Iraqi Non-Lethal Contributions to the Counterinsurgency
By CPT Justin Gorkowski, Small Wars Journal

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In the battle for the support of the population, it is not the capture of the Zarqawis or the Bin Ladens that will defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Nor is it the cordon and search of the villages that have had their doors kicked in by every coalition force rotation over the past four years. The solutions are much more complex and much further out of the conventional mindset. The current threat is extremely unique, making it impossible to use a stenciled approach in applying large scale solutions developed in other insurgencies throughout history. What we can do is take the knowledge, experience and tools we possess, and immerse ourselves in the current situation, developing new methods and tools that are effective in defeating a known threat. One staple in an insurgency is the role of the population, and counterinsurgents must apply that knowledge to all actions and inactions. A method that effectively gains popular support in one geographic area may actually be counter-productive in another due to fundamental differences in the ways of life. Many factors contribute to the way people think and feel. Counterinsurgents cannot fully develop techniques that will affect thought and emotion unless they are immersed in the situation. Counterinsurgents need small unit leaders with the mental capacity and agility to think on their own to develop solutions not found in field manuals. They must be adaptive and continually reexamine the insurgent and population to be most successful in developing methods that are effective in defeat.

This article does not attempt to provide a solution to fight the insurgency in Iraq. It does provide insight on successful methods that can be applied to the current situation. An insurgency’s success is fundamentally based on its level of popular support. The counterinsurgent’s success is therefore intertwined with the limitation of the insurgent support base. Critical to the attainment of popular support for counterinsurgents is the presence of non-lethal effects. Non-lethal effects can simply be defined as the results of all actions that are not designed to kill. Primary contributors are civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations. Efforts must focus on effecting how people think and how counterinsurgent actions or inactions affect those thoughts.

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Should Cadet's NFL Status Keep Him Out of Iraq? - Tom Weir and Reid Cherner, USA Today.

.... But [Caleb] Campbell also belongs to another fraternity -- at the U.S. military academy. His selection in the seventh round Sunday made him the first cadet taken in the NFL draft since Green Bay chose quarterback Ronnie McAda in 1997.

Ignoring players from the Army, Navy or Air Force academies is understandable, considering their commitment to serve in the military after completing college. But Campbell could break ground. He could become the first football player to take full advantage of a new rule that allows athletes with pro potential to fulfill their military commitment as an Army recruiter and with time in the reserves...

An Officer and a Linebacker for the NFL by Judy Battista, New York Times.

... The Army’s hope is that talented people, like elite athletes or musicians, can help promote the service and boost recruiting. But the Army has also found itself defending the policy, which drew little attention before Sunday. Before this year, five former West Point athletes were accepted into the program. In the next few days, Campbell will join two Army teammates who signed free-agent contracts at N.F.L. minicamps. They are beneficiaries of a policy that allows them to start their playing careers sooner than they would had they played for Air Force or for Navy.

If he makes the Lions’ roster, Campbell will most likely spend his off days and the off-season recruiting for the Army in the Detroit area. But his real job, he said, will be playing football. And that is enough to satisfy the Army...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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All The News That’s… A Rebuttal
By Jill Russell

I have known Bob Bateman several years through our mutual participation in H-War, another internet forum, and from that experience I have great respect for him. However, I must disagree with his dismissive critique of David Barstow’s New York Times article. To the contrary, I would argue that the muted tones of the piece belied problems far deeper than would be inferred from his recent blog post. That retired officers are acting as the puppets of DoD in their role as network and cable news military analysts is troubling when examined within the historical context of the Vietnam War’s effect upon the credibility of military officers and the subsequent decades-long effort to restore their reputation for integrity. Thus, if the NYT article deserves criticism (1) , I would submit it’s for missing the real significance, in big historic terms, of the military “analyst” story.

It may seem almost heretical to suggest, but the single greatest casualty of the Vietnam War for the American military was not the damage done to cohesion and morale, or training and readiness. These are actually fairly common occurrences in the aftermath of any American war, successful or not. (2) Rather, the real tragedy of that war was the American public’s loss of faith in the credibility of the military leadership. And although there is constant scholarly (and other) jousting as to the outcome and ramifications of the Tet Offensive, what cannot be disputed is that it was at this point in the war that the American people began to doubt the veracity of what they heard from their nation’s officers. The constant repetition that the “light at the end of the tunnel” was in sight, that the war’s successful conclusion was just around the corner, could not be squared with the events of ’68...

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CNN reported earlier today that the Republican National Committee takes exception to a Democratic National Committee campaign ad they say misuses Senator John McCain's remarks on US troops staying in Iraq for "100 years" in such a way to paint an incorrect portrait of McCain’s position on Iraq.

