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After Action Report (AAR) by General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) on his visit to NATO SHAPE Headquarters and Afghanistan – 21-26 July 2008.

This memo provides a strategic and operational assessment of security operations in Afghanistan.

Full AAR at the link above. Excerpts (emphasis and links by SWJ) follow:

Context

This report is based on a series of briefings and conversations at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium and then subsequent field observations in Afghanistan while accompanying General John Craddock SACEUR during his command update visit. I am very appreciative that the JCS Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen approved the trip and gave me his own take on the situation prior to my travel in theater…

This report is also based on continuous personal research, unclassified data provided in-country during this trip, and firsthand observations gained during my many field visits to both Pakistan and Afghanistan during the period 2003 forward to the current situation.

The conclusions are solely my own as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at West Point and should be viewed as an academic contribution to the national security debate. No one in NATO-SHAPE or the ISAF Command in Afghanistan has vetted this report.

Bottom-Line: Six Assertions

(1) Afghanistan is in misery. 68% of the population has never known peace. Life expectancy is 44 years. It has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world: One of six pregnant Afghan women dies for each live birth. Terrorist incidents and main force insurgent violence is rising (34% increase this year in kinetic events.) Battle action and casualties are now much higher in Afghanistan for US forces than they are in Iraq. The Afghan government at provincial and district level is largely dysfunctional and corrupt. The security situation (2.8 million refugees); the economy (unemployment 40% and rising, extreme poverty 41%, acute food shortages, inflation 12% and rising, agriculture broken); the giant heroin/opium criminal enterprise ($4 billion and 800 metric tons of heroin); and Afghan governance are all likely to get worse in the coming 24 months.

(2) The magnificent, resilient Afghan people absolutely reject the ideology and violence of the Taliban (90% or greater) but have little faith in the ability of the government to provide security, justice, clean water, electricity, or jobs. Much of Afghanistan has great faith in US military forces, but enormous suspicion of the commitment and staying power of our NATO allies.

(3) The courageous and determined NATO Forces (the employable forces are principally US, Canadian, British, Polish, and Dutch) and the Afghan National Army (the ANA is a splendid success story) cannot be defeated in battle. They will continue to slaughter the Pashtun insurgents, criminals, and international terrorist syndicates who directly confront them. (7000+ killed during 2007 alone.) The Taliban will increasingly turn to terrorism directed against the people and the Afghan National Police. However, the atmosphere of terror cannot be countered by relying mainly on military means. We cannot win through a war of attrition. The economic and political support provided by the international community is currently inadequate to deal with the situation.

(4) 2009 will be the year of decision. The Taliban and a greatly enhanced foreign fighter presence will: strike decisive blows against selected NATO units; will try to erase the FATA and Baluchi borders with Afghanistan; will try to sever the road networks and stop the construction of new roads (Route # 1 – the Ring Road from Kabul to Kandahar is frequently now interdicted); and will try to strangle and isolate the capital. Without more effective and non-corrupt Afghan political leadership at province and district level, Afghanistan may become a failed state hosting foreign terrorist communities with global ambitions. Afghan political elites are focused more on the struggle for power than governance.

(5) US unilateral reinforcements driven by US Defense Secretary Bob Gates have provided additional Army and Marine combat forces and significant enhanced training and equipment support for Afghan security forces. This has combined with greatly increased US nation-building support (PRT’s, road building, support for the Pakistani Armed Forces, etc.) to temporarily halt the slide into total warfare. The total US outlay in Afghanistan this year will be in excess of $34 billion: a burn rate of more than $2.8 billion per month. However, there has been no corresponding significant effort by the international community. The skillful employment of US Air Force, Army, and Naval air power (to include greatly expanded use of armed and reconnaissance UAV’s : Predator, Reaper, Global hawk, and Shadow) has narrowly prevented the Taliban from massing and achieving local tactical victories over isolated and outnumbered US and coalition forces in the East and South.

(6) There is no unity of command in Afghanistan. A sensible coordination of all political and military elements of the Afghan theater of operations does not exist. There is no single military headquarters tactically commanding all US forces. All NATO military forces do not fully respond to the NATO ISAF Commander because of extensive national operational restrictions and caveats. In theory, NATO ISAF Forces respond to the (US) SACEUR…but US Forces in ISAF (half the total ISAF forces are US) respond to the US CENTCOM commander. However, US Special Operations Forces respond to US SOCOM... not (US) SACEUR or US CENTCOM. There is no accepted Combined NATO-Afghan military headquarters. There is no clear political governance relationship organizing the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and its many Agencies, NATO and its political and military presence, the 26 Afghan deployed allied nations, the hundreds of NGO’s, and private entities and contractors. There is little formal dialog between the government and military of Pakistan and Afghanistan, except that cobbled together by the US Forces in Regional Command East along the Pakistan frontier...

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USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy - USAID, July 2008.

Purpose: This policy establishes the foundation for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) cooperation with the United States Department of Defense (DoD) in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. This cooperation is designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach in which U.S. Government (USG) agencies work within their mandated areas of responsibility in a more coherent way to provide a coordinated, consistent response in pursuit of shared policy goals to include, inter alia, humanitarian relief efforts, counter-terrorism initiatives, civil affairs programs, and reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Such improved cooperation is a critical element of stabilization efforts in fragile states, particularly in pre- and post-conflict environments. This paper clarifies, formalizes, and defines the parameters of USAID’s interaction with DoD. It complements the efforts of the Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), to define a broader civilian interagency engagement with DoD. DoD representatives in the field and in Washington do not seek to supplant USAID’s role, but rather look to the Agency for guidance in identifying how the military can play a more supportive role in USAID’s development activities.

The companion internal document, Civilian-Military Cooperation Implementation Guidelines, further details functional areas for USAID DoD cooperation, provides legal guidance on operational issues, and illustrative approaches for implementing this policy framework.

The present policy is not intended to modify or supplant existing USAID policies regarding disaster response activities. Standard operating procedures of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), will continue to be used in these situations.

Update: Colonel Dave Maxwell was kind enough to send SWJ a copy of Securing Peace in Mindanao through Diplomacy, Development, and Defense by US Embassy, Manila, Republic of the Philippines.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the United States Government (USG) are pursuing a successful strategy incorporating diplomacy, development, and defense to secure peace and defeat terrorists in Mindanao. This strategy is based on the principle that the threat of terrorism is eliminated only when both terrorists and the ideology that supports their actions are defeated. In Mindanao, the GRP and USG are working in partnership to expand a stable zone of peace and development, thereby denying domestic (Abu Sayyaf Group) and international (Jemaah Islamiyah) terrorists the physical and psychological space they require to survive.

The US Embassy in Manila maintains a strong bilateral relationship with the Philippines based upon a shared history and common goals in today’s world. Vibrant economic and political ties between the two countries strengthen governance, spur economic growth, and reduce the threat posed by terrorism in the Philippines.

Development assistance from the American people improves the lives of average Filipinos - Muslims and Christians alike - in the areas of health, education, economic livelihood, and the environment. Finally, US military assistance is enhancing the professionalism of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and strengthening its ability to respond to a range of modern threats, including domestic and international terrorists...

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Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level
The Integration of Special Operation Forces and USAID in Afghanistan
by Sloan Mann, Small Wars Journal

Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF)

The publication of FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) was a major step in the evolution of military thinking about unconventional warfare. It provides a useful guide to military commanders, soldiers, and civilians as they face a determined enemy interwoven within foreign cultures in Iraq and Afghanistan. It further recognizes that the military cannot counter insurgency alone. This multi-dimensional form of warfare requires the advice, expertise, and resources of civilian agencies that can focus on the political, social, and developmental aspects necessary to undermine support for insurgents.

Despite there being an entire chapter dedicated to the integration of civilian and military activities in the COIN manual, it does not address how to work with and integrate civilian agencies. Different organizational cultures, values, and sensitivities to risk create challenges to integration. Misunderstandings about methods of operation, timelines, and authorities can create friction. Managing expectations and working with idiosyncratic personalities, on both the military and civilian sides, can create frustration. Fully integrating military and civilian agencies down to the tactical level, however, can enhance operational effects and speed the process of creating stability in COIN operations.

In Afghanistan, USAID and Special Operation Forces are working together in a successful interagency model to address the myriad of challenges posed by a growing insurgency. USAID representatives working with SOF are integrating principles of development in creative ways with COIN principles to develop appropriate interventions in select communities. This paper will examine USAID’s relationship with CJSOTF-A, describe a successful interagency process for selecting strategic communities, and cover best practices associated with interagency operations. Examples of holistic planning and joint operations in insecure areas will highlight what can be achieved when expertise and combined resources are brought to bear in a COIN environment.

Sloan Mann of the United States Agency for International Development is a Development Advisor to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan.

Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF)

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An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War
A Survey of Christian Political Thought on the Justification of Warfare
by Keith Gomes, Small Wars Journal

An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF)

This paper will briefly outline the development of the just war doctrine, with special emphasis on the developments in Christian thought which ultimately influenced modern international legal documents . Numerous legal documents, such as the Geneva Conventions (1864-1948) contain within them references to just war. More recent attempts to codify the just war include the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty entitled Responsibility to Protect. In examining the development of Christian thought with respect to war, I will illustrate the link between developments within Christian philosophy, the precepts of the Bible, and ultimately, the eventual universalisation of certain elements of Christian morality through the intermediary of natural law.

The need for just war criteria represents the efforts of Western cultures to regulate and restrict violence by establishing rules which specify the situations in which war can be legitimately used as a tool in international statecraft, as well as by setting out rules which govern ethical conduct during combat. However, today these regulations and restrictions are not confined to only Western cultures but, because of developments in international law and the establishment of international organisations such as the UN, this once Western narrative is seen to have universal relevancy, and to a large extent, universal appeal and applicability. While this paper will focus mainly on the rules dealing with the decision to go to war, both sets of rules arise from the same intellectual narrative which recognises recourse to violence not as the preferential modus operandi for dealing with disputes, but the exception. Both sets of rules trace their genealogy to developments in Christian thought, and understanding this genealogy is important, not only for academics, but for military strategists and foreign policy planners alike, since it highlights that these rules are never static because the rationale for these rules is situated in various historical contexts, and interpretations vary depending on the prevailing socio-political atmosphere. This, therefore, always leaves open the possibility that at the very least, the interpretations of these rules can be modified, or at the most, that the rules themselves ought to be more closely scrutinised, given that Christianity itself is constantly evolving and reinventing itself to retain contemporary social, political and ethical applicability.

An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF)

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The second in a promised trilogy of Rwandan reviews from Tom Odom, serial SWJ contributor and highly regarded Small Warrior.  Link to review #1.  #2 follows:

A review of:

Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide

Andrew Wallis, London: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd, 2006.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

As a member of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in 1988, I once spent a week on observation post duty in El Arish, Egypt with a French Army captain of Vietnamese-French heritage.  I remember that week well because he convinced me to try Nuc Mong (rotten fish oil sauce).  To my relief, it did not taste fishy.  Seven years later I attended a diplomatic function in Kigali, Rwanda where to my surprise my former El Arish comrade was introduced as the newly arrived second secretary of the French embassy.  Unlike the Nuc Mong in 1987, his arrival in Kigali in 1995 was most definitely fishy.  He was using a different name and he pretended not to know when I grabbed his hand and addressed him by what had served as his first name the last time we met.   This encounter only increased the sour taste I had in my mouth regarding French activities and policies toward Rwanda before, during, and after the genocide.

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I've not had the time to visit and / or fully read my favorite blogs of late. That said here are some items from just a few sites as well as a SWJ Daily News Roundup item that I thought warranted special attention here.

The Last Battle by Michael Gordon at The New York Times

... Over the previous few years, my own trips through Iraq had focused mostly on the US and Iraqi governments’ struggle with Sunni insurgents in battlegrounds like Mosul, Baquba, Hit and Arab Jabour. But the nature of the war has fundamentally changed. The American “surge,” together with a strategy that emphasized protecting civilians and engaging with Sunni tribesmen, weakened Sunni insurgents and jihadists. The bitter fighting between Shiites and Sunnis that turned Baghdad into a killing ground of car bombs, suicide attacks and mutilated corpses has quieted down. And now this sectarian struggle has been eclipsed by a growing tussle for power among the Shiites themselves. The competition involves Prime Minister Maliki and the Shiite religious parties (the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Maliki’s Dawa Party) that constitute the ruling hierarchy in Baghdad; Moktada al-Sadr’s weakened but still-popular political movement and its military wing, the Jaish al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army; and, increasingly, Shiite tribes.

