Small Wars Journal

It's Time We Move Beyond COIN

Mon, 12/19/2011 - 2:37pm

Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel published an article of mine on strategy

It's Time We Move Beyond COIN

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the much needed conversation over counterinsurgency (COIN) has returned. Ryan Evans’ COIN is dead, long live the COIN attempts to add to this debate, but his efforts fall short, because he and other COIN proponents refuse to understand the underlining flaws in counterinsurgency as a strategy. COIN as a strategy cannot work in today’s world, given the current limitations in available resources, time, and national will. It was a collection of tactics and operational arts developed for twentieth century wars of nationalism and communism. Strategy, defined as the ends, ways, and means of American policy, must rise above a collection of disjointed tactics that have no proven cumulative effect. 

Refusing to understanding the disconnect between tactics and strategy leaves analysts like Evans wondering why “success has eluded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been unable to translate operational progress into strategic success,” as one recent journal article asked. Instead of addressing the underlying problems of the fledgling Afghan state, the regional geopolitics, and COIN in general, Evans in his article looks internally at the American perspective far removed from the fight and examines how “divisions that were aggravated in the lead-up to the Afghan ‘surge,’ remain unhealed” leading to a current “debate surrounding counterinsurgency [that] has become highly personal, emotional, and angry.”  Evans thus ignores the possibility that tension in the COIN debate may arise from our actual failure in war.

The Death of a Dictator: Danger, Opportunity or Best Timing Possible?

Mon, 12/19/2011 - 1:56pm

When assessing the North Korean succession process the “Korean Hands” will remind us that Kim Jong-il had 21 years to consolidate power and eliminate all political opposition and that the longer that Kim Jong-il lived the greater the chances of a smooth succession from the North Korean perspective.  Everything changed on December 17, 2011 at 8:30 in the morning aboard a train in north Korea when Kim Jong-il died of fatigue and overwork according to the Korean Central News Agency.  The questions are many but can be boiled down to what next for the  Kim Family Regime, the ROK, the US and Northeast Asia?

There are two scenarios that are likely to play out within North Korea.  The first scenario depends on the strength and power of Jang Song-taek who, along with his wife and the late Kim Jong-il’s sister, is the de facto “regent” for the young Kim Jong-un.  Has he been able to help Kim Jong-un establish sufficient legitimacy within the Regime and will they be able to consolidate power?  It is very likely that if Kim has sufficient strength and control of the security apparatus there are very likely arrests and purges taking place even as we try to figure out what is happening. 

The second scenario is that he has not been able to consolidate sufficient power and will be faced with internal threats from other senior members of the regime who are unwilling to allow a 27 year old four star general rule the party and the military.  If there is a power struggle many scenarios can play out ranging from internal chaos, civil war, and “implosion” to an external “explosion” – e.g., spillover of the effects of chaos and civil war into China and the ROK or the worst case: the desperate execution of the regime’s campaign plan to reunify the peninsula as the only means left to ensure survival of the Kim Family Regime.  Finally, regime collapse will occur when there is the loss of the ability of the regime to centrally govern and the loss of control and support of the military and security apparatus.    We have seen cracks in the system like hairline cracks in a dam.  The recently reported alleged defection of eight armed guards is but one indication of such cracks with water slowly dripping from through the regime’s dam - the question is are those cracks repairable or will they cause the dam to crumble and collapse; unleashing such a torrent on the peninsula that will make 1950-53 look like a minor skirmish in terms of scale of potential conflict and devastation.

Either scenario will ensure the continued suffering of 23 million north Korean people and the second scenario will expand the tragedy to the Republic of Korea and its 46 million citizens and significantly affect the other countries in Northeast Asia as well as have global effects.

This should be a wake-up call for the ROK, the US and the international community.  For 61 years the international community has been reacting to the Kim Family Regime.  While the ROK and US have conducted contingency planning for various scenarios in the north, the question that needs to be asked now is whether the ROK-US Alliance and the international community have sufficiently prepared for such contingencies?  Since 1994 when it was assessed that we could accept the political risk of the Agreed Framework because we assumed that the regime would soon collapse, we have written plans but we have not laid the groundwork to actually prepare for collapse.  Here are just two small examples of the preparation not conducted.   We have not executed an aggressive influence campaign targeting the second tier military leadership and the population to prepare them for collapse.  We have not aggressively targeted the external regime mechanisms around the world such as Department 39 – the lifeline of illicit activity that sustained the regime that if cut would cause the regime to strangle on its own incompetence.  If collapse occurs plans may be executed without sufficient preparation.

Serious dangers have been laid out above.  However, what is the likely outcome following the death of one of the world’s worst human rights violators and dictators?

Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one’s perspective, the timing of Kim Jong-il’s death probably came at the most opportune time.  With elections and a leadership transition in the ROK and US and China respectively, it is likely that there is going to be a major “strategic pause” on the Korean Peninsula. 

Just from a US perspective, the Administration is not going to be able to make any effective overtures toward Kim Jong-un in an attempt to influence him.  It will be interesting to see if agreements at the recent meetings in Beijing at which allegedly the US agreed to provide 240,000 tons of food aid and the north agreed it would return to the Six party talks, actually plays out (though there is precedence for agreements to be worked out during leadership transition as the Agreed Framework was completed after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994).  However, any action by the US Administration is likely to be exploited by the President’s political opponents.  Even such a seemingly simple condolence statement is likely being hotly debated at the White House.  If it is too conciliatory then it will be attacked as being too soft.  If it is too strong then it will have no chance to have a positive influence effect on Kim Jong-un.  The Administration is in a no win situation because even it makes a conciliatory statement the regime will interpret the attacks by the US political opposition as an indication of the real American position toward the north.