The Associated Press reported that he actually went on to say:

“As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me, and I hope it would be fine with you, if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al-Qaida is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

The ad makes no distinction between sustained combat and other operations that require a much smaller US force footprint – a training and advisory role comes to mind here. Here is the ad - you be the judge:

I agree with the RNC on this one.

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Two timely and well written items concerning US National Security Strategy - first up is Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier's op-ed The Strategy Deficit that was recently published by the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

An honest survey of post-Cold War national security policy exhibits a dangerous strategy deficit. The word “strategy” is overused. The concept, too, is poorly applied. It is many things to contemporary policymakers except, well—strategy. In the current environment, strategic communications and strategy have become synonymous. Strategic communications is the carefully crafted but overly general and widely consumable articulation of key political messages—“assure, deter, dissuade, defeat”; “as they stand up, we’ll stand down”; “clear, hold, build”; “phased strategic redeployment”; etc, etc, etc. It is strategy by façade versus strategy through effective, deliberate investment of intellectual, temporal, material, and human capital in pursuit of well-defined outcomes. Real strategy is the reasoned determination of specific, minimum essential objectives, rationalized with suitable ways to achieve them and the necessary means for success. No careful observer of executive decisionmaking since the end of the Cold War believes the latter high bar to be the norm...

The second item was recently published by the Center for a New American Security - Sustainable Security: Developing a Security Strategy for the Long Haul by Jim Thomas.

The inability of many states in the developing world to govern and police themselves effectively or to work collectively with their neigh­bors to secure their regions represents a global security capacity deficit that can threaten U.S. interests. Effectively addressing this security deficit will require a new approach, one that is more preventive and indirect in its nature, that seeks to husband American power, and that reconciles America’s values, interests, and commitments with its finite resources over the long haul...

Both are well worth reading.

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The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes
Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman’s Terms
by Captain Craig Coppock, Small Wars Journal
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There are many books, manuals, and articles that define strategies and principles for counterinsurgency (COIN) success. No one author is completely right and no one is completely wrong; they all have great information and tools to add to your arsenal. This document is not a complete lesson on counterinsurgency theory and strategy, but is rather a collection of counter-insurgent and counter-guerrilla techniques that the author believes are relevant to the current fight in Iraq. This paper is written with an intended primary audience of Rifleman through Platoon Leader, though the information is applicable to company-level leadership as well. Remember that these are only techniques learned by one Infantry platoon in a specific place (central Iraq) at a specific time (June ’06 to Sept ’07). The decision to adopt and implement these techniques is entirely yours. However, using techniques specifically aimed at counter-insurgency and counter-guerilla warfare is critical to supporting your Commander’s greater strategy. While it is true that every AO is different, the overarching COIN principles will apply anywhere. You just have to figure out the finer tactical means of employing them; and that is where this paper will help you out.

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Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno Embodies 'Surge' in Iraq - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times, 28 April 2008.

... So Odierno made a fateful move: He challenged his boss, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., to change the strategy. It was an opening salvo in the behind-the-scenes battle over what became known as the "surge."

And Odierno's challenge, though initially spurned, goes a long way toward explaining why he was nominated last week to succeed Army Gen. David H. Petraeus as the overall commander in Iraq.

The tall, intimidating artilleryman with a shaved head and a grave bearing was an early believer in what is now basic U.S. policy in Iraq. And he has proved he will stand up for it under fire.

Odierno's commitment to the new approach is all the stronger because he embraces it with the fervor of a convert. During his first tour in Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, critics charged that his dedication to overwhelming force and firepower was the antithesis of counterinsurgency doctrine.

As a result, although Petraeus has become the face of the war, it is Odierno who more truly mirrors the American military's experience in Iraq...

More at the Los Angeles Times.

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Lawrence and his Message

By Robert L. Bateman

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”

~ T.E. Lawrence

Of late there are quite a few people who have taken to quoting T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. The quote presented above is seen almost every day now, on military briefings and in State Department papers, in quotes in news articles and in public statements from people involved in all aspects of our effort. In the eyes of many Lawrence, it seems, holds the answer to our dilemmas both in our efforts to suppress an insurgency and helping develop a democracy.

Unfortunately, as seems to happen too often, almost everyone who uses this particular quote does so without understanding the context in which it was written. Many people, for example, assume that it comes from his 1922 classic, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Unfortunately, not so many of those who use the quote have actually read The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in all of its sometimes mind-numbing “Oh aren’t these rocks and the shadows of the desert beautiful” glory. Even fewer realize that the quote is actually from a collection tidbits of advice Lawrence penned during the war in a British publication known as The Arab Bulletin. This particular quote was number fifteen (of twenty-seven) pieces of wisdom published under his byline on 20 August 1917. The salient points regarding the relevance of the citations are actually twofold. This is an issue is because, especially when quoting Lawrence, the context is important...

