To be fair, as normally happens, he probably reviewed a galley (or perhaps an early incomplete draft) of the book, and he therefore may not have had a chance to read it in full, read the later chapters or look at the theory chapter. Mr Bacevich's review focuses on the Iraq and Afghanistan chapters, but of course the book also analyses five other conflicts at some length (West Java, East Timor, Pakistan, Southern Thailand and radicalization in Europe), and there are three theory chapters also. I understand Mr Bacevich may have been pressed for time or short of space, and so I can completely understand a desire to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. But whatever the reason, the fact is that the book Mr Bacevich criticizes so harshly is simply not the book I wrote...

Some examples. Mr Bacevich writes "the consummate counterinsurgency professional understands that the application of technique, however skillful, will not suffice to salvage the Long War. Yet as someone deeply invested in that conflict, [Kilcullen] cannot bring himself to acknowledge the conclusion to which his own analysis points: the very concept of waging a Long War as the antidote to Islamism is fundamentally and irrevocably flawed."

I agree completely. I said so in the book, actually, in chapter 5. At the top of page 268, I write "counterinsurgency in general is a game we need to avoid wherever possible. If we we are forced to intervene, we now (through much hard experience) have a reasonably sound idea of how to do so. But we should avoid such interventions wherever possible, simply because the costs are so high and the benefits so doubtful."

He also writes, in one of the best parts of his review: "If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn't be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda's game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?"

Again, I couldn't agree more. That's what I said in the book -- on the middle of page 269: "we should avoid any future large-scale, unilateral military intervention in the Islamic world, for all the reasons already discussed." A few pages earlier, in the middle of page 264, I write: "Our too-—and heavy-handed interventions in the so-called "war on terrorism" to date have largely played into the hands of this AQ exhaustion strategy, while creating tens of thousands of accidental guerrillas and tying us down in a costly (and potentially unsustainable) series of interventions." I do, however, make the point (at the top of page 284) that "This will be a protracted conflict. Because the drivers of conflict in the current security environment...lie predominantly outside Western governments' control, our ability to terminate this conflict on our own terms or within our preferred timeline is extremely limited." In other words, I'm not saying we should seek to continue the Long War -- far from it, I'm saying this is likely to be a long-term conflict, whether we seek it or not. This may seem a very subtle distinction, but it's one that other reviewers have grasped easily.

For instance Jay Nordlinger, in his gracious and fair review in The New Criterion (fair largely, I suspect, because he has actually read the book in detail) criticizes me accurately for taking the opposite position from the one Mr Bacevich claims I hold. Mr Nordlinger describes me, correctly, as someone who dislikes whole concept of a Long War on Terrorism, writing "Kilcullen doesn't like this term, thinking it stupid. What would he like to say instead?" Mr Nordlinger also criticizes me (again fairly, I think, on reflection) for portraying myself as more culturally adept than others I worked with in the field, writing "the author likes to paint himself as the one native-knower—the Malinowski of the warrior class—amid oafish and insensitive palefaces. This, too, is unbecoming (even if occasionally—occasionally—true)." He has a point -- I was abashed to read this in his review, went back and looked at the book, and realized that he is quite correct. I do often seem to suggest that I knew better than the others around me. It was indeed unbecoming of me, and I apologize unreservedly for giving that impression. I have worked with, or read the writings of, dozens of people -- Mac McAllister, Harold Ingram, Derek Harvey, Chris Cavoli, and many many others -- whose knowledge of the environment and of local cultures leaves mine for dead. It's no excuse, but I suspect that in writing a first-person account I tended to unconsciously overstate the importance of my own insights. Well spotted, Mr Nordlinger -- this was accurate and constructive criticism that will help me do better next time, I hope -- exactly what a review should be. Mr Nordlinger's comments are thus valid, and they are of course based on a correct reading of the book.

Meanwhile Mr Bacevich writes: "When it comes to dealing with Islamism, containment rather than transformation should provide the cornerstone of U.S. (and Western) strategy." Again, I find myself in violent agreement with Mr Bacevich and...um, myself.

Starting on page 280 there is an entire section entitled "understanding the limits of our influence" (which quotes Mr Bacevich at length, by the way, one of two lengthy and favorable mentions of him) and argues against a series of interventions in the Muslim world. The book considers the option of containment strategy (in Chapter 1, at the bottom of page 19), criticizes the policy of direct intervention, and shows how containment would have been a valid strategic response to 9/11, though it notes that containment would have been extremely difficult to achieve, given the effects of globalization. The book also quotes Senator John F. Kerry, in Chapter 5, page 277-78, and describes his proposal of a containment strategy as showing "evident good sense".