The ROK election season was not expected to have north Korea as a dominant issue.  While the political opposition will attack the ruling party on Korean policy, both parties are more likely to focus on economic and social issues.  Neither side will want to make the north the dominant issue.

The Chinese Communist Party also undergoes its leadership transition in 2012.  More than any other country, save the ROK, it wants to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and does not want the distraction of the leadership transition in the north.  It has its own internal complications with such events as protests in Wuken and other internal domestic political stability issues.

What the US, ROK, and China have in common is that they do not want collapse or war on the Peninsula.  China in particular, will do what is necessary to assist the regime to maintain the status quo.  We are likely to see food and fuel aid and protection from international political pressure on the regime to allow it to conduct its leadership transition in the hopes of preventing implosion or explosion.

This is going to lead to “peninsula paralysis” for the next two years at least.  None of the major powers in the region want collapse or war so we are likely to see overt (China) and tacit (US) support to the north in order to ensure stability on the peninsula.  While some will see the potential danger as outlined above there are others who will see this as an opportunity for regime change (beyond a Kim Family Regime transfer of power).  However, it is unlikely that there has been sufficient preparation made to be able to orchestrate or at least influence such a change and the foundation has not been laid from a military, economic, diplomatic, and influence perspective to either effect change or deal with the potential fall-out.  The bottom line is we are not prepared to exploit the current opportunity; however, the “peninsula paralysis” that we are about to experience may present the window of opportunity to conduct the necessary preparations to deal with the likely collapse of the regime because, as one Korea Hand recently opined, the regime cannot indefinitely defy the laws of economic and political gravity. 

The real opportunity is not to exploit the current events to cause a regime change for which no one is prepared, but to exploit the opportunity over the next two or more years to conduct the effective preparations necessary to deal with regime collapse on terms that the ROK and US desire.  Hasty and ill-advised calls for regime collapse are made only by those who do not understand the nature of the regime and the likely scenarios that will emanate from the final collapse of the Kim Family Regime.  They are made by those who do not understand the preparation that is necessary to mitigate the fallout from regime collapse.  At this time of potential crisis it is time to take a longer view to allow us to be proactive rather than reactive.   The peninsula is likely to weather this storm for a period of time.  But this should be the wake-up call that drives the ROK-US alliance to make the realistic preparations to deal with the only outcome on the Korean Peninsula that is necessary for both denuclearization and ultimate regional stability – the end of the Kim Family Regime and the solution to the lingering “Korea Question” that was supposed to be solved following the 1953 Armistice.

The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone

Kim’s death is one more headache for China

Mon, 12/19/2011 - 11:58am

The sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il comes at a particularly bad moment for the political leadership in Beijing. China has long been North Korea’s patron and protector, a task Beijing may not have wished for, but one it took on in order to maintain stability along its northeast frontier. Kim’s death unsettles the stability that Beijing has hoped to maintain, just as China’s leaders face growing internal instability themselves.

Kim Jong-Il’s death was premature (at least from Beijing’s perspective) because preparations for a smooth political transition in Pyongyang were almost certainly incomplete. Kim Jong-Il had several decades to prepare to take over from his father, Kim Il-Sung. By contrast, the 20-something near-child Kim Jong-un was selected for succession less than two years ago and has virtually no experience in political or military leadership. He undoubtedly will receive protection from more senior family members, but such protection is equally likely to create other fissures within North Korea’s ruling circles. By waiting so late in the game to finally settle on a successor, and choosing one so manifestly unprepared, Kim Jong-Il greatly increased the likelihood of political fragmentation inside North Korea.

As the major power with a closest working relationship with Pyongyang, China will also get the largest burden of responsibility for stabilizing North Korea, should that become necessary. Stability has been China’s goal all along; the current succession crisis will be the biggest test of China’s plans in this regard. And by refusing to discuss with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and others North Korean political reform and the possibility of life without the Kim Family Regime, China has only heaped more of the responsibility for North Korea onto its own back.

All of this comes at a bad time for China’s leaders. The open rebellion against local Communist Party officials in Wukan in Guangdong province threatens to spread. China’s real estate market, and thus its banking system, teeters on the edge. And the fact that China’s security authorities have imposed even harsher restrictions on electronic communications bodes ill for the regime’s legitimacy and for the future efficiency of the economy.

Can China’s leaders manage several significant crises at the same time? We may soon find out.

Covert Operations and Policy

Mon, 12/19/2011 - 9:37am

Covert Operations and Policy

by Adam Elkus

Infinity Journal

Nonstop covert operations against America’s enemies occur simultaneously in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. But as the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan give way to a worldwide shadow conflict, popular discussion of covert operations erroneously assume that these discrete capabilities are largely without precedent. Perhaps more perniciously, covert operations are often equated with direct action—the capture and killing of terrorists and insurgents. But covert operations are more than simply direct action writ large, and they have a distinguished historical pedigree. While daring exploits make the news, they also obscure the utility and limitations of covert action as a tool of policy.

