The 2nd Quarter 2009 issue of Joint Force Quarterly is now posted.

Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JFQ is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to better meet tomorrow's challenges while protecting freedom today.

Here is the lineup:

Forum Executive Summary by David H. Gurney

What Is Economic Power? by Ellen L. Frost

The Rise of the Rest by William H. Overholt

Finance and Power by James G. Lacey and David L. Asher

Conflict Trends in the 21st Century by Michael Moodie

Transnational Movements and Terrorism by Mark E. Stout, Thomas F. Lynch III, and T.X. Hammes

Time to Improve U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere by Craig A. Deare

Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia by Michael Krepon

NATO's Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny? by Jeffrey Simon

Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer by Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo

Commercializing USCENTCOM Aerial Ports by John E. Michel and Jean M. Mahan

Looking Back on Operation Jump Start by David M. Church

Trouble with Doctrine? by David H. Gurney

Effects-based Thinking in Joint Doctrine by Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division Staff

Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design by Richard M. Swain

A Case Against Systemic Operational Design by Milan N. Vego

Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency Strategy by Jeffrey Philip Treistman

A Perfect Storm for Pentagon Reform by Travis Sharp

DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System: A Path Toward Improvement by Albert T. Church and Ted Warner

Bridging the Strategy-Resources Gap: Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis by Ionut C. Popescu

Protecting the Past to Secure the Future: The Strategic Value of Heritage Training by Laurie W. Rush and Matthew F. Bogdanos

Joint Doctrine Update by Joint Chiefs of Staff J7

Col. James A. Brandon flew Black Hawks when Moscow was considered a mortal foe of the United States and spent years in the Army studying enemy aircraft. So he now finds it a little bizarre to be piloting an old MI-17 Russian helicopter, a legacy of the Soviet invaders here, in the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan.

But in a case of going to war with not just the military you have, but the military your enemy once had, Colonel Brandon is a leader of a bumpy American effort to build an Afghan Air Force from the wreckage up. To do that as quickly and (relatively) cheaply as possible, the United States is training American pilots to fly the helicopters of the former Soviet Union - Colonel Brandon calls them "flying trucks" - so the American pilots can in turn train, or retrain, Afghan pilots who once flew for the Russians, the Taliban or powerful warlords.

More at The New York Times.

Remarks of President Barack Obama -- As Prepared for Delivery

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Friday, February 27, 2009

Good morning Marines. Good morning Camp Lejeune. Good morning Jacksonville. Thank you for that outstanding welcome. I want to thank Lieutenant General Hejlik for hosting me here today.

I also want to acknowledge all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That includes the Camp Lejeune Marines now serving with -- or soon joining -- the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq; those with Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Afghanistan; and those among the 8,000 Marines who are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. We have you in our prayers. We pay tribute to your service. We thank you and your families for all that you do for America. And I want all of you to know that there is no higher honor or greater responsibility than serving as your Commander-in-Chief.

I also want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Ryan Crocker, who recently completed his service as our Ambassador to Iraq. Throughout his career, Ryan always took on the toughest assignments. He is an example of the very best that this nation has to offer, and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. He carried on his work with an extraordinary degree of cooperation with two of our finest Generals -- General David Petraeus, and General Ray Odierno -- who will be critical in carrying forward the strategy that I will outline today.

Next month will mark the sixth anniversary of the war in Iraq. By any measure, this has already been a long war. For the men and women of America's armed forces -- and for your families -- this war has been one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our nation. You have endured tour after tour after tour of duty. You have known the dangers of combat and the lonely distance of loved ones. You have fought against tyranny and disorder. You have bled for your best friends and for unknown Iraqis. And you have borne an enormous burden for your fellow citizens, while extending a precious opportunity to the people of Iraq. Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military have served with honor, and succeeded beyond any expectation.

Today, I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end.

To understand where we need to go in Iraq, it is important for the American people to understand where we now stand. Thanks in great measure to your service, the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq's Security Forces, and through our partnership with Sunni Arabs. The capacity of Iraq's Security Forces has improved, and Iraq's leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation. The relative peace and strong participation in January's provincial elections sent a powerful message to the world about how far Iraqis have come in pursuing their aspirations through a peaceful political process.

But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq. Too many fundamental political questions about Iraq's future remain unresolved. Too many Iraqis are still displaced or destitute. Declining oil revenues will put an added strain on a government that has had difficulty delivering basic services. Not all of Iraq's neighbors are contributing to its security. Some are working at times to undermine it. And even as Iraq's government is on a surer footing, it is not yet a full partner -- politically and economically -- in the region, or with the international community.

