Surge In Afghanistan Can Work, With Right Resources, Enough Time by John Nagl

There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan...

More at U.S. News & World Report.

Afghanistan Surge Is Not Worth the Cost in Blood and Treasure by Andrew Bacevich

More than seven years after 9/11, the global war on terrorism—in Pentagon parlance, the Long War—is entering a new phase. Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight...

More at U.S. News & World Report.

That perspective is based on serving long ago on both sides of the GPF / SOF fence and on current conversations with relatives having recent multiple deployments on both sides of that fence today. My belief and their belief is that there is a problem, that it is significant and that it will take a major effort to fix. Some may differ; discussion would be welcome.

To place this in perspective, look at today's force array and functions. There are the GPF and the SOF including SF (in a Direct Action role), SEALS, MarSOC, AFSOC, JSOC and others. We also have MTT, ETT, BTT, NPTT, PTT, NPoETT, OMLT, MCTAG, SF (in their designed UW/FID role), 6th SOS, the Navy has NECC advisors, the USGC has DOG, there are some Joint advisory elements and enablers like JIEDDO, REF, AWG and others. Plus DoJ/ DoS have contracts for DYNCORP and others for police advisors. There is also the ArNG and / or the Partnership for Peace. We are in a war and none of those things urgently requires change now. For possible future commitments, we can do better.

That cluster of hard working elements exists today as a result of actions in the mid 1970s. At that time, recruiting for all services was down and the quality of personnel recruited was marginal in many respects so the system in effect, dumbed down. We degraded training to an elementary level and a number of missions and tasks that the GPF had formerly performed were migrated to the SOF community. This was partly due to GPF concentration on a single theater and battle type and partly due to the poor quality of much GPF training at the time. It was also due to efforts to provide adequate 'mission' justification for the activation of USSOCOM in 1987 -- delayed until after Goldwater Nichols was signed into law in October 1986. Twenty three years ago...

The law and the activation were results of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, coordination problems in Operation Urgent Fury in 1983 and the bombing of the Marine Billets in Lebanon in 1983. Those also led to the Weinberger Doctrine and its follower, the Powell Doctrine, both were attempts to influence foreign policy and to avoid messy, tedious and expensive counterinsurgency operations. While there was logic in both, they failed in their intent to deter or preclude national action. A President decided that over 20 years of provocations emanating from the Middle East required a more robust response than his four successors had attempted and the doctrines became history. Another President in another day may make a similar decision.

A significant amount of mission migration occurred during the 25 or so years between the mid-70s and 2001.

The possibilities of FID and operations similar to our current deployments were largely ignored by both GPF and SOF. 'Relevance' was sought, roles and missions were changed. Thus SF, the FID and UW specialists, were diverted into CIF and Strategic Reconnaissance missions among others. While some pointed out the fallacy of using SF for those missions, one well within the capability of any truly competent Infantry Battalion and the other of a decently trained Long Range Surveillance Company, they were ignored and we elected, in essence, to use a Cadillac to do an Oldsmobile job. Oldsmobile, as we know, no longer exists...

Intervention in Panama and the liberation of Kuwait reinforced the view of each Force that its mission sets were correct and any comingling or cooperation was diligently avoided. The political debacle in Somalia and issues in the Balkans led to a hardening of positions between SOF and GPF, but also within the GPF between Light and Heavy and Combat Arms and other branches of the Army. Regrettably, the Army seemed to forget that it was now a professional force and the marginal quality of the mid 1970s troop unit was no longer the rule. The GPF was -- and now emphatically is -- capable of doing much more than it was or is allowed to do. At the same time, some SOF elements are performing routine tasks that detract from their primary mission sets.

In 2001 the Armed Forces showed that against a mediocre opponent in conventional combat, significant over match was available. What was also shown was a significant lack of adaptability and flexibility. It took some time to adapt to unexpected missions. That adaptation led to the elements cited above and to a number of ad hoc 'fixes.' The SOF adapted more rapidly as was to be expected but they were stretched due to finite number as only so many can qualify. That led to the GPF performing some 'SOF like missions' -- actually, those missions, raids, HVT capture and similar missions were and are not 'SOF-like' at all, they are simple and normal infantry missions. The types of missions that in World War II, in Korea and in Viet Nam common infantry Battalions routinely performed but which were not trained by the Infantry during the 1990s for the reasons stated above.

Strategic Direct Action (DA) is undeniably a SOF mission -- though under most circumstances Operational and Tactical DA is not. Adequate dedicated strategic DA elements are required and probably more than are currently available would be prudent. Those highly trained specialists should not be wasted on DA missions that Infantry units can perform. Nor should SF be used for DA missions under most circumstances.

Strategic Reconnaissance could, mission dependent, arguably be a SOF mission but it is not or should not be a SF mission. Operational and tactical reconnaissance are not SOF missions.