19 December SWJ Roundup

Mon, 12/19/2011 - 5:29am

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Iraq

US Troops Leave Iraq, Ending Almost 9 Years of War - VOA

Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq - NYT

Last US Troops Withdraw from Iraq - BBC

‘No Sadness’ as US Troops Leave Iraq - S&S

Last Troops Exit Iraq in Subdued End to 9-Year War - AP

Iraqi-Turned-US Soldier Bids Farewell - WP

Iraqis Celebrate US Exit, But Worry for Future - AP

Court Martial Set for Remaining Marine Charged in Killings - S&S

Taking Leave of Iraq - LAT editorial

An Elusive Victory in Iraq - LAT opinion

States of Conflict: A Final Update - NYT opinion

 

North Korea

Kim Jong Il Dead at Age 69 - VOA

N. Korean Leader Kim Jong-il Dies - BBC

North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-il Dies - NYT

Enigmatic Leader Kim Jong Il Dies at 69 - WP

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il Dies - LAT

North Korea Says Kim Jong-il Dead at 69 - WT

Kim Jong-il Dies: N. Korean Leader has Heart Attack on Train - TT

North Korea: Kim Jong Il Dead, Son Is 'Successor' - AP

N. Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il Dead, Son Hailed as Heir - Reuters

World Reacts To Kim Jong Il Death - VOA

Kim’s Death Inspires Worries, Anxiety - NYT

N. Korea's Neighbors Prepare for Unexpected After Kim's Death - Reuters

Kim's Death Viewed With Wary Optimism - AP

A Ruler Who Turned North Korea Into a Nuclear State - NYT

Death May be a Turning Point for the North - LAT

Kim Jong Il: Dynastic Leader With Nuclear Ambition - AP

Kim Jong-Il: Reclusive Leader in a Hermit Country - Reuters

Kim Death Complicates Obama's N.Korea Nuclear Quandary - Reuters

US Poised to Announce Significant Food Aid to N. Korea - WP

 

Afghanistan

US Military, Taliban Use Twitter to Wage War - WP

NATO Says It Will Continue Afghan Night Raids - AP

States of Conflict: A Final Update - NYT opinion

 

Pakistan

Pakistani Crisis Prompts Leader to Race Home - NYT

Pakistan's President Returns Home - BBC

Zardari Returns to Pakistan Amid Memo Saga - Reuters

Pakistan's Supreme Court Probes Coup Memo - AP

The Pakistanis Have a Point - NYT opinion

States of Conflict: A Final Update - NYT opinion

 

Syria

Arab Officials: Syria's Assad to Sign Peace Plan Soon - VOA

Syria to Sign Arab Peace Initiative - Reuters

Gulf Leaders to Meet, Hoping Syria Will Sign Deal - Reuters

 

Egypt

Deadly Unrest Continues in Cairo - BBC

US Worried by Egypt Clashes Now in Fourth Day - Reuters

Muslim Brotherhood Criticizes Egypt's Military Crackdown - WP

Egypt News Media Clash Over Cause of Violence - NYT

Egypt's Military, Activists Vie for Public Support - AP

Egypt's Wary Christians - LAT editorial

 

Israel / Palestinians

Israel Releases 550 Palestinian Prisoners - VOA

Israel Frees Palestinians in 2nd Stage of Exchange - NYT

Israel Frees Last Swap Prisoners - BBC

Israel Completes Prisoner Exchange - WP

Plans for More than 1,000 New Housing Units on Disputed Land - LAT

 

Iran

Iranian TV Airs Video It Claims Is of US Spy - NYT

Iran TV Shows Suspected US Spy 'Confessing' - AP

Iran TV Shows 'US Spy Confession' - BBC

 

Middle East / North Africa

Dempsey: DOD to Stay Engaged, Vigilant in Middle East - AFPS

Dempsey, Saudi Partners Discuss Iraq, Regional Challenges - AFPS

 

WikiLeaks

Computer Security Subject of Manning Pretrial - WP

Defense in WikiLeaks Case Claims Lax Computer Security - S&S

Manning’s Gender Identity Issues Raised in WikiLeaks Case - WP

Bias Rejected in Wikileaks Case - BBC

Testimony in Manning's Case Shows Breadth of Evidence - LAT

Private Linked to Sensitive Data - AP

 

US Department of Defense

Secretary Expects Cuts in Marines and the Navy - NYT

Air Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of Stress - NYT

 

United States

Help for Homeless Veterans - NYT editorial

A Wrong Turn in Terror Fight - LAT editorial

For Obama, Time to Unveil the Vision Thing - WP opinion

End of America’s Era - WP opinion

Flags for Civilians - NYT opinion

 

World

War Really Is Going Out of Style - NYT opinion

 

Africa

Congo Opposition Leader Declares Himself Legitimate President - VOA

Congo Opposition Leader Declares Himself Winner - AP

Nigeria Arrests 'Islamist Leader' - BBC

Nigeria Police Arrest 14 After Deadly Shootout With Sect - Reuters

Man in Soldier Uniform Kills Somali Journalist - AP

Shortchanging Somalia - LAT editorial

 

Americas

Cartels Use Legitimate Trade to Launder Money, US, Mexico Say - LAT

Mexico: Safe Travels South of the Border - WP

Venezuela’s Chavez Keeps Trying to Lure Anti-US Allies - WT

Brazil Easing Amazon’s Land-use Rules - WP

 

Asia Pacific

Chinese Rebel Villagers Hunker Down With Rocks and Rice - Reuters

China Villagers in Police Standoff Plan Big March - AP

Death Toll from Philippines Storm Passes 650 - VOA

Death Toll from Philippine Storm Rises Past 700 - LAT

Flash Floods Ravage Filipino Cities - AP

 

Central Asia

Violence Spreads to a Second Town in Kazakhstan - NYT

Kazakh Police Chief Defends Use of Live Rounds - AP

 

