| Small Wars Journal

War disciplines militaries: it forces them to refine, and sometimes revise, their tactics, techniques and technologies, or risk defeat in battle. Yet there is no theory of how militaries improve in war. This article develops a theory of military adaptation, which it applies to an analysis of the British campaign in Helmand from 2006 to 2009. Drawing on a wealth of primary sources (military plans, post operation reports and interviews), it shows how British brigades adapted different ways of using combat power to try and defeat the Taliban from 2006-07, and how from late 2007, British brigades have adapted a new population-centric approach that has focused more on influence operations and non-kinetic activities.

Read the entire article at Journal of Strategic Studies.

Here's the seventh edition of Small Wars Journal's Saturday Night Quote (SWJ SNQ). Kudos to Robert C. Jones. In the commentary section of SWJ Blog entry "Afghanistan: It's Not Over" COL Jones had this to say:

"Those who dwell on ideology, those who dwell on sanctuary, and those who dwell on the thousands of perspectives as to how best engage the lower tier of the [Afghanistan] insurgency (from the "kill them" to the "develop them" to the "secure them" to the "govern them" and all shades in between) are all tilting at windmills in large degree. No amount of energy directed at the bottom can do more than suppress the insurgency for some small period of time. True victory, true stability, comes when the top tier issues are resolved. Focus there."

Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers

Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers by Major Niel A. Smith, Joint Force Quarterly.

After three decades of conflict, Sri Lanka's government defeated the ethnic separatist insurgent group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers, in May 2009. The violence and brutality employed by both sides in the final years of the conflict drew significant interest from the global civilian and military communities, especially when Sri Lanka credited its callousness to civilian casualties as a key to its success. The defeat of the LTTE added to the debates over U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the role of lethal force in counterinsurgency. Some have advocated that the United States consider employing such tactics as part of an effective COIN campaign, utilizing recent cases such as Sri Lanka and Chechnya to bolster their case...

Read the entire article at Joint Force Quarterly.

The Allure of Quick Victory

The Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru's Fight against Sendero Luminoso - Major Michael L. Burgoyne, Military Review.

The decapitation of Sendero Luminoso (SL) in conjunction with the use of local security forces and a whole-of-government approach allowed Peru to defeat SL in the 1990s. A failure to follow through with the benefits of government services and a lack of pressure by security forces has allowed SL to regroup. In order to achieve a lasting victory the Peruvian government must address the foundations of insurgency: the intransigent insurgent leadership and the welfare of the population. Peru's current challenges provide an admonition to the US in its current efforts to consolidate gains in Iraq and in support of other allies facing insurgency...

Read the entire article at Military Review.

Hot Off The Press: JFQ Issue 59

The latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly is now posted at National Defense University Press. Here's the lineup:

JFQ Dialogue

From the Chairman - Admiral Michael Mullen

Letters to the Editor - JFQ

Forum

Executive Summary - David H. Gurney

An Interview with General James T. Conway, 34th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps - Dabid H. Gurney

Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward - John D. Winkler

Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves - John A. Nagl and Travis Sharp

Senior Officer Professional Military Education as an Equalizer - James T. Currie

Special Feature

The Security Trinity: Understanding the Role of Security Forces in COIN - Eric E. Greek

Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers - Niel A. Smith

ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO's Future - Tarn D. Warren

A QDR for All Seasons? The Pentagon Is Not Preparing for the Most Likely Conflicts - Roy Godson and Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Is the Conduct of War a Business? - Milan Vego

Essay Contests

Winners of the 2010 Writing Competitions - Joint Force Quarterly

Harmonious Ocean? Chinese Aircraft Carriers and the Australia-U.S. Aliiance - John Frewen

U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions Will Lead to Ultimate Failure - Mark Schrecker

Information Strategy: The Missing Link - Hans F. Palaoro

Comentary

Ike Warned Us About This: The MICC Stranglehold on Responsible Procurement - Eric A. Hollister

Redress of Professional Military Education: The Clarion Call - Charles D. Allen

Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional - Andrew R. Milburn

Building a Potemkin Village: A Taliban Strategy to Reclaim the Homeland - Jeff Donnithorne

Strategic Communication in the New Media Sphere - Timothy Cunningham

Features

What U.S. Cyber Command Must Do - Wesley R. Andrues

China's Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements - Cindy A. Hurst

Responsible Drawdown: Synchromizing the Joint Vision - Paul C. Hurley and John J. Abbatiello

