General Vincent Desportes
Small Wars Journal Interview
by Judah Grunstein

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein’s SWJ review of The Likely War.

Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?

Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I’m defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it’s something that’s extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the “end state” is defined after we’ve sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an “end state.” So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I’m defining is an ideal schema. What’s certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we’ve launched the operation. So we’re pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.

Now, in France, it’s probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we’re missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d’Orsay) didn’t exist. Now, I don’t know if that center is functioning, but it’s probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an “end state” before launching the operation.

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes
The Likely War
by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

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One of our favorite war correspondents provides a detailed background on the origins of "The Surge" - Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate by Michael Gordon, New York Times.

When President Bush speaks to the Republican convention on Monday, he is expected to tout the “surge” of forces in Iraq as one of his proudest achievements. But that decision, one of his most consequential as commander in chief, was made only after months of tumultuous debate within the administration, according to still-secret memorandums and interviews with a broad range of current and former officials.

In January 2007, at a time when the situation in Iraq appeared the bleakest, Mr. Bush chose a bold option that was at odds with what many of his civilian and military advisers, including his field commander, initially recommended. Mr. Bush’s plan to send more than 20,000 troops to carry out a new counterinsurgency strategy has helped to reverse the spiral of sectarian killings in Iraq.

But Mr. Bush’s penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and “civil war.” ...

In the end, the troop reinforcement proposal split the military. Even after the president had made the basic decision to send additional troops, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in Iraq, never sought more than two brigades, about 8,000 troops in all, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates reported to Mr. Bush in late December. But General Casey’s approach substantially differed from those of two officers who wanted a much bigger effort: the No. 2 commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen Raymond T. Odierno, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, who helped oversee the military’s new counterinsurgency manual and whose views were known by the White House before he was publicly named to replace General Casey, administration officials said.

Current and former officials from the Bush administration and the military agreed to disclose new details about the debate over the troop increase in response to repeated requests. Most insisted on anonymity because the documents were still classified, but said they believed the historical record should reflect the considerations that were being weighed at the time...

Much more at The New York Times.

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Corruption in Iraq
Exploiting Market Behavior as a Form of Irregular Warfare
by William S. McCallister, Small Wars Journal

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

The term corruption, when used in a technical sense, is a general concept in which components of an organized and interdependent system are not performing the functions for which they were originally intended, or performing them improperly to the detriment of the system's original purpose. Its original meaning has connotations of being morally wrong in practice and principle. Corruption has evolved into an institution in Iraq. What has been described as a culture of corruption now serves a vital function in the distribution of scare resources. In a sense, corruption has been elevated to a form of irregular warfare as various groups compete for access to influence and limited resources. The study of corruption as a form of irregular warfare therefore will assist in developing suitable anti-corruption strategies and to communicate these strategies within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.

Social, political and personal ideologies differ as to the costs and benefits derived from economic activities and how best to distribute the gains and losses of cumulative market transactions among individuals and groups. How best to distribute these gains and losses reflects the unique cultural, ideological and political sentiments of the society within which economic activities occur.

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance and by extension the use of appropriate economic and market management mechanisms vary. One definition describes good governance as the efficient and effective “delivery of security … economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered.” This definition implies a central role for government in the management of societal resources and a service centric function emphasizing equitable “delivery” and distribution of social services to all its citizens. Not all cultures articulate the role and function of governance in quite the same way.

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

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Update: Inside Defense was kind enough to place the article Mattis Sparks Vigorous Debate On Future Of Effects-Based Ops on a page that can be viewed by non-subscribers. SWJ hat tip to Dan Dupont. The discussion is continuing at Small Wars Council...

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis’ Effects Based Operations memo and the “vigorous debate” that followed. Excerpts from the article:

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis' decision to exorcise the term "effects-based operations" from US Joint Forces Command's vocabulary is sparking passionate debate as the military mulls potentially sweeping implications for doctrine, training and operations.

Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. It is supposed to be backed by a framework called operational net assessment (ONA) enabling commanders to capitalize on unprecedented high-tech information about the battlespace as well as an analytical process called system of systems analysis (SoSA) focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.

But somewhere along the way it all stopped making sense, according to Mattis, who writes in an Aug. 14 memo that EBO, ONA and SoSA are "fundamentally flawed" and must be removed from the military's lexicon, training and operations…

There has been a spirited debate about EBO in recent years. Critics such as retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper and Naval War College professor Milan Vego have vivisected the concept, while Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, one of EBO's main proponents, and other advocates like Naval War College professor James Ellsworth have repeatedly argued its merits.

Mattis' memo is not the end of the debate, but the start of a new chapter. Deptula is defending EBO while welcoming further discussions that will follow from JFCOM's guidance.

"I stand by the efficacy of EBO as a proven joint planning construct and welcome internal discussions on the topic as different viewpoints in joint doctrine are important in raising dialogues that ultimately result in enhancing joint force operations," Deptula tells Inside the Pentagon…

Not surprisingly, the memo is ruffling feathers in Air Force circles.

Before Deptula provided comments on the missive to ITP, Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney (retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney) , who unloaded heaps of criticism.

"Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document," McInerney says. "I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much."

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

Much, much more at ITP – praise, criticism and “between the lines” - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription. Also, the discussion continues at Small Wars Council.

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What Role for Germany in Iraq? - Christopher Chivvis of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The security situation in Iraq has improved markedly. The US "Surge," along with several other factors appear to have had a positive effect. A window of opportunity has opened. Iraq's future nevertheless remains uncertain and the possibility that the situation could deteriorate into a broader regional crisis remains.

To date, debate over Iraq in Germany and Europe has focused primarily on the wisdom and success of the US-led 2003 invasion. Five years later, however, experts are beginning to recognize that the time has come for a renewed discussion of Germany's own interests in Iraq.

This paper identifies key German interests and assesses German policy options.

More at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

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Posted this week at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute - US Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts by Dr. Donovan C. Chau.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has never been the centerpiece of US foreign and defense policy. Yet the current struggle between the United States and its allies against terrorist groups and individuals motivated by Islamic extremism thrusts SSA forward as a front in the global conflict. The author asks, centrally, what is the most effective long-term approach to US counterterrorism in SSA. By comparing views in Washington, DC, with perspectives from SSA, he assesses that a fundamental and dangerous misunderstanding of SSA may be leading US policy astray. Recommending a new grand strategic approach to US counterterrorism policy, he suggests urgently educating a future generation of analysts, officers, and policymakers on SSA--whose interest must match their knowledge and understanding.

More at SSI.

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US, Pakistani Military Leaders Meet Aboard USS Lincoln - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

US and Pakistani military leaders continued their ongoing dialogue about the war on terrorism during an Aug. 26 meeting aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Pentagon reporters today his meeting with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani army’s chief of staff, was constructive and focused on the challenges posed by extremists in the federally administered tribal area and the North West Frontier in Pakistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida are using the areas to plan and train for attacks in Afghanistan.

“There is... a growing complexity and coordination among extremist groups there -- an almost syndicate-like behavior -- that has resulted in new and ever more sophisticated attacks on coalition forces,” Mullen said. He pointed to attacks against French forces near Kabul last week and against US forces in the Wanat Valley near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan last month.

“The safe havens in the border regions provide launching pads for these sorts of attacks, and they need to be shut down,” the admiral said.

Accompanying Mullen at the conference was Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan; Army Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, acting US Central Command chief; Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the soon-to-be commander of US Central Command who now commands Multinational Force Iraq; and Navy Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of US Special Operations Command.

Mullen said he came away from the long-planned meeting “very encouraged that the focus is where it needs to be and that the... military-to-military relationship we're building with Pakistan is getting stronger every day.”