In short, today there is a renewed cause for hope in Iraq, but that hope rests upon an emerging foundation.

On my first full day in office, I directed my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of our strategy in Iraq to determine the best way to strengthen that foundation, while strengthening American national security. I have listened to my Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders on the ground. We have acted with careful consideration of events on the ground; with respect for the security agreements between the United States and Iraq; and with a critical recognition that the long-term solution in Iraq must be political -- not military. Because the most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq's future must now be made by Iraqis.

We have also taken into account the simple reality that America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities: we face the challenge of refocusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan; of relieving the burden on our military; and of rebuilding our struggling economy -- and these are challenges that we will meet.

Today, I can announce that our review is complete, and that the United States will pursue a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility.

This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe-haven to terrorists. We will help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world. And we will forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.

What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals. We cannot rid Iraq of all who oppose America or sympathize with our adversaries. We cannot police Iraq's streets until they are completely safe, nor stay until Iraq's union is perfected. We cannot sustain indefinitely a commitment that has put a strain on our military, and will cost the American people nearly a trillion dollars. America's men and women in uniform have fought block by block, province by province, year after year, to give the Iraqis this chance to choose a better future. Now, we must ask the Iraqi people to seize it.

The first part of this strategy is therefore the responsible removal of our combat brigades from Iraq.

As a candidate for President, I made clear my support for a timeline of 16 months to carry out this drawdown, while pledging to consult closely with our military commanders upon taking office to ensure that we preserve the gains we've made and protect our troops. Those consultations are now complete, and I have chosen a timeline that will remove our combat brigades over the next 18 months.

Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end.

As we carry out this drawdown, my highest priority will be the safety and security of our troops and civilians in Iraq. We will proceed carefully, and I will consult closely with my military commanders on the ground and with the Iraqi government. There will surely be difficult periods and tactical adjustments. But our enemies should be left with no doubt: this plan gives our military the forces and the flexibility they need to support our Iraqi partners, and to succeed.

After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops.

Through this period of transition, we will carry out further redeployments. And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home with the honor that they have earned.

As we responsibly remove our combat brigades, we will pursue the second part of our strategy: sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.

The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq's future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend upon decisions made by Iraq's leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people. Iraq is a sovereign country with legitimate institutions; America cannot -- and should not -- take their place. However, a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security.

This effort will be led by our new Ambassador to Iraq -- Chris Hill. From his time in the Peace Corps, to his work in Kosovo and Korea, Ambassador Hill has been tested, and he has shown the pragmatism and skill that we need right now. He will be supported by the courageous and capable work of so many American diplomats and aid workers who are serving in Iraq.

Going forward, we can make a difference on several fronts. We will work with the United Nations to support national elections, while helping Iraqis improve local government. We can serve as an honest broker in pursuit of fair and durable agreements on issues that have divided Iraq's leaders. And just as we will support Iraq's Security Forces, we will help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services.

Diplomacy and assistance is also required to help the millions of displaced Iraqis. These men, women and children are a living consequence of this war and a challenge to stability in the region, and they must become a part of Iraq's reconciliation and recovery. America has a strategic interest -- and a moral responsibility -- to act. In the coming months, my administration will provide more assistance and take steps to increase international support for countries already hosting refugees; we'll cooperate with others to resettle Iraqis facing great personal risk; and we will work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle refugees and displaced Iraqis within Iraq -- because there are few more powerful indicators of lasting peace than displaced citizens returning home.

Now, before I go any further, I want to take a moment to speak directly to the people of Iraq.

You are a great nation, rooted in the cradle of civilization. You are joined together by enduring accomplishments, and a history that connects you as surely as the two rivers carved into your land. In years past, you have persevered through tyranny and terror; through personal insecurity and sectarian violence. And instead of giving in to the forces of disunion, you stepped back from a descent into civil war, and showed a proud resilience that deserves respect.

Our nations have known difficult times together. But ours is a bond forged by shared bloodshed, and countless friendships among our people. We Americans have offered our most precious resource -- our young men and women -- to work with you to rebuild what was destroyed by despotism; to root out our common enemies; and to seek peace and prosperity for our children and grandchildren, and for yours.

