In House Report 111-166 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has directed "the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent assessment of the Human Terrain System, and submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing that assessment by March 1, 2010."

The reasons why such an assessment are being required are spelled out quite clearly:

The committee is aware of anecdotal evidence indicating the benefits of the program supporting operations in the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The committee also notes that a number of press accounts provide anecdotal evidence indicating problems with management and resourcing. The committee finds it difficult to evaluate either set of information in the absence of reliable, empirical data.

As someone who has followed the Human Terrain System since it first started being discussed, I am glad to see that such an assessment will be taking place. Indeed, I called for this type of assessment last year (here and here).

Elements of the Review

The committee goes on to outline seven key elements they want examined:

1. An overview of all of the components of HTS, including related technology

   development efforts;

2. The adequacy of the management structure for HTS;
3. The metrics used to evaluate each of the components of HTS;
4. The adequacy of human resourcing and recruiting efforts, including the implications

   of converting some contractor positions to government positions;

5. An identification of skills that are not resident in government or military

   positions, and how the Army can leverage academic networks or contracting

   opportunities to fill those gaps;

6. An identification of policy or regulatory issues hindering program execution;

   and

7. The potential to integrate HTS capabilities into existing exercises.

On its face, this list appears to be quite encompassing, and it is certainly a good starting point. Let us consider each one of these in turn.

(1) An overview of all of the components of HTS, including related technology development efforts;

This is the initial "mapping" of the system defining what is and is not to be included as a property of the system. Well worth doing, although I would hope that the "components" considered include those that are relevant to but not under the direct control of the HTS.

(2) The adequacy of the management structure for HTS;

I find the use of the term "adequacy" interesting, as well as the focus on "management structure" rather than personnel. One of the oft repeated negative claims relates to management personnel and the development of a "toxic culture" inside the program, so I would hope that whoever conducts the assessment will consider more than the formal structure of management.

As I mentioned, the use of the term "adequacy" is quite interesting. For one thing, it implies that the management structure only needs to be minimally functional as measured against a particular set of criteria. But what are those criteria? They are not stated, although they might be inferred from the earlier reference to anecdotal support for the program. Another possibility is that they will be measured against some supposedly "objective" standard of structure within TRADOC - a set of "best practices" that concerns formal organizational design while excluding informal organizational practice. I would hope that the latter would not be the case.

(3) The metrics used to evaluate each of the components of HTS;

This is one of the requirements I have some serious concerns about. "Metrics", in the sense of quantitative measurements, are useful if and only if they are significant indicators of the concepts and factors attempting to be measured. This is relatively simple and straightforward when it comes to areas dealing with the physical world such as, say, measuring marksmanship or building a bridge. It is, however, much more difficult when it comes to looking at things in the social world.

For example,

The HTS Mission is to provide commanders in the field with relevant socio-cultural understanding necessary to meet their operational requirements.

Key terms here are "relevant", "understanding" and "operational". First off, how is "relevance" defined? This is simple when it comes to the type of cultural "knowledge" at the "Don't wear shoes in the mosque" level, but it becomes increasingly difficult to define once one gets to more abstract levels. What is meant by "understanding"? Normally, at least in many of the social sciences, this term is used in the sense of "empathic understanding" (verstehen) after Dilthey and Weber's usage. This is an extremely subjective concept that is very difficult to quantify. What is meant by "operational"? Normally, at least in the context of US military discourse, this isn't a problematic term. However, it can easily be noted that the tactical is the strategic in counter-insurgency operations; in effect, corporals can influence the strategic direction of any COIN operation. Given this, and it is certainly a point or set of assumptions that appear to have been embraced by GEN McChrystal in his recent assessment of the Afghan situation, it might be argued that one of a commanders operational requirements is cultural awareness at the squad level, something that the HTTs cannot currently do. If that was set as one of the criterion for a "metric" on evaluating the HTS, they would necessarily receive a down check.

