As the NATO countries prepare for the last alliance summit of George Bush’s presidency, scheduled for April 2-4 in Bucharest, there is widespread recognition that the alliance needs reinforcement. On the practical level, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan needs more men and equipment, particularly helicopters, to block resurgence of the Taliban. On the strategic level, the alliance’s 1999 concept of its role and operations is in dire need of updating to reflect new realities in the wake of 9/11 and NATO’s subsequent mission in Afghanistan. On the political level, new life needs to be pumped into the alliance’s veins, to convince skeptical commentators, publics and parliaments that the transatlantic bargain is still a viable and valuable deal.
Hopefully, new commitments to the alliance mission in Afghanistan will emerge from Bucharest. None of the allies will want to celebrate NATO’s 60th anniversary in 2009 by acknowledging that it is incapable of handling the Afghanistan mission.
However, the commitment to prepare a fresh strategic concept along with a new “Atlantic Charter,” as advocated by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, may have to wait. As good an idea as it is, the reality of the American election schedule will enforce a delay. Do the European allies really want to take the chance of handing off a drafting process begun under President George Bush to a new American administration led by Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton? There could not be a more awkward way for the allies to greet the next US administration...
SWJ friend, former Soldier (he led a platoon of light infantry in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks and subsequently led a platoon of Army Rangers as a part of special operations task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan) and King's College of London PhD candidate Andrew Exum stirs things up over at The Guardian (see the comments section).
... But maybe the British army was never that good at counterinsurgency warfare in the first place. In fact, the very existence of the United States of America points toward an 18th-century counterinsurgency failure of epic proportions. At the moment, Americans are reliving their revolutionary era through HBO's slick new mini-series on founding father John Adams. But this interest in the American Revolution surely opens the door onto an interesting thought experiment: What would have happened had the British army applied contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine against those pesky colonists in the 18th century?
This question is one currently being asked by several smart US army and Marine Corps officers who have taken their experiences fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and applied them to historical analysis of other American wars...
Overhaul the budget. If you'd awakened from a 20-year-long slumber and glanced at the current defense budget, you'd think the Cold War were still raging...
Rejigger the military services. One obstacle to rational military planning is that, for the past 40 years, by unspoken agreement, the defense budget has been evenly split among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force....
Fix the Army. The Army is (barely) meeting its recruitment goals by lowering standards and dishing out large bonuses...
Invest in people. When the draft ended in 1973, the Army chiefs shifted incentives from veterans' benefits (such as the GI Bill) to enlistment bonuses...
Promote the right leaders. Owing to a shortage of officers, almost anyone can get promoted to lieutenant colonel...
Create incentives for a real nation-building or counterinsurgency capability. ... more troops are trained in such operations and more officers with expertise in that area are promoted to general...
Spread the responsibilities around. Civilian experts are probably better than sergeants at the kinds of stability operations described above....
Taxes. ... more citizens have to contribute something to national defense—if not their blood, then more of their treasure.
Phil Carter has teamed with Fred Kaplan to write the first in a ten-part series on fixing what ails America’s military.
Many of the suggestions are familiar: drastically change budget priorities away from major procurement programs designed to fight an enemy that doesn’t exist; do away with parity between the Service budgets, realigning spending to our real-world mission requirements; stabilize career patterns to make them less burdensome on wives and families; and promote the most innovate, visionary leaders rather than the best bureaucrats...
... The case for U.S. disengagement from combat is compelling in its own right. But it must be matched by a comprehensive political and diplomatic effort to mitigate the destabilizing regional consequences of a war that the outgoing Bush administration started deliberately, justified demagogically and waged badly. (I write, of course, as a Democrat; while I prefer Sen. Barack Obama, I speak here for myself.)
The contrast between the Democratic argument for ending the war and the Republican argument for continuing is sharp and dramatic. The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for "staying the course" draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown and relies on worst-case scenarios. President Bush's and Sen. John McCain's forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of "falling dominoes" that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster, but their fear-mongering makes prolonging it easier...
Why am I not reassured by Zbigniew Brzezinski's breezy assurance in Sunday's Outlook section that "forecasts of regional catastrophe" after an American pullout from Iraq are as overblown as similar predictions made prior to our pullout from South Vietnam? Perhaps because the fall of Saigon in 1975 really was a catastrophe. Another domino fell at virtually the same time -- Cambodia.
