Israel's assault on Gaza in early 2009, Operation Cast Lead, achieved significant tactical successes and managed to redeem the Israel Defence Forces' poor performance during the 2006 Lebanon War. This paper examines Israel's military and public information campaign and why Cast Lead failed to accomplish the government's two main goals of stopping rocket attacks on Israel and the influx of weapons for resupplying Hamas.

Israel's Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum

As President Obama and his national security team debate strategy for the war in Afghanistan, some of the options on the table involve a greater focus on training and strengthening the Afghan security forces. To an American public - and an administration - that may be reluctant to send more troops to a faltering, eight-year war, the notion of helping the Afghans fight for themselves could seem particularly attractive.

But it's an appeal that should be tempered. In a recent essay published by the security-focused Stimson Center in Washington, Robert Haddick, managing editor of the Small Wars Journal, reviews American experiences helping foreign security forces. Though he believes such initiatives will be a "growth business" in the years ahead, Haddick contends that if US policymakers hope such foreign forces can be a "competent and reliable substitute" for US military personnel, they will "frequently find themselves disappointed." ...

More at The Washington Post.

FRONTLINE Season Premiere

Obama's War

Tuesday, October 13, 2009, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS

Press Release:

Tens of thousands of fresh American troops are now on the move in Afghanistan, led by a new commander and armed with a counterinsurgency plan that builds on the lessons of Iraq. But can U.S. forces succeed in a land long known as the "graveyard of empires"? And can the U.S. stop the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, where U.S. troops are not allowed and the government is weak?

In FRONTLINE's season premiere, Obama's War, airing Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2009, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS (check local listings), veteran correspondent Martin Smith (Beyond Baghdad, Return of the Taliban) travels across Afghanistan and Pakistan to see firsthand how the president's new strategy is taking shape, delivering vivid, on-the-ground reporting from this war's many fronts. Through interviews with top generals, diplomats and government officials, Smith also reports the internal debates over President Obama's grand attempt to combat terrorism at its roots.

"What we found on the ground was a huge exercise in nation building," says Smith. "The concept's become a bit of a dirty word, but that's what this is. We started with the goal of eliminating Al Qaeda, and now we've wound up with the immense task of re-engineering two nations."

The brunt of the work is falling on rank-and-file soldiers, and nowhere is it more difficult than in the dusty, unforgiving landscape of Helmand province, the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, where FRONTLINE embedded with Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment. Since the Marines' arrival in July, Helmand has become the most lethal battlefield in Afghanistan. But FRONTLINE found the Marines trying to act as armed diplomats, attempting to build the necessary trust for badly needed economic development.

"It's trying to change the culture of the organization," Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, tells FRONTLINE of the administration's plan. "At the end of the day, our best counterinsurgents are going to be young sergeants who just have an ability to deal with people. We've got to give them the flexibility to make decisions."

Even as American soldiers struggle to make progress in Afghanistan village by village, equally vexing challenges remain across the border in Pakistan. "In Afghanistan we know what to do; we just don't know if we have the resources or the time available to do it," David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency expert, tells FRONTLINE. "The problem in Pakistan is we're not really sure what to do."

When FRONTLINE confronts the Pakistani army about its reluctance to take out key Taliban leaders, the military's chief spokesman, Gen. Athar Abbas, argues that the accusations are misplaced. There is no truth, he claims, that insurgents stage attacks on American forces from the Pakistani side of the border. "They operate from Afghanistan. If somebody claims that everything is happening from this side of the border, I am sorry, this is misplaced, and we refute it."

Barred from sending troops across the border, the United States is left with few good options. No quick fix will solve Pakistan. "If we have a strategy in Pakistan," says George Packer, a staff writer at The New Yorker, "it's to build up the civilian government to the point where it can be a kind of counterbalance to the military and begin to reorient their own sense of their destiny. Is that even thinkable for a foreign power to do? Even as I say it, I think, why do we think we could even begin to accomplish that?"