At a slightly more abstract level, how would causation be "measured"? Is it enough to use a subjective evaluation from a BCT commander that their "cultural understanding" has increased during the tenure of an HTT? Even if this happened, was it because of the HTT? How could the effects of the HTT on the commander's cultural awareness be separated out from that of general learning by experience or self directed reading? As one can see, attempting to apply a metric in this situation is fraught with difficulties.

(4) The adequacy of human resourcing and recruiting efforts, including the implications of converting some contractor positions to government positions;

Once again, we see the word "adequacy", which is, once again, interesting. I certainly agree that the move from contractor status to government status is an issue that needs to be examine, but, in my opinion, it is one that should be examined separately from that of recruitment, except where there are specific, structural, overlaps (such as security clearance issues).

(5) An identification of skills that are not resident in government or military positions, and how the Army can leverage academic networks or contracting opportunities to fill those gaps;

This is the element I have the greatest difficulty with. First of all, the core analytic capabilities that are required for the HTTs are not really amenable to being treated as "skills"; they should be seen as "competencies" instead. As a note, a "skill" in this sense is a set of actions that has a fairly precise outcome that may be objectively measured and has a directly measurable relationship to a desired outcome (e.g. marksmanship), while a "competency" is a cluster of skills combined with an attitude, a set of perceptions and, most importantly, culturally specific rules for the deployment of the skill set (see Locating Competence, Jacobi and McNamara, 1999). At the minimum, these competencies will need to be defined, something that is not currently done in a manner that has a significant predictive value in my opinion.

The second concern I have with this element is that it is looking at a recruiting issue - "leverage academic networks or contracting opportunities to fill those gaps." - without requiring an assessment of the issues that hinder such recruitment. Or, to put it a touch more strongly, the element ignores the extremely strong anti-HTS backlash inside academia. Now, some might assume that this is just an academic complaining about being ignored. Well, I may be an academic, but I also know a lot about recruiting and the types of candidates who are most likely to be recruited in such conditions. At the minimum, whoever conducts this assessment will need to examine the structural and cultural interactions between the Academy and the HTS including, but not limited to, an analysis of ethical and professional concerns.

(6) An identification of policy or regulatory issues hindering program execution; and

On the surface, I have no difficulties with this. I will note, however, that the assessment will, if conducted properly, involve the identification of a significant number of issues.

(7) The potential to integrate HTS capabilities into existing exercises.

Again, on the surface, I have no difficulties with this. I do, however, foresee many problems in getting the capabilities integrated into exercises if the term 'exercises" is left wide open.

Concluding remarks

I would like to make several concluding remarks about this assessment. First of all, I would hope that at least one Anthropologist be included in the team that conducts it. I consider this to be a minimum requirement since, quite frankly, most people with a background in management are completely unable to understand what we do and how we do it. That, by the way, is not a "sour grapes" comment - it is the result of having worked with management people - academics, governments and private industry - for almost 20 years. There is also a very pragmatic reason as well; without an Anthropologist involved in the assessment, that assessment will have limited or no credibility within the academic community and that will impact on future perceptions of the HTS as well as on future recruiting.

A second point I want to make is that the timeline for this assessment, March 1st, 2010, is very tight. I believe that, in order for this assessment to be of real value to all stakeholders, it will require a lot of interview work, which is quite time consuming. I am concerned that the tight timeline may prove to be a stumbling block.

Finally, I have been told that TRADOC itself "believes this audit to be a positive development" and that they will "give a good hard look on what we need to improve and will offer insights into how we might be more effective at rapidly standing up new programs in the future". Given TRADOCs recent moves to become more transparent and, especially, those conducted here at the SWJ (e.g. here and here), I have no doubt that these comments are sincere.

White House Starts Review of Afghan Strategy - Peter Spiegel and Jonathan Weisman, Wall Street Journal.

The White House began its review of the Afghan war strategy in earnest Tuesday, with senior administration officials meeting via videoconference with the top commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, at the start of what could be weeks of debate over whether to send thousands of reinforcements. White House officials said President Barack Obama will join in the discussions Wednesday, when he is expected to meet with Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among other top officials.

