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2 September SWJ Roundup

US ARMY

Is the US Army Ready for Conventional War? - Gian Gentile, Christian Science Monitor opinion

Images of Georgian infantry moving under fire and Russian tanks on the attack show that the days of like armies fighting one another on battlefields are far from over.
What does this mean for the US Army? As it considers its role after Iraq, should it be restructured for war and conflict along the lines of counterinsurgency and nation-building, or toward conventional fighting as represented by the Georgian war?
Armies trained to fight conventional warfare can quickly and effectively shift to counterinsurgency and nation-building. Contrary to popular belief, the US Army proved this in Iraq.
Its lightning advance up to Baghdad in the spring of 2003 happened because it was a conventionally minded army, trained for fighting large battles.
If the Army had focused the majority of its time and resources prior to the Iraq war on counterinsurgency and nation-building, the march to Baghdad would have been much more costly in American lives and treasure.
Critics argue that because the Army did not prepare for counterinsurgency prior to the Iraq war, it fumbled for the first four years of the war until rescued by the surge in February 2007.
Not true, according to "On Point II," a Army history of the Iraq war by Donald Wright and Timothy Reece. In fact, according to this book, the US Army very quickly transitioned from the conventional fighting mode. By the end of 2003, the Army – which spent much of the 1980s and 1990s training to fight large battles – moved into the successful conduct of "full-spectrum" counterinsurgency and nation-building operations.

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

IRAQ

Victory in Anbar - Wall Street Journal editorial

Two years ago, on September 11, 2006, the Washington Post stirred an election-year uproar with this chilling dispatch:
"The chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in Iraq recently filed an unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing that country's western Anbar province are dim and that there is almost nothing the US military can do to improve the political and social situation there..."
But there was something we could do: Pursue a different counterinsurgency strategy and commit more troops. And on Monday, US forces formally handed control of a now largely peaceful Anbar to the Iraqi military. "We are in the last 10 yards of this terrible fight. The goal is very near," said Major-General John Kelly, commander of US forces in Anbar, in a ceremony with US, Iraqi and tribal officials. Very few in the American media even noticed this remarkable victory.
Yes, the stunning progress in Anbar owes a great deal to the Awakening Councils of Sunni tribesmen who broke with al Qaeda terrorists and allied with US forces. But those Sunni leaders would never have had the confidence to risk their lives in that way without knowing the US wasn't going to cut and run. The US committed some 4,000 additional troops to Anbar as part of the 2007 "surge," along with thousands more Iraqi troops.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

US Hands Over Anbar, Iraq's Once-deadliest Region - Tom Peter, Christian Science Monitor

The US military handed over control of Anbar Province Monday, marking a significant milestone in the Iraq war.
Anbar was the deadliest Iraqi province for US troops, with nearly 1 in every 3 Americans killed there. It was once the symbol of Sunni resistance, the base of operations for Al Qaeda, and home to two major US military offensives and the most intense urban combat of the war.
But in the past two years, Anbar has emerged as the symbol of a turnaround as Sunni sheikhs formed "Awakening Councils," ousted Al Qaeda, and created community police forces.
Anbar is the 11th of Iraq's 18 provinces to return to Iraqi control, but it is the first predominately Sunni province handed over.
While most praise the transition, some Iraqis are concerned that corrupt police and Al Qaeda remain a threat. "Now the major challenge is how to build on the victories and maintain the situation," says Sheikh Ali al-Hatem, one of the founders of the Awakening movement in Anbar. However, he is critical of the hand-over, saying that Iraqi and American politicians made a rushed decision. "The threat of Al Qaeda has not ended in Anbar," he says.

More at the Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Times and The Times.

US Military Will Transfer Control of Sunni Citizen Patrols to Iraqi Government - Erica Goode, New York Times

Come Oct. 1, the Iraqi government will take over responsibility for paying and directing the Sunni-dominated citizen patrols known as Awakening Councils that operate in and around Baghdad, American and Iraqi officials said Monday.
The transfer will involve 54,000 Awakening members who are now paid by the American military to guard neighborhoods or, in some cases, simply to refrain from attacking American and Iraqi forces.
Once the transfer takes place, the Iraqi government will have “full administrative control” of the Awakening cadres, said an American military official who asked to remain anonymous because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the subject.
It was not clear whether the Iraqi government, which is dominated by Shiites, had given the Americans or the Awakening forces assurances about how long, or even whether, it would keep the patrols intact. Some senior Iraqi officials have expressed reservations about paying armed Sunni militias, which draw from the ranks of former insurgents.
Awakening members have complained in turn that the Iraqi government has been far too slow in making good on promises to bring them into the Iraqi security ranks.