Besides these intellectual inaccuracies, I was rather surprised to find Mr Bacevich so critical of my personal character, since I have never met him. He wrote "with the administration whose policies he sought to implement now gone from office, Kilcullen uses Accidental Guerrilla to skewer those he served for gross strategic ineptitude," suggesting that I showed moral cowardice by waiting until the Bush administration left office before airing my criticisms of policy.

At the risk of treating SWJ readers like poorly-read undergraduates, I would suggest that people Google "countering global insurgency", my first major published work on this topic, which heavily criticized the Bush administration's strategy back in 2004, or read George Packer's article "Knowing the Enemy" in the New Yorker of 18th December 2006, in which Mr Packer publicly described my position as a "thoroughgoing critique" of Bush administration policy. Or people may like to look at my post in this journal from July 2008, in which I publicly reiterated my strong and long-standing public disagreement on the decision to invade Iraq. Two points here, I guess -- first, my views have been on the public record for years, since well before I came to work for the government and since before I served in the field in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They hired me anyway. And secondly, surprising as it may be, the last administration -- just like the present administration -- was big enough, open enough and intellectually honest enough to tolerate and, indeed, welcome constructive criticism and genuine attempts to fix policy problems. I never found that it needed much moral courage to be honest about my opinions -- non-partisan honesty was exactly what Secretary Rice wanted from me, and she told me that more than once. The ability to tolerate and integrate different opinions, and thus to self-correct, is one of the foremost strengths of our form of government, and I suspect this is true of all administrations, though perhaps it is true of some more than others.

It would probably be improper to go on at (even greater) length about this. Suffice it to say, I'm honored that such a prominent, prolific and able commentator as Mr Bacevich took the time to notice and review my book. I guess I just wish he had read it in detail, as Mr Nordlinger and other reviewers seem to have done. And I hope that others who have the chance will read the book also, before making up their minds.

Contrary to what my good friend and fellow Marine, Frank Hoffman, argues, I believe that this continual adding of adjectives in front of "war" is counterproductive. As Clausewitz wrote, "In war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole, for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together." Every modification of the word "war" serves mainly as fodder for un-needed conferences, workshops, and meetings where the new definitions as well as the merits of these terms are debated with, in my estimation, little value added. These new terms also help confuse our officer corps and undermine a solid professional lexicon. I remain in Professor Colin Gray's corner who maintains that "warfare is warfare"---plain and simple. At most we need only think of it in two forms, wars of fire and maneuver and wars of insurgency.

Clausewitz allowed for this with two observations:

(1) "War is more than a chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case."

(2) "We can thus only say that the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs . . . will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character."

Our current enemies have adopted wars of insurgency as the form they use to challenge us.

Paul Van Riper

Updates:

Frank Hoffman responds:

I have always been informed by the tremendous scholarship of Dr. Gray and of course have benefited over the years from my interaction with General Van Riper. But they are both wrong here (I think Dr. Gray is being misquoted out of context and not wrong). We've been arguing this particular point for some time since the Army 2003 Arm War College strategy conference where I was critical of The American Way of War, and at NDU in 2008 where General Van Riper first articulated his views.

I agree with Dr. Gray's true point that War is War. War defined as a state of violent interaction between two groups, a clash of wills AND cultures, between groups (not necessarily just States) to obtain political ends is War. As he states in his great book, my Loop choice Fighting Talk, war is a relationship. Furthermore, the nature of war is immutable (violence, chance, human dimension, etc) But Warfare, Dr Gray makes pains to distinguish as a subset of War and I agree, warfare describes the military component of War, the warmaking. I recommend his chapter "There is More to War than Warfare" for those seeking more distinction.

Warfare is not immutable, quite the opposite. Dr. Gray points out that some cultures (he means ours) have a dominant military culture that precludes understanding the distinction between war and warfare (p. 32), which often leads to tactical success but strategic failure. I think Dr. Gray is right about us, for we conflate our preferences about warfare and then mirror image our enemies with our culturally induced idea about what warfare is and isnt. We focus on the warfare, and ignore the strategic context. Regrettably, General Van Riper's comments continue that misunderstanding--undoubtedly unintentionally.