Obama's War is a FRONTLINE co-production with RAIN Media, Inc., written and produced by Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith. The correspondent is Martin Smith. FRONTLINE is produced by WGBH Boston and is broadcast nationwide on PBS. Funding for FRONTLINE is provided through the support of PBS viewers. Major funding for FRONTLINE is provided by The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional funding is provided by the Park Foundation. FRONTLINE is closed-captioned for deaf and hard-of-hearing viewers and described for people who are blind or visually impaired by the Media Access Group at WGBH. FRONTLINE is a registered trademark of the WGBH Educational Foundation. The executive producer of FRONTLINE is David Fanning.

The coalition is weakening. While the US has gotten serious, the organism called NATO is a jellyfish for which the United States is both sea and prevailing wind. The disappointing effort from many partners is best exemplified by the partners who are pushing hardest: The British are fine examples. The British landed in Helmand province after someone apparently vouched that Helmand would be safe, and they believed it. Helmand is today the most dangerous province in Afghanistan.

British combat tours are arduous and the troops suffer in countless ways. The soldiers sweat and freeze in the desert filth; British rations are terrible; mail can be weeks late; and they fight constantly. Troops endure high casualties yet they keep fighting. These things are true. Some say the British "lost Helmand," but this is not true. Helmand was a mess before they arrived. British soldiers are strong but their government is pitiful, leading to an average effort in Afghanistan...

More at The Washington TImes.

Topics include:

1) The CIA finds job security in Afghanistan,

2) Can Israel get MAD with Iran?

The CIA finds job security in Afghanistan

On Sept. 30, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell made it clear that the objective of President Obama's Afghanistan policy -- "to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda" -- remains unchanged. According to Morrell, what is currently open for discussion among Obama senior advisers is "whether or not counterinsurgency is still the preferred means of achieving that end."

As I discussed last week, Gen. Stanley McChrystal thinks counterinsurgency is the right course and has asked for at least 40,000 additional U.S. soldiers to implement this approach. It is now up to Obama to assess the risk of McChrystal's strategy and weigh whether the costs measure up to the promised benefits.

While Obama and his team deliberate, other developments are underway that will either support McChrystal's request or perhaps create alternatives. On Sept. 20, the Los Angeles Times reported on another "surge" into Afghanistan, this one by the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the article, the Central Intelligence Agency's headcount in Afghanistan will increase to 700, led by increases in paramilitary officers, intelligence analysts, and operatives tracking the behavior of Afghan government officials.

The piece discussed how McChrystal, while in charge of special operating forces in Iraq, formed teams composed of CIA paramilitary officers and special operations personnel from the U.S. military. This fusion of capabilities is credited with improving intelligence collection and direct action operations against insurgent networks. McChrystal may now be using this same technique in Afghanistan.

But raising the CIA's presence in Afghanistan to a higher plateau may set the stage for alternative approaches to U.S. strategy. Popular discussions of U.S. alternatives for Afghanistan focus on three options: McChrystal's beefed-up counterinsurgency campaign; a counter-terror campaign using special operations raids and drone strikes; and abandonment. In reality, there is an entire continuum of options formulated by U.S. planners to achieve Obama's stated objective. Some of these options would focus on training, equipping, and advising Afghanistan's official security forces. Others might focus on enhancing security at the local level through village and tribal militias. Still others might attempt to turn the clock back to 2001-2002, when the CIA and special operations forces essentially hired Afghan warlords to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda. And there are many more options, all with varying degrees of plausibility.

One thing all of these options have in common is a requirement for greater CIA participation. Options that have fewer U.S. military forces directly providing security imply more Afghans providing security. This will require greater employment of U.S. liaison officers and advisors from both the U.S. military and the CIA's clandestine service.

If Obama chooses McChrystal's most military-intensive recommendation, it seems as if the CIA's role in Afghanistan will still increase both now and in the future. A successful military surge in Afghanistan will eventually be followed by a drawdown and a handoff to Afghan security forces. In the wake of this scenario, U.S. military advisors and CIA officers would maintain contact with Afghan security forces and keep watch on the residual al Qaeda threat.

Afghanistan seems bound to provide job security for the CIA.

Can Israel get MAD with Iran?

One option, perhaps the most likely option, for dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran is the tried-and-true Cold War model: containment, deterrence, and the related doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). The United States and Soviet Union deterred a nuclear first strike against their territory and forces when they were able to convince the other side that a devastating second-strike force would always survive to retaliate after a first strike.