More at The New York Times

The General's Dilemma - Steve Coll, The New Yorker

Early in 2007, when David Petraeus became Commanding General of United States and international forces in Iraq, he had in mind a strategy to manage the political pressures he would face because of the unpopularity of the war, then four years old, and of its author, George W. Bush. He pledged to be responsive to “both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue”—to his Commander-in-Chief in the White House, of course, but also to antiwar Democrats on Capitol Hill. Petraeus earned a doctoral degree at Princeton University in 1987; the title of his dissertation was “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam.” In thinking about how to cope with political divisions in the United States over Iraq, he was influenced, he told me recently, by Samuel Huntington’s 1957 book “The Soldier and the State,” which argues that civilian control over the military can best be achieved when uniformed officers regard themselves as impartial professionals. Petraeus is registered to vote as a Republican in New Hampshire—he once described himself to a friend as a northeastern Republican, in the tradition of Nelson Rockefeller—but he said that around 2002, after he became a two-star general, he stopped voting. As he departed for Baghdad, to oversee a “surge” deployment of additional American troops to Iraq, he sought, as he recalled it, “to try to avoid being pulled in one direction or another, to be in a sense used by one side or the other.” He added, “That’s very hard to do, because you become at some point sort of the face of the surge. So be it. You just have to deal with that.”

More at The New Yorker.

PAKISTAN

Zardari Orders Ceasefire for Votes - Bruce Loudon, The Australian

Pakistani political leader Asif Ali Zardari ordered a government ceasefire against the Taliban at the weekend to shore up the votes of an extremist religious party for his presidential bid, reports said yesterday.
Mr Zardari, the widower of slain former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and head of the Pakistan Peoples Party, is the leading candidate for president in an electoral college vote scheduled for Saturday.
A three-week Pakistani military assault in the country's tribal regions around Bajaur has killed more that 400 al-Qa'ida and Taliban-linked militants, but the Government in Islamabad called a ceasefire at the weekend, citing the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins tomorrow.
Reports yesterday said the military was not involved in the decision to halt what was regarded as the most successful offensive against the militants in almost two years.
The reports said the ceasefire was designed to ensure Mr Zardari secured the support of the electorally important Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam religious party in Saturday's presidential poll.
Military commanders in charge of the offensive against the militants were taken aback when told of the order to suspend operations.

More at The Australian.

Pakistani Tribesmen Organize Private Armies to Fight Taliban - David Montero, Christian Science Monitor

Pakistan's Taliban might be getting stronger, wreaking havoc along the country's border with Afghanistan, but they are also growing wildly unpopular, inciting their own tribesmen to turn against them.
In the latest of a series of incidents, a lashkar, or private army comprised of Pakistani tribesmen, torched the houses of Taliban commanders in Bajaur, near the Afghan border, vowing to fight them until they are expelled, the Daily Times, a Pakistani newspaper, reports.
Tribesmen in Bajaur Agency's Salarzai tehsil on Sunday formed a private army (lashkar) of around 30,000 people against the local Taliban. A local jirga decided to form the lashkar in the wake of the increasing presence of the local Taliban in the area. The lashkar torched 14 houses, including the house of a local Taliban commander. Tribal elder Malik Munsib Khan, who heads the lashkar, said tribesmen would continue their struggle until the Taliban were expelled from the area, adding that anyone found sheltering Taliban militants would be fined one million [rupees] and his house would be torched. The tribesmen also torched two important centres of the Taliban in the area and gained control of most of the tehsil.
Dawn, another English-language daily in Pakistan, cited the lashkar at a much lower number.
The tribe has raised a lashkar of more than 4,000 volunteers. Malik Munasib Khan, who is leading uprising against the militants, said that the houses destroyed by the volunteers included one of militant leader Naimatullah, who had occupied several government schools and converted them into seminaries.
The development comes in the midst of the Pakistan Army's bombardment campaign, which has been unfolding for weeks in the tribal agency of Bajaur, a militant stronghold where some top commanders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, are believed to be hiding.