The tug of war among the religious parties and the Shiite tribes has emerged as one of the most-significant but also least-understood aspects of Iraq’s political scene. It pits leaders from the Shiite core of Maliki’s coalition against outsiders looking for a way in. It is a struggle between party officials who spent the Saddam years in exile, mostly in Iran, and tribal leaders who endured his rule at home - and, on another level, a contest between urbanized Shiites, who lean more toward the religious parties and Sadr’s movement, and agrarian Iraqis, whose loyalties lie more in tribal society. Significantly, it is also a rivalry between Shiites who favor a government based on religious parties and those who have a more secular vision...

Much, much more - and discuss at Small Wars Council (Hat Tip MikeF).

Peacemaking is the Graduate Level of Strategic Discussion by Galrahn at Information Dissemination.

... When thinking about whether COIN is the graduate level of war, we ultimately decided that whether COIN is the graduate level of war or not is semantics, but what is relevant is that COIN represents the graduate level of strategic military discussions today.

The value of the COIN discussion is that its emphasis has required military thinkers to take a broader view of military strategy in a context outside of the Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Fuller, etc.. wartime centric military strategy approaches. The COIN debate is part of a larger, and growing, military strategy debate towards peacemaking, or war prevention, and that is what makes it graduate level.

Why is this important? Because it has the effects of broadening the debates in other aspects of military strategy. An example would be the evolution of military strategy involving nuclear weapons from a broad position of MAD into a peace time strategy of escalation control and a wartime strategy of escalation dominance. I’m being general for the example, much intellectual rigor is still required in this and other schools of military strategy that connects the peacetime posture and wartime posture towards winning conclusions in military strategy....

RAND Terrorism Report Thrashes a Straw Man by Westhawk at his blog Westhawk.

... Seth Jones and Martin Libicki of RAND released a historical study of how terrorist movements end. Their examination of 648 terror groups that operated between 1968 and 2006 concluded that military force led to the end of terror groups in only seven percent of the cases. Political accommodation (43%) and police work (40%) were the most common techniques for ending terror campaigns.

The instant response of the mainstream media (for example, here) was to label the RAND report as an indictment of the Bush administration’s strategy against al Qaeda, a military campaign also known as The War on Terror.

Yet a closer examination of the RAND report shows it to be little more than easy smack-down of a straw man...

Messrs. Jones and Libicki must know that for at least two decades the FBI has made a major priority of expanding its liaison operations with foreign police services. And the RAND authors must also know about the Pentagon’s wide-ranging training and advisory efforts, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the Sahel, west Africa, southeast Asia, and Latin America. Rather than making themselves look foolish by calling for activities the US has already been doing for years, the authors might have critiqued these efforts instead...

Is the Islamic Army Going Back to the Mattresses? by Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark.

It hasn't gotten any attention that I've noticed amidst the furor over the provincial election law and Kirkuk, but a few days ago the Emir of the Islamic Army of Iraq announced a new offensive against American bases and troops. This campaign was authorized, according to the very brief statement, because Iraq's fate must not be determined by occupiers or their agents. This follows on the heels of the announcement a few weeks ago by Jaysh al-Mujahideen that it was leaving those two coalitions, of which it was a founding member along with the Islamic Army, due to their failure to produce any political results.

Why does this matter? Because the Islamic Army is the core of the coalition of 'nationalist-jihadist' insurgency factions which have expressed interest in joining the political process (the Reform and Jihad Front, the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance) and is one of the key factions believed to have joined up with the Awakenings Councils / Sons of Iraq in force. Its public break with the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI) in April 2007 was probably the most important turning point in the transformation of the Sunni insurgency.

This could very well just be a propaganda move, an attempt to rebuild some credibility and draw attention to their military capability. It may amount to nothing more than an upswing in videos of exploding hummers. But that could backfire upon them, since if attacks do not in fact begin to pick up, it could prove seriously damaging to the Islamic Army's remaining credibility and devalue them as interlocutors. I've already seen some mocking posts on other forums asking, essentially, "where's the beef?" ...

The Wrong Place by Richard Fernandez at The Belmont Club.

Two assertions about Iraq ought to be challenged or at least examined more closely. The first is the idea that security improvements in Iraq and al-Qaeda’s defeat had little if anything to do with the US effort. The second is the assertion that the “real” strategic center of gravity always should have been Afghanistan, because the proper object of the War is to “get bin Laden”.

Take the question of whether the growing success in Iraq had anything to do with US effort. Once violence in Iraq began to wane and al-Qaeda was clearly being defeated, the search to find a non-American explanation began in earnest. For a while it was fashionable to credit Moqtada al-Sadr’s “ceasefire” with improving conditions in Iraq...

A variant of the same narrative was that Iran had for reasons never fully explained, decided to let a defeated American army off the hook...

Still another line of argument was that the Anbar Awakening occurred prior to and independently of the Surge...

This discounts the effect of operations prior to the 20% increase in troop strength in Iraq that is commonly regarded as the start of the Surge. It discounts improvements in intelligence gathering, the creation of the Iraqi Army, the election of the Iraqi government, dismantling of the insurgency’s lines of communication of the insurgency, the change in tactics - a whole host of things - almost as if the Surge started from tabula rasa; a blank slate...

Rethinking Smith-Mundt: A Look Back at its Purpose by Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner.

Small Wars Journal just published my paper "Rethinking Smith-Mundt" in which I researched the historical record, scholarly books and articles and media reports surrounding the information activities portion of the US law commonly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. After two years (1946-1947) of debates, testimony, amendments and a European fact finding trip, the Act was passed in January 1948. The result was legislation that institutionalized America's international engagement. It mandated controls and oversight to improve the quality of America's international broadcasting and as well as cultural and educational exchanges. To the modern reader, the concerns of the 80th Congress are remarkably similar to those of the 110th, right down to the public statements. However, the 80th Congress had deeper concerns than today's Congress and managed to deal with a far more comprehensive package than being considered today.

The purpose of "Rethinking Smith-Mundt" is to see through the haze of misunderstanding surrounding the Act and understand its original intentions. These intentions were not to prohibit the role of government in information engagement but rather to enhance its role, though in very proscribed ways. In fact, the media and the private sector recognized and supported the notion that engaging the world required assets beyond their capacity. The prohibition against domestic dissemination of news by the State Department's (and later the the United States Information Agency, created five years after Smith-Mundt) was not an outright prohibition but rather an allocation of responsibilities that let private sector media do what it did best and governmental media do what it did best. The wall between public and private was far more porous than we imagine today, something that only becomes clear when we re-examine the debates surrounding the formulation and passage of the Act. Such a re-examination also reveals why such prohibitions are no longer needed today...

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Dr. TX Hammes (Col, USMC Ret.), long-time friend of SWJ, enjoins readers to “read different” in the latest issue of Armed Forces Journal.

Since the early 1990s, the defense industry has been talking about the revolutionary technological changes taking place across society. It has worked hard to ensure we know what those changes are and how they are affecting national security. Yet, the industry rarely talks about the fundamental requirement to change the way we think in order to understand the implications of the technological and social changes we face…

…The authors of these works highlight aspects of how the world has changed. This forces us to change how we frame problems, how we organize to deal with them and even how to get the best out of our people. For instance, if one still saw the world as a hierarchy, then one looked for the “leadership” of the Iraqi insurgency in 2003. Yet if one saw the world as a network in which emergent intelligence is a key factor, then one quickly saw the networked insurgent entities as they evolved an emergent strategy in Iraq. Our ability to adjust to the rapidly changing future security environment will, to a large degree, depend on our ability to understand the world as it is rather than as we have been taught to understand it. Reading these 12 books should help.

Continue on to AFJ for TX Hammes’ read different reading list.

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The 2008 Warlord Loop Reading List

Introduction and reading list posted here with permission of the author and Proceedings.

John M. Collins began to amass military experience when he enlisted in the Army as a private in 1942. Thirty years and three wars later, in 1972, he retired as a colonel. He spent the next quarter century as the leading analyst on military and defense issues at the Congressional Research Service. Seven years ago, he established the Warlord Loop, a by-invitation-only e-mail forum that fosters voluminous, freewheeling exchanges seven days a week. Resultant brainstorming is roughly equivalent to a graduate education in national security at no cost save time expended.

The Warlord Loop’s current reading list features two books apiece that a cross section of 300 cosmopolitan members believe would best enable practitioners at every level to prepare for an uncertain future and concurrently help concerned citizens understand salient issues.

This compilation differs from countless competitive lists because contributors include civilian national security specialists along with Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard representatives who range in rank from NCO stripes to four-stars. Males, females, liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisans touch every point on the public opinion spectrum.

One note – My two selections were The Village by Bing West and Fiasco by Tom Ricks. Apparently during the editing process, The Village was replaced with Dreams and Shadows by Robin Wright – a fine book I’m sure – but not one that I’ve had the opportunity to read just yet.

Continue on to the 2008 Warlord Loop Reading List.

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#3 of 3 book reviews from our favorite old Rwanda hand.  Links to review #1 and review #2.  #3 follows.  And don't neglect Tom's book, either, in the short list of good works on that period.

A review of:

Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide

Linda Melvern, New York: Vasco, 2006 2nd edition.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

"It is called The General's Book on Rwanda, and, right, the General is Rwandan Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who was the head of the Nationale Gendarmerie during the period of time in which what has come to be referred to as the "Rwandan Genocide" of 100 days (7 April to 4 July 1994) took place. And everybody knows the boilerplate of "800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus slaughtered by extremist Hutus." But, so far at least, my writing hasn't really been about any kind of personal story of the General's life. It's about what really happened in Rwanda between 1 October 1990 and sometime after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took over (or "liberated," as they would have it) the country on 4 July 1994 -- because the mainstream version couldn't be further from the truth. [1]"

Pick a tragedy and you will almost always find an alternate conspiracy theory to go with the accurate accounts. Rwanda is no different. The above extract comes from an interview with Mick Collins who holds that all that happened in Rwanda was due to US greed.  Mr. Collins is not alone in making that assertion.  Robin Philpot's book Rwanda 1994: Colonialism dies hard, as listed on the Taylor Report is another.  Keith Harmon Snow is another conspiracy theorist who pushes the US conspiracy theory as does Wayne Madsen.   The truly sad thing about these alternate theories--aside from their use of fantasy as fact--is they lend weight to the Hutu Power's mantra that they were victims of the second genocide, that the first genocide of 800,000 to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus was an unfortunate result of war between them and a foreign aggressor, namely Tutsi "aliens" bent on Hutu destruction...

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Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency
by LTC Raymond Millen, Small Wars Journal

Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF)

Perhaps the most bandied about premise in counterinsurgency strategy is the need to win the hearts and minds of the affected population. In abstract, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of the people through social, economic, and political incentives. Yet, this premise begs the question: if the rectitude of hearts and minds is indisputable, why does it have such a poor record of success? The lackluster results of its application are certainly not from a lack of effort and resources. Here lies the rub. The aforementioned incentives are founded on a tacit assumption that people have a choice in the matter. If they don’t, what eclipses hearts and minds?

In his book, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes contends that the pursuit of self-preservation dominates human behavior first and foremost. The covenant between the citizen and the government centers on security, not only at the macro-level (e.g., sovereignty of the state) but also the micro-level (e.g., sovereignty of local governance). People created society and surrendered some individual sovereignty in exchange for the collective good of security. It is within this province that citizens are able to pursue happiness and societal progress. Hence, this covenant is founded on a tacit security agreement between the citizen and the government.

Insurgents understand and seek to shatter the covenant by creating the conditions of insecurity as a means of gaining control of the population in their area of operation. Subversion of government authority through terrorist acts, selected assassinations of officials, murder and threats perpetrated on the populace, and general mayhem ultimately results in the intimidation of the populace and hence its acquiescence to insurgent activities. With the individual’s faith in and allegiance to the government in question, the government’s task of reasserting its authority and regaining the confidence of the people becomes infinitely more difficult.