Europe

More Protests in Russia Over Alleged Election Fraud - VOA

Thousands Rally in Russia Over Fraud-Tainted Vote - AP

Medvedev Urges Reform of Russia Political System - NYT

Putin 'Would Lose Honest Presidential Election' - TT

Ukraine-EU Summit Clouded by Tymoshenko's Jailing - AP

Kosovar Leader Speaks Softly, Carries Big Hope - WT

Vaclav Havel, Playwright and Former Czech President, Dead at 75 - VOA

Former Czech President Havel Dies - WP

Czechs’ Dissident Conscience, Turned President - NYT

Czechs, World Leaders Mourn Vaclav Havel - AP

Turkey's Human Rights Challenges - LAT opinion

 

South Asia

India Has No Shortage of Aspiring Hangmen - LAT

18 December SWJ Roundup

Sun, 12/18/2011 - 4:19am

US Naval Institute Daily - USNI

Real Clear World - RCP

Iraq

Capping US Withdrawal, Final Convoy Leaves Iraq - NYT

Last US Troops Withdraw from Iraq - BBC

As Last US Troops Exit, Leave a Troubled Land Behind - LAT

Last US Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War - Reuters

Last US Troops Elated to Leave Iraq as War Ends - AP

Iraq: A War of Muddled Goals, Painful Sacrifice - AP

4,474th. And Last? - WP

As Soldiers Leave, US Diplomats Face Huge Challenge - Reuters

Large Bloc of Lawmakers Boycotts Iraqi Parliament - NYT

Iraq Sunni Bloc Suspends Parliament Participation - Reuters

Hezbollah Prisoner Held by Iraq Faces Minor Charge - AP

Dwindling Christian Community Faces New Uncertainty - LAT

NATO Closes Up Training Mission in Iraq - Reuters

NATO Ends its 7-year Training Mission in Iraq - AP

Camp Echo Packs Up in Iraq with Little Fanfare - S&S

Turkey Playing Increasing Role in Iraq - VOA

Dempsey Thanks Kuwaiti Leaders for Help in Iraq - AFPS

Key Dates in the 2003-2011 Iraq War - AP

Iraq: Key Figures Since the War Began - AP

Taking Leave of Iraq - LAT editorial

An Elusive Victory in Iraq - LAT opinion

 

Afghanistan

Childbirth and Maternal Health Improve in Afghanistan - CSM

Karzai: Afghans Still Don't Have Personal Security - AP

 

Pakistan

Pakistan PM Dismisses Rumors of Rift With Army - VOA

The Pakistanis Have a Point - NYT opinion

 

Syria

Arab League Panel Considers U.N. Action Against Syria - VOA

Arab States Warn Syria on Inaction - NYT

Arab League Considers Turning to UN Over Syria - AP

Arabs May Take Syria Peace Plan to United Nations - Reuters

Iraq 'Positive' after Syria Talks - BBC

Syrian Forces Using Families as Hostages - TT

 

Egypt

Eight Dead in Second Day of Egypt Clashes - VOA

Death Toll Rises as Cairo Clashes Enter Second Day - NYT

Protesters, Soldiers Continue to Clash in Egypt - WP

Troops, Protesters Clash in Cairo for Third Day - Reuters

Egypt Military Uses Heavy Hand in Crushing Protest - AP

Egypt's PM Criticizes Protesters - BBC

Egypt's Wary Christians - LAT editorial

 

Libya

US Defense Chief Makes Historic Visit to Libya - VOA

Panetta Promises Continued Support to Libya - AFPS

Panetta Offers Support to New Libya - WP

Panetta Warns of 'Long and Difficult Transition' - LAT

Pentagon Boss Praises New Libya - BBC

Historic Visit to Libya by Pentagon Chief Panetta - AP

Panetta Says Libya Faces Long, Difficult Transition - Reuters

Libya’s Civilian Toll, Denied by NATO - NYT

 

Israel / Palestinians

Obama Responds to Republican Criticisms on Support for Israel - VOA

Bethlehem: The Divisions Deepen - TT

Palestinian Textbooks Debate Reaches US Campaign - AP

Israel Due to Free 550 Palestinians in Shalit Swap - Reuters

What ‘Pro-Israel’ Should Mean - WP opinion

 

Middle East / North Africa

Russian Customs Seize Iran-bound Radioactive Metal - CSM

Russia Seizes Radioactive Isotope Bound for Iran - TT

Iran Says Arrests Another CIA Spy - Reuters

Warring Yemen Forces Quit Sanaa, 2 Troops Die in South - Reuters

Protesters, Police Clash for Third Day in Bahrain - AP

Tunisians Rally on Anniversary of Uprising - VOA

Tunisia Remembers Man Whose Death Sparked Arab Spring - TT

Cradle of Arab Spring Celebrates First Anniversary - Reuters

Tunisia Unveils Bouazizi Statue - BBC

Algeria Ups Security for Year-End Tourism - AP

Pastor Yousef: Convert to Islam or Die - WT editorial

 

WikiLeaks

Manning’s Gender Identity Issues Raised in WikiLeaks Case - WP

Bias Rejected in Wikileaks Case - BBC

Testimony in Manning's Case Shows Breadth of Evidence - LAT

 

US Department of Defense

Secretary Expects Cuts in Marines and the Navy - NYT

 

United States

A War Obama Didn’t Want Shaped His Foreign Policy - NYT

Obama: Nation Should Emulate Troops’ Service, Sacrifice - AFPS

As Wars End, Young Veterans Return to Scant Jobs - NYT

Is Puerto Rico Becoming a Narco-State? - CSM

A Wrong Turn in Terror Fight - LAT editorial

For Obama, Time to Unveil the Vision Thing - WP opinion

End of America’s Era - WP opinion

Flags for Civilians - NYT opinion

 

World

War Really Is Going Out of Style - NYT opinion

 