I think the bromide that Warfare is Warfare is a dangerous over-simplification and residue from the poor professional conceptualization of warfare that has marked U.S. military since Vietnam. I recall the late Harry Summer's as the first in the "War is War is War" school, in his essay by that title in the post-Vietnam era. This was central to his argument that Vietnam was a conventional fight, which remains a dubious argument that has fallen aside. This has led us to the problems in our doctrine and profession reflected in operations and the poor transition to a better peace in Panama, Desert Storm and OIF. It has truncated our thinking to a narrow professional sphere in the conflict spectrum, the most irrelevant today and for the mid-range future.

There ARE forms of warfare, and different societies and cultures have they own forms or modes of warfare. There is fighting and dying in each of them, but the rule sets or principles or what Clausewitz suggested by Grammar are different. One doesn't succeed in COIN by applying conventional warfighting capabilities and one doesn't succeed in major combat operations with t he six Logical Lines of Operation of FM 3-24. Moreover, ignoring the distinction simply continues the tragedy.

Moreover, as General Van Riper points out, and as Dr. Tony Echevarria has discussed in some length in his book on Clausewitz and Contemporary Conflict, our Prussian friend was very much aware that war (more accurately warfare) has an ever evolving character. Each age he said has its own conception and preconceptions, and that war is MORE than a chameleon, that is it changes more than just color, it changes its character and characteristics. I think General Van Riper, given his profound historical founding and study, appreciates this more than most of us and actually means this in his statement, but by trying to bin everything into Warfare is Warfare, he perpetuates our misunderstanding of what has changed and what has not. This will continue to leave us poorly prepared for tomorrow's fights.

I think its patently illogical to ignore language and its influence on our professional thinking. We already have numerous adjectives about warfare: Unconventional, Irregular and "Conventional" or Traditional. I think all of these are flawed or outdated in our thinking right now. UW is related to the SOF community and needs serious updating. Irregular has become synonymous with COIN, which is a very clear case of what Colin calls "presentism." I don't agree that our enemies have picked something called Wars of Insurgency, t hat is OUR term and its a label or adjective after the noun instead of in front of it. There are many forms of Irregular Warfare for which the Joint concept leave us utterly unprepared for. What I think most folks think of as Regular or Conventional or Traditional warfare is vague but is very Western or ethno-centric. I think we need a serious professional discourse about warfare and what assumptions and illusions we hide behind when we use the terms we have.

This is a valuable debate because we are entering an era in which our conceptualization of future conflict will influence our strategy, and the allocation of scarce resources is upon us. I trust that the debate will continue.

Frank

LtGen Van Riper responds:

Ah, it is a sad task to debate a good friend in a public forum, but in this case a necessary task. Let me say at the outset, however, that for several reasons I am surprised by Frank Hoffman's focus on a term many view as simply trendy, for in the past we have both lamented the steady degrading of the military's professional lexicon in numerous conversations over dinner. (Pity our poor wives who have to listen to such professional talks for hours on end.) Moreover, from 1995 to 1997 Frank was the very best writer at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and many of his words appeared in my formal congressional testimony and speeches. Those words were simple and elegant, unburdened by use of stylish terms.

Also, let me second Frank's words that Dr. Gray's, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare and Dr. Antulio (Tony) Echevarria's Clausewitz: Contemporary War are exceptional books that serious scholars of war, strategy, and operational art need to read and study! I might also tout Dr. Gray's latest book, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities, one for which I was honored to write a forward.

I took the words "warfare is warfare" from the Conclusion (page 370) of Another Bloody Century. The lead sentence to that chapter reads, "Warfare is warfare, period." Later in that chapter Dr. Gray notes that "War, and warfare, has an enduring, unchanging nature, but a highly variable character." He also observes that "The American defense community is especially prone to capture by the latest catchphrase, the new-sounding spin on an ancient idea which as jargon separates those who are truly expert from the lesser breeds without the jargon." Though Dr. Gray's words, I believe, support my case, please read the entire chapter—better the entire book—to judge for yourself. Again, I am surprised by Frank's insistence that the word "hybrid" adds to our understanding of war, for he is "truly expert" in things military, and certainly not "from the lesser breeds."

