wardak this past month who had this to say:

“Victory is within our grasp, provided we recommit ourselves based on lessons learned and provided that we fulfill the requirements needed to make success inevitable…I reject the myth advanced in the media that Afghanistan is a “graveyard of empires” and that the U.S. and NATO effort is destined to fail. Afghans have never seen you [U.S.] as occupiers, even though this has been the major focus of the enemy’s propaganda campaign. Unlike the Russians, who imposed a government with an alien ideology, you enabled us to write a democratic constitution and choose our own government. Unlike the Russians, who destroyed our country, you came to rebuild.”

The best approach to achieve a successful end to the al Qaeda network and establish a governance in Afghanistan is to execute what General McChrystal is currently attempting—“trying to change the culture of the organization.” This is, essentially, what previous unsuccessful “empires” have failed to do: establish relations with the Afghan populace without attempting to change their way of life/beliefs.

Thomas P.M. Barnett touched on this in “The Pentagon’s New Map”. Quite simply, once commanders have achieved success in the “battle space” (via kinetic force) it simply needs to shift its primary focus to the “transitional space” –-effectively this is where relations with local coalition forces, local populace (tribesmen, whatever), take place (a "quid pro quo" if you will).

If the objective is to simply shower an area with ammunitions and attempt to contain it for long periods (e.g. 8 years) then you’re not going to be successful at all. You have to utilize the populace; you have to get them to join your side.

Previous empires mainly focused on achieving success in the “battle space” but never accounted for the “after the fact” portion. In attempting to establish relations with the Afghan local populace, General McChrystal is looking beyond the "battle space" phase to the “transition space” and hopefully to the "peace space" . He will be successful in this endeavor.

J. Keith Purvis:

I hope that the Frontline show also addresses the difficulty and challenge outlined by New Yorker staff writer, George Packer, to "build up the civilian government to the point where it can be a kind of counterbalance to the military and begin to reorient their own sense of their destiny" as related to Afghanistan rather than the focus seemingly given only to Pakistan.
In order to gain the popular support in any kind of host nation security force building there needs to be a legitimate government for the outsiders (ISAF) to support. I offer that the frontline of this fight is not the Taliban in Helmand, but those in the capital of Kabul.
For this to succeed there needs to be more emphaysis on local security which brings us back to the troop on the ground, the "young sergeants who just have an ability to deal with people."
Security first, then "nation building."

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This page contains a single entry posted on October 3, 2009 11:47 AM.

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