Africa

Kenya Marches Into Somalia but Can't See the Enemy - AP

Kenya 'will Pursue Somali Rebels' - BBC

Nigeria Seizes Bomb Factory After Islamist Attacks - Reuters

Nigeria Protest Over Toll Roads Turns Violent - AP

5 Killed in Drive-By Shooting in Northeast Nigeria - NYT

UNICEF Urges Quick Action in Sahel - VOA

Congo Opposition Parties Plan 'Ghost Towns' - Reuters

Gabon Voters Casting Ballots in Legislative Election Saturday - VOA

Shortchanging Somalia - LAT editorial

 

Americas

Mexico Party Formally Names Presidential Candidate - AP

Mexico: Safe Travels South of the Border - WP

Argentina Eyes Tighter Newsprint Control - BBC

American Who Was Jailed in Peru Is Blocked at Airport - NYT

Berenson Barred From Leaving Peru - AP

In Cuba Property Thaw, New Hope for a Decayed Icon - AP

 

Asia Pacific

China's Rebel Villagers Threaten March on Government - TT

Flooding Kills Hundreds in Southern Philippines - NYT

Flash Floods Kill More than 450 in Philippines - LAT

Flash Floods Kill at Least 450 in Philippines - AP

Philippines Steps Up Flood Rescue - BBC

Migrant Ship Sinks Off Indonesia; Over 200 Missing - AP

Gunmen Attack Helicopter Carrying Mine Workers in Indonesia - NYT

Testing the Limits of Freedom in New Burma - Reuters

S. Korean President Presses Japan on Sex Slaves - AP

 

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Declares State of Emergency After Deadly Protests - VOA

Kazakhstan Orders Curfew for Oil Town - NYT

Crackdown Follows Kazakh Clashes - BBC

Kazakh Leader Orders Curfew After Oil City Riots - Reuters

 

Europe

Medvedev Urges Reform of Russia Political System - NYT

Putin 'Would Lose Honest Presidential Election' - TT

Russia: Smaller Turnout at 2nd Round of Moscow Protests - AP

France: Sarkozy's Popularity Remains Stable - Reuters

Turkey Slams France Over Genocide Bill - AP

As The Iraq War Ends, Reassessing The U.S. Surge

Sat, 12/17/2011 - 2:47pm

As The Iraq War Ends, Reassessing The U.S. Surge by Tom Bowman, NPR.

Here's the conventional wisdom about the U.S. troop surge in Iraq: By 2006, Iraq was in chaos. Many Americans called for the U.S. to get out. Instead, President Bush sent in 30,000 additional troops. By the end of 2007, Iraq started to stabilize, and the move took on an almost mythic status.

In 2008, for example, Sen. Lindsey Graham spoke at the Republican National Convention about the U.S. presence in Iraq, saying that, "by every measure, the surge of troops into Iraq has worked."

And in a 2007 speech to Congress on the situation in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus said, "The military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met."

But Doug Ollivant, who was an Army planning officer in Baghdad, took part in putting the surge troops on the street. And he disagrees with the idea that the surge fixed things…

Republicans Propose Bill to Treat Mexican Drug Cartels as 'Terrorist Insurgency'

Sat, 12/17/2011 - 2:30pm

Republicans Propose Bill to Treat Mexican Drug Cartels as 'Terrorist Insurgency' by Elizabeth Harrington, CNS News.

Calling the situation along the U.S. border a “threat to national security,” a House committee Thursday took up a bill sponsored by Republican congressmen that would treat Mexican drug cartels like terrorists and apply a counterinsurgency strategy to the growing violence along the Southern border.

Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.) introduced H.R. 3401 the “Enhanced Border Security Act” on Nov. 9 to secure the U.S.-Mexico border, stop criminal access to U.S. financial institutions, and work with Mexico to implement counterinsurgency tactics to undermine the control of the drug cartels in the country.

The bill would also double the number of Border Patrol agents, and provide additional infrastructure to secure the border, including “tactical double layered fencing"...

Mexican Cartel Operational Note No. 1

Sat, 12/17/2011 - 1:56pm

Mexican Cartel Operational Note No. 1:

Mexican Military Operations Against Los Zetas Communications Networks

Via CNN Mexico, “La Marina desarticula la comunicación de ‘Los Zetas’ en Veracruz.” Jueves, 08 de septiembre de 2011 a las 10:32, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2011/09/08/la-marina-desmantela-la-red-de-comunicaciones-de-los-zetas-en-veracruz, view the 2:31 video of the initial seizure of Zetas communications equipment.

Via the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, Naval Post Graduate School, “Zetas’ Communications Systems.” n.d.:

The Los Zetas operate a vast telecommunications network involving two-way radios, encrypted, secure radio networks, computers and burner cell phones. The original Zetas experience in the military lead to a number of innovative techniques in the Zetas operations including successfully using existing networks securely and building their own radio systems.

During a 26 day operation the Mexican Navy seized various communications devices from throughout the state of Veracruz. The seizure included mobile radio transmitters and high frequency repeaters, computers, cables and wiring, two-way radios, batteries and power supplies / amplifiers, solar power cells, 13 large antennae, 7 radio amplifiers, encryption devices and 7 trailer trucks carrying other supplies such as clothing and groceries.[1][2][3][4] There were also 80 persons arrested during the operation, including six police officers. The system was reportedly capable of handling the communications in Veracruz and partially into neighboring Tabasco state.[1] Images of the items can be seen in the gallery below.