I am fairly certain that I understand Dr. Gray's distinction between war and warfare. In fact, I would have preferred to use words I believe he spoke in 2005 at the opening of an address at the Army War College, "War is war," but not having a transcript of that address I hesitated. As a nation we are too single-minded and center our attention on warfare rather than war. Dr. Echevarria has pointed this out in numerous places, noting that it is the reason we have an "American way of battle," not war. I agree! Too few Americans understand the full impact of Clausewitz's admonition: ". . . war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs." As a Marine I am deeply interested in the "grammar" of war, but I know that it is the "logic" that is most important.

The one thing Frank and I certainly agree on is that "we already have numerous adjectives about warfare." He is also correct that my "wars of fire and maneuver" and "wars of insurgency" place the adjectives after the noun. However, my words have the distinct advantage in that they spell out a meaning; the reader does not have to guess as he or she might with words like "irregular," "unconventional," "nontraditional," forth generation," and yes, "hybrid."

Let the debate continue.

May the winner enjoy a Sam Adams and a steak at the expense of the other!

PKVR

Recent operational experience has identified the need for the United States Government to make better use of law enforcement concepts, skills and organizations to improve outcomes in population centric operations. However, within this broad consensus, there is a lack of common understanding beyond 'we need more police'. Deeper analysis of this problem space quickly identifies not just a lack of common understanding but three varying and overlapping perspectives on the role of law enforcement in this context.

From a military perspective, the value of law enforcement may be seen as enhancing the military's conduct of population centric operations through improved patrolling techniques, investigation, community engagement, graduated use of force etc. Separate to the military perspective is the potential to deploy civilian law enforcement personnel to essentially perform domestic law enforcement tasks, such as community policing, in support of broader operational goals. Finally, there is the perspective focused on long term capacity building and institutional reform of host nation law enforcement agencies, which is a prerequisite for the successful drawing down of international resources and the establishment of ongoing diplomatic relations. It should be noted that all three of these perspectives are valid and, in fact, mutually reinforcing.

The reasons for these different perspectives and associated gaps in USG capability become apparent when one considers that elements of the responsibility for law enforcement capability in international operations reside across the Departments of State, Justice and Defense in addition to USAID's role in capacity building. Additionally there is no single point of Congressional oversight and funding for these various organizations.

To help address this situation, the Emerging Capabilities Division within the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored an interagency project on Transitional Law Enforcement aimed at stimulating, informing and providing a framework for discussion on the application of law enforcement in international operations. This was achieved by first documenting the various interagency perspectives and contributions as well as the specific functions of TLE in international operations. This was supported by an analysis of the USG authorities (legislation, policies, directives, etc) that govern various aspects of TLE. The project also covered international models for deploying law enforcement expertise including a detailed analysis of the capabilities of the Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group as well as issues associated with international supply and demand for law enforcement and an overview of the law enforcement communities and international contributions of sixteen major donor nations.

The Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute has uploaded these documents for use by any interested organization. These documents are the first set of deliverables in an ongoing body of work which investigates the role of law enforcement on international operations.

Ben Fitzgerald is the Principal for Noetic Corporation, a strategy firm focused on national and homeland security issues. Scott Brady, a former Australian Army officer, is a senior analyst with Noetic.

Ten Questions with Bing West

Bing West served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. A graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities, he served in Marine infantry in Vietnam. His books have won the Marine Corps Heritage Prize, the Colby Award for Military History and appeared on the Commandant's Reading List. West appears regularly on The News Hour and Fox News. He is a member of St. Crispin's Order of the Infantry and the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Newport, RI.

He recently released The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, the result of fourteen trips to Iraq embedded with front-line units over the entire course of the war, and agreed to be interviewed by the CCO on the lessons he learned from writing the book.

1. Your assessment of the national Iraqi security forces, including the Army and the Police, is pretty bleak. An important aspect of counterinsurgency is working with indigenous partners, but given that their inability to take control of the counterinsurgency effort was a major part of our change in strategy in early 2007, do we need to rethink our basic assumptions as to how best to work with the host nation? Would it have been better to adopt a grass-roots approach from the beginning, putting all our effort into working with groups from each town, city and region to secure their own areas before looking to create national forces?

President Obama has declared a total pull out by Aug of 2011. So US advisers have about two years to improve the Iraqi security forces. But the leverage of advisers has been tremendously weakened -- discounted -- because the date certain for their departure has been agreed by the US and GOI. It's too late for significantly more strengthening by US mentoring. We will provide technical training, staff procedures and logistical support. The greatest defect in our approach is the lack of police techniques appropriate to an insurgency.