U.S. and Soviet submarine-based nuclear forces guaranteed MAD and stabilized nuclear deterrence for the duration of the Cold War. Even if land-based missiles and bombers were wiped out in a surprise attack, the submarines lurking in the deep would survive and be ready to retaliate.

While publicly vowing to prevent the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon, Israel may also be developing its own submarine-based nuclear force in an attempt to achieve a MAD deterrent in the event that prevention efforts fail.The Sept. 29 edition of Defense News noted that Israel took delivery of two German-built submarines, adding to the three it already operates. According to the article, Israel's submarines are capable of launching cruise missiles, which could possibly be fitted with nuclear warheads.

Israel cannot rely on land-based missiles and aircraft for nuclear deterrence. In fact, relying solely on land-based forces would end up being highly destabilizing. Israel's land area is tiny and it has few places to disperse these forces. They will someday become vulnerable to Iran's advancing ballistic missile threat. With missile flight times from Iran measuring just a few minutes, Israel would have to adopt a highly dangerous launch-on-warning doctrine for its land-based forces. The possibility of nuclear war starting by accident would be greater than it was during the Cold War.

As with the Cold War, a submarine-based deterrent force would add stability to the Israel-Iran nuclear competition. If Israel could maintain at least one submarine on patrol at all times and in contact with Israel's leadership (no small challenge), there would be a greatly reduced need for a hair-trigger alert.

Of course, the arms race between Israel and Iran was never supposed to happen. However, Israel never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and is widely assumed to be a nuclear weapons state. The NPT has hardly lived up to its promises among its signatories; the U.N. Security Council has been unable to enforce the resolutions it passed when it concluded that North Korea and Iran violated the treaty.

With the NPT shown to be either ignored or unenforceable, the international community may have to resort to managing rather than preventing such arms races. Germany's decision to sell cruise-missile capable submarines to Israel will make one such arms race safer. If outside powers cannot stop the nuclear arms race between Israel and Iran, they will have to consider what other steps they can take to reduce its risks.

Senior White House officials have begun to make the case for a policy shift in Afghanistan that would send few, if any, new combat troops to the country and instead focus on faster military training of Afghan forces, continued assassinations of al-Qaeda leaders and support for the government of neighboring Pakistan in its fight against the Taliban. In a three-hour meeting Wednesday at the White House, senior advisers challenged some of the key assumptions in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's blunt assessment of the nearly eight-year-old war, which President Obama has said is being fought to destroy al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and the ungoverned border areas of Pakistan.

McChrystal, commander of the 100,000 NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, has asked Obama to quickly endorse his call for a change in military strategy and approve the additional resources he needs to retake the initiative from the resurgent Taliban. But White House officials are resisting McChrystal's call for urgency, which he underscored Thursday during a speech in London, and questioning important elements of his assessment, which calls for a vast expansion of an increasingly unpopular war. One senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the meeting, said, "A lot of assumptions - and I don't want to say myths, but a lot of assumptions - were exposed to the light of day." ...

More at The Washington Post.

McChrystal Rejects Scaling Down Afghan Military Aims - John F. Burns, New York Times.

The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, used a speech here on Thursday to reject calls for the war effort to be scaled down from defeating the Taliban insurgency to a narrower focus on hunting down Al Qaeda, an option suggested by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as part of the current White House strategy review. After his first 100 days in command in Kabul, General McChrystal chose an audience of military specialists at London's Institute for Strategic Studies as a platform for a public airing of the confidential assessment of the war he delivered to the Pentagon in late August, parts of which were leaked to news organizations.

General McChrystal, 55, did not mention Mr. Biden or his advocacy of a scaled-down war effort during his London speech, and referred only obliquely to the debate within the Obama administration on whether to escalate the American commitment in Afghanistan by accepting his request for up to 40,000 more American troops on top of the 68,000 already deployed there or en route. But he used the London session for a rebuttal of the idea of a more narrowly focused war. When a questioner asked him whether he would support scaling back the American military presence over the next 18 months by relinquishing the battle with the Taliban and focusing on tracking down Al Qaeda, sparing ground troops by hunting Qaeda extremists and their leaders with missiles from remotely piloted aircraft, he replied: "The short answer is: no." "You have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish to be," he said. "A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy." ...