All this is not to say that the present understanding of hearts and minds is unimportant, it is, but its application must be sequenced properly. Or stated another way, the attainment of security must be the first stage of hearts and minds. Without a solid foundation of security, the other incentives will crumble on a bed of sand. The challenge lies in the ways and means of achieving these ends.

In view of Hobbes’ contention that self-preservation dominates human behavior, this article addresses the operational and tactical calculus for the prosecution of a counterinsurgency strategy: 1) the centrality of local communities in the conflict; 2) the methodology for securing local communities; 3) restoring the covenant between the government and the people; and 4) enhancing the covenant. Success for any counterinsurgency hinges on three factors: understanding the plight of the people caught in the vise of an insurgency; acknowledging that insurgents derive their strength from population centers; and denying insurgents access to local communities. In short, counterinsurgency strategy should focus on creating security spheres for every community (e.g., city, town, village, or hamlet) as the first step in restoring local societies. For the U.S. military, pursuit of this calculus carries significant political-military implications.

Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF)

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AntoniusBlock has posted his first draft (revision underway) of High Value Targeting and Counterinsurgency at his blog Strategy and National Policy.

Here is a bit from the intro and a bit from the conclusion. Lots of good stuff in between to include a conceptual framework, a Chechnya case study, a Peru case study and a Palestine case study.

As America’s first serious involvement with counterinsurgency for several decades, Iraq has become a laboratory and schoolroom for new thinking about this dangerous and complex endeavor. The way that Americans have approached that conflict reflects broader assumptions about security and armed violence. Take the bursts of optimism that accompanied the killings of Qusay and Uday Hussein in July 2003, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006. In each instance, large segments of the American public and a number of political leaders concluded that the removal of these figures would alter the trajectory of the insurgency, possibly even pave the way to victory. This was easy to understand: rather than believe that armed conflict arises from deep, sometimes even irresolvable structural or cultural causes, Americans attribute it to the nefarious action of evil people. Remove these evil people and stability and comity—the “natural” state of human affairs—returns. For this reason, “high value targeting”—the killing or capture of key insurgents—has great appeal when Americans grapple with counterinsurgency.

Yet if high value targeting is mentioned to counterinsurgency experts, many immediately retort that it does not work. In fact, they argue, it can actually be counterproductive, distracting effort and attention from the difficult, often infuriating processes of establishing security, building effective law enforcement and intelligence systems, political reform, and economic development. As is often the case, the truth lies between the extremes...

... Obtaining actionable operational and tactical intelligence is always a challenge for high value targeting. By definition, only wily and security conscious insurgents become important enough to warrant the effort. Those who are easy to kill or capture are not worth the effort. Those worth the effort are not easy to kill or capture. But an accurate strategic assessment can be even more difficult than obtaining actionable intelligence because of the complex interplay of multiple effects and because it requires prediction rather than simply collection and analysis. Since insurgency is quintessentially psychological and the insurgents themselves have a major say in determining the strategic effects of high value targeting, the best that a strategist or intelligence professional can do is assign probabilities to certain actions or patterns of actions.

To integrate high value targeting into strategy, counterinsurgents must first identify the desired outcome...

High Value Targeting and Counterinsurgency

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The public dust-up concerning recent British operations in Basra started with three items in Tuesday's Times, nothing yet on the Ministry of Defence official web page or the Basra Blog (official news blog of Headquarters, Multi-National Division South East, Basra) on this issue. (Update: See Top US Officer Praises Army's Efforts in Basra City at Basra Blog) Below the fold is the SWJ roundup of news, analysis, op-ed, editorials and blog commentary so far - check back as we'll be updating this page as the story develops. And remember - No FACTUAL STATEMENT should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true.

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Social Science and the Pentagon - audio of a segment from today's The Kojo Nnamdi Show (American University Radio - WAMU).

The Pentagon is funding academic research to better understand the attraction of terrorism and violent groups in the Middle East -- among other things. But some scholars are concerned the military is only interested in funding research that reinforces its world view. We discuss the complex relationship between the Pentagon and academia.

Guests were William S. Rees, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences; David Vine, Professor, American University; and Patrick Cronin, Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

From a DoD 16 July press release - Department of Defense Partners With Universities For Social Science Research:

The DoD has launched a university-based social science initiative to support basic research in topic areas of importance to current and future US national security.

The initiative, called Minerva, will support multi- and interdisciplinary and cross-institutional efforts addressing a range of social science topic areas. It will bring together universities, research institutions and individual scholars into a partnership to tackle topics of interest to DoD. For example, DoD could pursue topics such as foriegn military and technology research, terrorism or cultural studies. The initial funding is $10-20 million annually.

The objectives include:

(1) To foster and improve the Defense Department’s social science intellectual capital and ability to understand and address security challenges.
(2) To support and develop basic research and expertise within the social sciences community in subject areas which may provide insight to current and future challenges.
(3) To improve the Defense Department’s relationship with the social science community.

To achieve the secretary of defense’s vision, DoD will pilot a number of approaches for engaging the social science community. This multi-pronged strategy will enable the department to solicit a broad range of proposals from the social science community and to leverage the expertise and infrastructures of a wide range of existing mechanisms for funding basic research.

The Minerva initiative will have several components to solicit and manage proposals. The first of these has been released through a DoD broad agency announcement (BAA). Additionally, DoD signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Science Foundation on July 2, 2008, to work together on a range of projects related to DoD’s Minerva initiative, which might include a solicitation of proposals. Submission to DoD’s open BAA will not preclude any offerer from submitting proposals to future solicitations.

Links:

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates on the Minerva initiative.
The currently open DoD BAA.
NSF’s Press Release regarding the signing of the memorandum of agreement with the DoD.

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Gates's Next Mission - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion

Defense Secretary Bob Gates has been talking recently about how to rebuild America's national security architecture so that it fits the 21st century. The next president should think about assigning Gates to fix what he rightly says is broken.

Gates is an anomaly in this lame-duck administration. He is still firing on all cylinders, working to repair the damage done at the Pentagon by his arrogant and aloof predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. Gates has restored accountability in the military services by firing the secretaries of the Army and Air Force when they failed to respond forthrightly to problems. And he has been an early and persuasive internal administration critic of US military action against Iran.

Amazingly for a defense secretary, Gates has been arguing against the "creeping militarization" of foreign policy. In a speech last month, he urged more funding for the State Department and other civilian agencies, saying they have been "chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long." In Washington, that's almost unheard of -- sticking your neck out for the other guy -- and it's one reason Gates's reputation has been steadily rising...

More to include a proposal for a 'Gates Commission' to revise the basic framework of the National Security Act of 1947.

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Small Wars Journal has received an advance copy of Bing West’s newest book The Strongest Tribe. We will be posting a review and SWJ interview with Bing in the near future. The early pages and reviews indicate that The Strongest Tribe will be acknowledged as a classic work on counterinsurgency in Iraq – much like The Village defined COIN in Vietnam. The Strongest Tribe can be pre-ordered (highly recommended – 12 August release date) at Amazon. The publisher’s book description, video, several short endorsements and a Random House interview with Bing follow.

Description: From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.

During the fierce battle for Fallujah, Bing West asked an Iraqi colonel why the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had fled in women’s clothes. The colonel pointed to a Marine patrol walking by and said, “Americans are the strongest tribe.”

In Iraq, America made mistake after mistake. Many gave up on the war. Then the war took a sharp U-turn. Two generals–David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno–displayed the leadership America expected. Bringing the reader from the White House to the fighting in the streets, this remarkable narrative explains the turnaround by U.S. forces.

In the course of fourteen extended trips over five years, West embedded with more than sixty front-line units, discussing strategy with generals and tactics with corporals. He provides an expert’s account of counterinsurgency, disposing of myths. By describing the characters and combat in city after city, West gives the reader an in-depth understanding that will inform the debate about the war. This is the definitive study of how American soldiers actually fought –a gripping and visceral book that changes the way we think about the war, and essential reading for understanding the next critical steps to be taken.

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I’m a cautious book buyer, normally waiting several weeks to months after a book has been released to get the low down on whether I really want a particular item for my personal library. I just made an exception and preordered Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq by Colonel Peter Mansoor. I can’t imagine anything by COL Mansoor being less than outstanding and figure the pre-release reviewers (an impressive list at that) can’t be all wrong.

From the Amazon.com Baghdad at Sunrise page:

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, the on-the-ground commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division—the “Ready First Combat Team”—describes his brigade’s first year in Iraq, from the sweltering, chaotic summer after the Ba’athists’ defeat to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government a year later. Uniquely positioned to observe, record, and assess the events of that fateful year, Mansoor now explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency of unexpected strength and tenacity.

Drawing not only on his own daily combat journal but also on observations by embedded reporters, news reports, combat logs, archived e-mails, and many other sources, Mansoor offers a contemporary record of the valor, motivations, and resolve of the 1st Brigade and its attachments during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet this book has a deeper significance than a personal memoir or unit history. Baghdad at Sunrise provides a detailed, nuanced analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and along with it critically important lessons for America’s military and political leaders of the twenty-first century.

Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute

"This book will be read by students at military academies and war colleges for years to come. It also speaks to general readers interested in Iraq, in the voices of our soldiers, and in understanding the problems we faced and those we created, without the hyperbole and politicization of most first-person accounts of the early years of this conflict."

Conrad Crane, lead author of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

"This is the best personal memoir of the Iraq War that I have seen."

General David H. Petraeus, US Army, Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq

"Baghdad at Sunrise is a masterful account of command in counterinsurgency operations. Colonel Peter Mansoor''s superb description of his brigade''s experiences during our first year in Iraq is a must read for soldiers, scholars, and policymakers, alike-and all would do well to examine the lessons he draws from his experiences."

Colonel H. R. McMaster, US Army, author of Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam

"A moving, insightful, and unique account of a combat brigade''s experience in Iraq crafted by a gifted soldier-historian-a must-read for anyone who wants to understand how the U.S. military is coping with counterinsurgency warfare in the 21st century."

Thomas E. Ricks, military correspondent, The Washington Post, and author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

"The Iraq war has produced many good books by sergeants and lieutenants, but few notable memoirs by senior officers. Finally, in Baghdad at Sunrise, Colonel Mansoor gives us an account of a year''s combat in the Iraqi capital as seen by a brigade commander. What''s more, he brings the eye of a trained historian to the task. He is candid about both the successes and the failures of the U.S. military. Read it."

Williamson Murray, author of A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War

"Colonel Mansoor has provided us with an exceptional memoir from mid-level of the tragic course of post-conflict operations in Iraq. It represents an account by a first-rate soldier and perceptive historian that is a must read for anyone interested in what really happened."

Preorder Baghdad Sunrise at Amazon.com.

Hardcover: 432 pages
Publisher: Yale University Press (September 15, 2008)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 030014069X
ISBN-13: 978-0300140699

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Correcting the Course - Max Boot, Commentary's Contentions

It’s taken a while but the Bush administration is slowly and belatedly starting to correct some of the deficiencies which have cost us so much in the post-9/11 wars. The best known and most successful course correction was the surge in Iraq. Now in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates is finally proposing to increase the size of the Afghan National Army from fewer than 70,000 today to a projected level of 120,000 in five years. That is a badly needed expansion given that the Afghan army has to police a country larger than Iraq with a force of less than one-third the size of the Iraqi army...

Receiving less notice (in fact no notice at all), but potentially of great long-term significance, was the overdue decision by Congress in July to give $75 million, as part of the supplemental appropriation for Afghanistan and Iraq, to the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. This office was created a few years ago to provide the civilian component in places like Afghanistan and Iraq so the armed forces won’t have to do all the heavy lifting. But it couldn’t do much because Congress wouldn’t fund it...

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How The Surge Worked by Peter Mansoor, Washington Post, 10 August 2008.

Pete Mansoor served as General David Petraeus's executive officer at Multi-National Force - Iraq from February 2007 to May 2008. He holds the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University and is the author of the forthcoming book "Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq."

Mansoor is also the founding director of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Under his leadership, the Counterinsurgency Center helped to revise the final version of the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which was published jointly by the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. This document was the first revision of US counterinsurgency operations in more than 20 years, incorporating lessons learned during conflicts throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.