There are those who will try to prevent that future for Iraq -- who will insist that Iraq's differences cannot be reconciled without more killing. They represent the forces that destroy nations and lead only to despair, and they will test our will in the months and years to come. America, too, has known these forces. We endured the pain of Civil War, and bitter divisions of region and race. But hostility and hatred are no match for justice; they offer no pathway to peace; and they must not stand between the people of Iraq and a future of reconciliation and hope.

So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America's intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations.

That leads me to the third part of our strategy --comprehensive American engagement across the region.

The future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of the broader Middle East, so we must work with our friends and partners to establish a new framework that advances Iraq's security and the region's. It is time for Iraq to be a full partner in a regional dialogue, and for Iraq's neighbors to establish productive and normalized relations with Iraq. And going forward, the United States will pursue principled and sustained engagement with all of the nations in the region, and that will include Iran and Syria.

This reflects a fundamental truth: we can no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation -- we need a smarter, more sustainable and comprehensive approach. That is why we are renewing our diplomacy, while relieving the burden on our military. That is why we are refocusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing a strategy to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; and actively seeking a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world. And that is why we have named three of America's most accomplished diplomats -- George Mitchell, Dennis Ross and Richard Holbrooke -- to support Secretary Clinton and me as we carry forward this agenda.

Every nation and every group must know -- whether you wish America good or ill -- that the end of the war in Iraq will enable a new era of American leadership and engagement in the Middle East. And that era has just begun.

Finally, I want to be very clear that my strategy for ending the war in Iraq does not end with military plans or diplomatic agendas -- it endures through our commitment to uphold our sacred trust with every man and woman who has served in Iraq.

You make up a fraction of the American population, but in an age when so many people and institutions have acted irresponsibly, you did the opposite -- you volunteered to bear the heaviest burden. And for you and for your families, the war does not end when you come home. It lives on in memories of your fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who gave their lives. It endures in the wound that is slow to heal, the disability that isn't going away, the dream that wakes you at night, or the stiffening in your spine when a car backfires down the street.

You and your families have done your duty -- now a grateful nation must do ours. That is why I am increasing the number of soldiers and Marines, so that we lessen the burden on those who are serving. And that is why I have committed to expanding our system of veterans health care to serve more patients, and to provide better care in more places. We will continue building new wounded warrior facilities across America, and invest in new ways of identifying and treating the signature wounds of this war: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury, as well as other combat injuries.

We also know that service does not end with the person wearing the uniform. In her visits with military families across the country, my wife Michelle has learned firsthand about the unique burden that your families endure every day. I want you to know this: military families are a top priority for Michelle and me, and they will be a top priority for my administration. We'll raise military pay, and continue providing quality child-care, job-training for spouses, and expanded counseling and outreach to families that have known the separation and stress of war. We will also heed the lesson of history -- that those who fight in battle can form the backbone of our middle class -- by implementing a 21st century GI Bill to help our veterans live their dreams.

As a nation, we have had our share of debates about the war in Iraq. It has, at times, divided us as a people. To this very day, there are some Americans who want to stay in Iraq longer, and some who want to leave faster. But there should be no disagreement on what the men and women of our military have achieved.

And so I want to be very clear: We sent our troops to Iraq to do away with Saddam Hussein's regime -- and you got the job done. We kept our troops in Iraq to help establish a sovereign government -- and you got the job done. And we will leave the Iraqi people with a hard-earned opportunity to live a better life -- that is your achievement; that is the prospect that you have made possible.

There are many lessons to be learned from what we've experienced. We have learned that America must go to war with clearly defined goals, which is why I've ordered a review of our policy in Afghanistan. We have learned that we must always weigh the costs of action, and communicate those costs candidly to the American people, which is why I've put Iraq and Afghanistan into my budget. We have learned that in the 21st century, we must use all elements of American power to achieve our objectives, which is why I am committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that the burden is not continually pushed on to our military. We have learned that our political leaders must pursue the broad and bipartisan support that our national security policies depend upon, which is why I will consult with Congress and in carrying out my plans. And we have learned the importance of working closely with friends and allies, which is why we are launching a new era of engagement in the world.

The starting point for our policies must always be the safety of the American people. I know that you -- the men and women of the finest fighting force in the history of the world -- can meet any challenge, and defeat any foe. And as long as I am your Commander-in-Chief, I promise you that I will only send you into harm's way when it is absolutely necessary, and provide you with the equipment and support you need to get the job done. That is the most important lesson of all -- for the consequences of war are dire, the sacrifices immeasurable.

You know because you have seen those sacrifices. You have lived them. And we all honor them.