More at The New York Times.

McChrystal Defends Military Goals in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

Speaking in London, Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said he opposes strategies that would require fewer troops and focus on fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership through drone attacks, airstrikes and similar approaches, according to transcripts and audio recordings of his remarks. Such an approach is favored by some Obama administration officials, including Vice President Joe Biden.

However, counterinsurgency advocates have said that a narrow war effort would leave the Afghan government unprotected from encroachment by the Taliban or other extremist organizations. The strategy debate is at the heart of a sweeping review requested by President Obama as the administration grapples with a tainted Afghan presidential election, escalating violence and mounting allied casualties...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Back Your General and Send More Troops, David Miliband Urges Barack Obama - Francis Elliott and Michael Evans, The Times.

David Miliband urged President Obama to embrace a renewed "hearts and minds" strategy in Afghanistan as ministers indicated that they would not send more British troops unless the US adopted such an approach. The Foreign Secretary did not mention America by name but called on every government in the coalition to back troops, aid workers and diplomats in support of a clear plan. "We came into this together. We see it through - together," he told the Labour conference in Brighton.

His words reflect a growing concern in the Government over Mr Obama's apparent reluctance to garner political consent for a troop "surge", which commanders say is needed to build up the Afghan Army and defeat the Taleban insurgency. General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, wants a revamped counter-insurgency - more forces on the ground engaging civilians and persuading the Taleban to switch sides - as opposed to a counter-terrorism strategy focused on al-Qaeda - reducing troop numbers and attacking militants mostly with drone missile strikes. Last night, David Cameron said that that the first thing he would do if elected prime minister would be to form a war cabinet. He said that it would comprise his Foreign Secretary, Chancellor, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and the heads of the Armed Forces, MI6 and MI5...

More at The Times.

Hillary Clinton vs. Afghan Reality - Washington Times editorial.

In a PBS interview on Monday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton dismissed Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's detailed assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. "I respect that because clearly he is the commander on the ground," she said, "but I can only tell you there are other assessments from very expert military analysts who have worked in counterinsurgencies that are the exact opposite." She said the administration's goal "is to take all of this incoming data and sort it out." We aren't sure what the secretary of state means by "the exact opposite" of Gen. McChrystal's assessment. He concluded that a change was needed in US strategy, further resources were required, the Afghan forces need to be made more effective and that success is achievable.

Should we believe the exact opposite - that a change in strategy is not needed, resources are adequate, the Afghan forces are fine as they are, and we are headed for certain failure? Mrs. Clinton is correct that there is no lack of views on the subject. Counterinsurgency "experts" proliferated in Washington after the invasion of Iraq in the same way that the city was suddenly awash in counterterrorism "experts" after the Sept. 11 attacks. The White House is free to pick and choose from among them in the same way a patient can shop for doctors until he gets the diagnosis he likes. Unfortunately, this path is frequently fatal for the patient...

More at The Washington Times.

Hybrid vs. Compound War - Frank Hoffman, Armed Forces Journal.

Over the past two years, the hybrid threat construct has found some traction. It appears in official government reports and has been cited by the defense secretary in articles and speeches. In addition, it was referred to in the new Joint Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, in Joint Forces Command's Joint Operational Environment 2008 and in the latest Maritime Strategy.

However, it is not clear this usage is based on a common understanding of what a hybrid threat or hybrid warfare entails. Hence, this article details an array of definitions and debates their merits and an alternative concept - compound war. It also provides a preliminary overview of ongoing historical study related to this issue...

Illusions of Victory - Douglas Macgregor, Defense News.

... Our large and pervasive military presence in Iraq alienated both the Sunni and Shiite Arabs while giving the Kurds an addictive taste of independence, a development with ominous consequences for their future survival in close proximity to Turkey. Our impact on Afghanistan is similar with even more profoundly negative strategic effects in Pakistan.

Anyone sitting in the Kremlin must be delighted. After watching the United States squander a trillion dollars in Iraq while grinding its ground forces into ruin, Moscow can now celebrate the diversion of precious US military and economic resources into Afghanistan while it turns its attention to the goal of controlling Ukraine and returning Russian military power to NATO's eastern border...