In 2003-04, Mansoor served as Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Iraq, which was responsible for security and stability in the Rusafa and Adhamiya districts of Baghdad, an area of 195 square kilometers and 2.1 million people. After the April 2004 uprising of militia loyal to the Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, Mansoor’s brigade combat team restored the holy city of Karbala to coalition control within three weeks, an operation that earned the organization a Presidential Unit Citation for collective valor in combat.

Pete Mansoor on The Surge (italicized emphasis SWJ):

Given the divisive debate over the Iraq war, perhaps it was inevitable that the accomplishments of the recently concluded "surge" would become shrouded in the fog of 30-second sound bites. Too often we hear that the dramatic security improvement in Iraq is due not to the surge but to other, unrelated factors and that the positive developments of the past 18 months have been merely a coincidence.

To realize how misleading these assertions are, one must understand that the "surge" was more than an infusion of reinforcements into Iraq. Of greater importance was the change in the way US forces were employed starting in February 2007, when Gen. David Petraeus ordered them to position themselves with Iraqi forces out in neighborhoods. This repositioning was based on newly published counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the protection of the population and recognized that the only way to secure people is to live among them...

The arrival of additional US forces signaled renewed resolve. Sunni tribal leaders, having glimpsed the dismal future in store for their people under a regime controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq and fearful of abandonment, were ready to throw in their lot with the coalition. The surge did not create the first of the tribal "awakenings," but it was the catalyst for their expansion and eventual success. The tribal revolt took off after the arrival of reinforcements and as US and Iraqi units fought to make the Iraqi people secure...

The Iraq war is not over, but our war effort is on a firmer foundation. In the end, the Iraqis, appropriately, will determine their future. The surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs. Success is not guaranteed, but such an outcome would be a fitting tribute to the sacrifices of the men and women of Multi-National Force-Iraq and their ongoing efforts, along with their Iraqi partners, to turn around a war that was nearly lost less than two years ago.

More at The Washington Post.

Update: The Importance of The Surge - Max Boot, Contentions

By now the improvement in conditions in Iraq is undeniable. But opponents of the surge are still loath to give credit where it’s due. Too often we hear that the “surge” was just one factor among many–and not necessarily the most important–in the improving security situation. Other factors are often cited, including the Sunni Awakening, the growing size and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and Moqtada al Sadr’s retreat. Those other developments are real and important, but they would not have been game-changers were it not for the additional influx of American soldiers and a change of strategy in how they were employed.

Flashback: Don't Confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy - Dave Kilcullen, Small Wars Journal, 19 January 2007

Much discussion of the new Iraq strategy centers on the “surge” to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops. I offer no comment on administration policy here. But as counterinsurgency professionals, it should be clear to us that focusing on the “surge” misses what is actually new in the strategy - its population-centric approach...

What matters here is not the size of forces (though the strategy will not work without a certain minimum force size), but rather their tasks. The key element of the plan, as outlined in the President’s speech, is to concentrate security forces within Baghdad, to secure the local people where they live. Troops will operate in small, local groups closely partnered with Iraqi military and police units, with each unit permanently assigned to an area and working its “beat”.

This is different from early strategies which were enemy-centric (focusing on killing insurgents), or more recent approaches that relied on training and supporting Iraqi forces and expected them to secure the population.

The new strategy reflects counterinsurgency best practice as demonstrated over dozens of campaigns in the last several decades: enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often.

The extra forces are needed because a residential, population-centric strategy demands enough troops per city block to provide real and immediate security. It demands the ability to “flood” areas, and so deter enemy interference with the population. This is less like conventional warfare, and more like a cop patrolling a beat to prevent violent crime.

This does not mean there will be less fighting indeed, there will probably be more in the short-term, as security forces get in at the grass-roots level and compete for influence with insurgents, sectarian militias and terrorist gangs. But the aim is different: in the new strategy what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather than directly targeting the enemy – though this strategy will effectively marginalize them...

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Information Management in the Non-kinetic Space

By Jason Port

As we have moved from the dynamic fight of the high intensity conflict into the counterinsurgency aspects of today’s endeavors, we find our lower leaders being used more as strategic assets and less so as the pointy end of the spear. Solutions for problems are no longer counted in rounds expended, and diplomacy at the muzzle end of the rifle is no longer an option. Over the past five years our company, CC Intelligent Solutions, working with units like the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division found that by mining tactical data at the forward edge, soldiers on the ground were leaving on patrols better prepared to meet the current threats. In addition, we found that analysts on high were better able to forecast the actions of the enemy. It is our belief that by tracking the non-kinetic aspects of our operations in a similar, digital fashion, we would be able to better predict the benefits we receive by taking certain actions over others. Further, we would be able to help commanders make decisions based on facts and history, rather than gut instincts alone.

These ideas are based on what we saw as the combat events reporting and management system for the Coalition Joint Task Force in Afghanistan during OEF 06-08 and for Multinational Corps-Iraq (XVIII Airborne Corps) in OIF 05-07. Our system fundamentally collected operational reports from the forward leaders via a browser based interface and stored the information for retrieval and reporting later. Further, these reports were managed based on priority and matching certain criteria, moving them up the chain of command as required by the policies in place. Once captured the data was disseminated around the world within 45 minutes so that experts in the Pentagon and elsewhere had the same data as the next patrol out of the gate. Further, as we focused on interoperability between systems, we shared the data via a variety of mechanisms to get the information into other tools like Analysts Notebook, Command Post of the Future (CPoF) and Maneuver Control Systems (MCS). This approach enabled soldiers throughout the SIPRNet cloud to see the information and respond to it in near real time...

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The Center for American Progress sponsored a discussion today on the logistics of a redeployment of American troops from Iraq. Speakers included Marine Corps Col. T.X. Hammes (Ret.), Army Lt. Col. John Nagl (Ret.), and Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

The full C-SPAN video of the panel discussion can be found here.

Also see the Center for American Progress report How to Redeploy: Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of US Forces from Iraq by Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan and Peter Juul. The link has the full report plus a video produced by CAP on the report. Excerpt summary follows:

Some have asserted that a US military withdrawal from Iraq will take two years or more, but we believe it is not only possible, but necessary, to conduct a safe and responsible redeployment of US forces from Iraq in no more than 10 months. Our military can accomplish such a task, should it be assigned, if it uses all elements of US military power, focused on our land forces’ proficiencies in maneuver warfare and logistics.

There is significant disagreement and confusion about the time necessary to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq. Proponents of an indefinite US military presence in Iraq have asserted that a withdrawal of over 140,000 American troops and equipment would be fraught with risk, uncertainty, and overwhelming logistical complications. According to a recent ABC News piece, several commanders in Iraq stated that there was “no way” a withdrawal of one to two brigades per month could work logistically - although none of them agreed to be quoted on the record.

The debate over how to conduct an American withdrawal has gravitated back and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid, precipitous withdrawal, and those advocating for a long, drawn-out redeployment. Many who argue for an extended redeployment over several years do so simply in order to “stay the course” in Iraq, and cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for an extended US presence.

Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false choice. Both options are logistically feasible, but this report will demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over an 8 to 10 month period. This report, written in consultation with military planners and logistics experts, is not intended to serve as a playbook for our military planners; it is a guide to policymakers and the general public about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly redeployment of US forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely daunting - but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of the US military...

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Flying Back to Flying Man
In Iraq, the Surge has helped secure freedom, with all its attendant uncertainties.

By Joel Arends

This article was originally published on 11 August at National Review Online and is posted here with permission of the author and NR.

Baghdad, Iraq - Last week, I had the opportunity to visit the World War II battlefields of Monte Cassino, the Rapido River, and Anzio in southern Italy. Those were just some of the places that America’s Greatest Generation fought and where many died in order to break through Hitler’s vaunted Gustav Line in the eventual March to Rome. Today I’m in Baghdad going back to the battlefields where I fought with the Army’s First Cavalry Division, where some of my comrades died, and where America’s next Greatest Generation is currently doing battle. I’ve returned to Baghdad after three years as an embedded correspondent for NRO to observe the situation for myself.

The battle for Iraq today is not so dissimilar to the Italy campaign waged by the Allies in WWII. Into the late winter of 1943 - two years into the war - the Allies did not have a strategy for victory. Likewise, America did not have a strategy for victory in Iraq until January 2007 when President Bush announced the Surge.

In 1943, Churchill had determined that breaking the back of the German Army in Italy would lead to the eventual downfall of the Axis powers in Europe. His theory went that a March to Rome would siphon off enough German troops to allow the Allies to effectively overwhelm the enemy at Normandy. At the time, Prime Minister Churchill’s theory was controversial, and while President Roosevelt signed off it on, military leaders in the Mediterranean were initially skeptical. General Mark Clark, commander of American forces in Italy, at first resisted Churchill’s notion that a full-out assault on the most powerful army in the world would lead to anything but disaster. Clark thought the plan was nothing less than death by stupidity.

Similarly, many in Washington were not convinced that a plan as bold as the Surge would work. Of course, the major difference between WWII and now is that today’s strategy came from the military, while the skepticism about that strategy came from the politicians. Some in Washington called the Surge an escalation of the war; others called it a quagmire and likened our efforts in Iraq to Vietnam. But General David Petraeus was convinced that if the number of troops available to him was increased and if he were able to effectively deploy them, his counter-insurgency strategy would pay off...

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Bing West, author of The Village, The March Up and No True Glory was kind of enough to be interviewed by Small Wars Journal on the occasion of the release of his latest book The Strongest Tribe.

Francis J. ‘Bing’ West, originally from the Dorchester section of Boston, served as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. A warrior-scholar, West authored an extremely influential study while a Visiting Research Associate at the Rand Corporation (1966 - 1968) entitled: "The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential". He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. He is a graduate of Georgetown University (BA) and Princeton University (MA), where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. He is currently president of the GAMA Corporation, which designs wargames and combat decision-making simulations. West is a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, appears on The News Hour on PBS and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. West has been to Iraq on 15 trips since 2003, embedding with over 60 battalions.

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 1 of 2)

1. You assessed that the Iraq war turned around for the better prior to General David Petraeus assuming command of Multi-National Force – Iraq. Please explain this assessment.

As we look toward changes in Afghanistan, it’s important that we understand why the Iraq war turned around, lest we think changing top commanders is the critical variable.

There are two broad views of history. By far the more popular is the “Great Man” view that nations are led from the top. Leaders like Caesar and Lincoln shape history. Most accounts of Iraq subscribe to the Great Man view. The books about Iraq by senior officials like Paul Bremer, George Tenet, Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez have at their core a wonderful sense of self-worth: History is all about them.

The other view of history holds that the will of the people provides the momentum for change. Leaders are important, but only when they channel, or simply have the commonsense to ride the popular movement. “Battle is decided not by the orders of a commander in chief,” Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace, “but by the spirit of the army.”

Iraq reflected Tolstoy’s model. Events were driven by the spirit, or dispirit, of the people and tribes. It took four years of sending the same units back to the same areas, getting to know the local leaders, to give the tribes enough reassurance that they rebelled against al Qaeda. Sheik Sattar, a tremendous leader, would never have stepped forward had it not been for his close relations with the local Americans. (A tank was parked on Sattar’s front lawn.)

Anbar was the heart of the insurgency. The Sattar and the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned before General Dave Petraeus and the surge troops arrived. In February of 2006, I listened as General Jim Mattis told the troops in Ramadi that they had won; the tribes – including the former resistance gangs - were aligning with the American battalions and al Qaeda was on the run. The next day, Mattis flew to Baghdad for Petraeus’s change of command.

Iraq wasn’t a “Great Man” or a general’s war, although General Petraeus certainly was the right and key leader. Transcending that, though, the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are bottom-up movements. They must be defeated at the local level by deploying thousands of Americans who believe in their cause and stick at it, year after year. Washington politicians must avoid the trap of believing that the selection of the right general is a shortcut to success. That attitude enables the rest of us to avoid commitment by leaving it up to the generals, while we turn against the war when we tire of reading about it. By understanding what really occurred in Iraq, we better prepare for Afghanistan, where we are in for a long fight...