The White House unexpectedly decided to review its strategy in Afghanistan after a series of recent setbacks in the war, including allegations of fraud following last month's presidential elections and surging violence throughout the country. It begins just days after Gen. McChrystal submitted his request for as many as 40,000 additional troops to the Pentagon. Some in the administration, notably Mr. Biden, have argued for a smaller military footprint and a tighter focus on counterterrorism as the best way forward. Advocates of such a shift point to the effective use of Predator drone strikes to kill Taliban leaders in Pakistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Decision Time for Obama - Michael Gerson, Washington Post opinion.

As President Obama approaches a decision on the way forward in Afghanistan - the most historically consequential choice of his presidency so far - military leaders seem impressed with his decision-making process. During the next few weeks, Obama has scheduled considerable time to be personally involved in discussions. In the White House economy, presidential attention is the most valued commodity - coveted, hoarded and stolen. Obama's engaged, deliberate style has fans in the military. But there are also risks when arguments about military strategy are too public for too long. An enemy can try to influence the outcome of a debate with attacks and propaganda.

Al-Qaeda's most recent video warns Europeans that they are about to be abandoned: "It won't be long until the dust of war clears in Afghanistan, at which point you won't find a trace of any American, because they will have gone away far beyond the Atlantic." There are also risks for American military morale. Soldiers in Afghanistan are going outside the wire, dismounting from their vehicles and mingling with the people - increasing their chances of being killed - for the sake of a counterinsurgency approach that the president has publicly questioned and may now change. No one wants to be the last to die for the sake of yesterday's strategy. Major military decisions require deliberation. The debate, however, should generally take place in private and produce outcomes with all deliberate speed. At some point soon, the seminar must end...

More at The Washington Post.

Via Noah Shachtman at Danger Room - Draft Policy Would OK Troops' Tweets.

The Defense Department may allow troops and military employees to freely access social networks - if a draft policy circulating around the Pentagon gets approved, that is.

For years, the armed services have put in place a series of confusing, overlapping policies for using sites like Twitter and Facebook. But a draft memo, obtained by Nextgov, allows members of the military to use Defense Department networks to get on the social media sites - as well as on "e-mail, instant messaging and discussion forums." ...

More at Danger Room.

Defense to Allow Troops, Family Members to Use Social Network Sites - Bob Brewin, NextGov.

The Defense Department, which had seen some services ban the use of social networking sites, will allow troops and their families to use the popular online communication tools such as Facebook and Twitter on its unclassified networks, according to a draft memo obtained by Nextgov.

The memo, written by Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III and due out in days, solidly backs the use of social network sites, which Lynn calls "Internet capabilities," for both official and unofficial purposes and envisions these tools as providing an information advantage for Defense.

The new policy "addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the Internet," Lynn wrote. "This policy recognizes that emerging Internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners." ...

More at NextGov.

I'm following this closely as we have a stake in this fight -- the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) currently blocks our Small Wars Council discussion board. I am told our Blog, Journal and other pages are still accessible. It's also quite ironic -- the Army is taking full advantage (and here) of our reach and feedback capabilities while the Marine Corps sees fit to block what many call the most professional and useful social networking site concerning Irregular Warfare / Small Wars issues on the Internet. Go figure...

The biggest news from last week's United Nations and G-20 meetings was the revelation of a second gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility under construction on a military base near Qom, Iran. Although the Iranian government denies that its failure to disclose the construction of this facility to the IAEA constitutes a breach of Iran's obligations under the NPT, the U.S., British, and French governments disagree.

President Obama and his advisers hope that last week's dramatic disclosure will finally create the diplomatic leverage over Iran the West has heretofore lacked. They are hoping that one more case of Iran's cheating will be enough to convince Russia and China to support tougher economic and financial sanctions against Iran, sanctions that will be stern enough to change Iranian behavior. This is very unlikely to happen.

