Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan by Major Darin J. Blatt, Captain Eric Long, Captain Brian Mulhern and Staff Sergeant Michael Ploskunak

There is an ongoing discussion about the merits of engagement activities — activities between coalition military forces and foreign civilian personnel — as a means of obtaining information, influencing behavior and building an indigenous base of support for coalition and government objectives.

During a recent rotation to Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces A-detachments 3321 and 3315 developed models in the Paktia and Paktika provinces of what can be accomplished in terms of tribal engagement by working within the existing tribal power structure in Afghanistan. An examination of the detachments' understanding of the operational environment and subsequent methods of engagement can provide a model for others to use throughout Afghanistan...

Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan

Cliffhanger Fierce Battle in the Shok Valley Tests SF Team's Mettle by Janice Burton

There are no roads leading into the Shok Valley. A village that stands sentinel over the valley is home to one of the fiercest of the insurgent forces in Afghanistan - the Hezeb Islami al Gulbadin, or HIG.

On April 6, 2008, a daring raid into the stronghold by Afghan Commandos and their Special Forces counterparts tested the mettle of the Afghan forces and further forged the bond between them and their SF brothers.

On Dec. 12, Lieutenant General John F. Mullholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, pinned Silver Star Medals on the chests of 10 of the men involved in the raid and the ensuing six-and-a-half-hour firefight that saw more than 150 insurgents killed.

The ceremony was the largest of its kind since the Vietnam era. But for the members of Team 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group, it was never about the medals.

When you ask them to use one word to describe April 6, their words pop, much like the gunfire that rained down on them...

Cliffhanger Fierce Battle in the Shok Valley Tests SF Team's Mettle

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster...

Part 1 - What happened at Wanat?

Part 2 - Did we tip our hand to the enemy?

Part 3 - Did the troops have what they needed?

Part 4 - Underestimating the enemy.

Losing Their Way? - The Economist editorial

The British army suffers from lack of soldiers, lack of money and lack of conviction.

... For all the public recognition, the armed services are going through unusually difficult times. This is challenging Britain's belief in itself as a fighting nation with an important role in the world. The severe strain of waging two wars in faraway countries has been aggravated by undermanning and equipment shortages. More serious still is a new mood of self-doubt. The invasion of Iraq was controversial and its occupation inglorious; the campaign in Afghanistan is going badly. British commanders have belatedly realised that they have much to learn, or rather relearn, about fighting small wars in distant lands. "We have lost our way," says one general...

Much more at The Economist.

Australia's Afghan Crossroads - Cynthia Banham, Sydney Morning Herald opinion

Australia is at a crossroads in its military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. What Australia does next will affect its relationship with the US.

It will also have an impact on the reputation of our defence forces among our closest allies, the US, Britain and Canada.

The questions facing the Rudd Government as it determines which path to take go well beyond whether it should simply offer more troops to the Obama Administration, if asked...

Much more at The Sydney Morning Herald.

Afghan officials said Thursday that they had decided to postpone the country's presidential election until August, saying they needed more time to prepare. But the decision, which appeared to contravene Afghanistan's Constitution, raised questions about the legitimacy of what could be President Hamid Karzai's final months in office.

But Afghanistan's Constitution states that the president's term expires on the equivalent of May 22 on the Roman calendar. Presidential elections, the Constitution says, must be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the term.

More at the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Times, Associated Press and Voice of America.

Obama Taps a General as the Envoy to Kabul - Eric Schmitt, New York Times

The Obama administration has picked Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, a former top military commander in Afghanistan, to be the next United States ambassador to Kabul, an administration official said Thursday. Tapping a career Army officer who will soon retire from the service to fill one of the country's most sensitive diplomatic jobs is a highly unusual choice.

But Afghanistan specialists say that General Eikenberry, who served in Afghanistan twice, including an 18-month command tour that ended in 2007, knows the players and issues there well. That is a valuable commodity in a year when the United States will send thousands of additional troops to Afghanistan and the country will hold presidential elections.

More at The New York Times.

Call for More Afghan Troops - Mark Dodd, The Australian

The Australian Defence Force has enough spare capacity to boost its military contribution in Afghanistan, but any increase would be meaningless unless matched by other NATO nations, counter-insurgency expert, retired Major-General Jim Molan said yesterday.

Afghanistan was discussed in a 25-minute phone call to Kevin Rudd from US President Barack Obama yesterday, but there was no request for Canberra to boost its troop commitment to the understrength 55,000-strong NATO-led International Security Assistance Force there.

The ADF has 1000 troops deployed, including a 300-strong Special Forces Task Group targeting insurgents.

More at The Australian.

British Were Complacent in Afghanistan, Says Sir Jock Stirrup - Michael Evans, The Times

Britain's top military commander has admitted for the first time that America was right to criticise the way in which British troops carried out counter-insurgency operations against the Taleban in southern Afghanistan when they first deployed to Helmand province in 2006. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff and a former head of the RAF, blamed commanders for being "smug and complacent" about the challenges they faced in Helmand.