No Reason to Quit - Joseph Collins, Armed Forces Journal.

... It is easy to see why the American people tire of this war. It appears that the more we do, the less we have to show for it. Americans are also concerned for their men and women in uniform, who have endured tour after tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. In August, the majority of Americans in an ABC News-Washington Post poll for the first time said that the war in Afghanistan was not worth fighting.

The pundits and scholars are also restless. Columnist George Will has called for withdrawal and an "offshore" strategy. Boston University professor Andrew Bacevich questions the depth of our basic interests there. Richard Haas of the Council on Foreign Relations despairs that Afghanistan, once a war of necessity, has become a war of choice superimposed on an Afghan civil war. Ralph Peters questions both the aim of the effort and the value of victory...

Return of the Jedi - MG Robert Scales, Armed Forces Journal.

It's that time again. About once a decade, the military services attempt to reform how they educate officers. This time, the catalyst is a series of Senate and House hearings on how well the services educate officers. The Defense Science Board will begin a study on military education reform soon. The defense intellectual blogosphere is electric with calls for reform. Other creative ideas for reform will follow in the coming days. And all will fail.

They will fail because the services will not be able to attract the brightest and groom them through proper schooling for positions of responsibility unless the intellectually gifted are rewarded with selection for promotion and command. Unless intellectual excellence is tied to the services' personnel systems, true reform is impossible...

Too Few - COL Robert Killebrew, Armed Forces Journal.

... At a time when we're throwing billions at banks and car companies, though, the US continues to be strangely parsimonious with its Army. At the end of the Vietnam War, the Army mustered 1.5 million soldiers in the active force; subsequent reductions and "peace dividends" brought it down to 480,000 at the beginning of the "war on terror." Today, after grudgingly increasing manpower through eight years of war, the service will be allowed to grow to 569,000 in the active force, with another 550,000 Reserve and National Guard troops - and it's still not enough. Career soldiers and reservists alike still will face repeated combat tours at a rate that would have staggered the Cold War force. They are the ones paying the price for pinching Defense Department pennies...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

Afghanistan, September, 2009 - Great, nay, outstanding collection of 43 images at the Boston Globe.

... the first of a new regular feature on the Big Picture: a monthly focus on Afghanistan. Collected here is a one-month collection of photos related to Afghanistan for September, 2009.

Here's one sample (reduced in size here):

Frontline in Afghanistan - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama.

A reader alerted me to the fact that I am in this PBS Frontline feature on Afghanistan. If you do not know the work of Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith, you should, because their team - producers and cameramen and everyone else -- has done some of the very best journalism of this war. Enduring, legendary, Bernard Fall-type stuff, really. Just watch some of this footage.

Enemy Reactions to the US Strategy and Force-Sizing Options - Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, American Enterprise Institute and Institute for the Study of War.

As the Obama administration considers its strategic approach and future resource levels in Afghanistan, CTP Director Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan (Institute for the Study of War) have produced a second report, Enemy Reactions to the US Strategy and Force Sizing Options, considering how enemy groups and other stakeholders in Afghanistan and Pakistan would respond to several US Policy scenarios...

Resourcing an Afghan Strategy - Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations.

In his assessment of the Afghan conflict, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, painted a dire picture and is recommending an infusion of US forces on top of the sixty-eight thousand Americans already allocated. But six months after unveiling a new objective for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region - focused on protecting the public and preventing al-Qaeda from reconstituting in Afghanistan - President Barack Obama is reportedly reconsidering the US commitment to the fight amid mounting Democratic opposition to a surge of US forces.

Six analysts - Peter R. Mansoor, Andrew J. Bacevich, Amin Tarzi, Thomas E. Ricks, Candace Rondeaux, and John A. Nagl - offer a range of strategic choices for US planners in Afghanistan.,,

Forces Available for an Afghan Troop Increase - Wesley Morgan, Institute for the Study of War.

This document describes the American forces available for deployment to Afghanistan as ground-owning brigades in the coming year. It begins by detailing American brigades currently in Afghanistan, followed by brigades with orders to deploy and then provides details on brigades available for deployment in late 2009/early 2010.

Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy - Jeffrey Dressler, Institute for the Study of War.