More at The Christian Science Monitor

AFGHANISTAN

Selling the Taliban - Joanna Nathan, Wall Street Journal opinion

In the West, assumptions about Afghanistan too often seem premised on the idea that the Taliban are "men in caves," raising questions about why thousands of international troops cannot quickly defeat them.
However, an insurgency is at its heart a battle of wills and staying power, not of military might. Insurgents in Afghanistan appreciate this and have created a sophisticated propaganda operation that both targets what is seen as weakening support back in foreign capitals and seeks to mold perceptions among the Afghan population.
This is no small-scale operation. The efforts include a Web site, Al Emarah, which is updated several times a day in five languages. The English may often be laughable -- with reference to gourds (guards), a "poppet" (puppet) government and "spatial fours" (special forces) -- but it does the job. The Web site mocks government weakness and highlights every perceived foreign misstep to tap a deep vein of nationalism in Afghanistan -- and to raise questions back in foreign capitals about the role of their forces.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

RUSSIA

Older weapons' Efficacy Evident in Georgia Conflict - Martin Sieff, United Press International (Washington Times)

The effective use of decades-old Russian T-72 main battle tanks in the brief conflict with Georgia again shows how supposedly obsolete weapons can still play a potent and even decisive role in modern war.
The Russian army did not rely exclusively on its 30-year-old T-72s. State-of-the-art T-90 main battle tanks also were identified during Russia's brief but highly effective five-day drive into the former Soviet republic of Georgia last month.
But the old T-72s, upgraded with explosive-reactive armor, were there, too.
The Russians pushed ahead with overwhelming concentration of force, according to classic Carl von Clausewitz principles, using artillery, tactical air support for ground forces and a mix of older T-72 MBTs and modern ones backed up with overwhelming forces of highly mobile infantry.
Special forces were used effectively to pre-emptively seize potential bottleneck positions in the heavily forested Caucasus Mountains to prevent Georgian forces from slowing down the Russian drive.
In all, about 10,000 troops, still a very small proportion of the Russian armed forces, were used in the operation.

More at The Washington Times.

NEWS & OPINION NOTES

Iraq

Credit Where Credit is Due - National Post opinion

Afghanistan / Pakistan Tribal Areas

NATO: Forces Accidentally Killed 3 Afghan Children - Voice of America
3 Afghan Children Killed in Western Artillery Strike - Los Angeles Times
Paramedic-style Aid for Diggers - The Australian
Diggers Admit Taliban Held in Dog Pens - The Australian
Cameron Calls for More Leave for Troops in Afghanistan - Daily Telegraph

Russia / Georgia / NATO

EU Backs Away From Sanctions on Russia - Washington Post
Europeans Meet on Crisis in Georgia - New York Times
EU Condemns Russia Over Georgia Action - Voice of America
Russia's Strongmen Warn the West - The Australian
Fear Lingers for Georgian Refugees - New York Times
Understanding Russia - Washington Post editorial
'Stop! Or We'll Say Stop Again!' - Wall Street Journal editorial
Putin Twists UN Policy - The Australian opinion

The Long War

Invisible Nuclear Threat - Washington Times opinion

Americas

Can Mexico's Calderón Stop the Killings? - Christian Science Monitor
Colombia's Betancourt Meets With Pope Benedict - Associated Press

Asia / Pacific

State of Emergency Declared in Bangkok - The Times
State of Emergency in Thailand - New York Times
Thailand's Premier Declares Emergency - Washington Post
Thailand's Political Stalemate Deepens - Christian Science Monitor
Thai Army Chief Won't Use Force Against Protesters - Associated Press
Australians Join Exercise off Thailand - The Australian
Thailand's New (Old) Politics - Wall Street Journal editorial
Japan's Unpopular Prime Minister Resigns - Christian Science Monitor
Aso Set as Besieged Fukuda Quits - The Australian
Japan’s Prime Minister Resigns - New York Times
Japan's Premier Resigns Position After 11 Months - Washington Post
Japan Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda Resigns - Los Angeles Times
Japanese PM in Shock Resignation - The Times
Yasuo Fukuda: Japan Retrospective - The Times editorial
Farewell, Mr. Fukuda - Wall Street Journal editorial

