| Small Wars Journal

A Jordanian double agent’s suicide bombing of the CIA base in eastern Afghanistan received days of media coverage. The CIA had been tricked into welcoming one of al-Qaeda’s own onto the agency’s base, enabling him to detonate a vest laden with explosives.

In October 2010, the CIA released results of the agency’s internal investigation into the Khost province attack, fueling another round of stories that Jennifer Matthews, a CIA operative, was partially responsible. Matthews and her team, the report concluded, failed to follow the agency’s procedures for vetting informants.

One of Matthews’s severest critics was her uncle, Dave Matthews, a retired CIA official who had helped inspire his niece to join the agency. Now Gary Anderson, Matthews's husband, and other relatives who once agreed not to speak with the media are breaking their silence to talk about Matthews’s life and death and about how her promotion to a perilous CIA posting has divided them.

Failing into Collaboration?

When is the time for peace? Talking to the man from HaGalil and asking forgiveness and wondering or wandering how to fight for peace?

حين قررت الرحيل في تلك اللحظة توقفت كل عقارب أيامي لاأسمعُ للساعةِ صوت _ قَد أوقَفَها صمتُ رَحيلي فقراريَ يعني--ماذا يعني أتركُ أهلي ___أهجرُ بَلَدي أن تخرج روحي من جسدي أن أُسجَن سجنٌ أَبَدي فَصَمتُ رَحيلي صمتٌ قاتل صَمتُ قراري حَكَمَ بموتي __صمتٌ أَخرَسَ حتى صوتي جَلَستُ وَحيداً----أَتَنَقلُ مابَينَ سكوني نَظَرتُ بَعيداً--لاأدري ماترقبُ عيوني في تلكَ أللحظة جائَتني مَحبوبَةُ قلبي__ جلست قربي وعيوني تنظرُ عَينَيها __قالت والدَمعُ يواسيها قبل أن تَرحَل حبيبي إنتظر __ إن قلبي تحتَ صَدري يَحتضر خذهُ مني --ضَعهُ فوقَ الكف وأنظر ___ أي جزء لستَ فيه خذهُ باللهِ عليك __طائراً بينَ يَديك كَسَرَ الهجر جناحه __أنتَ مَن يشفي جراحه كل جرح يرتجيك ياحبيبي قلبي لايصبر وحيداً ____إن تكن تنوي الرحيل ًلاأرى للصبر نفعا __في ظلام المستحيل ماذا مابعد الفراق __غير آه واشتياق ___إن بُعدك لايُطاق أسكتها صوت نحيبي__ أبكاها صوت نحيبي قالت مايبكيك حبيبي قلت لها والنار بقلبي عفوا حبي فدموعكِ لاتقطع دربي فحقيقة قراري --إن قراري --ليس قراري فزماني مَن سَن قراري فزماني دمر أسواري __أجبرني أن أهجرَ داري ًغاليتي --لاتبكي أبدا فجسمي يرحلُ حيثُ قراري أما روحي __ فبقربكِ تبقى روحي وبذكراكِ أداوي جروحي غاليتي أقسم بالحب __ إني يوماً سوف أعود فَخُذي عَهدي بقايا جَسَدي لاتدفنُ إلا في بَلَدي حيدر

-Email from friend who's lost hope as an Iraqi Refugee in Syria.

In attacking Turki Village by initial air assault followed by ground maneuver, we achieved tactical surprise on the enemy, a basic tenant of warfare but a maneuver largely lacking from the Occupying American Forces in Iraq during the fall of 2006. We chose to be different.

-A/5-73 Recon Operational Summary

At what point does reality completely overwhelm the neatly, beautifully constructed theories we’ve used to explain it? Why do men Rebel? At what point will the violence diminish and the people learn to live together? What does it mean to be human? Who are Us, Them, and We?

I came home from my final tour in Iraq in September 2007. Looking back, it was a time of that Mackenzie Allen Phillips would call “The Great Sadness.” After five years of fighting, it was my time to rest, reflect, and process, but I could not. I was stuck knowing and fearing and seeing and understanding that despite our best efforts, our brothers and sisters in Iraq were still stuck in anger and hate and seeking revenge.

While we finally established security, there would be no political resolution. The violence would continue.

During that same fall and into the winter, I settled into Monterey, CA to attend graduate school, young teenage girls from Zaganiyah and the surrounding villages deep inside the Diyala River Valley physically exploded. Ali Latif al Zaharie and the rest of al Qaeda network effectively co-opted and recruited them to become suicide bombers and martyrs. The poor, the downtrodden, those with no hope- they wore black, and they attacked into Baqubah knowing that God was going to cut them down.

But, during those times, perhaps Allah or God or Nature or the Higher Power turned her back to mankind disgusted by the way we chose to treat each other. He allowed us to fight and destroy each other.