The grass-roots approach makes all the sense in the world; but it cannot be applied until a majority of the locals in the affected area support the approach and are —to inform on the insurgents in their midst. In Iraq, that willingness on the Sunni side did not appear until late 2006; then it spread rapidly. On the Shiite side, the power of the Sadr extremists was not broken until the battles in Basra and Baghdad in April of 2007.

2. Similarly, do we need to revisit our assumptions for creating governance in such a situation? How can we avoid giving the impression that we're playing favorites, thereby branding someone as an American lackey, while also avoiding the negative consequences of top-down power brokering, such as groups like Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army gaining control over critical departments like the Health Ministry?

If we have to go in to remove some son of a bitch, why shouldn't we play favorites? The people understand when they are ruled by a tyrant. We should have arrested Sadr for treason in July of 2003.

3. Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the Awakening Council who was assassinated in September 2007 told you that the Iraqis had to decide for themselves that their future lay with the Americans and not al Qaeda. What role does securing the population play in winning the loyalty of the population? Is it enough on its own or does it require some other catalyst, such as al Qaeda's brutal treatment of the Sunni population, that causes the people to end their support for the insurgents? What implications does this reality have for Afghanistan?

Darned if I know when and why a population turns against the insurgents previously harbored, either out of fear or ideological or religious solidarity. There are limits to what foreigners, no matter how well-meaning, can do when reaching across cultural lines. I do believe that the American soldier and marine bring a combination of decency, perseverance and overwhelmingly superior fighting power. That has an effect first upon the security forces of the host nation; they feel empowered by aligning with the strongest tribe. Eventually in Iraq the Sunni sheiks, rallying around Abu Risha's remarkable leadership, turned first to the American side, and after a year or so, began a grudging political dialogue with the Baghdad Shiite-dominated government.

How or when or even why that model can be transferred to Afghanistan is beyond my ken at the moment. It would be sheer speculation on my part. It may or may not happen; I haven't spent enough time in Afghanistan to offer an informed opinion.

4. After using numerous "cease-fire" declarations since 2004 to rearm and regroup, Moqtada al-Sadr announced last summer that he was disbanding most of his militia. Is this "ceasefire" different from all the rest? If so, what do you think influenced this decision, particularly if the majority of the American effort in Baghdad in 2008 was against al Qaeda and not the Jaish al-Mahdi?

Sadr's synapses don't beat in regular rhythms. He's somewhere in Iraq playing video games. He is a diminished player. His organization is marginalized. The Iranians would like to use Sadr's henchmen as their cat's paw, to include terrorist acts. Sadr is no longer main stream because his forces lost their power status in Sadr City and Basra. Many are in hiding or in Iran.

5. What, in your view, is the proper relationship between civil and military players in counterinsurgency? Should major reconstruction aid be used primarily as a means of ending support for insurgents, or as a reward for populations that reject the insurgents and provide assistance to the counterinsurgents? Or should we be involved in major reconstruction efforts at all in places like Iraq?

I'm not a advocate of fulsome nation-building. In the March issue of Military Review, I lay out my reasons. In a nutshell, if you hand sovereignty over to a set of leaders, then the burden and authority to build a nation rest with them, not you.

6. You tell the story of Maj. Rory Quinn, who, with the experience of two tours as a company commander in Iraq, advises other company commanders on proper police techniques for counterinsurgency, which he calls a "police war." You point to this as a "gap in military training." From your perspective, what are the biggest gaps in military training and education for counterinsurgency? What can the military be doing differently in preparing soldiers for counterinsurgency?

Every treatise on counter insurgency begins by explaining that you must hold a census and identify the population because that strips the insurgent of his protective cover. For some reason, we have refused to do that in either Iraq or Afghanistan. In Iraq, the average Sunni male was stopped twice a year for ID; yet over seven years, we claimed it was too hard to be systematic about taking fingerprints and a census.

7. You argue, "reducing US force in Iraq can be done prudently, as long as we don't promise a total withdrawal that signals America has given up. That makes no sense given the progress that has been made." What are your thoughts on the Status of Forces Agreement? Does it meet your metrics for prudent withdrawal of American forces?