"Semper Fidelis" -- it means always being faithful to Corps, and to country, and to the memory of fallen comrades like Corporal Jonathan Yale and Lance Corporal Jordan Haerter. These young men enlisted in a time of war, knowing they would face great danger. They came here, to Camp Lejeune, as they trained for their mission. And last April, they were standing guard in Anbar. In an age when suicide is a weapon, they were suddenly faced with an oncoming truck filled with explosives. These two Marines stood their ground. These two Marines opened fire. And these two Marines stopped that truck. When the thousands of pounds of explosives detonated, they had saved fifty Marines and Iraqi police who would have been in the truck's path, but Corporal Yale and Lance Corporal Haerter lost their own lives. Jonathan was 21. Jordan was 19.

In the town where Jordan Haerter was from, a bridge was dedicated in his name. One Marine who traveled to the ceremony said: "We flew here from all over the country to pay tribute to our friend Jordan, who risked his life to save us. We wouldn't be here without him."

America's time in Iraq is filled with stories of men and women like this. Their names are written into bridges and town squares. They are etched into stones at Arlington, and in quiet places of rest across our land. They are spoken in schools and on city blocks. They live on in the memories of those who wear your uniform, in the hearts of those they loved, and in the freedom of the nation they served.

Each American who has served in Iraq has their own story. Each of you has your own story. And that story is now a part of the history of the United States of America -- a nation that exists only because free men and women have bled for it from the beaches of Normandy to the deserts of Anbar; from the mountains of Korea to the streets of Kandahar. You teach us that the price of freedom is great. Your sacrifice should challenge all of us -- every single American -- to ask what we can do to be better citizens.

There will be more danger in the months ahead. We will face new tests and unforeseen trials. But thanks to the sacrifices of those who have served, we have forged hard-earned progress, we are leaving Iraq to its people, and we have begun the work of ending this war.

Thank you, God Bless you, and God Bless the United States of America. Semper Fi.

Good, intelligent piece by Kilcullen. I think he is right on the Option A timeline. To be honest, this is why I make the argument in Great Powers that going to Iraq was right. There we've dealt with a state located in the center of al Qaeda's strategic ambitions. In Afghanistan, to do it right (meaning, to include Pakistan's FATA), it will stretch across presidencies. We will expend lotsa blood and treasure and--at the end of any day we choose to leave--it's likely to return right back to what it's always been. Al Qaeda's ambition is not Afghanistan or even Pakistan (the latter being unallowable by India and the US--at least--and probably more). The longer it's trapped there, the more it will lose its strategic ambitions and thus the more we'll spend significant blood and treasure on something that--in the grand scheme of things--will not matter much at all...

More at Tom's place and related issues in Dave's new book The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One as well as Tom's latest - Great Powers: America and the World after Bush.

... In light of the opportunity and challenge that Afghanistan presents to the Obama Administration, the Committee's hearings are very timely. Today, I want to make five major points.

1. During the past three years, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated, particularly in terms of security. The vast majority of Afghans oppose the Taliban, but local communities cannot defend themselves from insurgent intimidation and attacks. Reversing the negative trends requires rededicated U.S. leadership, greater resources, and an improved strategy and campaign plan. The fact that the Obama Administration is undertaking a wide-ranging strategic review is an encouraging sign.

2. In this review, it would be a mistake to revise our goals downward, giving up the current objective of enabling Afghans to establish an effective and representative government aligned with us in the war against terror. The United States needs an Afghan state capable of policing its territory to prevent the reestablishment of a terrorist safe haven. Helping the Afghan people succeed politically and economically will produce a significant positive demonstration effect in the wider region, thereby contributing to the war of ideas against extremism. Success will end the cycle of proxy warfare that has cost more than a million Afghan lives during the 1980s and 1990s. It will also open a route to global markets for the Central Asia states and create an economic zone that can be the basis for greater prosperity in Central and South Asia.

3. The focus of our policy should be to defeat a real and growing threat arising from a set of violent extremist groups based in western Pakistan and their supporters in Pakistan. The necessary conditions for success include the stabilization of Afghanistan, as well as strengthening elements in Pakistan opposed to extremism and finding ways progressively to narrow the areas in Pakistan in which the extremists can operate until these organizations have in effect been smothered.