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Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.

US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. April 2008.

From the Introduction:

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to investigate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because they are considered to be critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subcommittee used PRTs as a case study of an issue that the subcommittee has been interested in – examining in more depth how multiple agencies work together, or for that matter, do not work together in the field and in Washington, as the third quote above suggests. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the national effort involves more than just military actions, and instead requires integrated efforts and the resources of government departments and agencies beyond the Department of Defense (the Department, DOD). PRTs illustrate the need for effective, integrated action to achieve government-wide “unity of effort” in complex contingency operations. We wanted to know how the departments and agencies in Washington give comprehensive and consistent guidance to the military services and combatant commanders (COCOMs), as well as how both Washington and organizations at agency, service, and COCOM levels support interagency operations in the field. After all, mission success will only be ensured if senior leaders adequately guide and support the people who the nation has asked to do difficult jobs under dangerous and challenging conditions.

Understand the Administration’s strategy and plans for the use of PRTs, and how this strategy supports larger campaign plans and strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations more generally;

Delineate the roles of the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments, and coalition allies in PRTs and PRT-like entities;

Understand the brigade combat teams’ (BCTs’) and regimental combat teams’ (RCTs’) relationships to various kinds of PRTs, including command and control issues;

Understand the capabilities of various kinds of PRTs;

Review DOD and related interagency assumptions, processes, and metrics used to assess the accomplishments of PRTs;

Assess the resources invested in PRTs against the returns on those investments;

Contribute to congressional oversight of PRTs, Iraq, Afghanistan, and interagency operations;

Report findings and recommendations to the House Armed Services Committee or other committees of jurisdiction for further hearings and legislation; and

Present information for public debate, with the hope of improving the Department’s approach to organizing, training, and equipping military members for PRTs, and optimizing military support to PRTs.

This report includes only a brief summary of how the subcommittee went about this oversight project (more detail can be found at Appendix B). We have focused instead on our major findings, and lay out the details of these, with related recommendations, at the tactical level (field operations), the operational level (combatant commands, services, and agencies with their policy and guidance responsibilities and their ‘organize, train, and equip’ missions), and at the strategic level in Washington.

The PRT tactical-level concept and the fact that there are approximately 50 such U.S. units on the ground reflect a willingness among government agencies to move outside of “stovepipes.” However, the subcommittee found many significant issues during the course of our study. Although efforts have been made over the last seven years attempting to improve interagency coordination and cooperation, the government has not gone far enough or fast enough to support the people in the field or accomplish the nation’s mission. The efforts that have been made must be assessed to determine whether interagency integration is improving or whether a different approach is needed. Many people are working very hard, but processes and structures in Washington still resemble what was used in the Cold War rather than what is needed to best address our nation’s current and future opportunities and challenges. While agency stovepipes still exist, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan offer lessons we can use at every level to increase our “strategic agility”. What our nation needs now is a sense of urgency in capturing and applying these lessons. Our recommendations are meant to foster just that.

Read the entire report.

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‘What’s Happening In Basra?’
by Paul Smyth
Small Wars Journal Magazine

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The recent Iraqi military operation in Basra has generated much speculation in media and commentary circles, but without access to classified sources it is extremely difficult to accurately judge what has been happening in Basra and why. Even attempts to draw on Iraqi sources or anonymous quotes from within the Coalition do not eradicate confused or contradictory reporting. Hence, some commentators will claim that the targets of the Iraqi security clampdown in Basra are the criminal and Iranian sponsored ‘Special Groups’ that plague the city, while others will equally assert that it is the militia followers of Moqtada Al Sadr which are being attacked in order to weaken his power base ahead of provincial elections.

Whether the subject in view is the motive behind the operation, its timing and conduct, the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias, the role of Iran or the relative effect the operation is having on the standing of the various protagonists, there is no consensus of opinion which reigns supreme.

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Road-Building in Afghanistan
Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency

Dr. David Kilcullen

As a tactics instructor in the mid-1990s, teaching British platoon commanders at the School of Infantry, I spent many weeks on extended field exercises in the wilds of south Wales and on windswept Salisbury Plain. Both landscapes are studded with Roman military antiquities, relics of ancient counterinsurgency campaigns – mile-castles, military roads, legion encampments – as well as the Iron Age hill-forts of the Romans’ insurgent adversaries. Teaching ambushing, I often found that ambush sites I chose from a map, even on the remotest hillsides, would turn out (once I dragged my weary, rucksack-carrying ass to the actual spot) to have Roman or Celtic ruins on them, and often a Roman military road nearby: call me lacking in self-assurance, but I often found this a comforting vote of confidence in my tactical judgment from the collective wisdom of the ancestors.