... Success in Helmand requires a comprehensive population-centric counterinsurgency campaign that is properly resourced and executed. Such a campaign seeks to maximize the net effect of limited resources in critical areas by protecting and positively influencing the population. Coalition forces cannot be everywhere and prioritizing objectives is essential.

Given limited resources, coalition efforts must focus on the critical population centers. For the enemy and indeed, the coalition, the most critical population centers in the province are Lashkar Gah, Gereshk, Nad Ali, Nawa, Garmser, Sangin, Musa Qala, and Kajaki...

Latest GOP Stunt on McChrystal Testimony Fails, and the GOP Is Lucky It Did - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent.

An amendment to the defense appropriations bill sponsored by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) to compel Gen. Stanley McChrystal to testify before Congress by mid-November has failed on a party-line vote of 59 to 40. It was an escalation of a gambit most recently backed by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) to cleave McChrystal from President Obama. But funny thing: the GOP might have ended up in a worse position if it got McChrystal to testify ahead of Obama's decisions on Afghanistan strategy.

To understand why, really listen to McChrystal's remarks to London's Institute for International and Strategic Studies. The New York Times piece doesn't do McChrystal's performance justice. McChrystal reiterated his position that Afghan population security is necessary for a strategy to defeat al-Qaeda, but not at all in the thumbing-his-nose-at-Joe-Biden way that the Times portrays...

USMC Battling for the Future - Vago Muradian and Kris Osborn, Defense News.

The US Marine Corps is fighting for the future of Afghanistan overseas, but back at home, officials are battling for the Corps' future in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Virtually everything important to the service's future is up for grabs, from its core amphibious assault missions to its vehicle, ship and aircraft programs, current and former Marines say. And it's all happening as the Pentagon responds to intense budget pressure that has already forced the cancellation of several high-profile weapon programs belonging to its sister services.

Perhaps no program is bigger - or more controversial - than its $14 billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a tank-sized amphibian Marine leaders see as essential to preserving its core amphibious assault mission. Long-delayed, expensive and seen as vulnerable to roadside bombs, EFV is viewed by some as a symbol of ineffective program development, but by others as a key to advancing the Marine Corps into the future...

And one for the road:

See Cartoons by Cartoon by Brian Fairrington - Courtesy of Politicalcartoons.com - Email this Cartoon

The president, vice president and an array of cabinet secretaries, intelligence chiefs, generals, diplomats and advisers gathered in a windowless basement room of the White House for three hours on Wednesday to chart a new course in Afghanistan. The one thing everyone could agree on: None of the choices is easy. Just six months after President Obama adopted what he called a "stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy" for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he is back at the same table starting from scratch.

The choices available to him are both disparate and not particularly palatable. He could stick with his March strategy, but his commander wants as many as 40,000 more troops to make it work. He could go radically in the other direction and embrace Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s idea of using fewer troops, focused more on hunting down leaders of Al Qaeda, but risk the collapse of the Afghan government. Or he could search for some middle-ground option that avoids the risks of the other two, but potentially find himself in a quagmire...

More at The New York Times.

On War, Obama Could Turn to GOP - Scott Wilson, Washington Post.

With much of his party largely opposed to expanding military operations in Afghanistan, President Obama could be forced into the awkward political position of turning to congressional Republicans for support if he follows the recommendations of the commanding US general there. Congressional Democrats have begun promoting a compromise package of additional resources for Afghanistan that would emphasize training for Afghan security forces but deny Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal the additional combat troops he has indicated he needs to regain the initiative against the Taliban insurgency.

The emerging Democratic consensus is likely to constrain the president as he considers how best to proceed with an increasingly unpopular war. On Wednesday, Obama chaired a three-hour discussion on Afghanistan with Cabinet members and senior officials at the White House. The meeting was largely a reassessment of the past eight years of American involvement in the region, with the president repeatedly probing his military and civilian advisers to justify their assumptions, according to one participant. This source said there was a recognition that the decision facing Obama is one of the most critical of his presidency...

More at The Washington Post.

Gates Doubts US's Afghan Strategy - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

President Barack Obama met with senior counselors for three hours Wednesday to launch his review of Afghan war strategy, amid indications that his defense secretary - the key link between the White House and the military - is among those undecided about the right approach. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the senior US commander in Kabul, is advocating a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy that focuses on protecting the Afghan populace rather than hunting individual militants. He submitted a classified assessment over the weekend calling for up to 40,000 US reinforcements.