4. A key task is to induce elements of the government of Pakistan that have historic ties to the Taliban and other groups to make a strategic choice to cooperate fully in eliminating extremist sanctuaries. This requires the United States to undertake sustained diplomacy that is cognizant of the motivations and interests that might underlie Pakistan's policies and that is designed to create a regional context conducive to the stabilization of Afghanistan. The Obama Administration's appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as a special envoy presents this opportunity.

5. U.S. efforts to "harden" Afghanistan against the insurgent threat operating out of the sanctuaries can succeed. To do so will require changes in our current approach, including development of a more robust political and state-building effort, shifting to a classic counterinsurgency strategy focused primarily on providing security to the population, and integrating Afghan and international civilian and military efforts in a phased campaign to secure contested areas.

Full transcript of Dr. Strmecki's prepared statement. Also see the prepared statements of Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) and Ambassador James Dobbins.

Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.

Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).

The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.

More than three years ago, I spoke at AEI about the war in Iraq. At that time, conditions on the ground were going from bad to worse. Violence had accelerated out of control, al Qaeda had firmly entrenched itself in Anbar province, and Iranian-backed Shia militias had taken control of large swaths of Baghdad and southern Iraq. The Iraqi government and its security forces appeared hopelessly corrupt, sectarian, ineffective, and unable to break the cycle of reciprocal violence fueled by Sunni and Shiite extremists. The Bush administration continued to pursue a failed war strategy—despite mounting evidence of its catastrophic consequences. More and more Americans, members of Congress and opinion leaders wondered whether the war in Iraq could ever be won, or whether it was already lost.

It seemed obvious to me that failure in Iraq would be a calamity, and to prevent it we would have to accept the urgent necessity of a new strategy -- a strategy based on the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency, the imperative to secure the civilian population, and a significant increase in the number of American troops. Yet more than a year passed, as the deteriorating situation in Iraq approached the point of no return and a substantial majority of Americans turned firmly against the war, before President Bush at last shifted course, dismissed Secretary Rumsfeld, and adopted such a strategy.

Thanks to the courage and skill of our troops on the ground and the wisdom of leaders such as General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General Ray Odierno, the collapse of the American effort in Iraq was not just arrested but reversed. With the right strategy finally in place -- and I should note the intellectual contributions to it by General Jack Keane, Fred and Kim Kagan, Andrew Krepinevich, and Gary Schmitt -- and the resources on the ground necessary to implement it, we not only stepped back from the precipice of a strategic disaster of immense and long lasting consequences, but progressed toward obtaining our objectives in Iraq beyond the most hopeful projections for the new strategy's success.

We now face a similar moment with respect to the war in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is nowhere near as dire as it was in Iraq just two years ago -- to cite one example, civilian fatalities at their peak in Iraq were ten times higher than civilian deaths at their peak in Afghanistan last year. But the same truth that was apparent three years ago in Iraq is apparent today in Afghanistan: when you aren't winning in this kind of war, you are losing. And, in Afghanistan today, we are not winning. Let us not shy from the truth, but let us not be paralyzed by it either.

Nearly every indicator in Afghanistan is heading in the wrong direction. Civilian fatalities in Afghanistan have increased dramatically as security has deteriorated, particularly in the southern provinces of the country. The number of insurgent attacks was higher every single week in 2008 than during the same week in 2007. Since 2005, violence has increased over 500 percent, and despite the presence of tens of thousands of coalition troops, growing portions of the country suffer under the influence of the Taliban. The percentage of Afghans rating their security positively has declined from 77 percent in 2005 to 40 percent today. Only a third of Afghans say that U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their areas, down from 57 percent just two years ago, and Afghans cite the lack of security and corruption as the foremost reasons their country is moving in the wrong direction.

In the face of these daunting statistics, many Americans have begun to wonder whether it is truly possible to turn this war around. Public commentary increasingly focuses on past failures in Afghanistan by the Soviets and British, and warns that the country has earned the label "graveyard of empires." Some suggest it is time to scale back our ambitions in Afghanistan—to give up on nation-building and instead focus narrowly on our counterterrorism objectives, by simply mounting operations aimed at killing or capturing terrorist leaders and destroying their networks, while leaving the broader tasks of building fundamental security, governance, and development to someone else -- or abandoning them altogether.

I disagree. I am confident victory is possible in Afghanistan. I know Americans are weary of war. I'm weary of it. But we must win the war in Afghanistan. The alternative is to risk that country's return to its previous function as a terrorist sanctuary, from which al Qaeda could train and plan attacks against America. Such an outcome would constitute an historic success for the jihadist movement, severely damage American standing and credibility in a region that already doubts our resolve, and threaten the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan would encourage and enable al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to destabilize neighboring countries. Broader insecurity in Afghanistan -- with the violence, refugee flows, and lawlessness it would engender -- could spill beyond its borders to nuclear armed Pakistan or other states in south and central Asia, with the gravest implications for our national security.