One report indicated the network was highly sophisticated and stated: "The communications network was composed of several communication repeaters of high frequency band, known by its acronym UHF, which had independent power sources, frequency amplifiers, antennas known as "pool cues”, which are slender and go up to 20 feet above the ground, and antennas that were concealed in trees."[5]

There were a total of twelve reported municipalities in which the seizures took place. The map below outlines the locations and demonstrates how the network traveled through the state north to south.[1][2][3][4][5]

The municipalities are:

    * Tepetzintla

    * Panuco

    * Veracruz

    * Xalapa

    * Orizaba

    * Cordoba

    * Naranjos Amatlan  

    * Tantoyuca

    * Poza Rica de Hidalgo

    * Perote

    * Coatzacoalcos

    * Tuxpan

See the map and photo gallery at this site, http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Other/Zetas'_Communications_Systems.

Via Hispanically Speaking News, “Zetas’s High Tech Narco-Communications Central Seized (VIDEO).” 21 November 2011:

Communication equipment valued at $350,000 was seized by Mexican army elements in Torreón who raided a home known by Zeta narcos as “The Central.”

The $350,000 worth of equipment, was used by the Zetas for the control and coordination of their criminal cells as well as to monitor security forces to evade capture.

Army elements seized a central processing unit as well as 2 high capacity hard drives, long-range broadband digital radio equipment, networked laptops, 63 digital radios, 59 analog radio units with multiple accessories and a digital ICOM radio to communicate with aircrafts from the ground and 24 cell phones.  Mexican authorities also found several doses of cocaine [1].

Via Associated Press, “Mexican Army Dismantles Gang’s Antennas, Radios.” Thursday 1 December 2011:

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexican army troops dismantled a telecommunications system set up by organized crime in four northern states, authorities said Thursday.

The Defense Department said soldiers confiscated 167 antennas and 166 power supplies that gang members used to communicate among themselves and to monitor military movements.

The operation also netted more than 1,400 radios and 2,600 cellphones in the border states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Coahuila and in the state of San Luis Potosi, a statement said.

The army hasn’t said which cartel was affected.

During the summer, Mexico's navy dismantled a communication system used by the Zetas cartel in the Gulf state of Veracruz. The Zetas have a strong presence in all four of the states involved in the army's operation….[2].

Via Ronan Graham, “Mexico Seizes 'Zetas' Communications System.” In Sight. Friday 2 December 2011:

Mexican army troops have dismantled a sophisticated communications network, believed to have been operated by the Zetas drug gang to conduct internal communications and monitor the movements of the security forces.

A statement from the Defense Department (SEDENA) said that military personnel dismantled the network in the northern border states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, San Luis Potosi and Tamaulipas following a 12-month operation.

Although the statement did not give the name of the drug cartel operating the network, the Zetas have extensive operations in these areas.

The military confiscated more than 1,400 radios, 2,600 cell phones and computer equipment during the operation, as well as power supplies including solar panels, according the Defense Department.

The equipment was found in rural, sparsely populated areas of the four states. According a military source, the antennas were painted green to blend in with the surroundings…[3].

An extensive collection of photos of this equipment can be found at “Desmantelan red de comunicación de Los Zetas.” El Universal.com.mx. Miércoles 14 de diciembre de 2011, http://fotos.eluniversal.com.mx/coleccion/muestra_fotogaleria.html?idgal=11883.

External Analysis:

Concerning the initial operations against Los Zetas communication system, per the STRATFOR analysis “Zetas Communications Network Disrupted in Veracruz,” Mexico Security Memo: Zetas Communications Network Dismantled. 13 September 2011:

The Mexican navy on Sept. 8 dismantled a communications network used by Los Zetas throughout Veracruz state. Among the equipment seized were mobile radio transmitters, computers, radio scanners, encryption devices, solar power cells and as many as seven trailers that served as base stations, according to media reports. A spokesman for the Mexican navy said some 80 individuals have been arrested over the past month in connection with the operation, itself the result of months of work by naval intelligence officers.

Los Zetas have been known to utilize more sophisticated communications networks than other cartels, due in large part to the organization’s origins in military special operations. The Zetas needed to augment sparse communications in some areas they control, and the Veracruz network likely was for the purpose of “off the grid” communications. Since cellphones are relatively easy for authorities to monitor, Los Zetas have sought to diversify their telecommunications capabilities, a fact of which Mexican authorities are aware.

It is possible that the seizure of this communications equipment means the navy is preparing to launch operations to push the Zetas out of the Veracruz port region. Indeed, a navy spokesman said the immediate result of the operation was the disruption of the Zetas’ “chain of command and tactical coordination.” If the navy is about to engage the Zetas in Veracruz, dismantling the Zetas’ communications network would be one of the first moves it would make….[4].

Concerning the Nextel phones, the networks themselves, and issues of OPSEC (operational security) and encryption, the initial outside analysis conducted by Tim Wilson, “The Zetas Take to the Air,” In Sight. Friday 9 December 2011, states:

…Notable in the most recent seizure were [1]354 Nextel radio phones— a higher radio take than in previous busts. The seized Nextel radios work on Nextel’s Conexion Directa network, a digital two-way radio “push-to-talk” cellular service that allows for free private calling with selected users. This service is difficult to hack, yet functions much like a police or taxi dispatcher. Up to 100 users can be connected free of charge, with capabilities extending even to cross-border calling. Anything less secure would put the group in an odd situation, i.e., worried about getting hacked itself.

However, it’s also clear from the seizures that the Zetas may not have the firmest grasp of the technology just yet.

Given the transmitter equipment being seized by the Mexican military, for example, it is obvious that the Zetas cartel has also been buying commercial-grade telecommunications gear and establishing their own open-band transmission system with basic encryption— completely independent of Nextel’s licensed spectrum.