Prime Minister Maliki, who is convinced he does not need those pesky Americans, outfoxed President Bush, who agreed to a total withdrawal by August of 2011. President Obama was delighted to affirm Bush -- and to say that the Bush policy of going into Iraq and managing the war were wrong. I have no idea what will happen after 2011 in Iraq.

8. You are critical of the contributions from the civilian agencies in Iraq. With the new administration, there has been an emphasis, at least verbally, in providing greater resources to the State Department to allow it to take some of the burden off of the military, particularly in counterinsurgency and stability operations. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have also repeatedly stressed the need for increased civilian resources in these types of missions. In your view, how far will this go to rectify the problem you point to in sharing responsibilities? Are the shortcomings on the civilian side fundamentally one of resources or is the problem bigger than that?

Our diplomats are trained to respect the sovereign rights of other countries, including the right to steal, etc. Iraq and Afghanistan rank among the most corrupt nations in the world. Yet we say corruption impedes good governance. Of course it's more complicated than that, but as a nation we've not determined how we correct glaring blemishes in governments such as the one in Kabul. The Pentagon is anxious to transfer the mission of creating responsive governance to State. I'm not sure how either an American civilian or a military officer eradicates the corruption associated with drug money in Kabul and the provinces. Obama has promised a new NATO strategy in April.

9. You make the case that holding elections in Iraq too early, at least at the national level, contributed to the problem by giving power to a government that was beholden only to certain segments of the population and ignored other groups. In situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, where we found ourselves with control of countries with no government, what would you suggest as an alternative? Should local elections be held sooner than national elections? Should the intervening power play a role in the governance of the country until it can bring some semblance of security and stability to the country? Should it organize and appoint an indigenous governing body until security and stability can be restored? Or is there some other option?

It's not so much the exact political model as it is a matter of power. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the fundamental error was turning over complete authority to host nation leaders who were badly flawed. We should have insisted on a joint board to review key promotions and billets for the security forces.

10. You take issue in previous writings with the phrase attributed to David Galula that "COIN is 80% political and 20% military." In your estimation, is it more likely that political advances will lead to security, or that ending the violence and creating security will allow room for political advances?

Insurgency is a branch of warfare. War is about killing until the other side is eradicated or accepts your terms. If you cannot protect the population from death, you lose. Security leads.

As the CCO approaches its first anniversary, the CCO Support Office will be moving to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University (NDU) under the oversight of Hans Binenndijk and Bernie Carreau. This move introduces clear advantages as well as some manageable challenges to the CCO's charter and has thus generated some moderate debate. Based on my experience in leading the development and launch of the CCO, I thought I would offer the following insight for the SWJ readership and the CCO community of interest.

The CCO-NDU Plan

One of the things that made the CCO unique, was its link to policy makers, via the governing structure across State, DoD, and USAID. This link was designed to give the community a voice to leadership. Accordingly, the project will maintain ties to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) office for Policy via a permanently detailed Deputy Director from the Stability Operations office, (currently Dave Sobyra). A new executive director under NDU should be named soon. The Executive Committee will continue to be comprised of policy reps from OSD, US Agency for International Development (US AID), State Pol/Mil, State Center for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Joint Staff and will be chaired by Hans Binenndijk.

Pros? Cons?

While there will be a few challenges to overcome, overall the move to NDU offers clear advantages to the mission of the CCO. The immediate proximity to the academic community and the thought leadership in the CTNSP will introduce resources and collaborative opportunities. The CTNSP has a fist hand interest and expertise in Complex Operations having just released a compressive draft publication on the Complex Operations challenge across Defense and the interagency space.

The Center's prolific policy emphasis, and the University's events and students from across government, industry and academia will undoubtedly add energy and focus to the CCO's constituency, productivity and offerings.

There is demand for the CCO's insights on the part of both government and academia. Partners from Ohio State, the University of Texas, George Mason and others share interests in the events and activities of the Consortium and are keenly interested in focusing their students and institutions on addressing some of the nation's challenges and opportunities. The move to NDU can only help with actively involving these partners from outside the government.