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Public Diplomacy and National Security
Lessons from the U.S. Experience
by Bruce Gregory, Small Wars Journal

Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience (Full PDF Article)

Calls to build greater civilian capacity in national security are well founded, and public diplomacy is high on the list of essential capabilities that must be strengthened. U.S. public diplomacy’s principles and methods are rooted in 20th century models of communication, governance, and armed conflict, which contribute to an inability to learn from recent experience and foster real change. This article defines public diplomacy, describes forces shaping the context of 21st century public diplomacy, and identifies five lessons from recent experience that point the way to change: abandon message influence dominance; drop the war on terror narrative; leverage knowledge, skills, and creativity in civil society; emphasize net-centric actors and actions; rethink government broadcasting and adapt to new media.

Ask most strategists today about national security reform and one answer is assured: strengthen civilian capabilities to meet 21st century challenges and relieve an overburdened military. High on the list of capabilities to be strengthened is what variously is called public diplomacy, strategic communication, and “winning the war of ideas.” The Defense Department’s 2008 National Defense Strategy laments that the U.S. is unable to communicate to the world what it stands for as a society. The State Department calls for new public diplomacy approaches and getting the “war of ideas right” in the battle against today’s terrorist threat. Seven years after 9/11, the nation’s leaders agree. Public diplomacy is crucial to national security and must be improved.

These calls for change sound strikingly familiar. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy also urged “effective public diplomacy” – “a different and more comprehensive approach” in “a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.” Lawmakers, cabinet secretaries, and the 9/11 Commission were in early agreement on the same diagnosis, inadequate public diplomacy in an ideological struggle, and the same solution, transform tools designed for a different era and use them more effectively.

Why then has there been no real change? It’s not that U.S. leaders lack for advice. Experts in and out of government wrote more than thirty reports on public diplomacy during the past seven years. Failure to turn report recommendations into business plans and action is part of the answer. But much of the challenge lies in learning from experience.

What is public diplomacy? What can be learned? And how might it change for the better?

Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from the U.S. Experience (Full PDF Article)

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Bing West, author of The Village, The March Up and No True Glory was kind of enough to be interviewed by Small Wars Journal on the occasion of the release of his latest book The Strongest Tribe.

Francis J. ‘Bing’ West, originally from the Dorchester section of Boston, served as an infantry officer in the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. A warrior-scholar, West authored an extremely influential study while a Visiting Research Associate at the Rand Corporation (1966 - 1968) entitled: "The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential". He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. He is a graduate of Georgetown University (BA) and Princeton University (MA), where he was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow. He is currently president of the GAMA Corporation, which designs wargames and combat decision-making simulations. West is a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, appears on The News Hour on PBS and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. West has been to Iraq on 15 trips since 2003, embedding with over 60 battalions.

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 1 of 2)

Small Wars Journal interview with Bing West (Part 2 of 2):

5. You have a long history of advocacy for combat advisers. Why the skepticism about our current and potential future adviser program?

We do not have consistent goals, rigorous selection and training or a set of measures and expectancies. From the start, the role of advisers in Iraq was ill-defined. In Vietnam, advisers were valued because they were the link to fire support. In Iraq, fights requiring fire support were rare. Some adviser teams improved Iraqi staff planning functions, while others set the combat leadership example by daily circulation on the battlefield. I saw some adviser teams where the rule was to be out on two patrols a day; I saw other teams where the rule was to coach the Iraqis on staff procedures and not leave the wire with less than four humvees.

The aggressiveness of adviser teams varied broadly because there was no shared standard about their proper role. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended replacing US brigades with a corps of advisers embedded in Iraqi units and supported by US firepower. Since that was the road not taken, the Iraq War provides few clues whether advisers with indigenous troops can substitute for US conventional units, assuming the advisers have a role in deciding promotions.

It is unclear whether the US command envisions advisers remaining with Iraqi units. It seems that as US combat units pull back, so will the advisers. The absence of advisers runs the risk that deterioration may creep in from the bottom up - fewer arrests, fewer patrols, taxing drivers at checkpoints, etc. But with the war winding down, Iraqi officials do not want the daily presence of pesky Americans. By removing advisers from the level where the insurgency is fought, the risk of American casualties will decrease, as will the supervision that limits corruption, inspires aggressive operations and provides a warning when conditions are falling apart.

Iraqis marvel at advisers who stride into IED-infested areas without blinking and raise holy hell when they catch anyone stealing or abusing civilians or jundis. The physical and moral fortitude of a protean adviser impresses hundreds of Iraqis and sets a standard they seek to emulate. It would be a grave mistake to pull out the advisers too early...

Continue on for more of Part 2.

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The impact of the Russian attack on Georgia is still being assessed around the world, in that slow-motion way that global events have on governments. Getting the full picture of what's going on will take a few weeks yet. But this much seems to be clear.

First, there's no illusion about who's running Russia. Vladimir Putin is clearly the effective head of state, flying from the Beijing Olympics to southern Russia to oversee military operations and to dominate Russian TV. The return of strongman rule to Russia, and particularly one who regards the demise of the Soviet Union as a historic catastrophe, is now a fact of international life to which we will all have to adjust to.

Second, Putin and his government are attempting to establish the legitimacy of a Russian sphere of influence that looks very much like a reestablishment of the old Soviet empire. This is the core of an enormously sophisticated information campaign that is having some success -- at least around Washington -- in appealing to the realpolitik crowd who look for excuses for inaction in the case of a Russian invasion of their democratic neighbor. The invasion of Georgia was accompanied by an information campaign based on the idea that Russia has a right to intervene anywhere that the "dignity" of Russian minorities is threatened. Since there are Russian minorities in every former Soviet state of the old empire, this is an attempt to establish a "sphere of influence" precedent that must chill newly independent states still struggling with democracy.

From a military perspective, the first impression is that the Russians laid an effective "strategic ambush" for Georgia President Mikhail Saakashvilli, inciting anti-government attacks in South Ossetia by local militias and then responding to the Georgian offensive with a well-planned and rehearsed offensive of their own. Even when viewed through the imperfect lens of news media scrambling to catch up to events, military experts understand that the joint and combined-arms attacks Russia staged in the opening hours of the war were anything but spontaneous. For historians, a retrospective on Nazi Germany's offensive to "protect" the Sudaten Czechs shows a striking similarity of purpose and method...

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John Nagl (LTC, US Army ret.), a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, reviews Bing West's latest book on Iraq, The Strongest Tribe in Sunday's edition of the Washington Post.

Here are several excerpts from the full review.

... The Strongest Tribe is the first overview of the entire course of the Iraq war to be published since Gen. David Petraeus implemented a change in strategy...

... presents a biting analysis of the muddled strategy that marked the war's second and third years, when the United States rushed to hand over control to an Iraqi military that was not ready to assume such responsibility.

... change in how the troops conceived of their mission was far more important than the relatively small increase in the number of troops that the "surge" label overemphasizes.

... A large number of senior (mostly Army) generals come in for scathing reviews in The Strongest Tribe, but West reserves his most critical assessments for politicians and journalists.

... Instead, the soldiers and Marines who do the fighting and the dying endure repeated tours of duty because we have more war than our too-small Army and Marine Corps can handle. West tells the story of their sacrifices better than anyone else, with an infantryman's keen eye for combat and a father's love for those who engage in it.

... The consequences of defeat in Iraq, West argues, are similarly severe, entirely foreseeable and preventable at an increasingly bearable cost. "Reducing the US force in Iraq can be done prudently, as long as we don't promise a total withdrawal that signals America has given up," he writes. "That makes no sense given the progress that has been made." Looking through the prism of my own experience, I find it hard to disagree.

In it to Win - Washington Post, 17 August 2008.

SWJ Interview with Bing West - (Part 1)

SWJ Interview with Bing West - (Part 2)

Purchase The Strongest Tribe - Amazon.com

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America’s exit strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan depends upon competent, confident Host Nation Security Forces responsive to the rule of law. In Iraq, years of effort to train and equip the Iraqi Army and Police are beginning to pay dividends, although they will continue to need our advice and assistance for a number of years to come. The Afghan National Army and Police are some years behind the IA and IP’s; recent decisions to increase the size of both forces are long overdue, but will demand additional American advisors in a theater that is already under-resourced.

Special Forces are the best US troops at conducting the Foreign Internal Defense mission, but there aren’t enough of them to train the IA, IP, ANA, and ANP, so most of the FID mission has fallen on conventional Army soldiers who are not organized, trained, or equipped to conduct the FID mission. Faced with a problem requiring organizational adaptation, the Army has adopted a series of ad hoc measures to select, organize, train, employ, and demobilize its advisors, despite numerous statements from senior Army leaders that testify to the essential nature of the advisory task in enabling our exit strategy in two wars.

I have previously advocated the creation of an Advisory Corps, in which combat troops would be assigned to standing advisory units ("A Team 1st Battalion 1st Advisory Brigade 1st Advisory Division") for a three-year tour of duty just as they now rotate through other line units. I believe that it is even more important to create standing advisory units now that we are increasing the size of the ANA and focusing more on the advisory effort to the IA while drawing down US units in Iraq. Standing units have history, lineage, and traditions; who wants to serve in Unit Rotating Force 1134 (as Transition Teams of Advisors are currently designated), especially if URF 1134 is disbanded four days after redeploying from combat?

If the Army can't or won't build standing units, at the very least it should designate someone below the level of the Chief of Staff of the Army who is responsible for all aspects of the advisory mission. Once named, the head of Advisor Command should establish a permanent advisory schoolhouse, get doctrine written, get the organization of the advisory teams right, be responsible for their training and employment, and ensure that advisors are given proper credit for their service. There are a number of Lieutenant Generals in the Army; I would submit that none has a more important mission than heading up such an Advisor Command with the possible exceptions of the MNC-I and MNSTC-I commanders.

Pete Dawkins wrote his doctoral dissertation at Princeton on the advisory effort in Vietnam; he called it "The Other War." I am confident that some bright and bitter Captain will do the same for the advisory effort in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

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Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq
by Norman Ricklefs, Small Wars Journal

Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

These thoughts were initially penned on my way to RnR, while stuck at Baghdad International Airport for three days waiting for the mother of all dust storms to end. At the time, by chance, I was handed a photocopy of T.E. Lawrence’s “27 Articles” – and while reading it was impressed by how useful the information still was for those working in an Arab cultural environment. I thought that this would have helped me prepare for my work in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, and wondered if I could put together something similar to help those who come to Iraq to work as advisors. Inspired by Lawrence and, especially, the work of Gertrude Bell, I’ve written the following points, which bring together my experiences of working with Iraqis over two deployments since 2005. It is not intended to advance the notion of cultural determinism – many of the individuals you meet in Iraq will defy many of the examples below, as individuals do in all cultures – but it is intended to provide examples of some of the chief cultural differences between Iraqi and Coalition culture and thus a few jumping off points for the advisor as his begins his work in an Iraqi Government office, a Provincial Reconstruction Team or Military Transition Team.

There are numerous sources that you can read before you deploy but the starting point (especially for US personnel) should be FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. I’ve provided some suggested starting points for FM 3-24 at the end of the paper.

As the Coalition presence in Iraq increasingly moves away from a warfighting role, the advisory role will become more important, and I hope that the points below will add to the section in FM 3-24 which deals with advisors in the context of building host-nation security forces (especially chapter 6).

I hope also that the points below will also be relevant and useful, at least in part, to those serving in Afghanistan, though it is focused on Iraq.

Fourteen Rules for Advisors in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

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From today's New York Times - Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics by Thom Shanker.

Russia’s victorious military blitz into the former Soviet republic of Georgia brought something old and something new - but none of it was impromptu, despite appearances that a long-frozen conflict had suddenly turned hot.

The Russian military borrowed a page from classic Soviet-era doctrine: Moscow’s commanders sent an absolutely overwhelming force into Georgia. It was never going to be an even fight, and the outcome was predictable, if not preordained.

At the same time, the Russian military picked up what is new from the latest in military thinking, including American military writings about the art of war, replete with the hard-learned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.

So along with the old-school onslaught of infantry, armor and artillery, Russia mounted joint air and naval operations, appeared to launch simultaneous cyberattacks on Georgian government Web sites and had its best English speakers at the ready to make Moscow’s case in television appearances.

If the rapidly unfolding events caught much of the world off guard, that kind of coordination of the old and the new did not look accidental to military professionals...

Much more at the NYT.