This was the fifth visit Mullen has made with Kayani since February, and was a chance to keep the lines of communication open between the two militaries...

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Anbar Handover Could Free Marines for Afghanistan Missions

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

Iraq’s once-deadly Anbar province could within the next few days become the 11th province to be turned over to Iraqi control, paving the way for a reduced US Marine Corps presence there, the Marine Corps commandant said today.

Gen. James T. Conway told Pentagon reporters the marked drop in violence in Anbar sets the stage for a drawdown of Marine forces that could be freed up for duty in Afghanistan, if needed.

“The change in the al-Anbar province is real and perceptible," with attacks at an all-time daily low of two to three, Conway said. He cited assessments by Marine Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force West, that a reduced US force in the region could keep violence in check.

“Anbar remains a dangerous place, but the ever-growing ability of the Iraqi security forces continues to move us closer to seeing Iraqi control of the province,” he said. Once believed to be “the last [Iraqi province] to turn for the better,” he added, it is expected to return to Iraqi control “in just a few days.”

Conway noted that signs of construction and rebuilding – not violence – were ever-present during his drive through the Anbar cities of Fallujah and Ramadi earlier this summer.

It’s become evident, he said, that “the force we needed in the Anbar province in 2005, 2006 to fight the insurgent at its height is not the force that we need there now to do nation-building and to try to bring the government and the Sunnis closer together.”

Marines deployed to Anbar “are doing a very good job of this nation-building business,” he said, but are more suited to other missions.

“It’s our view that if there is a stiffer fight going someplace else in a much more expeditionary environment where the Marine Air-Ground Task Force really seems to have a true and enduring value, then that’s where we need to be,” he said.

Conway cited increased violence in Afghanistan, where “the Taliban are growing bolder in their tactics and clearly doing their best to exploit security gaps where they exist.”

“Everyone seems to agree that additional forces are the ideal course of action for preventing a Taliban comeback, but just where they’re going to come from is still up for discussion,” he said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered additional Marine forces to Afghanistan earlier this year over concerns about a possible spring offensive. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, operating in the south, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, training Afghan security forces, are slated to return in late November after a one-month extension of their deployment.

Conway called it “a good idea” to backfill the Marines after they redeploy from Afghanistan, but he said the Corps can’t do it without cutting its current commitments in other parts of the world, including Iraq.

“Should our leadership determine that more US forces are needed in the fight in Afghanistan, it’s no secret that the Marine Corps would be proud to be part of that undertaking,” he said. “However, in order to do more in Afghanistan, our Marines have got to see relief elsewhere.”

More: Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Voice of America, Associated Press, Reuters, Stars and Stripes, Agence France-Presse.

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IRAQ

The Iraq Decisions That the Next President, Whether It’s Obama or McCain, Will Face: In a new book, war correspondent Linda Robinson also assesses the performance of Gen. David Petraeus - Linda Robinson, US News and World Report

As this nation prepares to elect a new president, there is a sense that America's involvement in Iraq has turned a corner. Much of the credit for the diminished bloodshed and the prospects for political progress has gone to the US commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who leaves Iraq next month to take up expanded regional responsibilities as head of US Central Command. In her new book, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, former US News Senior Writer Linda Robinson draws on 11 reporting trips to Iraq and extensive interviews with Petraeus and his team to document the evolution of American actions in Iraq. She offers recommendations on how to move forward in Iraq.

By June 2008, Iraq was calmer than it had been since April 2004. The war was not over, but it clearly had reached a new stage. When Gen. David Petraeus took command a year and a half earlier, Iraq was on fire. The majority in the United States believed there was no way to avoid an ignominious defeat such as America had not suffered in a quarter century. Petraeus, with the help of many others, pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war and created an opportunity for the next administration to bring the war to a soft landing.

