U.S., U.K. Differ on How to Confront Foes - United Press International.
A new strategic study has spotlighted different approaches adopted by British and U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront armed opponents and the tensions created over the differences, publishers for the Kingston University-led research said Monday.
"Hearts and Minds? British Counterinsurgency from Malaya to Iraq," a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies, said the different approaches favored by British and U.S. commanders in Iraq had become a "hot topic" because the military allies looked at ways of combating insurgents from divergent perspectives...
... the various interpretations of "hearts and minds" led to confusion about what degree of consent could be expected from the people and the implication of this for the use of force.
The study said the British military had been generally more "political" and less coercive in its approach to counterinsurgency...
The British approach to counterinsurgency has influenced the recent development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, said the study, citing Petraeus and others. But there are still considerable differences in the British and U.S. approaches to counterinsurgency, and that has led to severe tensions in the relationship between these allies, according to the study.
The study concluded the "hearts and minds" description of the British approach to counterinsurgency might soften its public image, but it was not an effective guide to operations, because it could be interpreted in such divergent ways...
More at United Press International.
Comments (1)
The British approach in Basrah is indicative of their approach to COIN. They aggressively patrolled, but in limited areas and only against forces who attacked them. All other forces were allowed to build arsenals, attack the population and local government, and exhort for profit as long as they did not directly attack British forces (although fairly constant but limited rocket attacks against the FOBs were tolerated). It is very similar to many governments dealing with Organized Crime. The threshold of tolerance is set against the threat to one's own forces or profits, in this case British, and not against the threat to the rule of law. This allows the enforcing element to appear to be "in the fight" while minimizing direct contact and hopefully casualties. It is question of goals; 1) do you want immediate stabilization with low costs/casualties or 2) do you want an enduring rule of law? You will never kill/capture/convert all the insurgents/thieves/disenfranchised. What is your endstate, where is your threshold of tolerance for violations set, and are you willing to pay the cost (time, casualties, money) to enforce and support your plan?
Posted by Nicholas Morris | July 20, 2009 8:00 PM