Even with software-based security protocols bolted on to the system, it is likely that the Zetas are exposing themselves to “man-in-the-middle” eavesdropping by Mexican authorities. From a purely technological perspective, this would be difficult to do on the Nextel system, as cellular networks—and certainly Motorola’s iDEN technology, which Nextel uses— have rigorous security features, but it would be considerably easier in the unlicensed “white space” used for basic radio.

That said, the way around wireless encryption isn’t to hack it— that’s just too hard— but to know it, usually through what is called “social engineering,” which is essentially having access to human information. In the case of wireless technology, this means knowing the standard practices of technicians and thus creating the necessary safeguards to thwart break-ins.

Think of it like the encrypted Wi-Fi networks, which have solid technology but can still be hacked— if you have the right information. According to security experts contacted by InSight Crime, this is a common problem for all countries in Latin America, because usually it is the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who are responsible for configuring the routers and access points of their users, and they often repeat practices. In other words: they manage from predefined configurations, including passwords, allowing criminals to hack routers of a given type, potentially compromising others using the same ISP.

Now apply this to cellular networks. Given that Mexican authorities might have access to Nextel’s system, or simply know how to hack it based on an understanding of industry protocol, we should expect that the Zetas’ next move will be to set up a self-encrypted, autonomous communications network, even though the technology itself might be less robust. With that, they will most likely reach their target of a fully-functioning, independent comms network, if they haven’t already [5].

Analysis:

Veracruz State, September 2011

The communications hardware and supporting materiel seized by the Mexican navy (as identified in the news reports) is as follows:

  • Mobile Radio Transmitters
  • High Frequency Repeaters/UHF
  • Computers
  • Cables/Wiring
  • Two-Way Radios
  • Cell Phones (Burner)
  • Batteries/Power Supplies/Solar Cells
  • Encryption Devices
  • Radio Scanners
  • 13 Large Antennae (some Pool Cue to 20ft/Tree Concealment)
  • 7 Radio Amplifiers
  • 7 Trailer Trucks (Base Stations with Food/Clothing)
  • 80 Personnel (Including 6 Police Officers)

The operation against Los Zetas communications network targeted their C2 (command and control) and counter-intelligence (military communications scanning) capabilities for mostly northern and central municipalities in the state of Veracruz and for a section of the state of Tabasco (See the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups map). As mentioned in the STATFOR analysis this could signal a prelude to Mexican military operations against Los Zetas in the Veracruz port region. This was supported by the Mexican navy spokesman concerning the intended disruption of Los Zetas ‘chain of command and tactical coordination.’ Though geographically the seizures appear to be meant to isolate Los Zetas territories in northeastern Mexico in the states below the US border.

Of note is that this is a mobile communications system based on Semi-Trailer Trucks (like Peterbilts) mated with very large antennas to create a network grid in underdeveloped/rural areas. No evidence of sizeable weapons seizures were evident in the Mexican news video or photographs reviewed. This suggests that the base stations were relatively ‘soft assets’ and relied upon their mobility and remoteness as a form of defense. Still, weapons and body armor for some of the Los Zetas personnel serving as a small security force would be expected.

Torreón (in Coahuila State), November 2011

The communications hardware and supporting materiel seized by the Mexican army (as identified in the news reports) is as follows:

  • 1 Computer (Central Processing Unit)
  • 2 High Capacity Hard Drives
  • Laptops (Networked)
  • Long Range Broad Band Digital Radio Equipment
  • 1 Digital ICOM Radio (for Ground to Air Communication)
  • Scanners [Not Identified/Required for Monitoring Ability]
  • Antenna(s) [Not Identified/Required]
  • Cables/Wiring [Not Identified/Required]
  • Batteries/Power Supplies [Not Identified/Required]
  • 63 Digital Radios
  • 59 Analog Radio Units (with Accessories)
  • 24 Cell Phones

It was estimated in the reports that the value of this equipment is $350,000. The equipment was found at a fixed site— a residence known as ‘The Central’— which provided C2 (command and control) and counter-intelligence (military communications scanning) capabilities for Los Zetas in the urban area of Torreón. Whether this site was raided prior to the December seizures/or was simply an early phase in the seizures in Coahuila state is unknown. No evidence of sizeable weapons seizures were reported in English language reports—though, as a fixed C2 asset, hardening of the residence and a weapons caches inside of it should be considered a standard operating procedure. Four Los Zetas personnel arrests were mentioned at this fixed site [6].

Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, and Tamaulipas States, December 2011

Per the SEDENA (Mexican Ministry of Defense) statement, the following hardware was seized in this operation:

Habiendo detectado, desmantelado y asegurado un total de:

    * 167 ANTENAS. [Antennas]

    * 155 REPETIDORAS. [Repeaters; Receivers/Transmitters]

    * 166 FUENTES DE PODER. [Power Supplies; Including Solar Panels]

    * 1,446 RADIOS. [Radios]

    * 1,306 CELULARES. [Cell Phones]

    * 1,354 NEXTELES. [Nextel Phones]

    * 71 EQUIPOS DE CÓMPUTO. [Computer Equipment] [7].

The sheer volume of equipment seized suggests a huge multi-state grid of fixed antennas and repeaters had been established by Los Zetas for their regional C2 (command and control) requirements. This was a rural based system meant to be hard to detect (camouflaged) and self-contained, relying upon solar panel cells to cut down on battery/power maintenance requirements. Military communications monitoring capabilities were also mentioned in the news reports but are not evident in the equipment seizure manifest. Possibly a forensics review of the seizure pictures (not conducted in this note) would allow for the identification of scanner systems among the generic computer equipment listed. Since the equipment seizure in the state of Veracruz identified such scanners, the capability will undoubtedly exist—though it would be found in fixed and mobile C2 Los Zetas facilities.