Russia and China have established their policies on Iran and the disclosure of the Qom facility does not add any information to the calculations that led to those policies. Certain elements of the Russian and Chinese industrial bureaucracies see Iran as an important export market. China sees Iran as an important future energy supplier. The foreign policy establishments in Russia and China have always resisted the idea of using the UN Security Council as a tool to inflict punishment on a country. They especially don't want to support such an effort that is organized by the U.S. and western Europe. For these reasons (and more) the Qom revelation isn't likely to change Russian and Chinese policy toward Iran. And if Russia and China don't agree to tougher sanctions against Iran, Iran will not suffer from tougher sanctions. And this means that sanctions won't be a route to changing Iranian behavior.

Should Russia and China worry about a nuclear-armed Iran? And should Russia and China worry about what their non-cooperation on Iranian sanctions will do to their relations with the U.S. and Europe?

Russian and Chinese policymakers are likely counting on the following end-state for the Iranian nuclear program: they likely believe Iran will become an undeclared but assumed nuclear weapons state, similar to Israel's status. They also appear to be unconcerned about Iran becoming a future nuclear proliferator, either to terrorists or to other states. Russian and Chinese leaders likely assume that the U.S. will have to expend great energy providing protection to Israel and the GCC countries, establishing a balance of power in the region against Iran. They are counting on America's risk aversion to prevent a major war against Iran from breaking out. Meanwhile, if the U.S. ends up distracted by expanded Iranian-backed subversions, insurgencies, and proxy wars, so much the better for Russia and China.

As for Russian and Chinese relations with the West, Russian and Chinese leaders calculate that those relations will be governed by other permanent interests and not by a dispute over how to handle Iran.

This is my guess as to how the Russian and Chinese governments view the Iranian problem. Obama, Gordon Brown, and Nicholas Sarkozy will find out (if they haven't already) that international economic sanctions will not be a solution for the Iran situation.

The next question for Western policymakers is whether they can arrange without war a stable and geo-strategically acceptable end-state with a nuclear-armed Iran. And if not, what risks and costs should the West be —to take?

McChrystal's Frank Talk on Afghanistan - 60 Minutes, 27 September 2009.

Watch CBS Videos Online

President Obama is rethinking his entire strategy in Afghanistan after the new commander there stunned the White House with a warning the war could be lost if he doesn't get more troops in the next 12 months. General Stanley McChrystal is up against an enemy that holds the initiative, and he's working with an Afghan government shot through with corruption.

Even with more troops, he warns, there has to be "a dramatic change in how we operate." That stark assessment comes from a man who is perhaps this country's most battle-hardened general and, according to those who have served with him, a one-of-a-kind commander.

McChrystal's Frank Talk on Afghanistan - CBS story behind the 60 Minutes interview.

There Are Only Two Choices Left on Iran - Eliot A. Cohen, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Unless you are a connoisseur of small pictures of bearded, brooding fanatical clerics there is not much reason to collect Iranian currency. But I kept one bill on my desk at the State Department because of its watermark - an atom superimposed on the part of that country that harbors the Natanz nuclear site. Only the terminally innocent should have been surprised to learn that there is at least one other covert site, whose only purpose could be the production of highly enriched uranium for atom bombs.

Pressure, be it gentle or severe, will not erase that nuclear program. The choices are now what they ever were: an American or an Israeli strike, which would probably cause a substantial war, or living in a world with Iranian nuclear weapons, which may also result in war, perhaps nuclear, over a longer period of time...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gates: Setting Afghan Withdrawal Date Would Be 'Strategic Mistake' - Jon Hilsenrath and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates pushed back against calls by Congress for the administration to set a timeline for withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan, as unease about the White House's handling of the war grows on Capitol Hill and among the public. In two television interviews, Mr. Gates argued that the Afghan war was vital to US national security. Laying out a timeline for removing American troops from Afghanistan would be "a strategic mistake" that could embolden al Qaeda and the Taliban, he said on CNN's "State of the Union."

