Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog: In the News and Thanks: Print This

A quick look at several recent news articles that mention or quote members of the Small Wars Journal and Council community of interest and a boatload of thanks to fellow bloggers, reporters and columnists who have helped us along in our quest to facilitate and support the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field.

Small Wars Journal and Council members ‘in the news’:

Filipino Terrorist Informants Awarded $10M from U.S. – FOXNews by Oliver North.

What has been altered is the approach being taken here by both the Philippine and U.S. governments. Decisions in Washington and Manila — to wage this fight not simply as a military campaign against terrorists, but primarily as a battle for the hearts and minds of the people — are paying big dividends. As one Philippine officer put it: “Today we are making a difference in the lives of the people. It has taken time, but now they know they can trust us. That's why they cooperate with us against the terrorists.”

When I asked Maj. Gen. Ruben Rafael, the commander of Joint Task Force Comet, and the senior military officer in this remote part of the Philippine archipelago — for the secret to this success, he replied, “Patience, persistence and perseverance. Last Christmas none of my soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines took leave because we needed to keep the pressure on the terrorists. It was hard on the troops, but it proved to the people we were here to protect them and that we are here to stay.”

U.S. Army Col. David Maxwell, who commands Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, fully supports that sentiment — for the Filipinos. But of the Americans under his command, he says, "We're here on a temporary basis to help them put us out of work.” Then, the veteran Special Forces officer quickly adds, “But none of us want to leave before the job is done.”

Counter-Insurgency and 'The Single Narrative' – Syndicated Column by Austin Bay.

"Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized."

That candid declaration of common sense appeared last year in IOSPHERE, the publication of the Joint Information Operations Center, in an article written by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Kilcullen's article expanded on the sources of motivation. "In most societies," he wrote, "there are opinion makers: local leaders ... religious figures, media personalities ... who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence -- including the pernicious influence of the insurgents -- often takes the form of a 'single narrative.' This is a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people's experience and provides a framework for understanding events.

"Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qaida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence, you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents."

After the Surge – Commentary Magazine’s Contentions by Max Boot.

What comes after the troop surge? Even though it isn’t complete yet, it makes sense to think about this issue now. The best proposal I’ve seen so far comes from Bing West and Owen West—a father-and-son pair of Marines and national security analysts with vast experience in Iraq. They propose maintaining about 80,000 troops for a decade or so, with 20,000 of them working as advisers to the Iraqi security forces, 25,000 in a combat role, and another 35,000 providing logistics. The only problem is how to get from here to there—how to send home half of the American troops without causing a complete collapse of the Iraqi government and its security forces. That’s where the surge comes in: the plan to downsize only works if the current surge manages to restore a semblance of order in Baghdad and its environs.

It's Patriotic to Criticize – Syndicated Column by Fred Kaplan.

Yet in the scheme of things, Gen. Mixon was merely filing a complaint. Two weeks earlier, a lower-ranking officer, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling – deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment – issued a jeremiad.

In a blistering article in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal, Col. Yingling likened the debacle in Iraq to the disaster in Vietnam and blamed them both on "a crisis in an entire institution, America's general officer corps." Tomorrow's generals are chosen by today's generals, and Col. Yingling charges most of this generation's generals with lacking "professional character," "moral courage," and "creative intelligence."

Col. Yingling's essay is the most stunning – and maybe the most fiercely intelligent and patriotic – public statement I have ever read from an active-duty officer.

At 41, a veteran of both Iraq wars and a graduate of the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, the Army's elite postgraduate strategy center, Col. Yingling is widely thought to be one of the brightest, most dedicated up-and-coming officers.

Col. Yingling's argument is tightly reasoned. Policymakers go to war to accomplish political objectives. Generals must provide the policymakers with an estimate of the war's likely success.

Multiple Enemies Complicate Iraq – Stars and Stripes by Drew Brown.

Frank Hoffman, an analyst with the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, an internal Marine Corps think tank in Quantico, Va., said there are least 20 major armed groups in Iraq.

In an essay to be published this summer in the Army War College’s “Parameters,” Hoffman argues that the dizzying array of actors, fueled by competing strains of religious inspiration, linked by the Internet and operating mostly in large urban areas, make Iraq difficult to comprehend.

“I think this is a unique conflict that we are having trouble with conceptualizing,” said Hoffman, who is also a retired Marine officer and senior fellow at Philadelphia’s Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Sunni insurgents, however, including former Saddam loyalists and al-Qaida in Iraq, an extremist group that emerged after the 2003 invasion, “are the biggies” as far as threats to U.S. forces.