Accomplishing that will not be easy, but what had seemed inconceivable to most onlookers in 2006 is now distinctly possible—if the 44th American president has the fortitude and wisdom to capitalize on what has been achieved. The new president has the great advantage of starting with a clean slate and no special relationships or past commitments. He can adopt a new policy that builds on the successes achieved in 2007 and 2008 and provides the critical missing ingredients that can be supplied only by presidential authority. The basic conceptual change needed is to shift the paradigm from war-making to peacemaking and to elevate achievement of the elusive political solution to be the policy's central goal.

More at US News and World Report.

AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban ‘Advance’: No Time To Wobble - Paul Smyth, Head, Operational Studies, Military Sciences Department, RUSI

The ambush and the loss of French soldiers in Afghanistan may well be described as a tactical setback if not defeat, but at a strategic level, the insurgents are nowhere near victorious.

This week’s violent encounter in Afghanistan’s Surobi district is a timely example of how a tactical event can have strategic impact. In this case, it brought a Head of State rushing to Kabul and it generated some unscheduled messages of France’s clear determination to support the ISAF mission, an outcome which some may say, cannot be seen as a Taliban victory.

For the families, friends and colleagues of the ten dead and twenty-one wounded French soldiers, the incident was an obvious tragedy of enduring effect. Every casualty in Afghanistan causes personal suffering and, in an expeditionary intervention that is based on choice not national survival, major losses inevitably raise questions which cast doubt on the purpose, validity and future of the endeavour. But without wishing to dismiss the reality of bereavement, when making strategic decisions of international importance, government leaders and military commanders must be beware of placing undue emphasis on the genuine heartbreak that can accompany their policy choices. For although it is true that some tactical events have strategic impact, it is a gross error to assume that all tactical incidents hold strategic relevance.

More at RUSI.

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Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region
by J. Bernhard Compton, Small Wars Journal

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

The existing body of quantitative research concerning violent non-state actors is sparse at best. It is characterized by disparate definitions of non-state actor violence, and largely fails to discriminate between insurgency, civil war onsets, and terrorism. It also has conflicting theories and conclusions. Meanwhile, defining legitimacy in Arab governments and its affect on non-state actor violence is also problematic. In this paper I look strictly at non-state actor violence perpetrated by actors originating from Middle Eastern States. I use four separate data sources, including the ITERATE, RPC, World Development Indicators, and Witches Brew Homogeneity datasets to relate such factors as RPC, GDP, National Power, levels of instability, and societal homogeneity to examine the notion of opportunity and cause as factors in the advent of non-state violent actors. I find some support among this data for the notion that correlation exists between legitimacy of governance, societal homogeneity, perceptions of wealth inequality and legitimacy, and number non-state actor terror attacks.

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

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Farewell to an American Hero - Joe Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

For the better part of 60 years, two old Army pilots who loved each other argued over many a meal and drink as to which of them was the second best pilot in the world.

The two shared the cockpits of old Beaver prop planes and Huey helicopters; they shared rooms in military hooches all over the world; they shared a love of practical and impractical jokes and they shared an undying love of flying and soldiers and the Army.

They also shared membership in a very small and revered fraternity of fewer than 105 men who are entitled to wear around their necks the light blue ribbon and gold pointed star that is the Medal of Honor, America’s highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call of duty.

Their story was told in a book my buddy Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and I wrote 15 years ago titled "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young" and in the Mel Gibson movie, "We Were Soldiers," released in the spring of 2002. Too Tall and Old Snake were ably portrayed in the movie.

Their argument over which of them is the Best Pilot in the Whole World sadly came to an end this week when our friend and comrade-in-arms Maj. Ed (Too Tall to Fly) Freeman slipped the surly bonds of earth and headed off to Fiddler’s Green, where the souls of departed cavalrymen gather by dispensation of God Himself.

More at McClatchy Newspapers.

After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley - LTC Hal Moore
LZ X-Ray - More about LZ X-ray and LZ-Albany
LZ X-Ray - Battle Overview
We Were Soldiers - Joe Galloway's Photos

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