Success is possible in Afghanistan. Afghans reject the Taliban. Just 4 percent of Afghans wish them to rule the country, and they rate the Taliban as by far the most dangerous threat to their nation. Despite the deteriorating conditions, nearly 70 percent continue to say the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban were a good thing. What the people in Afghanistan want most is not the exit of foreigners, or of coalition troops, but rather the things that a properly configured and resourced strategy would deliver: security, some degree of development, and basic good governance.

The problem in Afghanistan today is not innate xenophobia or hostility to the West. It is our own failed policies that are the problem. We have tried to win this war without enough troops, without sufficient economic aid, without effective coordination, and without a clear strategy. The ruinous consequences should come as no surprise. If we change our policies, the situation on the ground will change, too.

I say this with some confidence because we have been through this before. I refer not to Iraq, but to Afghanistan itself. For a brief but critical window between late 2003 and early 2005, we were moving on the right path in Afghanistan. Under Ambassador Khalilzad and Lt. Gen. David Barno, the United States completely overhauled its strategy for Afghanistan. We increased the number of American forces in the country, expanded non-military assistance to the Afghan government and -- most importantly -- abandoned a counterterrorism-based strategy that emphasized seeking out and attacking the enemy, in favor of one that emphasized counterinsurgency and the protection of the population. All of this was overseen by an integrated civil-military command structure, in which the Ambassador and the coalition commander worked in the same building, from adjoining offices.

The result was that, by late 2004, governance and reconstruction were improving and long-delayed projects, like the ring road that connects major Afghan cities, were at last getting off the ground. Entrenched warlords were being nudged out of power. Militias like the Northern Alliance were being peacefully disarmed of their heavy weapons, and national elections were conducted successfully and safely. The Taliban showed signs of internal dissention and splintering.

Rather than building on these gains, however, we squandered them. Beginning in 2005, our integrated civil-military command structure was disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement. The integrated counterinsurgency strategy was replaced by a patchwork of different strategies, depending on the location and on which country's troops were doing the fighting. And at a moment when many in Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to nurse doubts about America's commitment in South Asia, the Pentagon announced its intention to withdraw 2,500 American combat troops from the theatre.

These decisions laid the groundwork for the situation we see in Afghanistan today. They also underscore why "lowering our goals"—both rhetorically and in practice—is precisely the wrong move today.

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen has rightly warned against thinking that we can forgo the intensive work necessary to solidify security, development, and governance in favor of a narrower focus on "counterterrorism." The seductive appeal of such an approach is obvious. "After all," Dr. Kilcullen has written, "we might say we went into Afghanistan to defeat al Qaeda, not to build a model state in the Hindu Kush." Yet, as Dr. Kilcullen warns, this narrow counterterrorism approach carries a fatal flaw: namely, it will not work. As we have learned, most painfully in Iraq but in other fragile states as well, effective counterterrorism operations rely, among other elements, on accurate intelligence provided by the local population, which has no incentive to cooperate in the absence of sustained security or the promise of a better life.

In Iraq prior to the surge, for instance, U.S. Special Forces had complete freedom of action to strike at terrorist leaders, backed by more than 120,000 conventional American forces and overwhelming airpower.

Although we succeeded in killing numerous terrorist leaders through this approach - including the head of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the insurgency continued to grow in strength and violence. It was not until we changed course and applied a new approach -- a counterinsurgency strategy focused on providing basic security for the population -- that the cycle of violence was broken and al Qaeda was seriously damaged.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, if we focus on counterterrorism to the exclusion of counterinsurgency, we will only ensure that we successfully execute neither. Simply put, we cannot achieve our counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan without counterinsurgency, and we cannot achieve our counterinsurgency goals without development and good governance. As General Petraeus put it in a recent speech at the Munich Security Conference, "We have a hugely important interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for trans-national terrorists. Achieving that core objective, in turn, requires the accomplishment of several other significant tasks," namely, the application of counterinsurgency principles by increased numbers of U.S. troops.