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From today's Washington Post - Deployments Are a Factor in Army's Deficit of Majors by Ann Scott Tyson.

The Army's growth plans and the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are contributing to a shortfall of thousands of majors, critical mid-level officers whose ranks are not expected to be replenished for five years, according to Army data and a recent officers survey.

Majors plan and direct day-to-day military operations for Army battalions, the units primarily responsible for waging the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Army, majors fill key roles as senior staff members, putting together war plans, managing personnel and coordinating logistics.

The gap in majors represents about half of the Army's current shortage of more than 4,000 officers, and officials say there are no easy solutions to the deficit. "We need more officers, and we are pulling every lever we can," said Col. Paul Aswell, chief of the Army's personnel division for officers.

The Army's plan to expand its ranks by 65,000 active-duty soldiers by 2012 - to a total active-duty force of 547,000 - is increasing the service's demand for captains and majors. The Army is currently about 15 percent short of its goal of 15,700 majors, and the gap is expected to surpass 20 percent in 2012, according to Army data...

Much more at the Washington Post.

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I offer this in response to Dr John Nagl’s recent article on Advisory Operations.

As we consider requirements for advisors in the future I think it is important to look at the doctrinal missions of the US military both past and present and see if there is anything that is relevant to the future of advisory operations.

While most are agreement that the advisor mission is critically important in Iraq and Afghanistan I think it is important to consider the current missions there as well as those both currently outside of OIF and OEF and what we forecast might happen in the future.

I think the most important assumption we have to consider is whether we are likely to be faced with future situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan where we completely depose totalitarian governments, destroy or disband all indigenous security forces as well as the government bureaucracies and are forced to rebuild a nation virtually from scratch. If you see this in our future then I recommend that you pay attention to Dr Nagl’s writings and how he believes the Army should organize for the future.

If you do not believe that is a likely scenario then there are two others that must be considered. First is how we will organize for continued operations in Iraq after US combat forces begin to draw down as well as how to organize to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan. Second is how the US will engage throughout the world after OEF and OIF transition to supporting operations that require a minimal presence of US combat and general purpose forces. For the second and third scenarios I believe there is historical doctrine that would be a useful starting point to develop organizations to support our friends, partners and allies in their quest to bring stability and security to their countries and in particular ungoverned and under governed spaces within their sovereign territories. In addition these sovereign nations may need and request assistance in dealing with trans-national threats as well.

Many will say that Special Forces is the force of choice to conduct advisory operations and provide support to counter-insurgencies because of its Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. Many will also argue that because FID is a SOF/SF mission that the General Purpose Forces need a new mission to define what it is they are now doing. These have taken various names recently such as Security Force Assistance (SFA), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), and Stability Operations, just to name a few. And of course many will say (and I strongly concur) that there is not enough SF/SOF to conduct all the advisory and training requirements in OIF and OEF. But I think it is important to debunk a couple of myths about Special Forces...

Continue reading "Considerations for Organizing for Future Advisory Missions" »

14 August 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations

1. Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

2. Therefore, we must return to time honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear Commander’s Intent, unambiguous tasks and purpose, and most importantly, links ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today’s more complex operating environments.

3. My assessment is shaped by my own personal experiences and the experience of others in a variety of operational situations. I’m convinced we must keep the following in mind: First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart, and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote Sherman, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.” History is replete with such examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO’s long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.

4. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. JFCOM’s purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smoothes and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.

5. While NATO and many Partner Nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO’s policy focuses on the whole of government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO’s Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror U.S. EBO. NATO’s use of EBAO is left unaddressed in this USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance.

6. A pre-decisional working draft of this document was prematurely circulated and should be discarded. I regret any confusion resulting from the unintended early release of this draft document.

J. N. MATTIS
General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander’s Guidance Regarding Effects Based Operations - US Joint Forces Command

Update: The Council Weighs In (Bill Moore):

When I first heard of EBO, I admit I had high hopes for it, that was until I was actually trained in it, and saw the seriously flawed concepts of SoSA, ONA, and worse, much worse, MOE and MOP. Then I noted every one assumed their actions (unilaterally) we're creating these magical effects. At first I thought it was intended to flatten the organization and harmonize the interagency actors by arming everyone with the objectives and the associated effects, thus if you didn't have guidance from higher, you knew what needed to be done on the ground. However, after studying it and watching it in practice in the real world and during exercises it is clear that General Mattis's memo is spot on in most aspects.

I was a small bit player in one of the most successful interagency and multinational operations in recent history and that was JTF Liberia in 2003. Fortunately, it didn't receive much press outside of Africa, so we had considerable freedom of movement. During this operation the multinational forces and interagency were successfully harmonized with clear objectives that resulted in orders with clear cut task(s)/purpose(s). In this case leadership was decisive (both State Department and Military). I think we would have failed miserbly if we used EBO doctrine.

Unfortunately, this EBO like process has manifested itself in other ways, where U.S. forces inappropriately apply a CARVER matrix to terrorist and insurgent organizations, which resulted in the failed network approach where one attempts to destroy an insurgency by killing or capturing its so called key nodes (important individuals). In limited cases this method will work, and most cases it is a key supporting role, but not at the expense of failing to protect the population. What worked in Iraq was large scale population control measures that the surge enabled, where the focus was protecting the populace. I'm confident history will show that the much bragged about approach "it's the network stupid" was actually a failure or at most a minor enabler. Like EBO this was based on faulty assumptions that an insurgency is a simple system or simple system of systems like an electric power grid. It isn't, and surgical actions won't when the fight anymore than surgical bombings. That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both, and if we focused on the objective of defeating the insurgency, vice all the sub effects, we would have realized from day one we needed more forces (Iraqi or otherwise) to get control initially.

Prior to EBO, I think the most damaging concept to our military was the force protection bureaucracy which was an off shoot of General Downey's investigation of the Khobar Towers incident. Force protection was always an inherit responsibility, and there were several anti-terrorism courses long before force protection level I thru IV training. This resulted in yet another cottage industry of contractors, wasted military manpower and in too many cases operational paralysis. Force protection is important, it has always been our second priority, which in order are the mission, the men, then yourself. Prior to 9/11 we let force protection (the men) trump accomplishing the mission as a priority. I would like to see General Mattis tackle this one, and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.

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From today's Inside the Army (subscription required):

Senior Pentagon officials have prepared a memo for Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ signature that would give US Special Operations Command the lead in overseeing US efforts to train foreign security forces, defense officials tell Inside the Army.

The decision to pick SOCOM for the job of managing the field of “security force assistance,” or SFA, is all but made, according to sources. But publicly, officials are tight-lipped about the move because senior leaders are still reviewing what one official dubbed the “implementation memo” that would finalize the arrangement...

The memo, drafted by Michael Vickers, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, has yet to be blessed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, according to sources familiar with the document.

According to several officials, SOCOM chief Adm. Eric Olson has long been lobbying Pentagon leaders for the SFA lead.

Gates last year said the US military must increasingly take on the role of training and advising foreign security forces to prevent terrorists from destabilizing regions around the world where stability is crucial to American interests.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, officials believe a capable police and army are a prerequisite for the eventual withdrawal of US forces. “Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries,” Gates said in an Oct. 10, 2007, speech at the annual conference of the Association of the US Army in Washington.

According to defense officials, the debate in the Army about how to prepare the ground service for a greater role in mentoring foreign security forces centers around two questions: Does the service need a dedicated force structure for the mission, and should specialized forces or general-purpose forces take on the brunt of the work?...

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US Representative Ike Skelton, D-4th Dist., MO., Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has a guest post up on Interagency reform at the US Army Combined Arms Center blog.

As Yogi Berra once said, this is déjà vu all over again. The United States Government has many talented employees with critical skills and expertise, but its departments and agencies don’t always play well together. Even when they share common interests and common goals, they often fail to coordinate effectively, if at all. This can cause agencies to duplicate efforts, or worse, to work at cross purposes, which hardly makes the most of our resources to achieve our strategic objectives.

While not a new problem, the issue has lately taken on new urgency, particularly in the area of national security. The post-9/11 challenges that confront our nation – such as fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combating terrorism, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – require strategies that embrace the capabilities of all government agencies. Unfortunately, eight years into the twenty-first century, our institutions and policies maintain a lot of Cold War organization and thinking, but lack the common focus of the Soviet threat.

The few existing mechanisms to bring together the departments that should play a role in developing national security policy and translating that policy into action are weak. These mechanisms are usually the ad hoc efforts of those directly engaged in the challenge of the moment, and not the result of a broader deliberative process. The experiences of U.S. service members and civilians working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples that show how interagency solutions can be forged by necessity in the field. But there must be a better way – we shouldn’t have to reinvent the wheel each time agencies need to join forces...

More at CAC.

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State of Siege
Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency
by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal

State of Siege: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

Mexico is under siege, and the barbarians are dangerously close to breaching the castle walls. Responding to President Felipe Calderon’s latest drug crackdown, an army of drug cartels has launched a vicious criminal insurgency against the Mexican state. So far, the conflict has killed over 1,400 Mexicans, 500 of them law enforcement officers. No longer fearing retaliation, cartel gunmen assault soldier and high-ranking federale alike. The criminal threat is not only a threat to public order but to the state. A top-ranking Mexican intelligence official has noted in interview that criminal gangs pose a national security threat to the integrity of the state. Cartels are even trying to take over the Mexican Congress by funding political campaigns, CISEN director Guillero Valdes alleged. Should Mexico’s gangs cement their hold further, Mexico could possibly become a criminal-state largely controlled by narco-gangs. This is not just a threat to Mexico, however.

As the intensity of the violence grows, so does the possibility that Tijuana and Juarez’s high-intensity street warfare will migrate north. Recent cartel warfare in Arizona indicates that America has become a battleground for drug cartels clashing over territory, putting American citizens and law enforcement at risk. But the northward migration of cartel warfare is not the worst consequence of Mexico’s criminal insurgency. A lawless Mexico will be a perfect staging ground for terrorists seeking to operate in North America. American policymakers must act to protect our southern flank.

State of Siege: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

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Military History and the Drafting of Doctrine
FM 3-24, Relevant Case Studies or Seductive Analogies?
by Andrew Salamone, Small Wars Journal

Military History and the Drafting of Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

Military professionals value history as a tool for accomplishing objectives ranging from predicting future events and outcomes to developing new strategy and doctrine. Examining individual case studies helps reveal patterns and trends useful in forecasting, while drawing historical analogies between current and prior situations with similar characteristics can reveal "lessons learned," which are often applied to future contingencies. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24) published in December 2006 is an example of the degree to which history can influence the making of present-day military doctrine. The manual is based on the lessons learned from counterinsurgency experiences as far removed as the 1950’s. While the consideration of history is undeniably important, so is the need for in depth analysis of the selected case studies and historical analogies from which lessons are drawn. Such analysis ensures similarities are more than superficial and that the lessons we are learning are the correct ones. This paper calls into question the validity of the historical analogies used in FM 3-24 and cautions against the continued reliance on historical case studies that are diminishing in relevance.

As pointed out by Frank Hoffman in his summer 2007 article in Parameters, a careful read of FM 3-24 reveals that the manual is firmly grounded in the classical theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Key concepts, historical case studies, and even the list of suggested readings emphasize the experiences and lessons learned during the 1950’s and 60’s when politically organized Maoist inspired wars of national liberation dominated the security landscape. Sir Robert Thompson’s defeat of the insurgent movement in Malaya and David Galula’s efforts against insurgency in Algeria are touted as textbook examples for conducting a successful counterinsurgency. Even facets of our own experience in Vietnam are reintroduced and reexamined, in most cases to emphasize what not to do when combating an insurgency.

From a historical perspective, the new manual’s focus is understandable. Relatively recent examples of politically organized Maoist-inspired insurgencies achieving victory, most notably in Vietnam, leads us to believe our current enemies could and will adopt a similar approach in order to defeat us today. The existence of a “template” for a counterinsurgent victory, that being the writings of Thompson and Galula, further reinforces the perceived utility in emphasizing identical concepts in current doctrine. Finally, Mao’s strategy and tactics for conducting an insurgency with centralized and top down leadership structure, emphasis on maintaining the support of the rural population, and three-phased strategy for achieving victory are familiar and well understood concepts deeply engrained in the U.S. Military’s collective experience. Also understood are the tools and methods for combating such strategies and tactics, such as strengthening host nation capabilities through Foreign Internal Defense and winning the “hearts and minds” of the affected population through civic actions and economic development.