Operational Conclusions

Very little has been published on Los Zetas operations and intelligence ‘line and block’ organizational charts. The best work on this subject, now dated, has been conducted by Lisa Campbell and is based on the earlier Gulf and Los Zetas cartel alliance. Still, that work contains an intelligence organizational chart that identifies ‘Dirreccion’— approximately 20 communication experts providing C2 support and counter-intelligence capabilities via police / military communications monitoring (assumed COMINT; electronic intelligence (ELINT) not known). See Fig. 2 from Campbell’s work [8]:

Reprinted from Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge 2011: 59.

The Los Zetas / Gulf cartel communications equipment identified as of early 2010 was as follows:

  • Radio Transmitters
  • Walkie-Talkies
  • Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)
  • Broadband Satellite Instant Messaging
  • Text Messaging
  • Encrypted Messaging
  • Two-Way Radios
  • Scanner Devices
  • Modern Wiretapping Equipment
  • High-Frequency Radios with Encryption and Rolling Codes [9]

How the recently seized Los Zetas communications equipment is ultimately related to their current operational and intelligence structures is unknown— such information represents classified SEDENA intelligence being utilized in an active counter-criminal insurgency setting. This is evident because, without question, the equipment seizures taking place over the last 4 months signify a component of a coordinated multi-state offensive against Los Zetas by the Mexican Federal government. This offensive is likely benefiting from US intelligence capabilities providing targeting support against the OPFOR (opposing force)— via general SIGINT (signals intelligence) and remote sensing assets (drone/satellite). This offensive is evident in at least five Mexican states (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, Veracruz and possibly Tabasco).

A report had been filed by Chris Covert in October 2011 concerning the Laguna Segura counternarcotics operation which may represent a component of the Mexican government operations against the Los Zetas communications networks. Additionally, he noted “Last spring the national legislature, the Chamber of Deputies funded the addition of 18 new rifle battalions, most of which would be deployed in northern Mexican states” [10]. Covert linked it back to “A comprehensive security operation based on a framework used successfully in two Mexican southern states” [11]. Of note is how the counter-communications networks offensive against Los Zetas appears integrated into the broader counter-criminal insurgency strategy being conducted. That overarching strategy focuses on northeastern Mexico, and since early-2010, has been known as Operation Northeast Coordinated (Operación Coordinada Noreste). It represents a full scale Mexican federal governmental effort to take back territories controlled by both Los Zetas and the Gulf cartels [12]. One component of that strategy, which will eventually see the deployment of three of the new infantry (rifle) battalions, was recently highlighted in Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 10: Fortified Town (Burgward) Strategy Implemented in Tamaulipas [13].

Note(s):

1. See http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/notitas-de-noticias/details/zetass-high-tech-narco-communications-central-seized-video/11910/. The video link in the article may not function properly on some computer operating systems.

2. Posted at numerous news websites. See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=143034026.

3. See http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1925-mexico-seizes-zetas-communications-system. One photo of antennas seized at this link. Hotlinks to primary Mexican SEDENA and other documents in this article. The Borderland Beat site mirrors the In Sight article with the addition of additional pictures from the seizure. See http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/12/mexico-seizes-zetas-communications.html.

4. See http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1958-the-zetas-take-to-the-air. This analysis contains a hardware picture labeled “Antena Orizaba 1”.

5. Via Google’s cache of http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110913-mexico-security-memo-zetas-communications-network-dismantled.

6. From Mexican governmental report. “Los Zetas are slowly being dismantled: in Luguna Seura!” 19 November 2011, http://pikapvs.wordpress.com/2011/11/19/los-zetas-are-slowly-being-dismantled-in-luguna-seura/.

7. SEDENA, “Personal militar desarticula redes de radiocomunicación clandestinas.” Monterrey, N.L., a 1 de diciembre de 2011, http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php/sala-de-prensa/comunicados-de-prensa-de-los-mandos-territoriales/8104-1-de-diciembre-de-2011-monterrey-nl. The hardware seized is broken down by military zones.

8. Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge 2011: 59.

9. Ibid, 65. The sophisticated military style radios with the rolling encryption do not appear evident in the recent seizures of Los Zetas communications equipment.

10. Chris Covert, “Segura Laguna security operation begins.” Rantburg.com. 24 October 2011, http://www.rantburg.com/warticle.php?D=2011-10-24&ID=332129&HC=2. Derived from the following Spanish article “Llegan militares para plan Laguna Segura.” El Universal. Sábado 22 de octubre de 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/82661.html.

11. Ibid.

12. Gary J. Hale, Mexico’s Government Begins to Retake Northeastern Mexico. Rice University: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. 9 December 2011: 3. Concerning these communications networks this note is of interest: “The dismantled [Veracruz] network is thought to be part of a larger communications infrastructure erected by the Gulf cartel (when the Zetas were subordinate to the Gulf cartel) and that enabled realtime, handheld DTO communications from roughly Cuidad Acuña, Coahuila (across from Del Rio, Texas) in the northwest, to the Yucatan Peninsula to the east. This communications network, which is now largely disabled, previously allowed for continuous DTO command-and-control management of cross-border cartel operations.” p. 10.  Originally referenced to United States vs. Jose Luis del Toro Estrada aka “Tecnico,” United States District Clerk, Southern District of Texas, Case No. H-08CR616, plea agreement March 18, 2009.

13. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-strategic-note-no-10.