Middle East

Israel Has Learned From Hezbollah War 'Mistake,' Official Says - Toronto Star
A US Role in Syrian-Israeli Peace - Boston Globe opinion

South Asia

Pakistan Poll Tactics Reopen Islamic Schools - The Times

United Nations

US Fights Islamic Anti-defamation Push - Washington Times

BOOK REVIEW

With the Best Intentions - Adam Hochscild, New York Times

Freedom’s Battle is really two books that don’t quite fit together. The longer and better one is a lively narrative history of a string of European efforts to stop various massacres in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. In several short chapters before and after this story is a shorter and weaker book, in which Gary J. Bass argues for humanitarian military interventions as a tool of international justice today. The historical episodes, he claims, are “rare lights along an otherwise dark road” that show us how these might work. For me that road remains dark, for reasons I will come back to, but much of the history Bass unearths is fascinating and well told.

BOOKS

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

We Are Soldiers Still - Joe Galloway

In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.

BOOK DISCUSSIONS / SIGNINGS

The Strongest Tribe by Bing West. 11 September 2008, 12:00 - 2:00 PM - Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters. Details.

EVENTS OF INTEREST

11-12 September - DNI Open Source Conferece 2008 (Public Event - Conference). Washington, DC. Sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Office of the DNI is pleased to announce the "DNI Open Source Conference 2008" to be held on Thursday, 11 September and Friday, 12 September, 2008 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC. The conference is free; however, all who wish to attend must register online in advance (deadline 31 July). The two-day conference will explore a wide range of open source issues and open source best practices for the Intelligence Community and its partners. We invite participants from the broader open source community of interest including academia, think tanks, private industry, federal, state, local and tribal entities, international partners, and the media to attend. The conference will include speakers from across the broader open source community participating in panel discussions and focus group sessions. Information about the agenda and break-out sessions is now available. The DNI Open Source Conference 2007 was held 16-17 July 2007 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. More than 900 registered participants and speakers attended. Presentations made at the conference break-out sessions are available on the DNI Open Source Conference 2007 website.

16-18 September - The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: A Historical Perspective (Public Event - Conference / Call for Papers). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sponsored by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. The symposium will include a variety of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general discussions. This symposium will explore the partnership between the U.S. Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. Separate international topics may be presented. The symposium will also examine current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with U.S. Army operations requiring close interagency cooperation.

17 September - The Iranian Puzzle Piece: Understanding Iran in the Global Context (Public Event - Symposium). Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. Sponsored by the by the Marine Corps University (MCU) and the Marine Corps University Foundation to enhance the overall understanding of Iran, exploring its internal dynamics, regional perspectives, and extra-regional factors and examining its near-term political and strategic options and their potential impact on the course of action of the United States and the USMC.

2 October - Civil Affairs Roundtable (Public Event - Roundtable). ROA Headquarters, One Constitution Ave, NE Washington, DC. Sponsored by the Reserve Officers Association. In earlier roundtables, the observation was made that the center of gravity for stability operations is the human population in the area of operations. Civil affairs professionals and information operators are the key national security resources for influencing the human population. Civil affairs professionals assist in humanitarian operations and building civilian capacity. Information operators develop messages and keep the population informed. This roundtable will explore the relationship between the civil affairs and strategic communications functions.

Comments (2)

Rob Thornton [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Rob Thornton :
LTC and SWJ Member Gian Gentile is thought provoking read and worth discussing some"

LTC Gentile wrote:
“Images of Georgian infantry moving under fire and Russian tanks on the attack show that the days of like armies fighting one another on battlefields are far from over.”

My Response:
I think many here would agree with this statement, I do. The ability to conduct offensive operations as demonstrated by the Russians remains a key state tool to achieve a policy objective and demonstrate its ability to defend itself. Preserving a force capable of deterring such a tool is a prerogative of the United States in pursuit of its interests. There is both the need to provide a force capable of coercive influence, but also of physically compelling someone once they have committed. The two are inextricably linked and the former without the latter is hollow. However, the question of how much is enough when you need a range of policy tools because your objectives are as diverse as ours is the challenge. In this case the challenge extends beyond the Russian / Georgia relationship itself and is linked to multiple policy interests of the United States and its partners.