Military History and the Drafting of Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

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The SWJ news roundup will be taking several new turns and twists over the next several weeks to months as we attempt to fit in a very time intensive effort (read - takes mom and pop away from other SWJ tasks) with readership suggestions and comments (often 180 out from one another) as well as finding time for planned site upgrades and attending to the ever increasing article and blog submissions by site visitors - all while making time for day jobs and family…

For the time being we will be highlighting what we consider “overarching” news articles, opinion pieces, blog items and studies in shorter roundups – with a bit of narrative - or in separate individual blog entries – with a concentration on foreign affairs and national security issues we feel important enough to share with the Small Wars Journal Community of Interest. Please feel free to send us pointers to those items we miss – thanks much.

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The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence
Analytical Tradecraft and Education as Drivers for Intelligence Reform
by John P. Sullivan, Small Wars Journal

The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

Global security intelligence is an emerging need. Changes in technology, societal organization, and the security challenges and arrangements within and among states demand novel approaches and structures to ensure human security. Terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime challenge traditional security and intelligence structures. In this 'not crime-not war' operational environment, non-state actors, transnational criminal enterprises, gangs, warlords, terrorist and insurgent networks, and private armies intersect with traditional state organs and emerging elements of civil society. New security structures and legal regimes are potentially evolving, yet traditional structures are slow to adapt. This paper will explore the emergence of networked security structures, and new ways to approach intelligence (including the open source intelligence movement, terrorism early warning, and the co-production of intelligence), together with the role of research, analytical tradecraft, and education as potential drivers of intelligence reform.

Globalization, technology, transnational threats, and shifts in societal organization demand new approaches and structures for achieving security and developing intelligence to support operational and policy requirements. As such, global security intelligence is an emerging need. Terrorism, insurgency, and transnational crime are threats that are driving the current and future conflict environment. These individual—and increasingly linked—threats result in a diffuse security environment that is neither crime nor war. Non-state actors: transnational criminal organizations, gangs, warlords, private armies, terrorist and insurgent networks on the dark side and private military or security corporations, global corporations, civil society, NGOs, and evolving state, sub-state, and supra-state institutions on the bright side demand the development of new security and intelligence structures to ensure global stability and human security.ii Networks are an important element of this environment as is the flow of information in real-time through modern digital technology to empower all of the aforementioned actors. This paper discusses the role and evolution of networked intelligence approaches—including open source intelligence (OSINT), terrorism early warning, and the need for co-production of intelligence. In addition, this paper briefly discusses the role of research, analytical tradecraft, and education as drivers of intelligence reform.

The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

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In February SWJ posted an entry “Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?”

From that post: This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.

Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face “Hybrid Wars” that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.

Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time.

Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a “Revolution in Warfare.” Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and much more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one’s goals at that particular time - identified as “Hybrid Wars” in Conflict in the 21st Century.

Hoffman notes that it is too simplistic to merely classify conflict as “Big and Conventional” versus “Small or Irregular.” Today’s enemies, and tomorrow’s, will employ combinations of warfare types…

This short roundup – more of a compilation of hybrid threat and environment items - revisits this issue for several reasons. The assumption that our future adversary will employ multiple types of warfare simultaneously - state or non-state- is gaining traction amongst those charged to develop concepts, doctrine and capabilities to confront future threats – and – regardless of traction and the trend for the buzz-word crowd (see EBO) to be temporarily enamored with the latest – well, buzzword – hybrid is exactly what we will encounter on the battlefields of the 21st Century.

There is much work to be done in regards to maturing the concept of hybrid wars and the threat associated with that environment. And, much like the current and potential hybrid threat adapts to counter our efforts; we must be honest, adaptive and creative as we push through defining the national security and foreign policy capabilities required to defeat this threat. It won’t be easy – but it is a critical necessity. So now I’ll get off my SWJ soapbox and offer up several items regarding hybrid war and enjoin our readership to add to the discourse...

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For SWJ – a perfect storm – outstanding recent releases by authors who are “Small Wars Journal friends”. Each have offered up original material to SWJ and / or provided moral support. For a niche Internet site we are humbled that these acknowledged experts have extended their support to SWJ.

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

We Are Soldiers Still - Hal Moore and Joe Galloway

In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.

Pete, Bing, Linda, Joe – Again, we are humbled and grateful for your support – congratulations on your contribution to understanding the critical issues that will define and shape our nation’s future.

Job well done!

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Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, New York: Random House, 2008, 410 pgs, $28.00.

This author needs no introduction. Francis “Bing” West is the author of The Village, the definitive depiction of the Marine Combined Action Program in Southeast Asia. He is also is a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam war, a former RAND analyst, and at one time occupied the hallowed halls of the Pentagon as a political appointee during the Reagan Administration. Over the years, he has been a staunch advocate of the infantryman, that long overlooked asset in our national arsenal.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, West has been one of the most prolific and most respected reporters of the war. No author has matched, both in volume and in grim color, the past five years of fighting better than this author. His The March Up coauthored with MajGen Ray Smith, USMC) captured the drive of I Marine Expeditionary Force from Kuwait up to Baghdad from the grunt’s perspective. Mixing his broad grasp of national policy to the basic tactics that keeps a young Marine alert and alive, West’s battlefield narrative outshone all competitors for its tactical detail and marked sympathy for today’s young Marines and all that they endured to topple Hussein’s regime. The heat, fine sand, and fear of that campaign are captured with greater granularity and credibility because the authors lived through it at the front line, embedded with the 1st Marine Division, General Jim Mattis’ beloved “Blue Diamond.”

No True Glory came next. This book centered over the Marines again and their two fights in the caldron of the Iraqi insurgency in Fallujah. West’s masterful overview of the epic battle for Fallujah of November 2004 laid bare the tissue thin connections between American policy makers in Washington and the fearsome combat conditions of Al Anbar. I strongly recommend that our Presidential candidates and their prospective team read each page of that book as preparation for their duties in the White House.

West’s latest effort may also become required reading for future policy makers, most of which, given the demographic make up of the United States, will not have worn their country’s uniform or ever visited a combat zone.

In The Strongest Tribe West takes a step back and looks at the war in a comprehensive manner. The prose is clipped and the action concise and to the point. He briefly reviews the early “successful” military phase of 2003, and cursorily covers the planning failures and slow adaptation that allowed the insurgency to build in 2004. These four chapters serve as a useful foundation for the following section of three chapters which describe the inadequate means, contradictory goals and lack of understanding that perpetuated American actions in Iraq in 2005.

The book is centered on what the author calls the Second War, the fight against Al Qaeda in 2006. This section provides the most detailed account of the efforts by the coalition to stiffen resistance against Al Qaeda’s campaign of coercion and assassination. It also connects the dots in the Bermuda triangle between perspectives in Washington, Baghdad and Al Anbar. Here West provides some very original reporting on how the White House eventually came to the conclusion that simply “staying the course” was a losing strategy. Eventually, the President, his NSC staff, and a new team at the Pentagon came to agreement on a new strategy and a new team to implement it. In this chapter, the author proves that he can report on the machinations of the NSC bureaucracy and the even more turgid thinking of the Joint Staff with the same relentless quest for ground truth that he did in Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah.

West does not pull punches, and the incident in Haditha in 2006 comes in for close examination. Leadership and tactics deplorable. But West saves his strongest condemnation for politicians, including Congressman Murpha, for rushing to judgment.

The best parts of the book involve the implementation of that new strategy by Generals David Petraeus and LtGen Raymond Ordinero in 2007. Petraeus’s COIN manual, which was developed in cooperation with a team of Marines led by General James Mattis when he was the CG at Quantico comes in for some unsubstantiated criticism as an academic exercise in sociology. While FM 3-24 has imperfections, it was written with great urgency by solid professionals who provided a historically-grounded approach for Iraq in 2006. While the manual may be a bit long winded in sections, it has served its purpose well and The Strongest Tribe provides ample testimony for its utility.

There is much in this book to commend it to Marine readers. Now is the time to begin to draw lessons from Iraq. Some of the conclusions in The Strongest Tribe will not surprise you, others infuriated me. It lays bare the failings of our military leadership early in the war, as well as the faults of our political leadership who too often ignored inconvenient facts and too readily embraced news when it fit preconceptions. West is fair with his litany of mistakes, and gives credit where due to Army and Marine leaders like General Petraeus, BGen John Allen, USMC; LtCol Dale Alford, USMC; and Army Colonels H.R. McMaster and McFarland for their intellect and professional acumen. The best parts of this book depict how the U.S. military persisted in its mission and how it adapted itself to the point where success over Al Qaeda can now be claimed.

The strongest test of our profession will be how ruthlessly and objectively we can assess ourselves and move forward to best posture ourselves for the ever evolving character of conflict in the 21st century. The Strongest Tribe is a great product to start our self-assessment with.

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Farewell to an American Hero - Joe Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

For the better part of 60 years, two old Army pilots who loved each other argued over many a meal and drink as to which of them was the second best pilot in the world.

The two shared the cockpits of old Beaver prop planes and Huey helicopters; they shared rooms in military hooches all over the world; they shared a love of practical and impractical jokes and they shared an undying love of flying and soldiers and the Army.

They also shared membership in a very small and revered fraternity of fewer than 105 men who are entitled to wear around their necks the light blue ribbon and gold pointed star that is the Medal of Honor, America’s highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call of duty.

Their story was told in a book my buddy Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and I wrote 15 years ago titled "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young" and in the Mel Gibson movie, "We Were Soldiers," released in the spring of 2002. Too Tall and Old Snake were ably portrayed in the movie.

Their argument over which of them is the Best Pilot in the Whole World sadly came to an end this week when our friend and comrade-in-arms Maj. Ed (Too Tall to Fly) Freeman slipped the surly bonds of earth and headed off to Fiddler’s Green, where the souls of departed cavalrymen gather by dispensation of God Himself.

More at McClatchy Newspapers.

After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley - LTC Hal Moore
LZ X-Ray - More about LZ X-ray and LZ-Albany
LZ X-Ray - Battle Overview
We Were Soldiers - Joe Galloway's Photos

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Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region
by J. Bernhard Compton, Small Wars Journal

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

The existing body of quantitative research concerning violent non-state actors is sparse at best. It is characterized by disparate definitions of non-state actor violence, and largely fails to discriminate between insurgency, civil war onsets, and terrorism. It also has conflicting theories and conclusions. Meanwhile, defining legitimacy in Arab governments and its affect on non-state actor violence is also problematic. In this paper I look strictly at non-state actor violence perpetrated by actors originating from Middle Eastern States. I use four separate data sources, including the ITERATE, RPC, World Development Indicators, and Witches Brew Homogeneity datasets to relate such factors as RPC, GDP, National Power, levels of instability, and societal homogeneity to examine the notion of opportunity and cause as factors in the advent of non-state violent actors. I find some support among this data for the notion that correlation exists between legitimacy of governance, societal homogeneity, perceptions of wealth inequality and legitimacy, and number non-state actor terror attacks.

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle Eastern Region (Full PDF Article)

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IRAQ

The Iraq Decisions That the Next President, Whether It’s Obama or McCain, Will Face: In a new book, war correspondent Linda Robinson also assesses the performance of Gen. David Petraeus - Linda Robinson, US News and World Report

As this nation prepares to elect a new president, there is a sense that America's involvement in Iraq has turned a corner. Much of the credit for the diminished bloodshed and the prospects for political progress has gone to the US commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who leaves Iraq next month to take up expanded regional responsibilities as head of US Central Command. In her new book, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, former US News Senior Writer Linda Robinson draws on 11 reporting trips to Iraq and extensive interviews with Petraeus and his team to document the evolution of American actions in Iraq. She offers recommendations on how to move forward in Iraq.

By June 2008, Iraq was calmer than it had been since April 2004. The war was not over, but it clearly had reached a new stage. When Gen. David Petraeus took command a year and a half earlier, Iraq was on fire. The majority in the United States believed there was no way to avoid an ignominious defeat such as America had not suffered in a quarter century. Petraeus, with the help of many others, pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war and created an opportunity for the next administration to bring the war to a soft landing.