His words echoed accusations made by Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, and several senior American military officers who claimed that their British counterparts spent too much time boasting about their experiences in Northern Ireland.

More at The Times.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) released a statement on the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, which was required by the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act:

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report demonstrates that the Department of Defense's understanding of its mission and the core competencies required to achieve it has expanded quite substantially since the attacks of 9/11. The scope of the mission the Department is preparing to tackle is daunting and will require careful scrutiny.

This report represents an advance by organizing in one place a host of ideas about new or newly emphasized missions for the Department -- from the need to provide support to civil authorities, to cyber warfare, to training and mentoring foreign security forces. It raises significant issues about the appropriate role of the Department in these areas that will be heavily debated in the national security community in the coming years.

At the same time, this report shows the Department still has a lot of work ahead to reform its organization, budgets, and processes to execute this mission. The report makes only a small contribution to the difficult task of challenging the allocation of treasured turf and changing deeply held cultures within the Department which will be required to actually fulfill such a far reaching mission set.

I am reminded that the last time this task was seriously tackled, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, it took several years and the personal intervention of President Harry Truman to reach a workable consensus. I very much appreciate the work of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates in kicking off a similar cycle of reevaluation of these issues in this report. As Congress anticipated when it established this review as a continuing requirement every four years, there remains much work to do.

The six Core Mission Areas addressed in the QRM are Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HD/CS), Deterrence Operations, Major Combat Operations (MCOs), Irregular Warfare; Military Support to Stabilization Security; Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; and Military Contribution to Cooperative Security.

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report

Update:

Defense Department Releases Roles, Missions Review - AFPS

by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, US Army

Senior Combined Arms Battalion Trainer

National Training Center

I put this brief (ISF Partnering) together as a vehicle to discuss partnering with Iraqi Security Forces for units training at NTC as they prepare for deployment to Iraq. Throughout OIF we have used various phrases to describe conducting combined operations to include "put an Iraqi face on it", "IA in the lead", and "By, With, Through". I personally struggled with this in theater and I see units routinely struggle with this as they train for deployment. "IA in the Lead" often becomes a US plan and we put the IA on the lead stack to clear a building to get the "Iraqi face on it".

I prefer the term partnership. A combined approach built upon a relationship developed with our Iraqi Security Force partners. What I have put together here is based upon my experience trying to partner in Baghdad and some reflection on how I could have done it better. Partnering starts at the top with the right attitude. The commander must invest in developing relationships with Iraqi officers and truly try to integrate his staff with his counterpart. How to organize for that integration is also important, whether your unit is partnering with a brigade with several battalions or just one battalion.

We often made mistakes in not adequately preparing for a combined patrol. We show up at the IA unit 30 minutes before the patrol, without adequately conducting troop leading procedures and then complain that our partners screw up the mission. It is much more effective to include our partners in the planning process and use every patrol as a training opportunity - for them and us.

At the battalion and brigade level we should be thinking about how we can include our partners in our targeting process. In theater we started with a weekly synch meeting with the ISF to discuss the focus over the next week. Initially we did this primarily at the staff level. Over time we expanded to include battalion commanders, staffs, and company commanders from the ISF and CF and used it as a training opportunity and forum to discuss issues. We later added an intel synch meeting for the S2s to share information that helped to inform our targeting.

Finally, commanders should think about how they can conduct combined command and control. We tried several different techniques to include establishing our battalion command post as a Joint Security Station with an Iraqi Battalion and also using a smaller tactical command post in a similar role. This also served as a good place to conduct a combined morning update brief which we did two to three times a week.

ISF Partnering Brief

Overview: North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, and despite some progress, it is by no means clear that the ongoing six-party talks will be able to reveal the full extent of the country's nuclear activities, much less persuade Pyongyang to give them up. The United States maintains tens of thousands of forces on the Korean peninsula in support of its commitments to the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country with which the North is still technically at war. And the peninsula sits in a strategically vital region, where the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all have important interests at stake.

All of this puts a premium on close attention to and knowledge of developments in North Korea. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-Il's government is perhaps the world's most difficult to read or even see. This Council Special Report, commissioned by CFR's Center for Preventive Action and authored by Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, focuses on how to manage one of the central unknowns: the prospect of a change in North Korea's leadership. The report examines three scenarios: managed succession, in which the top post transitions smoothly; contested succession, in which government officials or factions fight for power after Kim's demise; and failed succession, in which a new government cannot cement its legitimacy, possibly leading to North Korea's collapse. The authors consider the challenges that these scenarios would pose—ranging from securing Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal to providing humanitarian assistance—and analyze the interests of the United States and others. They then provide recommendations for U.S. policy. In particular, they urge Washington to bolster its contingency planning and capabilities in cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others, and to build a dialogue with China that could address each side's concerns.