Estimates vary, but a safe bet is that some two million people died in the killing fields of Cambodia. In South Vietnam, the death toll was lower, but hundreds of thousands were consigned to harsh "reeducation" camps where many perished, and hundreds of thousands more risked their lives to flee as "boat people."
The consequences of the U.S. defeat rippled outward, emboldening communist aggression from Angola to Afghanistan. Iran's willingness to hold our embassy personnel hostage -- something that Brzezinski should recall -- was probably at least in part a reaction to America's post-Vietnam malaise. Certainly the inability of the U.S. armed services to rescue those hostages was emblematic of the "hollow," post-Vietnam military. It took us more than a decade to recover from the worst military defeat in our history...
Five years into the war in Iraq with no end in sight, a new strategy is needed. The current strategy of unconditional support to Iraq’s central government has not produced nearly enough political progress. President Bush and those wishing to succeed him should embrace a new political strategy in Iraq that makes our military presence conditional on political accommodation.
Under the leadership of General David Petraeus, U.S. forces in Iraq have designed and implemented the best military strategy possible under the circumstances. But security progress appears to have leveled off, and violence has started to tick back up. Further gains can only come through the political process. General Petraeus recently told reporters that “no one feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation.” Similar candor will likely be on display when Petraeus testifies before Congress in the coming days. Rather than re-litigate the debate over how we got here, Congress must look forward and help shape the public debate over the basic strategic choices from which this and the next President must choose.
President Bush and his successor have only three basic choices on strategy for Iraq: unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. Only a policy of conditional engagement can help translate recent security gains into something more sustainable...
When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld’s intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today’s political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.
1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO’s ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.
2) There exists a lack of “political will” among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.).
3) Allied governments have underestimated the tasks of simultaneously stabilizing the security situation, dealing with a complex set of opposition forces (Taliban, narco-terrorists, and tribal “warlords”), and developing a basic Afghan governmental capacity in a society wracked by decades of warfare and corruption. That said, there are important, albeit underreported, signs of progress in Afghanistan, and the strategic stakes remain high, for the region as well as the Alliance.
4) Within NATO, a variety of steps are underway to improve Allied individual and collective capabilities to deploy the forces and assets necessary for expeditionary missions, although resource limitations are a significant underlying problem. Within NATO and individual Allied forces, increased emphasis is needed on training military personnel and sharing “lessons learned” for complex and multinational counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with a heavy civilian military component.
5) “Naming and shaming” or “finger pointing” at Allies whose forces are not engaged, for various reasons, in the most dangerous areas will be counterproductive.
7) Notwithstanding public perceptions a few years ago that the United States had “lost interest” in NATO, the American commitment to the Alliance remains strong and enjoys broad bipartisan support.
One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr’s militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.
This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn’t uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.
Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.
President Bush has called the current battle between Iraqi security forces and Sadr militiamen in Basra “a defining moment.” In his mind, President Bush probably likens the Basra battle to America’s Whiskey Rebellion, when President Washington had to defend the new constitution against a militia uprising. Of course, many other observers interpret the violence in Basra as Shi’ite factions, some in government uniforms, battling for economic spoils in Basra and the surrounding oil patch.
For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will.
I have hesitated to comment on the fighting raging in Basra, which has spilled over into other cities including Baghdad, because the shape of events is so difficult to make out from afar-or for that matter even from up close. The best analysis I have seen is this article in the Financial Times which notes that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is taking a major gamble by challenging the power of the Shiite militias–more like criminal gangs-which have seized control of Basra, Iraq’s second or third largest city and home to its only major port.
While most news coverage has focused on the renewed fighting as signs of impending doom–or at the very least evidence that the surge isn’t working so well–the FT correctly detects a silver lining: “If the prime minister succeeds, the pay-off would deliver a big boost to the credibility of a shaky government, proving that the growing national army is capable of taking on powerful militia.”