Force Planning in the 2010 QDR - Kathleen H. Hicks and Samuel J. Brannen

Force of Law

A Patchwork Strategy of Consensus: Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan - Mark R. Hagerott, Thomas J. Umberg, and Joseph A. Jackson

Recall

Operation Albion and Joint Amphibious Doctrine - Gregory A. Thiele

Book Reviews

The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell - Rizwan Ali

Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? - John D. Becker

Intelligence for an Age of Terror - Clark Capshaw

Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces - Todd M. Manyx

Joint Doctrine

Redefining the Center of Gravity - Dale C. Eikmeier

Increasing Warfighter Interoperability - Ray A. Zuniga

Joint Doctrine Update - JPs Revised or Under Review

Read more about Hot Off The Press: JFQ Issue 59

4 September SWJ Roundup

Middle East Peace Talks

Analysts Pessimistic on Chances of Mideast Talks Success - Voice of America

Arab Views of Peace Talks Tend Toward Pessimistic - Voice of America

How Can Obama Push Talks Forward? - Christian Science Monitor

Clinton: Time is Now for Mideast Peace - Associated Press

Clinton Warns on Mid-East Talks - BBC News

Clinton: Time Ticking For Israel-Palestinian Peace - Reuters

Palestinian Militants Protest Peace Talks - Voice of America

Palestinian Security Must Step Up - Los Angeles Times

Hamas Attacks Show Group is Still Strong in West Bank - Washington Post

Iran Blasts Israeli-Palestinian Talks - Voice of America

Pessimism Permeates Mideast Media on Talks - New York Times

PA Delegation Feel Positive after Launch of Talks - Jerusalem Post

Inside the Israeli and Palestinian Delegations - BBC News

Another Start for Peace Talks - New York Times editorial

Mideast Peace: The Problem Obama Chose - Los Angeles Times opinion

Afghanistan

U.S. to Temper Stance on Afghanistan Corruption - Washington Post

Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy - AFPS

Petraeus Plans for Start of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan Next Year - VOA