Former regime supporters want to regain power, U.S. officials believe. But al-Qaida in Iraq’s goal is “to foment a crisis between Shia and Sunni, not take over, and they want as much chaos, disruption as possible,” Hoffman said.

Terror Gangs – Investor’s Business Daily editorial.

At a recent UCLA forum on terrorism, Los Angeles officials said the city's estimated 40,000 gang members are an attractive target for terrorists like al-Qaida. "There are many, many more people who consider themselves jihadists now," said L.A. Police Deputy Chief Mark Leap. "And criminal enterprises are being used to support terrorist activities."

L.A. County Sheriff's Lt. John Sullivan said officials are worried al-Qaida could tap into smuggling networks that move migrants and contraband across Mexico's porous border and into the U.S.

Chief among them is the notorious MS-13 gang, which has infiltrated L.A. and other U.S. cities from Central America.

"MS-13 has a lot of characteristics that could facilitate terrorist activities," Sullivan said, noting that al-Qaida has stated its intent to smuggle black-market nuclear devices into the U.S. and kill at least 4 million Americans.

Checking In On The 'Surge' – The National Journal’s The Gate by Irene Tsikitas.

The Christian Science Monitor reported this morning that one of those commanders, Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, acknowledged the struggles beefed-up U.S. forces are encountering as they pursue a more aggressive strategy, causing a natural spike in casualties. May was the year's deadliest month for U.S. forces in Iraq, and third-worst month for U.S. casualties since the start of the war.

"Right now if you asked me, I would tell you I'd probably need a little bit more time to do a true assessment," Odierno said yesterday in reference to the September deadline. In the Christian Science Monitor report, counterinsurgency expert Col. T.X. Hammes concurred, saying: "People shouldn't be looking for an answer by September."

U.S. Military Changes Needed – The News Tribune by Michael Gilbert.

In recent years there haven’t been any upsets when military forces clash on conventional terms; the big power wins. Think Operation Desert Storm and the Falklands.

But time after time – in Vietnam, in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in Somalia, in Lebanon – seemingly outgunned guerrillas fighting unconventionally have prevailed against superpowers.

And they think they’re winning again in Iraq and Afghanistan, author and military strategist T.X. Hammes said Wednesday in Tacoma.

The United States’ military and national security strategy relies too much on high technology and concepts like “network-centric warfare.” That makes us vulnerable to insurgencies that fight on low-tech terms and might have a greater long-term political will to win, said the author of “The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century.”

Hammes and a series of other national military and intelligence strategists spoke Wednesday at the Pacific Northwest National Security Forum at the Sheraton Tacoma Hotel.

Seminar: Media, Technology Change Battlefield – Marine Corps Times by Kimberly Johnson.

About 150 people from the services, U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Strategic Command, along with military and civilian organizations representing 21 countries, met in Potomac, Md., May 19-24 for Joint Urban Warrior 07. The war-game seminar was co-sponsored by the Marine Corps and Joint Forces Command.

The brainstorming sessions focused on how best to create a unified message from the battlefield that works in tandem with ongoing information and public relations campaigns.

“The concern they had was there were a lot of nontraditional actors — people or information — that they couldn’t quite control but were affecting how they conducted operations,” said Dave Dilegge, Joint Urban Warrior project officer at Quantico, Va. “That’s the purpose of this, to really get a handle on this.”

While based on fictitious scenarios, the war game is rooted in reality, participants said.

“Modern technology, where you have satellite channels covering every conceivable subject — you have the media on the scene at major battles, you have the media in all military activities in a way that they never have been before,” said David Passage, former ambassador to Botswana. “Strategic compression, more or less, obliges those from the military or from the diplomatic world to be more agile, to be more nimble, to be more responsive in the more compressed time frame than they’ve ever been before.”

The days are gone when military and diplomatic leaders could take time to mull over how best to respond to tactical events on the ground, Passage said.

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A special thanks to old and new friends – bloggers all – who have helped us along in our quest to facilitate and support the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field.

And yes… We are getting around to updating our blog roll – soonest…

In alphabetical order:

Abu Muqawama at Abu Muqawama

The Gang at Argghhh!

Carl at Because We're Here Boy, No One Else; Just Us

Wretchard at The Belmont Club

The Gang at BlackFive

Herschel Smith at The Captain’s Journal

Charles Sheehan-Miles at Charles Sheehan-Miles

Max Boot at Contentions

John and Allen at Cox and Forkum

Noah Shachtman at Wired’s Danger Room