Oh yeah, and another thing. Every time you think of the "adviser model" for Iraq, you should think of this operation in Basra. Because this is the end result of the U.S. advisory effort to date -- which has focused on creating well-trained and equipped units at the tactical level, but has basically failed at the national, strategic level. The leaders of the Iraqi security forces at the ministry level are as bad as they ever were. And the national government is about as bad. Training and advising Iraqi units at the brigade level and below is well and good. But if you fail to properly shape the national command structure, you're handing those units over to leaders who will misuse them.
Karen DeYoung's article in the Washington Post nicely captures two things: One, how tenuous a situation we have right now in Iraq, and how the gains of 2007 can be wiped out frighteningly quickly, and two, what an absolute mess the British Army left southern Iraq. This is what happens when you march into Basra Province thinking it's an Arabic-speaking Country Armagh. This is what happens when you equate a lack of violence with everything going well -- and ignore the militias who are taking control of the streets. This is what happens when you decide to do peace-keeping rather than counter-insurgency.
The attitude of the other factions towards Sadr was manifested when the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance apparently boycotted sessions attended by Sadr's faction. The question of how far Maliki will go against Sadr was partially answered when the Iraqi PM extended the deadline for the militias to lay down their arms. This has led some to suggest that a deal is now in the works.
But it's also possible that Maliki is trying to peel away the less loyal of Sadr's commanders and turn them to his side. Which exactly will be the case the next few days will reveal.
Leaving armed criminal gangs running half the country was never going to work, anyway. There were reports a few months ago that in some areas south of Baghdad, Shiites were interested in the Sunni experience and wanted to try it themselves. U.S. forces can support and even lead Iraqi troops, but none of it works in the long run until the people decide they’ve had enough.
If Abu Muqawama was leading one of those U.S. units into Sadr City past a bunch of Iraqi Army soldiers hanging out on the outskirts, he would not be happy. He would be asking himself a) why is he the one establishing the authority of the Iraqi state and not the Iraqi Army and b) why is he duking it out with a militia with broad popular support so that another Iran-backed political party can win a bigger share of the vote in the fall?
Now Iraqi Army units are calling for U.S. and UK military units to lend direct support in Basra as well.
Did the United States have advance notice of Maliki's decision to attack Basra? In a much-blogged story this morning, The Washington Post reported that "Maliki decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. allies, according to administration officials" and that they were all arguing over "who's got the best conspiracy theory about why Maliki decided to act now" (fortunately, they had this handy guide).
Al-Jazeera English has a good report on the current fighting in Basra, which offers a more nuanced analysis of events than is provided by most coverage. The report makes clear that underlying the engagement is a struggle for influence in the oil-rich south between the two main Shia factions in Iraq: the Sadrists led by Muqtada al-Sadr, whose armed wing - the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army) - is the object of the security operation; and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), whose armed wing - the Badr Organisation - dominates the security forces.
As smoke billows from Baghdad’s U.S.-controlled “Green Zone” following a series of rocket and mortar attacks thought to have been carried out by members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) movement last weekend, important questions have been raised concerning the direction of the movement as its leader becomes increasingly reclusive.
The young Iraqi firebrand and Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, recently tried to put to rest the confusion and rumors circulating around his withdrawal from the Iraqi political scene. In a statement posted on the Sadrist al-Amarah website, al-Sadr declared that his absence was due to a decision to pursue religious studies in Qom and Najaf—a path intended to lead to Ayatollah status within Shiite Islam (Gulf News, March 10). Though al-Sadr extended the self-imposed ceasefire on his forces last February, his absence poses serious questions regarding the status of his JaM militia.
Fighting in Basrah, Baghdad, and throughout much of the South continues as Iraqi security Forces and Multinational Forces Iraq press the fight against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed terror groups. The Iraqi Army has moved additional forces to Basrah as the US and Iraqi military have conducted significant engagements in Shia areas of Baghdad. The Mahdi Army has taken significant casualties. The US military has denied the Mahdi Army has taken control of checkpoints in Baghdad.
Several hundred Iraqis are reported to have been killed during the fighting since the operation began on March 25. A large majority of them are Mahdi Army fighters, according to the press reports. The US and Iraqi military have killed more than 70 Mahdi Army fighters in Shia neighborhood in Baghdad alone over the past three days.