Let us make no mistake: we will fail in Afghanistan without a serious change in both strategy and resources. I welcomed the President's decision last week to deploy some 17,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, given the dire state of affairs there. I believe the additional force levels can make a significant difference, but more troops alone cannot lead to success. A major change in course is long overdue. The new approach we need in Afghanistan should consist of several elements—several of which are, in fact, precisely those elements we had in place just a few years ago.

Reapply the principles of counterinsurgency. As it was in Iraq, security is the precondition for political and economic progress in Afghanistan. And the way to provide enduring security is by applying the same basic principles of counterinsurgency tailored for the unique circumstances of Afghanistan, backed with robust intelligence resources and a sufficient number of troops to carry it out.

This strategy should be operationalized through a nationwide civil-military campaign plan. There is today a campaign plan for Regional Command-East, one in the works for Regional Command-South, and a patchwork of other operations throughout the country. There is no comprehensive, nationwide plan for the war that spells out what level of combat troops and resources will be required, where, and to do what. The fact that we are engaged in this fight without such a plan more than seven years after our initial invasion explains much of the failure of our efforts thus far.

In order to carry out the necessary planning and coordination for a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, we should establish a military headquarters that is adequately staffed and resourced, similar to that of General Odierno when he served under General Petraeus in Baghdad. In addition, the senior coalition commander and the senior international civilian in Afghanistan must better coordinate efforts by the various international agencies and nongovernmental organizations, ideally through a body in Kabul that can routinely synchronize these efforts with military operations and Afghan government activities. And as we deploy more troops to carry out new operations, we must focus quickly on securing supply lines into Afghanistan -- a task made more urgent with the recent loss of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan.

Help the Afghans surge. Everyone knows the United States increased the number of its soldiers in Iraq during 2007. What is less well known is that the Iraqis surged with us, adding over 100,000 security forces to their ranks. It is now time for the Afghans to do the same. The Afghan army is already a great success story: a multiethnic, battle-tested fighting force. The problem is that it is too small -- it currently stands at 68,000 - and, even with the increase in projected end strength to 134,000, it will remain too small. For years, the Afghans have been telling us they need a bigger army, and they are right. After all, their country is more populous and significantly larger than Iraq. At a minimum, we need to more than double the current size of the Afghan army to 160,000 troops, and consider enlarging it to 200,000. The costs of this increase, however, should not be borne by American taxpayers alone. Insecurity in Afghanistan is the world's problem, and the world should share the costs. I believe we should work with our allies to establish an international trust fund to provide long-term financing for the Afghan army. At the same time, we need to increase the number of trainers and mentors assisting the Afghan police, who have suffered neglect and mismanagement for too long.

Change alliance diplomacy. Our diplomacy with NATO allies has led to frustration on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years. The U.S. has increased the number of troops it contributes to the fight, asked the allies to match our efforts, and grown frustrated with some allies' refusal to do so. In Europe, our allies complain their contributions have gone unappreciated, and that haranguing from Washington only makes the war less popular at home. While I believe the United States should continue to encourage European troop contributions and press for the reduction of caveats on their use, I also believe we should move away from stressing what Washington wants Europe to give, and more toward encouraging what Europe is prepared to contribute. Many of our NATO allies -- and other allies and partners outside NATO, including countries in Asia and the Gulf -- are fully capable of contributing many badly needed resources. In many areas, non-combat related contributions -- from police training to a trust fund for the Afghan National Army -- will be as critical to long-term success as more European troops on the ground.

Increase and reform non-military assistance. We also must increase our non-military assistance to the Afghan government, with a multi-front plan -- something akin to a "Plan Afghanistan" -- for strengthening its institutions, the rule of law, and the economy in order to provide a sustainable alternative to the drug trade. International partners, whom have grown enamored of using nongovernmental organizations to deliver services at the local level, have inadvertently eroded government authority. By empowering the government at local levels, we can help it extend its authority throughout the country.

In order to empower the government, however, we must work to reduce corruption and improve its delivery of services. We can start by agreeing with the government in Kabul on specific governance and development benchmarks, then working closely with its leaders to ensure they are met. Throughout this process, we should not be timid about pushing the government to crack down on corruption, no matter the level at which it is present, or in using our leverage to reduce the toxic influence of corruption on Afghan society.

Get control of the narcotics problem. Taking control of the narcotics problem is central to our efforts in Afghanistan. At last year's Bucharest summit, the NATO allies agreed that narcotics trafficking was fuelling the insurgency, but failed to reach consensus on how to combat this problem. Increased security will help enormously -- we have already seen poppy growers relocate their crops from newly secure areas to less secure ones in the south.