Analysis: Special-ops on Show to Woo War Skeptics - Associated Press

Petraeus Says Afghan Raids on Rebels Exceed Iraq Pace - Bloomberg

Afghan Exit Plan Already Drafted - The Times / The Australian

Gates Sketches Afghan Combat Timeline - Wall Street Journal

Gates Rallies Troops in Kandahar - Financial Times

Gates Confident Afghan Strategy Working, But Outcome Not Assured - VOA

Afghanistan Violence will Get Worse, Says U.K. Commander - BBC News

Gates Visits U.S. Forces in Southern Afghanistan - Associated Press

U.S. Marines, British Advisers at Odds in Helmand - Washington Post

Gates Meets U.S. Troops in Afghan Taliban Heartland - Agence France-Presse

Gates Sees 'Positive Direction' in Afghanistan - AFPS

Gates Says Pakistan Havens Still Threaten Afghanistan - Reuters

Progress in Kandahar Will be Gradual, General Says - AFPS

General Seeks to Build Professional, Sustainable Afghan Forces - AFPS

Mullen Gets Afghanistan Updates in Kabul - AFPS

Coalition, Afghan Forces Rescue Prisoners - AFPS

U.S. Doctors Work With Afghans to Improve Country's Medical Care - VOA

Trainers Build New Afghan Health System - AFPS

Kabul Bank: Karzai Urges Afghans Not to Panic - Washington Post

Ex-bank Executives Say Dismissals Caused Panic - Washington Post

NATO Captures Taliban Commander in Afghanistan - Associated Press

NATO Says 6 Afghan Insurgents Killed in Clash - Associated Press

Afghan Candidate Wounded in Grenade Attack - Associated Press

A Chaplain and an Atheist Go to War - Wall Street Journal

Pakistan

Suicide Bombing at Pakistan Shi'ite Rally Kills 53 - Voice of America

Bombing Kills 55, Prompts Fears of Rising Sectarian Violence - Washington Post

Suicide Bomber Kills 53 at Shiite Protest - New York Times

Pakistan Suicide Bombing Kills 58 - Los Angeles Times

Pakistani Taliban Attack Shiite Rivals- Wall Street Journal

Bomb Kills 54 In Pakistan, Taliban Threatens U.S. - Reuters

Toll From Attack on Pakistani Shiites Jumps to 65 - Associated Press

Pakistani Militants Stoking Sectarian Rift - Reuters

Crime Adds to Misery For Pakistan's Flood Victims - Reuters

Iraq

Shiite Bloc Names New Candidate for Iraqi PM - Associated Press

Top U.S. Commander Discusses Iraq With Turkey - Associated Press

Analysis: Iraq's Military Needs After 2011 - New York Times

Punk'd, Iraqi-Style, at a Checkpoint - New York Times

Iran

Iran Could Strike Israeli Nuclear Site if Attacked - Associated Press

Iran Blasts Israeli-Palestinian Talks - Voice of America

U.S. Rights Group Urges Release of Iranian Activist - Associated Press

United Nations

U.N. FAO Calls Meeting to Discuss Rising Food Prices - Voice of America

U.N. Raises Concerns as Global Food Prices Jump - New York Times

United States

Defense Secretary Offers Cautious Views on Wars - New York Times

Blackwater Won Contracts Through a Web of Companies - New York Times

U.S. Military Bands: Lighter and Faster - New York Times

Africa

Darfur Rebels Say Dozens Killed in Army Attacks - Voice of America

Sudan Settles on Independence Referendum Committee Head - BBC News

Mozambique Police Fire at Rioters - BBC News

Koranic Teachers Arrested for Forcing Children to Beg in Senegal - VOA

U.N. Report on Congo Genocide Strengthened - Washington Times

U.N.: Over Two Dozen Minors Raped In Eastern Congo - Reuters

Americas and Caribbean

U.S. Withholds Millions in Mexico Antidrug Aid - New York Times

$36M in Anti-drug Funds to be Sent to Mexico - Washington Post

Mexican Women Work, Die For Gangs In Drug War City - Reuters

Mexico Arrests 6 in Deadly Cancun Bar Blaze - Associated Press

Colombian Troops Storm Rebel Camp - BBC News

Graft Trial Starts For Former Guatemala Leader - Reuters

Castro Addresses Rally in Havana - BBC News

Asia Pacific

From North Korea, Word of Shortages, Grudges - Wall Street Journal

Will Heir Be Unveiled at North Korean Convention? - Associated Press

South Korea Foreign Minister Quits In Nepotism Row - Reuters

The Caucasus

Car Bomb In Caucasus Wounds Minister, Kills Driver - Reuters

Central Asia

Attack in Tajikistan Highlights Fears of Militancy - New York Times

Europe

Italian Cities Plan to Shut Roma Camps - New York Times

France to See Demonstrations Against Roma Expulsions - BBC News

Middle East

Syria Moves to Curb Influence of Muslim Conservatives - New York Times

Hezbollah Won't Cooperate With Hariri Tribunal - Associated Press

Posters for Egypt's Spy Chief as President Removed - Associated Press

Read more about 4 September SWJ Roundup

Friday Night North Korean People's Army Funky Get Down Juche Party

H/T jackscrew on YouTube and Niel Smith on Facebook

Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy, Gates in Kandahar, More...

Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy

By John D. Banusiewicz

American Forces Press Service

KABUL, Afghanistan, Sept. 3, 2010 -- Progress in Afghanistan has been faster than expected in some respects, and not as far along in others, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus said here today.

Petraeus, the commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, spoke to reporters traveling with Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before attending a working lunch with the admiral.

The progress achieved so far in Afghanistan is "about standard for any one of these kinds of deliberate campaigns," Petraeus said.

The current Afghanistan strategy has been in the making since 2008, the general said, when a U.S. Central Command assessment and subsequent policy reviews revealed that factors he called "the inputs" of the Afghanistan mission weren't right. New organizational structures and some new leaders were necessary, he explained, and concepts and approaches needed refinement. And, he added, insufficient resources had been applied to the effort at that time.

Petraeus -- who commanded U.S. Central Command before coming to Afghanistan -- credited his predecessor, Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, with having "a huge amount to do with getting the inputs right, obviously."

After taking command in Afghanistan in July, Petraeus said he looked at various plans and directives, including a controversial tactical directive that McChrystal had put in place to minimize the likelihood of civilian casualties.

"Some of these I've revised to varying degrees," Petraeus said. "I put out my own counterinsurgency guidance, and we refined the tactical directive. The most significant change to the tactical directive, by the way, was to state in it that no one could add further restrictions to what was in that directive.

"That was what the biggest concern was," he continued. "I think the directive was fundamentally sound. We made some tweaks to it based on requests from commanders in some of the classified portions ... that were not huge."

The problem, the general said, was that extra restrictions had been added in a handful of units as the directive made its way down the chain of command. Though the practice wasn't widespread, he added, a major mythology grew from it that the directive was tying forces' hands behind their backs.