While the proximity to academia and thought leadership can only help the CCO's energy and relevance, the CCO's leadership will need to stay focused on two primary CCO imperatives, the first to define and employ an interagency governance model, and the second, to avail ongoing training and information to our men and women who are continually engaging in complex operations in many and varied global regions. As was evident in every phase of the CCO stand up and execution, relentless attention, coordination and scheduling was required by CCO Support Center lead, Mac Bollman, to ensure the fully integrated oversight of the CCO among the interagency partners. It would have been be easy to revert to single point decision making, enabled by the fact that the funding for the CCO is primarily from defense. The CCO's interagency charter, and Executive and Steering committee bodies required perpetual attention and coordination to vet agendas and initiatives and to gather the leaders of five different organizations. As to the training challenge, while NDU is not a training institution, the CCO does have a charter responsibility to keep its members current on available training and to help them get at the training they need. The comprehensive catalogue of complex operations-related training and education across the consortium, which is maintained by the CCO on its portal, took a tremendous amount of energy to compile. It will continue to require sustained effort by consortium members and leadership to update to ensure the members' offerings are up to date and in view.

Overall the Right Move

The move to NDU is coming at the right time to take the CCO to the next level of collaboration and community support in Complex Operations. The move can energize all aspects of the CCO's charter on thought leadership, consortium support and coordination, and the guidance for its membership on available training for those heading out to support Complex Operations.

Background

Janine Davidson's CCO Kick Off speech, April 28, 2008: Janine's speech was co-authored by Janine Davidson and Mac Bollman and provides a clear overview of the original intent and design of the CCO.

Janine Davidson is an Assistant Professor at George Mason University's Graduate School of Public Policy and a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution.

I'm convinced this "New Model Army" is going to be encountered with more frequency on the world's battlefields. The U.S. military would do well to study this new and adaptive threat and prepare accordingly.

More at DoD Buzz.

The Axis of Upheaval by Niall Ferguson

Forget Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—Bush's "Axis of Evil." As economic calamity meets political and social turmoil, the world's worst problems may come from countries like Somalia, Russia, and Mexico. And they're just the beginning.

The Most Dangerous Place in the World by Jeffrey Gettleman

Somalia is a state governed only by anarchy. A graveyard of foreign-policy failures, it has known just six months of peace in the past two decades. Now, as the country's endless chaos threatens to engulf an entire region, the world again simply watches it burn.

Reversal of Fortune by Arkady Ostrovsky

Vladimir Putin's social contract has been premised on an authoritarian state delivering rising incomes and resurgent power. But the economic crisis is unraveling all that. And what comes next in Russia might be even worse.

State of War by Sam Quinones

Mexico's hillbilly drug smugglers have morphed into a raging insurgency. Violence claimed more lives there last year alone than all the Americans killed in Iraq. And there's no end in sight.

Much more at Foreign Policy.

Last weekend I sent out the following "RFI" to a number of bloggers I know:

Andrew Exum's post / review of Tom Ricks' The Gamble several weeks ago at Abu Muqawama got me thinking (once again) about the impact of the "new media" on issues concerning national security, military doctrine and concept development, as well as lessons learned. As one part of this new media I'm not sure I fully grasp our influence -- though I am often told we are, quote -- "making a difference". Here is the excerpt from the AM post that got me thinking about this.

"The New Media: Ricks cited a discussion on Small Wars Journal once and also cited some things on PlatoonLeader.org but never considered the way in which the new media has revolutionized the lessons learned process in the U.S. military. (Forget Abu Muqawama, though, because this lowly blog started around the same time as the surge.) Instead of just feeding information to the Center for Army Lessons Learned and waiting for lessons to be disseminated, junior officers are now debating what works and what doesn't on closed internet fora -- such as PlatoonLeader and CompanyCommand -- and open fora, such as the discussion threads on Small Wars Journal. The effect of the new media on the junior officers fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was left curiously unexplored by Ricks, now a famous blogger himself."

I'd like to get your thoughts on this - nothing elaborate -- maybe a paragraph or two on the core issues concerning the new media and it impact on the military. I'd then like to post the responses I get as one post on SWJ.

Appreciate the consideration.

What follows are the replies I received through yesterday. Some stuck to the one-two requested paragraphs, some sent more. Rather than attempt to "over edit" and get some uniformity I opted to go with this initial batch of thoughts on this issue.

All good stuff that hopefully energizes a discourse on the impact of new media and its influence on military doctrine, concept development, training, education, and lessons learned. Without further ado (and in alphabetical order) here is Spencer Ackerman, Tom Barnett, Janine Davidson, Andrew Exum, Grim, Judah Grunstein, Dave Kilcullen, Raymond Pritchett, Mark Safranski, Herschel Smith, Starbuck, Michael Tanji, and Michael Yon...