As we bring greater security to poppy growing areas and crack down on illegal narcotics activity there, we should increase our efforts to help Afghans get alternative crops to market and prosecute traffickers by Special Courts. And both the United States and Europe should provide assistance to expand the capacity of Afghan farmers to meet international export standards, in order to help boost the agricultural sector of the economy.

Work regionally. Afghanistan's problems exist, of course, in a regional context, and we must increasingly view them as such. The appointment of a new special U.S. envoy is a step in the right direction, and his goal should be to turn Afghanistan from a theater for regional rivalries into a commons for regional cooperation.

A special focus of our regional strategy must be Pakistan. For too long we have viewed Pakistan as important because of our goals in Afghanistan. Yet Pakistan is not simply important because of Afghanistan; Pakistan is important because of Pakistan. We cannot simply subordinate our Pakistan strategy to our Afghanistan policy.

We should start by empowering the new civilian government in Islamabad to defeat radicalism with greater support for development, health, and education. Today, development assistance constitutes just one percent of all U.S. funding directed toward programs in the tribal and border areas. This must change. We should also strengthen local tribes in these areas who are —to fight terrorists -- the strategy used successfully in Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq -- while recognizing that such an approach will not be nearly as quick or far reaching as it was in Iraq. We should strengthen the army and the Frontier Corps' counterinsurgency capacity, and do all we can to stiffen the will of our Pakistani partners to fight the war they face at home. Finally, we should make clear to all in the region, through both word and deed, that the United States and the international community are committed to success in the long run.

Communicate the stakes and the challenges to the American people. Above all, leaders in Europe and America must be clear with their publics about the nature of the effort in Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq, where the surge of troops conducting counterinsurgency operations, combined with a quickly spreading Anbar Awakening, transformed the country in less than a year, Afghanistan is likely to be harder and longer. The violence is likely to get worse before it gets better. The scale of resources required to prevail will be enormous, and the timetable will be measured in years, not months. The American people should understand the nature of this protracted conflict, and their leaders must spell out -- on a continual basis -- how this war is developing, why patience is in order, and why progress and eventual success is vital, despite inevitable setbacks and disappointments.

We need to take all of the steps I have outlined mindful of the unique burdens we have put on our fighting men and women. The surge in Iraq placed great strains on our forces, and we must avoid drawing down troop levels there too quickly or risk jeopardizing the hard-won security gains. The reinforcements we send to Afghanistan will similarly stretch our ground forces. All who advocate such a move are, I believe, obliged not to allow the U.S. military to become hollowed out, but rather to stand behind it by bearing the full price of our nation's conflicts. This means insisting on a further increase in the total size of U.S. ground forces, accelerating the reset of their equipment, and committing to the modernization they need and deserve.

None of this will be easy. While today Afghanistan is seen by many as "the good war" and the one into which the dispatch of thousands of additional American troops can go mostly uncontested, this day may soon pass. It is possible -- indeed likely -- that sometime in the near future, perhaps a year from now, as the fighting in Afghanistan increases, the costs grow more dear, and casualties become more numerous and more visible, that the will to finish this mission will dramatically erode.

Yet we cannot afford a crisis of confidence. Should the day I described arrive, let us remember the national will we mustered in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when we resolved not to permit such a terrible act to ever again occur, and never again to abandon Afghanistan to the terrorists that plot our destruction. As Americans, we must accept the responsibilities history has assigned us and our interests require. We must do the hard work, as we always have, of building a stable and prosperous world order, in which ever increasing numbers of human beings can flourish in peace, security and opportunity. We have achieved great things in the past; we will achieve greater things still, but only if we keep our faith in and accept the burden of being indispensable to the global success of our shared values and interests, and the progress of humanity. This war will take time and commitment, and it will not be easy. But as it has so often before, history -- and the world -- will look to America for courage and resolve.

Thank you.

In their quiet moments, aid workers call it "the tragedy:" the billions of dollars that never arrived here. The troops that landed somewhere else. The bright minds that turned to that other, greater subject. And, in all those events, the sad sinking of the promise that greeted the American-led victory over the Taliban in November 2001, more than seven years ago.

The "tragedy" these aid workers are referring to, of course, is the war in Iraq. Not that the Iraq war itself was tragic but that it was calamitous in its results for the other war that suddenly fell to the lower tier. More than any other factor, it is the American invasion of Iraq that looms over Afghanistan and all of its dashed hopes...

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