With Kim Jong-Il's health uncertain and with a new president in the United States, this report could not be more timely. And with all the issues at stake on the Korean peninsula, the subject could not be more important. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea is a thoughtful work that provides valuable insights for managing a scenario sure to arise in the coming months or years.

Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea

By Adam Weinstein, MNC-I Public Affairs

Jan. 28, 2009

The Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces are on pace to transfer all Sons of Iraq security volunteers to Iraqi control by April, and progress on finding jobs for the men is accelerating, representatives of the camps say.

"This transfer is truly the leading edge of reconciliation in a nation that saw so much discord and distrust under its old regime," said Maj. Gen. Michael Ferriter, deputy commanding general for operations, Multi-National Corps--Iraq, in a press conference in Baghdad Jan. 18. He was accompanied by Dr. Zuhair al-Chalabi, a representative of the Iraqi government's Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation, and Gen. Qasim Atta, spokesman for the Iraqi Army.

"Now it is within the hands of the Iraqi government," Qasim said of the future of the Sons of Iraq. The process has been challenging, Chalabi added, "but we have moved beyond all the complex issues." He vowed that the Government of Iraq would continue to support the "vital project and give it the attention it deserves."

Baghdad's Sons of Iraq -- who represent more than half the national total -- have already been transferred to Iraqi control and received paychecks from their new bosses in each of the past three months. "These 51,000 individuals now are within the Iraqi Government's responsibility," Qasim said. "It is a big success."

Ferriter said the transfers would continue in Diyala, then in February in the southern provinces of Babil and Wasit as well as Anbar in the west.

In northern Iraq last week, Iraqi and Coalition forces met in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces with all the Sons of Iraq leaders, representing about 10,000 members. The meeting detailed how the Iraqi government would assume responsibility for the Sons of Iraq in those regions, where registration for the transfer begins on Feb. 1.

At the same time, plans are already underway for the Sons of Iraq to transition into new, meaningful jobs. Twenty percent of them will join the Iraqi security forces; the rest will be given educational and training opportunities and hired into a variety of private-sector and civil-service fields.

The process begins with the Sons of Iraq filling out a history of their education and employment, which Iraq's government ministries will use to classify the men for employment. So far, 37,000 such forms have been gathered in Baghdad.

Additionally, 274 Sons of Iraq joined Iraqi Army in December and 89 received micro grants for private enterprises. Along with others employed in the Iraqi police and outside ventures, this brought the total number of Sons of Iraq who have transitioned to new jobs to about 5,000.

"We're all working together for the same thing - to bring these young men (SOI) back to the government, back to their country and to continue to build a stable a secure Iraq. So, what you see is a result of this partnership. Things are falling into place," Ferriter said at the Jan. 21 meeting in Ninewa.

The Sons of Iraq -- who number about 94,000 in nine provinces across the country -- arose out of a grassroots movement in 2006 known as Sahwah, or "The Awakening," that united Iraqis who had grown tired of Al Qaeda-inspired violence in their communities. In early 2008, the volunteers partnered with Coalition Forces to combat terrorist elements in their neighborhoods.

"Operating in their own towns and villages, the Sons of Iraq found weapons caches, located improvised explosive devices, identified criminals and kept Al Qaeda out," Ferriter said, adding that the men's assistance "thickened" the force and enabled the Iraqi army and police to further improve security conditions.

Last summer, as the security situation improved, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki approved a plan to take responsibility for paying and employing the Sons of Iraq from the Coalition.

Chalabi said the transfer was progressing with the help of sheiks and other tribal leaders in areas where the Sons of Iraq lived. "It is for sure their loyalty is going to be to the Iraqi government," he said.

He also said fluctuations in oil prices and the economy would not affect the pay or work status of the Sons of Iraq, because 2009 funding for the program has already been set aside by the Government of Iraq. Ferriter added that job creation and increasing opportunities for the Sons of Iraq--and all Iraqis--were key goals for all the parties involved. The priority, he said, was to make security gains permanent by giving every Iraqi a stake in the country's future.

"We believe that 2009 is the year when these things will happen," he said.

Spencer Ackerman (aka ATTACKERMAN) chimes in on about how Secretary Gate's SASC testimony offers a glimpse into a new Afghanistan policy - BUT - Jules Crittenden rounds up that same testimony quite nicely - thanks Jules.

SWJ's (and FP's) own Westhawk, at his proper blog, poses two humdinger questions - does Obama see Karzai the same way Kennedy saw Diem? -- and - what if Afghans will not defend themselves?

Tom Ricks (The Gamble) at FP's Best Defense, points out the obvious concerning a new and wise policy brief and the not so obvious in dubbing Gentile and Exum the Lewis and Martin (almost typed in Clark) of Counterinsurgency.

Max Boot at Contentions pays high praise to Yochi Dreazen for his reporting in general and for this specific dispatch from Afghanistan.

Ever diligent Bill Roggio, with no time for such speculation, keeps on keeping on with just the facts ma'am at The Long War Journal.

Something in Wednesday's water - or truly interesting times?