"We have to - absolutely must -- remain committed to reducing the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the conduct of our operations," he said. "In fact, [the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan] actually recognized recently in a report that even as we have tripled the number of U.S. forces on the ground, the number of civilian casualties has gone down by 30 percent, which is a pretty extraordinary achievement, frankly, and something we must stay committed to."

The biggest issue, Petraeus said, was the resources devoted to the effort in Afghanistan. In January 2009, he said, U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan numbered roughly 30,000, and that number soon will be more than 98,000. The number of civilians has been tripled, he added, and funding has been provided for 100,000 additional Afghan security forces.

"What that is enabling us to do for the first time here is to carry out a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign," Petraeus said.

Thanks to more International Security Assistance Force troops and Afghan special operations forces and enablers, as well as an effort that started last fall to provide the infrastructure to accommodate them, special mission element forces now are operating at a high tempo, Petraeus said. For example, he said, one of three special operations units conducted eight operations over the previous 24 hours, killing one targeted individual and detaining three others, with confirmation still pending on whether four other people detained were among the targets of the operations.

By comparison, Petraeus said, special operations units during the height of the troop surge in Iraq conducted about 10 intelligence-driven targeted operations per day. In Afghanistan today, 30 such operations take place on any given day.

ISAF and Afghan special operations forces have conducted more than 4,000 kinetic operations over the last 90 days, the general said, resulting in 235 insurgent leaders killed or captured and 1,066 rank-and-file insurgents killed and 1,673 captured.

But while military action is necessary, the general said, it's not sufficient for success. Over the same period, he said, the special operations forces also have conducted more than 1,200 "population-centric" operations, such as key leader engagements and medical exercises, in Afghan communities.

Without a strategy that calls for first clearing an area of insurgents and then holding and rebuilding that area, the general said, the insurgents simply reclaim the area as a safe haven.

"So that's where conventional forces come in, of course," Petraeus said, "and the substantial increase in those and in Afghan forces has been of enormous help."

But conducting a security campaign that seeks to take safe havens and sanctuaries from the enemy, he said, means the enemy will fight back and violence goes up.

"Then it takes a while before you get sufficient security as a foundation for the establishment of governance where before it didn't exist," Petraeus said, "and that was the case in many of the central districts of Helmand province. And then, of course, that has to be solidified and some economic progress has to take place before you actually have some popular confidence that all of this is going to prove sustainable."

More:

Petraeus Plans for Start of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan Next Year - VOA

Analysis: Special-ops on Show to Woo War Skeptics - Associated Press

Petraeus Says Afghan Raids on Rebels Exceed Iraq Pace - Bloomberg

Afghan Exit Plan Already Drafted - The Times / The Australian

Gates Sketches Afghan Combat Timeline - Wall Street Journal

Gates Sees 'Positive Direction' in Afghanistan - AFPS

Gates Rallies Troops in Kandahar - Financial Times

Gates Confident Afghan Strategy Working, But Outcome Not Assured - VOA

Gates Visits U.S. Forces in Southern Afghanistan - Associated Press

Gates Meets U.S. Troops in Afghan Taliban Heartland - Agence France-Presse

Gates Says Pakistan Havens Still Threaten Afghanistan - Reuters

Progress in Kandahar Will be Gradual, General Says - AFPS

General Seeks to Build Professional, Sustainable Afghan Forces - AFPS

Mullen Gets Afghanistan Updates in Kabul - AFPS

Read more about Petraeus Explains Afghanistan Strategy, Gates in Kandahar, More...

This Week at War: The Iraq Gamble

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Hoping for the best, planning for the worst in Iraq

2) How to fight an insurgency-cartel

Hoping for the best, planning for the worst in Iraq

On Aug. 31, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the end of the American combat mission in Iraq. After expressing his gratitude to the soldiers who served there, Obama could scarcely hide his eagerness to "turn the page" on to other subjects, most notably the shambling U.S. economy. Obama promised a long-term American commitment to Iraq, the implementation of which he will no doubt fully delegate to others. The U.S. government now foresees an impressively powerful Iraqi army, almost ready to defend the country on its own when the last U.S. soldier leaves in December 2011. But this is Iraq, where political chaos, coups, and civil war never seem far from the surface. What strategies might the U.S. government have on the shelf should any of Iraq's numerous political fault lines erupt?