Mr. Gates waded into the political debate over Afghanistan at a pivotal moment in the eight-year-old war. The Obama administration is conducting a broad review of its strategy for the conflict as it weighs a request from the top American commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for up to 40,000 US reinforcements. About 65,000 American troops are now in Afghanistan. Gen. McChrystal completed the formal request several weeks ago, but delayed submitting it to the Pentagon at the request of Mr. Gates and other senior Defense Department leadership. The commander was expected to send the classified report to Mr. Gates over the weekend...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

A recommendation by COL Dave Maxwell: The Taliban in Their Own Words - Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, Newsweek.

During wars and after them, the real voice of the enemy is rarely heard. Propaganda is plentiful, as are prideful boasts - and the Taliban have certainly been quick studies at the modern art of information warfare. But the fears and ambitions of ordinary fighters are too often buried under statistics and theories propounded from thousands of miles away. That's been even more true in Iraq and Afghanistan, where reporters who might accurately convey the other side's perspective are at risk of being kidnapped or killed for their efforts.

After eight long years of war in Afghanistan, however, America and its allies can ill afford not to understand who the enemy is and why they fight. To put together this remarkable oral history, told through the words of the Taliban themselves, Newsweek turned to contributing correspondent Sami Yousafzai, who has been covering the conflict for the magazine since 2001. Over that time he has developed and maintained contact with dozens of Afghan insurgents, including the six whose stories are told here.

Working with Newsweek's Ron Moreau, Yousafzai spent more than a month crisscrossing Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet these sources. He has known them all for some time, and in the past their information has generally proved reliable. Their accounts may sometimes be self-serving - most Afghan civilians recall the Taliban regime far less fondly, for one thing - but the facts are consistent with what Yousafzai knows about the men from earlier reporting. While it's impossible to confirm the credibility of everything they say, their stories offer a rare chance to understand how the insurgents see this war, from the collapse of the Taliban, through their revival and, now, their budding ascendancy...

Much more at Newsweek.

Diverse Sources Fund Insurgency In Afghanistan - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post.

The Taliban-led insurgency has built a fundraising juggernaut that generates cash from such an array of criminal rackets, donations, taxes, shakedowns and other schemes that US and Afghan officials say it may be impossible to choke off the movement's money supply.

Obama administration officials say the single largest source of cash for the Taliban, once thought to rely mostly on Afghanistan's booming opium trade to finance its operations, is not drugs but foreign donations. The CIA recently estimated that Taliban leaders and their allies received $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan...

More at The Washington Post.

McChrystal Says Insurgents Are Winning Communications Battle - Walter Pincus, Washington Post.

The United States and its allies in Afghanistan must "wrest the information initiative" from the Taliban and other insurgent groups that have undermined the credibility of the Kabul government and its international backers, according to the top US and NATO commander in the country. "The information domain is a battlespace," Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal wrote in an assessment made public on Monday, adding that the allies need to "take aggressive actions to win the important battle of perception."

As an initial step, McChrystal wants to change the goal of public relations efforts in Afghanistan from a "struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan population to one of giving them 'trust and confidence' " in themselves and their government. At the same time, he said, more effort should be made to "discredit and diminish insurgents and their extremist allies' capability to influence attitudes and behavior in Afghanistan." One way to accomplish that, McChrystal wrote, is to target insurgent networks "to disrupt and degrade" their effectiveness. Another is to expose what he calls the insurgents' "flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran," including indiscriminate use of violence and terrorism, and attacks on schools and development projects...

More at The Washington Post.

Let's Beat the Extremists Like We Beat the Soviets - Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Post opinion.

America's long war, which began on Oct. 7, 2001, when US bombs and missiles started falling on Afghanistan, has become the longest in this country's history. The eighth anniversary of the conflict beckons, with no end in sight.

The counterinsurgency campaign proposed in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's strategic assessment will prolong the war for an additional five or 10 years. The war's most ardent proponents insist that President Obama has no choice: It's either fight on or invite another 9/11.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to a global counterinsurgency campaign. Instead of fighting an endless hot war in a vain effort to eliminate the jihadist threat, the United States should wage a cold war to keep the threat at bay. Such a strategy worked before. It can work again...

More at The Washington Post.