Like the Romans, counterinsurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to the population. Clearly, roads that are patrolled by friendly forces or secured by local allies also have the tactical benefit of channeling and restricting insurgent movement and compartmenting terrain across which guerrillas could otherwise move freely. But the political impact of road-building is even more striking than its tactical effect.

This is my first Small Wars Journal post for several months; since leaving Iraq last year I have been working mainly on Afghanistan, in the field and in various coalition capitals. This brief essay (brief by my risibly low standards, anyhow!) describes recent road-building efforts in Afghanistan. A follow-on piece will explore the broader notion of political maneuver in counterinsurgency, using road-building as one of several examples...

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Lest we forget. ANZAC Day is commemorated by Australia and New Zealand on 25 April every year to remember members of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) who landed at Gallipoli in Turkey during World War I. ANZAC Day is also a public holiday in the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa and Tonga.

The ANZAC Day Tradition - Australian War Memorial
ANZAC Day - New Zealand History
ANZAC Day Full Coverage - The Australian
ANZAC Day Full Coverage - New Zealand Herald
ANZAC Day Full Coverage - Sydney Morning Herald
ANZAC Day Full Coverage - Australian Broadcasting Corporation

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Tuesday we gave you Sign of the Apocalypse.

...Recently, LTC Paul Yingling wrote a piece that appeared in the Armed Forces Journal - and sparked heated debate throughout the Army - ruffled some feathers - ruffled a lot of feathers. That is a good thing. We need more, not fewer, Paul Yinglings.

And on this point, George C. Marshall also can serve as our model. Many thought MAJ Marshall's career was at an end in 1917 when he publicly disagreed with and angrily lectured GEN "Black Jack" Pershing at 1st Division headquarters in France during World War I. He even grabbed the general's arm when he tried to disengage.

His anger and assertiveness did not draw a rebuke from Pershing - rather it earned his respect...

Wednesday Fred Kaplan provided Gates Celebrates Dissent.

Take, for instance, the case of Paul Yingling, the Army lieutenant colonel who, almost exactly one year ago, published a widely read article in the Armed Forces Journal that likened Iraq to Vietnam and blamed both debacles on "a crisis in an entire institution, America's general officer corps," which he accused of lacking "professional character," "moral courage," and "creative intelligence." Yingling was no crank. He was 41, a veteran of both Iraq wars, and at the time the deputy commander of the Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the unit that—well before Gen. David Petraeus took charge of U.S. forces in Iraq—brought order to the city of Tal Afar through classic counterinsurgency methods.

Gates didn't mention Yingling by name in his speeches on Monday, but he certainly had him in mind when he said at West Point, "I have been impressed by the way the Army's professional journals allow some of our brightest and most innovative officers to critique—sometimes bluntly—the way the service does business, to include judgments about senior leadership."

He went on, "I encourage you to take on the mantle of fearless, thoughtful, but loyal dissent when the situation calls for it. And, agree with the articles or not, senior officers should embrace such dissent as a healthy dialogue and protect and advance those considerably more junior who are taking on that mantle."...

Much more at Slate.

You can find articles by LTC Yingling at his SWJ Bio Page.

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US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Petraeus Picked to Lead Mideast Command - Tyson and Ricks, Washington Post
New Jobs Set for 2 Generals With Iraq Role - Thom Shanker, New York Times
Petraeus Tapped for Central Command - Sara Carter, Washington Times
Petraeus Promotion Ensures Continuation - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times
Petraeus to Head CENTCOM - Lubold and LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor
Promoted Petraeus to Leave Iraq - Tim Reid, The Australian
Petraeus Set for Central Command - BBC News
Odierno 'Best' Choice for Iraq Post - Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today
Battlefield Promotions - Wall Street Journal editorial
Republicans Hail Petraeus Selection - The Hill
Good News for Iraq - Max Boot, Contentions
Petraeus Nominated CENTCOM CINC - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club
Army Musical Chairs - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump
Impressions on Military Shifts - Shawn Brimley, Democracy Arsenal
Petraeus Gets Promotion; Odierno Gets Iraq - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room
Better for America... - Tom Barnett, Thomas PM Barnett
Petraeus to CENTCOM - William Kristol, Weekly Standard Blog
General Petraeus To CENTCOM - Threats Watch
Petraeus to CENTCOM - Charlie, Abu Muqawama