LTC Gentile wrote:
“What does this mean for the US Army? As it considers its role after Iraq, should it be restructured for war and conflict along the lines of counterinsurgency and nation-building, or toward conventional fighting as represented by the Georgian war?
Armies trained to fight conventional warfare can quickly and effectively shift to counterinsurgency and nation-building. Contrary to popular belief, the US Army proved this in Iraq.”

My response:
While I concur to a point, the statement must be qualified against the conditions, which include both domestic and political will to provide the time needed to adapt and achieve a sustainable policy objective. In this case it seems to be effective enough, but what if the conditions had called for something else? What if the conditions did not allow for the length of time required adapting and being successful? I think the answer is that we must be full spectrum. In my opinion the relevance of land power requires it. There is risk, and the civilian leadership needs to embrace that. That risk can be mitigated some with good forethought, and resources, but it will remain. CDR’s at all level must be empowered to make judgment calls about the training paths and priorities of their units, monolithic behavior is probably the biggest impediment to being what we need to be. This is an institutional dichotomy in that our perspectives are often short sighted at the same time they resist what is relevant to current and future situation.

LTC Gentile wrote:
“Its lightning advance up to Baghdad in the spring of 2003 happened because it was a conventionally minded army, trained for fighting large battles.”

My response:
I think the training and equipping did play an enabling role, but I think the key to taking advantage of the training and equipping lay in our leadership’s ability and culture of seeking and exploiting the initiative. This is what also allowed us to adapt over the last 5 years in Iraq. I don’t think it was a “convention mindset”, I would characterize it as a “successful” mindset. CDR’s taking inventory of the resources at hand against their understanding of the operational environment made critical decisions and took risks to accomplish the mission. Without that attitude, the training and equipping would have only provided the means, but not the desire to find the ways, or accept the risk to advance something like a “Thunder Run"

LTC Gentile wrote:
“If the Army had focused the majority of its time and resources prior to the Iraq war on counterinsurgency and nation-building, the march to Baghdad would have been much more costly in American lives and treasure.”

My Response:
That is a tough one to agree or disagree with. The policy objective and the “you go to war with the Army you have” thinking could have required a “more costly” operation, however its worth considering what an institution that was fully invested in full spectrum operations might have accomplished. How much of our total ground force was actually used to secure Baghdad? What if we had increased that number another division to conduct the attack, then increased it by a significant additional follow on force to immediately begin COIN and SSTR type tasks. This gets to the issue of a military that can transition within the whole of government framework from being the support agency to the supporting, and a broader Inter-Agency that has the required capabilities and capacity.

My response:
It is also worth going back to the policy objective itself. Did the destruction of Iraqi forces secure the policy objective, or just enable it? Did we create new requirements by our actions? Did we create new policy objectives (e.g. preventing Iran from realizing regional hegemony) by trying to achieve our policy with respect to Iraq?

The idea of “much more costly” itself must be qualified since its impossible to quantify it. If for example we’d lost 500 men and women and BN’s worth of vehicles in combat and accidents, but had only lost a 1000 since then due to our prewar emphasis emphasizing “full spectrum” operations would that be more or less costly? Truth is we don’t know, and we won’t. The set of conditions that made up (make up) Iraq is unique, as each war should be viewed. If our strategic culture and our strategic interests allowed us to go in and destroy an enemy without consideration for what follows or the post objective effects on our other strategic interests, then it might be different. Its not.

LTC Gentile wrote:
“Critics argue that because the Army did not prepare for counterinsurgency prior to the Iraq war, it fumbled for the first four years of the war until rescued by the surge in February 2007.
Not true, according to "On Point II," a Army history of the Iraq war by Donald Wright and Timothy Reece. In fact, according to this book, the US Army very quickly transitioned from the conventional fighting mode. By the end of 2003, the Army – which spent much of the 1980s and 1990s training to fight large battles – moved into the successful conduct of "full-spectrum" counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. “

My response:
A great observation, but again the relativity matters. Institutionally the Army, and the broader U.S. military and civilian leadership did adapt quickly. However, that is relative both to the standards by which it is judged, the conditions of METT-TC and the unique nature of the policy objective itself. Lots of things enabled the most important of which may be the cultivation and investment of leadership at the BN CMD and below, however we should not discount the effects of information technology, changes in the policy and civilian leadership, and the influence of some key personalities some of which are not American at all, but include Iraqis and others. I point this out to make get across the idea that our ability to adapt has been contingent on a number of things many of which might never be accounted for, but were/are outside of our ability to control. They are contingent, not deterministic.