While this isn’t necessarily a defeat for the IA, it remains to be seen if they can overcome the limitations of their equipment to move through the city to confront the Mahdi Army. For now, at least, it looks like their recon might not have been the best. A “Basra newspaper editor” quoted by the Times told the paper that “it was obvious that the central government had not consulted with local commanders in planning the assault, citing the inability of the armored vehicles to fit through city streets.”
When fighting an insurgency that relies on motorcycles and small cars and trucks to move around the narrow streets of a city, bigger isn’t always better.
In mid-2007 when the British retreated from Basra, they did so while telling the tall tale that since the very presence of the British themselves was causing the violence, it would be better if they just left. In other words, no one would shoot at the British Army if the Army wasn’t there. There wasn’t a rush of anyone or any faction into Basra. They were already there and had control of the city. The British never had control of Basra, and from the beginning it was left to Shi’a factions, criminal elements, Iranian proxy fighters (Badr, Quds), and the loss of Basra was a constant diminution of civilization up to the point that the British ended up behind barbed wire at the Basra airport, contributing nothing to the Iraq campaign. We have already linked Nibras Kazimi who, in the update to his post, conveys the Iraqi sentiment concerning the British Army. It isn’t flattering, and British Colonel Tim Collins knows and has said that the retreat from Basra has badly damaged the reputation of the British Army.
If Iran supports the Mahdi Army, and if Mehran is a source of that support, and if Kut is near Mehran, it stands to reason that Kut will harbor a particularly strong Mahdi Army force.
And so, I’d like to offer up Kut as a metaphor for what is happening inside Iraq. If that road between Kut and Mehran can be “cut,” if Iran’s support for militants in Iraq who foment violence and discord can be cut, Iraq stands a much better chance of getting on its feet again.
Add additional relevant links to comments below - thanks...
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework of the problem we face as a nation in terms of enabling friends, allies, and partners to defend against terrorism and insurgency and maintain internal stability, and to provide some recommendations for change.
We not only face a chaotic and complex environment in the post 9-11 world due to the nature of the threat and the interaction of religious and ideological conditions but we also face a complex and confusing national security environment. As we execute OIF and OEF and less visible WOT operations throughout the rest of the world under the rubric of OEF (e.g., OEF-TS, OEF-CCA, OEF-P, etc.) we find ourselves faced with questions of how to organize and train to be able to execute the full spectrum of operations required to be successful in the war on terror (WOT) and to conduct Stability Operations. Current Joint and Army doctrine (JP 3-0 and FM 3-0) recognize that Stability Operations are on par with Offense and Defense and there is general recognition that the emphasis on Offense, Defense, and Stability will shift over time and as conditions change.
There seems to be a major assumption among many planners that the level of effort in Iraq and Afghanistan will need to be sustained indefinitely in areas beyond those two countries and the focus is how to develop a force (some say an “Advisor Corps”) to be able to continue such large scale and continuous deployments. Before we develop such a force I think it is necessary to correctly frame the challenge we face, look at existing doctrine, training and organizations, and determine what is appropriate to sustain and what is appropriate for adaptation.
Even more on the future of a training and advisory role as part of our Security Force Assistance efforts. From Westhawk:
Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (ret) is an experienced veteran of COIN-in-the field; his views are worthy of serious attention. Writing at the Small Wars Journal Blog, Col. Killebrew dismissed LTC Nagl’s proposal for a permanent Advisory Corps. Col. Killebrew strongly supports the advisor mission, but wants the whole Army, not a specialized few, contributing to it...
The best argument for the Nagl Advisory Corps plan is how it offers the prospect of preventing large-scale U.S. COIN missions from becoming necessary in the future. By making it a regular practice for small U.S. advisor teams to work in all four corners of the globe, assisting allies with peacetime foreign internal defense preparation (so-called “Phase Zero operations”), the U.S. can prevent crises from happening in the first place. LTC Nagl’s Advisory Corps and its associated schoolhouse would ensure that these Phase Zero advisory efforts would be performed by well-trained and highly-prepared teams, employing best-practices tactics, techniques, and procedures.
After five years and over $500 billion, the U.S. military has gotten better at the advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A long-term commitment to Latin America, and a large presence of the Spanish language and Latin culture inside the U.S., has boosted the U.S. foreign internal defense missions in Latin America...