True FID is emphatically an SF mission. However, if the dedicated FID element, SF, does not have the numbers for a midsize, multiyear FID effort, then the GPF will be tasked to assist in that job as well. This means a cooperative effort by the DoD proponent, USSOCOM and TRADOC is needed to develop, emplace and support a good training regimen for the broader Army to be implemented on order. During Viet Nam, the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course operated by SWC was quite successful in training potential advisors of all ranks and services for duty in Southeast Asia. That seems to be a good model.

The QDR cannot stop arguments over roles and missions. It should not. Such argument can be helpful. Unfortunately, arguments can also be carried too far and do great harm. At Battalion and lower level, the GPF / SOF cooperation is generally quite good; it seems the bias problem is more severe in the upper echelons on both sides of the divide. This bias and separation is aided by excessive over-classification and compartmentalization of intelligence and that too must be addressed. The entire problem will take strong command effort to eliminate.

Required is a realization, no matter how painful, that most of warfare is really a general purpose sort of thing and that a lot of Chevrolets work quite well to oppose a good many Toyotas. Upgrade some Chevrolets to backfill the Oldsmobiles. Save the Cadillacs to oppose the odd imported Rolls or Lexus.

Define 'Special' down too far and it no longer is special...

The Winter 2008-2009 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Preserving Infrastructure: A 21st Century Challenge by Michael Chertoff

The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War by Colin S. Gray

Crafting Strategy in an Age of Transition by Shawn Brimley

COIN in the Real World by David R. Haines

Georgia's Cyber Left Hook by Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg

Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an 'Azimuth Check' by Richard deVillafranca

United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge by Gawdat Bahgat

Binding the Nation: National Service in America by Carol Armistead Grigsby

US Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth Kansas

Limited Tenure NTE: 3 Years; Renewable -- Full Time

Duties: The scope of duties of the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of Counterinsurgency involves interaction with national and international governmental and private agencies. Serves as an advocate for counterinsurgency education within the U.S. Army. Collaborates with the Commandant (Lieutenant General), Deputy Commandant (Brigadier General), CGSC school directors, staff and faculty, course and lesson authors, curriculum developers, and CAC agencies in the development and delivery of instruction addressing counterinsurgency subject matter. Serves as a professor, sits on thesis committees, and advises and assists student monograph development. Advises and provides recommendations on the role of CGSC and CAC in changing the culture of the force through the use of experimentation, counterinsurgency articles, and the creation and sharing of knowledge and experiences.

About the Position: CGSC is a multifaceted educational institution, annually teaching over 4,000 students in its resident and non-resident populations. Its diverse population includes representation from over 70 countries and all of the armed services of the United States military. Regionally accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and a member of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, CGSC grants the Master of Military Art and Science degree to approximately 200 students annually.

The incumbent serves as the focal point for the diffusion of knowledge within CGSC and its three schools (Command and General Staff School, School of Advanced Military Studies, and School of Command Preparation) concerning all aspects of counterinsurgency.

More information at the US Army Civilian Personnel Online - Job Announcement # SWEX09142011

... The US government has just released its new counterinsurgency guide for the civilian agencies, written under the direction of David Kilcullen. During the Bush years, a sort of counterinsurgency insurgency sprang up both in and out of the government and military - a group of thoughtful dissidents who, from very early on, tried to change American strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kilcullen was one of the key figures, and now other members of the group are being appointed to or talked about for important posts in the Obama Administration, including Janine Davidson as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans, Colin Kahl for the Middle East, and Phil Carter for detainee issues...

I know them all, think highly of them, would be very happy if they join the new administration, and wish them well. They've all absorbed the hard lessons of the past seven years of war, often up close. I don't know if there's still time to apply these lessons in Afghanistan, and I don't know if Pakistan even wants to learn them. But the new group in Washington might want to send a copy of both counterinsurgency manuals to the government in Islamabad, and another copy to the team of American advisers there.

More at The New Yorker.

This guide, written in a collaborative "whole of government" process and endorsed at the highest levels of our diplomacy, development, and defense leadership, reflects the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 and also FM 3-07). It is not, however, a tactical or operational "how-to" guide. Rather it is intended to be a "COIN 101" for policy-makers contemplating US intervention abroad.

As reflected in the debate over the Army's new doctrine on Stability Operations (FM 3-07), some cringe at the mere articulation of COIN principles in an official government publication; suspecting it might lead us to attempt more such intervention. But as I pointed out in my blog post on FM 3-07, doctrine is not grand strategy or policy. "For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect...Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes." Indeed, this is the core theme -- and purpose- of this new publication:

"Such understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and costs of intervention are weighted against US interests in determining whether to become involved and what form that involvement should take. This decision should not be taken lightly: historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated." (COIN Guide, p. 3)

The guide provides policy makers a framework for understanding the complexity and risks associated with COIN and, importantly, under what circumstances an attempted COIN intervention might actually be "folly." As with the latest publication of the Army's FM for stability operations, FM 3-07, this Handbook should generate debate about the wisdom of- and trade-offs associated with US involvement in these interventions. It should be read, understood, and debated by political leaders and anyone else interested in the what, why, and how of US intervention abroad.