LTC Gentile wrote:
“There is more continuity than discontinuity between pre-surge and surge US Army forces in their tactics and methods in fighting the insurgency in Iraq. So if a conventional army like the one that started the Iraq war in 2003 can quickly and effectively make the transition, why reconfigure toward a hyper focus on counterinsurgency and nation-building for future wars and conflicts? “

My response:
We should not reconfigure for a “hyper-focus” on anything. We should be capable of determining where to place emphasis on our focus, and understand that will change. Evaluation and re-evaluation of the role of land power based on policy objectives and the ability of the more appropriate office agency or department to meet the requirements of policy is critical. This is the heart of both NSPD-44 and DoD 3000.05. While administrations, the labeling of presidential orders and the numbers of DoD Directives may change, the heart of who the United States is, and by extension what it defines as vital is unlikely to change. Until we decide to resource the agencies that are more appropriate or responsible by law to optimally realize those objectives, there can be no exclusivity on any one agency or department. DoD having the lion’s share of $$$ and people is the “go to” department in many cases for a government that cannot afford to resource all equally well. There is risk in this, but hopefully by establishing early if the relationship is supported or supporting we can head off some bad decisions.

Investing some of our thought and resources toward BPC or “nation building” has always been part of our strategy. The question is based on our position in the world and on our policy objectives, how much should that be? The goal should be not to limit yourself to only one course of action, or recourse to the actions of others if you can. Fortunately we are a state that can broaden our options in comparison to other states. Is Land Power more relevant if it can achieve the range of policy objectives in a timely and acceptable manner of which our nation may require, or only those which fall in a slice of the spectrum? A hole remains hole, it doesn’t matter if we think the hole should be filled by somebody else. We may not be the optimal guy, but until that comes around and they are able to do it regardless of the conditions, then we are it. The hole doesn’t go away, and we only get to tell the civilian leadership how well we’ll be able to fill, not tell them they should go and get someone else.

LTC Gentile wrote:
“History also shows that when states focus their armies on nothing but counterinsurgency and world constabulary missions to the exclusion of conventional warfare preparation, strategic failure can result.
In the summer of 2006 in southern Lebanon, the Israeli army suffered a significant battlefield defeat at the hands of Hezbollah, who fought with conventional tactics centered on small infantry squads using machine guns, mortars, and antitank missiles.
Israeli scholar Avi Kober and US Army historian Matt Matthews have shown that the result was at least partly due to Israel's hyper focus on counterinsurgency. The Israeli army's conventional fighting skills had atrophied due to many years of focus on counterinsurgency operations in the Palestinian territories.
The British Army after World War I chose to mostly forget about fighting conventional wars and instead concentrated their efforts on building an imperial constabulary army to police their empire. In 1940, however, as the German Army raced across France to the English Channel, the British Army alongside the French were defeated by the Germans who had spent their interwar years preparing for large-scale battles.

If the US Army is not careful, a similar fate may await. Already, there is proof that the American Army's conventional fighting skills have atrophied. Three former combat brigade commanders in Iraq recently submitted a paper to Army Chief of Staff General George Casey, outlining how the Army's field artillery branch has lost the conventional fighting skills of firing guns at an enemy in open combat due to many years of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. They refer to the artillery branch as a "dead branch walking."

Artillery firing was a critical asset in Russia's crushing defeat of the Georgian Army. “"

My response"
Some great observations and an argument why we should consider what goes on elsewhere. It should be pointed out that in Israel’s case there was also some leadership issues with their top uniformed officer that went beyond his interpretation of their doctrine. Each situation has the components of policy, national temperament and strategic culture, and the conditions of METT-TC. The Israeli Military is not the United State’s military, Israel’s policy objectives are different from ours in scale and scope. The problems they face are weighed differently then ours in relevance, and as such their military should be based on those risks they can tolerate.