Writing for ForeignPolicy.com, Colin Kahl, deputy assistant defense secretary for the Middle East, describes the U.S. government's vision of its long-term relationship with Iraq. According to Kahl, the existing Strategic Framework Agreement, signed in November 2008, establishes the foundation for the long-term relationship after December 2011. Beyond 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad will establish an Office of Security Cooperation, similar to other such offices the U.S. government maintains with other allies in the region.

This office's principal task will be to further develop the higher-level combat and institutional capacities of the Iraqi military. In a recent briefing, Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, the deputy commanding general for advising and training in Iraq, described plans to transition the Iraqi Army from a constabulary counterinsurgency force to a high-end conventional force focused on defending against the threat from Iran. The first installment of this transition includes an Iraqi purchase of $13 billion in weapons from the United States, which will include 140 M1 main battle tanks, similar to those used by the U.S. military. The Iraqi Air Force seeks to purchase 18 F-16 fighter-bombers from the United States. As an initial test of its emerging conventional capability, Barbero discussed the Iraqi Army's plan to conduct a large-scale combined-arms training exercise in April 2011.

Although Barbero had high praise for its tactical leadership and combat experience, he made it clear that by 2012 the Iraqi Army will not have the conventional capability to defend the country's borders. Nor will the Iraqi Air Force have the capability to defend the country's airspace.

In his FP piece, Kahl listed Iraq's unresolved political fissures. These include simmering Arab-Kurdish tension, the still-separate and powerful Kurdish peshmerga militia, the status of the Sons of Iraq militias, and the unsatisfactory political inclusion of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Overlaying all these problems is a government that inspires little confidence from either the people or potential foreign partners and investors.

Kahl and Barbero have described the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship if all goes smoothly. What are the U.S. government's plans if one or more of Iraq's political fault lines ruptures? In such a scenario, how will the United States protect its interests in the region and prevent adversaries from exploiting an unfortunate opportunity? Happily, the United States now has a bounty of personal relationships in Iraq it did not have seven years ago. In a worst-case scenario, those relationships could be trump cards. But who in the U.S. government is thinking about how to play that hand?

How to fight an insurgency-cartel

A Sept. 1 New York Times article discussed a budding alliance between local government officials along Somalia's central coast and a pirate gang that has become wealthy and well-armed plying its trade in the Indian Ocean. The local government has recruited the pirates to help protect a coastal town from the violent Islamist al-Shabab militant group that seems to be sweeping up from the south. Pirate cousins in a nearby coastal village to the south have made the opposite bargain -- they have thrown their money and military muscle in support of al-Shabab.

We should count on criminal-commercial enterprises such as Somalia's pirates and Afghanistan's opium smugglers to take practical measures to thrive while political or ideological wars swirl around them. The pirates and smuggling cartels might prefer to stay out of politics, but being in transportation businesses, such cartels will find it difficult to remain agnostic, especially if the political combatants are as well-armed, if not as wealthy, as the cartels. Better for the cartels to avoid unnecessary conflict and keep their traffic moving by working out deals, perhaps simultaneously with both sides. After such cartels add their wealth and firepower to a conflict, such wars are likely to reach higher levels of intensity and endurance.

The formation of alliances with criminal cartels, by both insurgents and counterinsurgents, is not limited to Somalia and southern Afghanistan. During its early 1990s fight against drug smuggler Pablo Escobar, the Colombian government formed a highly effective alliance with Los Pepes, a secretive and violent criminal gang thought to be member of a paramilitary drug-smuggling cartel. It took just a few months for this alliance to crush Escobar. Today in Mexico, some analysts think that the Mexican government is tacitly protecting the Sinaloa cartel, a charge President Felipe Calderón vigorously denies. With government support, one cartel could defeat its competitors and bring an end to the violence, an outcome the government can't seem to manage on its own.

We can thus see why governments and insurgents would desire alliances with criminal cartels. For their part, cartels may not be interested in politics or ideology, but may feel the need to cooperate for short-term business reasons. But as I explained in a recent column, Mexico's cartels are becoming increasingly political, employing coercion against the government and direct control over the media's messages. As pressure on a cartel increases, from either competitors or the government, the cartel might feel the need to increase its appeal for support from the people, using an increasingly ideological or inspirational message to do so.

The latest models of insurgent organizations are arriving. They will combine the wealth of commercial-criminal operations with political and ideological appeals. Such an insurgency, with a broader and more diversified set of roots among the people, will be harder for governments to dig up. As we have seen elsewhere, governments may have to make their own deals with the criminal competition in order to fight back against the new insurgency-cartels.

Read more about This Week at War: The Iraq Gamble

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