The drafting of this Guide was led by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State with special thanks to Dr. David Kilcullen, Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Lieutenant Colonel Matt Porter, U.K. Royal Marines, and Colonel (Ret.) Carlos Burgos, U.S. Army.

The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education

By Craig M. Mullaney

If you can fill the unforgiving minute

With sixty Seconds' worth of distance, run,

Yours is the Earth and everything in it,

And--which is more--you'll be a Man, my son!

--Rudyard Kipling, "If"

My only regret in reading The Unforgiving Minute is that I had not read it earlier -- when I received an advance copy in the mail several weeks ago. Now finished, I will offer up my very short summation, echo the praise lavished on this fine piece of work since its release and give it a hearty thumbs up as essential reading for those in (or veterans of) our business -- and maybe more importantly - for those who need to know what that business is all about.

The Unforgiving Minute traces Craig Mullaney's life as a student at West Point, Ranger School and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar; as a Soldier in Afghanistan; as a teacher at the US Naval Academy, and as a veteran.

His writing style displays a fine balance that allows The Unforgiving Minute to be informative, educational, moving, and entertaining for both the seasoned warrior and uninitiated civilian alike. General David Petraeus was spot on in describing Mullaney's book as a wonderful, beautifully written story of the education and development of a young soldier-scholar, the coming of age of an infantry officer, and the exercise of a small unit leader's responsibilities in a tough, complex, and frustrating situation in Afghanistan. It captures particularly eloquently and movingly the relationships among those who walk point for our nation as part of that most elite of fraternities, the brotherhood of the close fight.

Within those words -- two -- soldier-scholar -- probably describe my major take-away from The Unforgiving Minute and reinforces all I've experienced the last 30 years associated with the US military -- we can ill afford leaders equipped solely with the implements of warfare -- they must be intellectually equipped as well. Craig Mullaney is indeed a soldier-scholar and --citizen as well and his story is the story of a whole generation of young leaders.

I'll leave you with Steve Coll's description of The Unforgiving Minute - ... one of the most compelling memoirs yet to emerge from America's 9/11 era. Craig Mullaney has given us an unusually honest, funny, accessible, and vivid account of a soldier's coming of age. This is more than a soldier's story; it is a work of literature.

The Unforgiving Minute - Craig Mullaney's web site

Interview with Andrew Exum - Abu Muqawama

Interview on Afghanistan - Charlie Rose Show

Of particular note on the book's website are their practical exercises -- OPDs in their parlance, but TDGs to many of us -- complete with instructor guides, etc.

The latest travel advisory for Mexico from the US State Department will certainly not please the tourist board. Rather than a glossy brochure advertising the country's many delights, the travel alert issued Friday reads like the plot of a crime thriller.

"Recent Mexican army and police confrontations with drug cartels have resembled small-unit combat, with cartels employing automatic weapons and grenades," the advisory reads. "Large firefights have taken place in many towns and cities across Mexico but most recently in northern Mexico, including Tijuana, Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez. During some of these incidents, US citizens have been trapped and temporarily prevented from leaving the area."

More at The Washington Post.

The Perilous State of Mexico - David Luhnow and José de Cordoba, Wall Street Journal

Detective Ramon Jasso was heading to work in this bustling city (Monterrey) a few days ago when an SUV pulled alongside and slowed ominously. Within seconds, gunmen fired 97 bullets at the 37-year-old policeman, killing him instantly.

Mr. Jasso had been warned. The day before, someone called his cellphone and said he would be killed if he didn't immediately release a young man who had been arrested for organizing a violent protest in support of the city's drug gangs. The demonstrators were demanding that the Mexican army withdraw from the drug war. The protests have since spread from Monterrey -- once a model of order and industry - to five other cities.

Much as Pakistan is fighting for survival against Islamic radicals, Mexico is waging a do-or-die battle with the world's most powerful drug cartels. Last year, some 6,000 people died in drug-related violence here, more than twice the number killed the previous year. The dead included several dozen who were beheaded, a chilling echo of the scare tactics used by Islamic radicals. Mexican drug gangs even have an unofficial religion: They worship La Santa Muerte, a Mexican version of the Grim Reaper.

More at The Wall Street Journal and:

Mexico Travel Alert - US Department of State

Juarez Police Chief Quits After Killings of Officers, Threats - Los Angeles Times

Mexican Cop Killed as Chief Pressured to Quit - Associated Press

Mexican President: Gov't Does Not Control Areas on US Border - Threats Watch

Undercover Cop in Middle American City - Global Guerrillas