Likewise the events of WWI and WWII should be considered, but not binding. The geo-political conditions change, and so do the threats. Ours threats to U.S. policy are full spectrum, and only preparing for existential threats would deny our civilian leadership options, and limit our ability to be who we are with respect to the rest of the world. It would also not prevent us from being told to go forth and do something to which we had told somebody we’d prefer not to be asked to do. We don’t get to make foreign policy as a uniformed service. We inform it, we articulate the risks, and then we go forward and do what we’re told.

There are a range of historical examples that could be used to discuss what potential outcomes may have come based what led up to it. Unfortunately the tendency is to linearize them in deterministic fashion, and isolate them from the range of other policies and personalities which brought them into being. This is hard to resist, as we often only account for those things that are recorded, and upon which the recorder placed value. There is a bias in such things we have to be careful in accounting for as it presents the opportunity to skew a perspective.

We will not, nor should we seek to avoid, being employed to fulfill a policy objective which does not fit our self image. We should inform our civilian leadership as to the risk in other areas, and of the risks in employing military forces to achieve (or support the achievement) of a non-military solution. Secretary Gates commented in his KU speech last year that he would be asking Congress for money for DoS, he followed by saying he’d also be asking form more $$$ for DoD. Unless we are willing to grow other agencies at the expense of DoD, and assume the associated risk of doing so, our acceptance of full spectrum operations may be the best we can do.
“There are a range of scenarios that might include the US having to engage in heavy fighting. One of them involves a possible failed North Korean state. Focusing on counterinsurgency and nation-building operations will not prepare the Army for such a possibility.

LTC Gentile wrote:
"The American Army must do what it takes to win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But good counterinsurgency tactics practiced by proficient combat outfits cannot compensate for flawed strategies and policies.
Considering events today in Georgia and the recent past of Israel in south Lebanon, the Army must soon refocus itself toward conventional “warfighting” skills, with the knowledge that if called on to do so, it can easily shift to nation-building and counterinsurgency as it has done in Iraq.
If it doesn't, it courts strategic peril.”

I agree with the reason, but not the recommendation. The focus on COIN or any singular piece of the spectrum exclusive to the others puts our ability to meet the policy requirements of our government at risk. It also denies the nature of war, and the fact that wars are fought by people for things that matter to people. As such my recommendation is focus must be assessed based on what the unit is being asked to do. As an institution we must consider the range of scenarios we will be employed in, and what the policy objective may entail, not only on its face value, or the short term, but it will require in the long run. This means evaluating and revaluating on a consistent basis the role of land power based on the United States’ role in the world, and the capacity of its internal tools and those of its partners to accomplish those policies in order to remain relevant.

We may all see a different perspective of the course upon which the institutional “super tanker” is being steered. For my part I see the course correction not as a radical shift toward the iceberg, but as one that puts us in a deeper channel that fits the policies of the United States. While recent doctrinal publications, and more training and education focused on non “Table XII” skills and attributes, it does not mean that those skills and attributes have been abandoned. We know that our doctrine and training in those areas is sound and proven and there is no need to reinvent that wheel. Our acquisitions are still focused (in terms of $$$) on those areas be it good artillery or combat vehicles. By contrast however, the institutional knowledge that makes up our doctrine, training and education in other areas is lacking. We should not confuse a conditional perspective on what is produced with institutional depth, the bulk of the iceberg is not “COIN” or “Nation Building”, nor is it likely to change. What is changing perhaps is acceptance of the full spectrum, and the gaps in our DOTMLPF attributes that make it possible.

I think this is a case where we would benefit from not advocating extreme positions that lead toward creating an institutional see-saw, but by recognizing that we require balance, and by comparison with the threats we currently face, and probably will for some time we have the resources to conduct full spectrum operations. In fact it is critical to remaining relevant. We exist to secure the United States and its interests; one is not exclusive to the other.

Best, Rob

Ken White [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Cogent, balanced and well reasoned comments all, Rob. Great job.

Balance works, fanatacism and polarity don't...

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This page contains a single entry posted on September 2, 2008 4:32 AM.

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