Thoughts on the "New Media" - compiled by Small Wars Journal

Update:

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama

New Media Poised to Change the Future National Security Debate - Raymond Pritchett, Information Dissemination

SWJ, New Media and COIN - Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review

Thoughts on the New Media and Military Blogging - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

New Media + Old Military = New Military - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

The "New Media," the Surge, and the Writing of History - Mark Grimsley, Cliopatria

Media Blitz - Spencer Ackerman, Attackerman

New Media and Modern War - Joshua Foust, Registan

Legacy Futures in Cyberspace - Adam Elkus, ThreatsWatch

Small Wars Invitational on The Surge and New Media - Grim, Blackfive

The Difference - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Recommended Reading - Mark Safranski, Zenpundit

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Starbuck, Wings Over Iraq

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.

Here is the March - April 2009 Issue lineup:

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq by Bing West

A noted author summarizes the lessons from Iraq and draws some surprising conclusions.

Unifying Physical and Psychological Impact During Operations by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army Retired

America's love affair with technology and raw power eroded appreciation for the psychological dimension of war.

Narrowing the Gap: DOD and Stability Operations by Colonel David W. Shin, U.S. Army

Performing all stability lines of operations as a "core mission" is impossible for the U.S. military; it does not have the resources. DOD must prioritize its strengths—providing civil security and control.

Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi: Grass Roots Reconstruction by Captain Chad M. Pillai, U.S. Army

Because no clear linkage exists between Army units' short-term goals and broader interagency goals, tactics meant to foster local governance and economic development have produced mixed long-term results.

Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Latham, U.S. Army Retired

Imagined efficiencies of contracting may cause the U.S. military to lose its jurisdiction over traditional roles.

From Peddlers to Sheiks: A Contracting Case Study in Southern Baghdad by Lisa A. Verdon

Coalition contracting for public projects in Iraq suggests that reconciliation in Iraq comes at the discretion of the sheik.

All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence by Major Ben Connable, U.S. Marine Corps

The military should expand its organic, sustainable cultural expertise rather than waste resources on external academics and the appendage called the "Human Terrain System."

Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Military by Colonel Henri Boré, French Army Retired

An expert from the French Army relates how cultural expertise was a critical combat skill that led to success for French counterinsurgents of the recent past.

Testing Galula in Ameriyah: the People are the Key by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, U.S. Army

David Galula claims that popular support for the counterinsurgent requires an active minority working on its behalf. Ameriyah showed him to be correct.

A View from Inside the Surge by Lieutenant Colonel James Crider, U.S. Army

The "surge" worked, and David Galula's 40-year old treatise proved its worth in the process. His works should be required reading for American military professionals.

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in South Africa by Major Timothy M. Bairstow, U.S. Marine Corps

South Africa successfully employed the principles of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2).

Educating by Design: Preparing Leaders for a Complex World by Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army

The School for Advanced Military Studies is meeting a recognized need for new conceptual tools to assist commanders in the operational planning process.

The Art of Design: A Design Methodology by Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army, and Alex Ryan Ph.D.

Two experts provide a brief overview of adaptive learning to develop comprehensive plans for complex missions.

Learning from Moderate Governments' Approaches to Islamist Extremism by Major Eric A. Claessen Jr., Belgium Army

One can learn much from states that controlled extremists for decades.

The Future Combat System Program by Major Luis Alvarado, U.S. Army

The Future Combat System will be the Army's best connection to America's future war machine.

Book Reviews

Letters

2009 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

Super (Sub) Secretaries - Thomas Friedman, New York Times

It is way too soon to say what policy breakthroughs Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be known for at the State Department. But she has already left her mark bureaucratically. She has invented new diplomatic positions that say a great deal about the state of foreign policy in these messy times. I would call them "The Super Sub-Secretaries of State."

Mrs. Clinton has appointed three Super Sub-Secretaries - George Mitchell to handle Arab-Israel negotiations, Richard Holbrooke to manage Afghanistan-Pakistan affairs and Dennis Ross to coordinate Iran policy. The Obama team seems to have concluded that these three problems are so intractable that they require almost full-time secretary of state-quality attention. So you need officials who have more weight and more time - more weight than the normal assistant secretary of state so they will be taken seriously in their respective regions and will have a chance to move the bureaucracy, and more time to work on each of these discrete, Gordian problems than a secretary of state can devote in a week...

More at The New York Times.