Accomplishing that will not be easy, but what had seemed inconceivable to most onlookers in 2006 is now distinctly possible—if the 44th American president has the fortitude and wisdom to capitalize on what has been achieved. The new president has the great advantage of starting with a clean slate and no special relationships or past commitments. He can adopt a new policy that builds on the successes achieved in 2007 and 2008 and provides the critical missing ingredients that can be supplied only by presidential authority. The basic conceptual change needed is to shift the paradigm from war-making to peacemaking and to elevate achievement of the elusive political solution to be the policy's central goal.

More at US News and World Report.

AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban ‘Advance’: No Time To Wobble - Paul Smyth, Head, Operational Studies, Military Sciences Department, RUSI

The ambush and the loss of French soldiers in Afghanistan may well be described as a tactical setback if not defeat, but at a strategic level, the insurgents are nowhere near victorious.

This week’s violent encounter in Afghanistan’s Surobi district is a timely example of how a tactical event can have strategic impact. In this case, it brought a Head of State rushing to Kabul and it generated some unscheduled messages of France’s clear determination to support the ISAF mission, an outcome which some may say, cannot be seen as a Taliban victory.

For the families, friends and colleagues of the ten dead and twenty-one wounded French soldiers, the incident was an obvious tragedy of enduring effect. Every casualty in Afghanistan causes personal suffering and, in an expeditionary intervention that is based on choice not national survival, major losses inevitably raise questions which cast doubt on the purpose, validity and future of the endeavour. But without wishing to dismiss the reality of bereavement, when making strategic decisions of international importance, government leaders and military commanders must be beware of placing undue emphasis on the genuine heartbreak that can accompany their policy choices. For although it is true that some tactical events have strategic impact, it is a gross error to assume that all tactical incidents hold strategic relevance.

More at RUSI.

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Anbar Handover Could Free Marines for Afghanistan Missions

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

Iraq’s once-deadly Anbar province could within the next few days become the 11th province to be turned over to Iraqi control, paving the way for a reduced US Marine Corps presence there, the Marine Corps commandant said today.

Gen. James T. Conway told Pentagon reporters the marked drop in violence in Anbar sets the stage for a drawdown of Marine forces that could be freed up for duty in Afghanistan, if needed.

“The change in the al-Anbar province is real and perceptible," with attacks at an all-time daily low of two to three, Conway said. He cited assessments by Marine Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force West, that a reduced US force in the region could keep violence in check.

“Anbar remains a dangerous place, but the ever-growing ability of the Iraqi security forces continues to move us closer to seeing Iraqi control of the province,” he said. Once believed to be “the last [Iraqi province] to turn for the better,” he added, it is expected to return to Iraqi control “in just a few days.”

Conway noted that signs of construction and rebuilding – not violence – were ever-present during his drive through the Anbar cities of Fallujah and Ramadi earlier this summer.

It’s become evident, he said, that “the force we needed in the Anbar province in 2005, 2006 to fight the insurgent at its height is not the force that we need there now to do nation-building and to try to bring the government and the Sunnis closer together.”

Marines deployed to Anbar “are doing a very good job of this nation-building business,” he said, but are more suited to other missions.

“It’s our view that if there is a stiffer fight going someplace else in a much more expeditionary environment where the Marine Air-Ground Task Force really seems to have a true and enduring value, then that’s where we need to be,” he said.

Conway cited increased violence in Afghanistan, where “the Taliban are growing bolder in their tactics and clearly doing their best to exploit security gaps where they exist.”

“Everyone seems to agree that additional forces are the ideal course of action for preventing a Taliban comeback, but just where they’re going to come from is still up for discussion,” he said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered additional Marine forces to Afghanistan earlier this year over concerns about a possible spring offensive. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, operating in the south, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, training Afghan security forces, are slated to return in late November after a one-month extension of their deployment.

Conway called it “a good idea” to backfill the Marines after they redeploy from Afghanistan, but he said the Corps can’t do it without cutting its current commitments in other parts of the world, including Iraq.

“Should our leadership determine that more US forces are needed in the fight in Afghanistan, it’s no secret that the Marine Corps would be proud to be part of that undertaking,” he said. “However, in order to do more in Afghanistan, our Marines have got to see relief elsewhere.”

More: Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Voice of America, Associated Press, Reuters, Stars and Stripes, Agence France-Presse.

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US, Pakistani Military Leaders Meet Aboard USS Lincoln - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

US and Pakistani military leaders continued their ongoing dialogue about the war on terrorism during an Aug. 26 meeting aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Pentagon reporters today his meeting with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani army’s chief of staff, was constructive and focused on the challenges posed by extremists in the federally administered tribal area and the North West Frontier in Pakistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida are using the areas to plan and train for attacks in Afghanistan.

“There is... a growing complexity and coordination among extremist groups there -- an almost syndicate-like behavior -- that has resulted in new and ever more sophisticated attacks on coalition forces,” Mullen said. He pointed to attacks against French forces near Kabul last week and against US forces in the Wanat Valley near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan last month.

“The safe havens in the border regions provide launching pads for these sorts of attacks, and they need to be shut down,” the admiral said.

Accompanying Mullen at the conference was Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan; Army Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, acting US Central Command chief; Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the soon-to-be commander of US Central Command who now commands Multinational Force Iraq; and Navy Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of US Special Operations Command.

Mullen said he came away from the long-planned meeting “very encouraged that the focus is where it needs to be and that the... military-to-military relationship we're building with Pakistan is getting stronger every day.”

This was the fifth visit Mullen has made with Kayani since February, and was a chance to keep the lines of communication open between the two militaries...

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Posted this week at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute - US Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts by Dr. Donovan C. Chau.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has never been the centerpiece of US foreign and defense policy. Yet the current struggle between the United States and its allies against terrorist groups and individuals motivated by Islamic extremism thrusts SSA forward as a front in the global conflict. The author asks, centrally, what is the most effective long-term approach to US counterterrorism in SSA. By comparing views in Washington, DC, with perspectives from SSA, he assesses that a fundamental and dangerous misunderstanding of SSA may be leading US policy astray. Recommending a new grand strategic approach to US counterterrorism policy, he suggests urgently educating a future generation of analysts, officers, and policymakers on SSA--whose interest must match their knowledge and understanding.

More at SSI.

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What Role for Germany in Iraq? - Christopher Chivvis of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The security situation in Iraq has improved markedly. The US "Surge," along with several other factors appear to have had a positive effect. A window of opportunity has opened. Iraq's future nevertheless remains uncertain and the possibility that the situation could deteriorate into a broader regional crisis remains.

To date, debate over Iraq in Germany and Europe has focused primarily on the wisdom and success of the US-led 2003 invasion. Five years later, however, experts are beginning to recognize that the time has come for a renewed discussion of Germany's own interests in Iraq.

This paper identifies key German interests and assesses German policy options.

More at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

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Update: Inside Defense was kind enough to place the article Mattis Sparks Vigorous Debate On Future Of Effects-Based Ops on a page that can be viewed by non-subscribers. SWJ hat tip to Dan Dupont. The discussion is continuing at Small Wars Council...

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis’ Effects Based Operations memo and the “vigorous debate” that followed. Excerpts from the article:

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis' decision to exorcise the term "effects-based operations" from US Joint Forces Command's vocabulary is sparking passionate debate as the military mulls potentially sweeping implications for doctrine, training and operations.

Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. It is supposed to be backed by a framework called operational net assessment (ONA) enabling commanders to capitalize on unprecedented high-tech information about the battlespace as well as an analytical process called system of systems analysis (SoSA) focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.

But somewhere along the way it all stopped making sense, according to Mattis, who writes in an Aug. 14 memo that EBO, ONA and SoSA are "fundamentally flawed" and must be removed from the military's lexicon, training and operations…

There has been a spirited debate about EBO in recent years. Critics such as retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper and Naval War College professor Milan Vego have vivisected the concept, while Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, one of EBO's main proponents, and other advocates like Naval War College professor James Ellsworth have repeatedly argued its merits.

Mattis' memo is not the end of the debate, but the start of a new chapter. Deptula is defending EBO while welcoming further discussions that will follow from JFCOM's guidance.

"I stand by the efficacy of EBO as a proven joint planning construct and welcome internal discussions on the topic as different viewpoints in joint doctrine are important in raising dialogues that ultimately result in enhancing joint force operations," Deptula tells Inside the Pentagon…

Not surprisingly, the memo is ruffling feathers in Air Force circles.

Before Deptula provided comments on the missive to ITP, Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney (retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney) , who unloaded heaps of criticism.

"Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document," McInerney says. "I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much."

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."…

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

Much, much more at ITP – praise, criticism and “between the lines” - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription. Also, the discussion continues at Small Wars Council.

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Corruption in Iraq
Exploiting Market Behavior as a Form of Irregular Warfare
by William S. McCallister, Small Wars Journal

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

The term corruption, when used in a technical sense, is a general concept in which components of an organized and interdependent system are not performing the functions for which they were originally intended, or performing them improperly to the detriment of the system's original purpose. Its original meaning has connotations of being morally wrong in practice and principle. Corruption has evolved into an institution in Iraq. What has been described as a culture of corruption now serves a vital function in the distribution of scare resources. In a sense, corruption has been elevated to a form of irregular warfare as various groups compete for access to influence and limited resources. The study of corruption as a form of irregular warfare therefore will assist in developing suitable anti-corruption strategies and to communicate these strategies within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.

Social, political and personal ideologies differ as to the costs and benefits derived from economic activities and how best to distribute the gains and losses of cumulative market transactions among individuals and groups. How best to distribute these gains and losses reflects the unique cultural, ideological and political sentiments of the society within which economic activities occur.

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance and by extension the use of appropriate economic and market management mechanisms vary. One definition describes good governance as the efficient and effective “delivery of security … economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered.” This definition implies a central role for government in the management of societal resources and a service centric function emphasizing equitable “delivery” and distribution of social services to all its citizens. Not all cultures articulate the role and function of governance in quite the same way.

Corruption in Iraq (Full PDF Article)

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One of our favorite war correspondents provides a detailed background on the origins of "The Surge" - Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate by Michael Gordon, New York Times.

When President Bush speaks to the Republican convention on Monday, he is expected to tout the “surge” of forces in Iraq as one of his proudest achievements. But that decision, one of his most consequential as commander in chief, was made only after months of tumultuous debate within the administration, according to still-secret memorandums and interviews with a broad range of current and former officials.

In January 2007, at a time when the situation in Iraq appeared the bleakest, Mr. Bush chose a bold option that was at odds with what many of his civilian and military advisers, including his field commander, initially recommended. Mr. Bush’s plan to send more than 20,000 troops to carry out a new counterinsurgency strategy has helped to reverse the spiral of sectarian killings in Iraq.

But Mr. Bush’s penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and “civil war.” ...

In the end, the troop reinforcement proposal split the military. Even after the president had made the basic decision to send additional troops, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in Iraq, never sought more than two brigades, about 8,000 troops in all, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates reported to Mr. Bush in late December. But General Casey’s approach substantially differed from those of two officers who wanted a much bigger effort: the No. 2 commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen Raymond T. Odierno, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, who helped oversee the military’s new counterinsurgency manual and whose views were known by the White House before he was publicly named to replace General Casey, administration officials said.

Current and former officials from the Bush administration and the military agreed to disclose new details about the debate over the troop increase in response to repeated requests. Most insisted on anonymity because the documents were still classified, but said they believed the historical record should reflect the considerations that were being weighed at the time...

Much more at The New York Times.

Continue reading "Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid Doubt and Debate " »

General Vincent Desportes
The Likely War
by Judah Grunstein

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

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General Vincent Desportes
Small Wars Journal Interview
by Judah Grunstein

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein’s SWJ review of The Likely War.

Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?

Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I’m defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it’s something that’s extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the “end state” is defined after we’ve sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an “end state.” So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I’m defining is an ideal schema. What’s certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we’ve launched the operation. So we’re pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.

Now, in France, it’s probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we’re missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d’Orsay) didn’t exist. Now, I don’t know if that center is functioning, but it’s probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an “end state” before launching the operation.

SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

General Vincent Desportes
The Likely War
by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).

General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

Continue reading "SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes" »