Mr. Obama met with senior military officials, diplomats and Cabinet members Wednesday as part of the review, which White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said was designed to "poke and prod" potential new approaches to the conflict. The discussion focused on the political and security situation on the ground, according to an administration official, with military commanders detailing the gains made by the insurgency and top diplomats discussing the Afghan election results that were marred by fraud claims. Mr. Obama focused his questioning on the current threat posed by al Qaeda and whether a resurgent Taliban would give al Qaeda leaders a new haven to regroup, the official said, which could indicate Mr. Obama is more concerned about the status of a threat to the US than overall stability in Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Obama, War Council Review Afghanistan Strategy - Julian E. Barnes and Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times.

President Obama, amid political contretemps at home and expanding international turmoil over the disputed Afghan election, summoned his war Cabinet to the White House on Wednesday for a high-stakes review of his Afghanistan strategy. The session, which produced no announcements concerning additional troops or strategy, came on a day in which the highest-ranking American serving in the United Nations mission in Afghanistan was fired. Peter W. Galbraith, who had pushed for more aggressive steps to deal with alleged vote fraud, had clashed with Kai Eide, the senior UN representative in Afghanistan. in what one US official called "an ugly dispute."

The White House billed Obama's war strategy meeting as a major discussion of options, and it offered the first opportunity for Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and allied commander in Afghanistan, to address the president directly since submitting a military assessment that called for an expanded counterinsurgency campaign and pointed to the likely need for more troops. With no major decisions reached, another meeting was set for Wednesday. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said Obama remains committed to his goals, to "disrupt, dismantle and destroy Al Qaeda and its extremist allies" and prevent the reemergence of safe havens...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Here is what Gates said in his speech. First, he expresses pride in the F-35 tactical fighter program. The F-35 program will soak up hundreds of billions in procurement dollars over the next decade supplying short range strike aircraft to all of the services:

Without question, the F-35 program represents an ambitious effort. More than 3,000 aircraft, counting all military services and foreign partners. Twenty-two million lines of code. Over $46 billion for development plus an estimated $300 billion in total acquisition costs. A truly massive investment in the future of U.S. air power ... Next year's budget reflects a major commitment to accelerate the development and production of the F-35 -- with nearly half a billion dollars added to the FY 10 budget to support the flight-test program. Our objective continues to be to equip the first training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in 2011, and achieve initial operating capability for the Marines and Air Force in 2012 and 2013 respectively. I consider the F-35 program a major leadership priority -- with all that entails with regard to funding, oversight, and accountability.

Then a few paragraphs later in the speech, Gates explains how a Chinese focus on high-end asymmetrical capabilities and theater ballistic missiles could thwart all of those new F-35s lined up at places like Kadena, Guam, and U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers:

In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically -- fighter to fighter or ship to ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options. Their investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific -- in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups. This would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and put more of a premium on being able to strike from over the horizon -- whatever form that capability might take.

As Gates explains, the solution is a long range strike capability for the future. What has the Pentagon been doing about obtaining this capability? Dithering, as Gates makes clear:

I am committed to seeing that the United States has an airborne long-range strike capability -- one of several areas being examined in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review ...Whatever system is chosen to meet this requirement -- be it manned, unmanned, or some combination of the two -- it should be one that can realistically be produced and deployed in the numbers originally envisioned. That is why it is so important that with aircraft -- as with all of our major weapons systems -- schedules are met, costs are controlled, and requirements are brought into line with reality.

Over the past three years, what priority has Gates himself assigned to this problem? Sure, it will be years before Chinese anti-access and area denial efforts threaten U.S. Navy and Air Force tactical operations in the western Pacific. But if Gates's remarks are any indication, it may be even longer before the U.S. builds an adequate long range strike capability. It is not clear the Pentagon has settled on a concept, let alone drawn up requirement for the platform.

Given the incredibly long lead times required for major U.S. weapons programs, the U.S. is at risk of lacking an adequate long range strike response to adversary anti access/ area denial efforts. Who will take responsibility for that?