And, so it must be sometimes. Sometimes we have to fail until we are willing to collaborate.

Give me your attention for a few more minutes of your time, and I’ll explain this in full…

Sometime in the spring of 2008, I was down in the Trident Room, the bar tucked into the basement of the Naval Postgraduate School, trying to quench my thirst. This is the same bar that LTG William H. Caldwell once roamed. Jonny Cash’s The Man Comes Around blared from the jukebox, and I was decisively engaged in conversation with Doug Borer as we wrestled over small wars and life and philosophizing over ends, ways, and means.

Doug, in his own way, paused for a bit. I had already grown accustomed to the academic posturing or absentmindedness lost in thought so I paid it no mind. I sipped my beer and reflected on my last conversation with Anna Simons on how she was going to change the world and fix our foreign policy. Simultaneously, I was wondering what Dr. Gordon McCormick and Dr. John Arquilla were going to brief to Congressman Leon Panetta about his views on what the foreign policy should be.

“Mike, it’s time for you to meet Nancy,” Doug beckoned as he escaped his own thoughts.

Doug grabbed my arm, and we pushed our way through the packed crowd of Air Force, Marine, Navy, and Army folks. We made our way towards a serious-looking woman who stuck out from the crowd even though she was positioned in the middle. On first glance, she seemed simultaneously aloof yet self-aware and attached.

“Nancy, this is Mike. Mike this is Nancy,” Doug introduced, “Nancy, Mike’s one of our better students. Mike, Nancy is simply brilliant. You need to take her class on Wicked Problems.”

Nancy Roberts would become my mentor and set me out towards another path and into my own process of discovery, healing, and eventual self-awareness. Her mentorship actually led to me serving for 18 months as the editor of Small Wars Journal.

Back in 1997, Nancy wrestled with her own wicked problems. After a PhD in Education from Stanford, she sought one her own journey towards fixing things and fundamental changes. Her journey landed her in the middle of Afghanistan working with the United Nations in attempting collaboration with the Taliban at the end of the Afghanistan Civil War.

In her own words written in 2000,

Competitive strategies have a long history. Whether they have been played out on the battlefield, in politics or in the market, stakeholders following this strategy assume a ‘zero-sum game.’ If my opponents win the right to define the problem and choose the solution, then I lose. If I win the right, my opponents lose. A win-lose mind-set thus permeates interactions. Warfare provides an extreme example of zero-sum competition when countries claim the right to define their wicked problems and their solutions (over religion, land, trade policy, etc.) in such a way that it threatens other countries. In the 1930s, Japan’s need for oil and its expansion into the Pacific were considered to be a direct threat to U.S. interests. U.S. attempts to limit this expansion were viewed as a direct threat to Japan’s national security. Each country’s insistence on dealing with its wicked problems in its own way resulted in war.

Afghanistan has been wracked by war and the consequences of competitive strategies for over two decades. Some 50,000 combatants from a population estimated to be well over 20 million are actively engaged in fighting. The country lacks a legitimate government with control over its whole territory. Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1989, there was a sense that the Afghan conflict would move towards resolution. This has not happened. The instability continues marked by the absence of functioning entities of governance. The crisis in Afghanistan has two facets: the absence of peace and security and the destruction of its civil infrastructure.

It is my firm conviction that people have to fail into collaboration. Experiences with authoritative and competitive strategies and personal knowledge of their disadvantages are great teachers. People have to learn what does not work before they are willing to absorb what they perceive to be the extra ‘costs’ associated with collaboration. This learning is especially important for people who come from cultures that place a high premium on taking charge, making decisions, being competitive, and using authorities and experts to settle whatever disputes arise. Only when people come to realize the shortcomings of competition and handing over decisions to authorities, are they willing to experiment with collaboration as an alternative way of coping with wicked problems.

Or as Winston Churchill once proclaimed, "The Americans will always do the right thing... after they've exhausted all the alternatives."

Simply put, our brothers and sisters across the world are singing, "Pardon Me while I burst into the flames"

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The untold story of the battle against the ‘Soldiers of Heaven’ (Updated)

Battles like this one near Najaf and Operation Turki Bowl begin to tell the real story of clearing safehavens and training camps in Iraq during the winter of 2006 before the so-called Surge

The untold story of the battle against the ‘Soldiers of Heaven’

Gina Cavallaro

Army Times

The fighting that erupted Jan. 28, 2007, turned out to be some of the fiercest of the Iraq war. U.S. and Iraqi soldiers killed 373 enemy fighters, and more than 400 surrendered. The U.S. Army awarded more than 100 combat decorations for bravery that day, including at least eight Silver Stars and a Distinguished Flying Cross.

No one knew about it.

by Don Kramer

www.army.mil

With the trappings of World War I and II tactics and 21st Century weaponry, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment's fight in January 2007 to recover a downed Apache helicopter south of Najaf stands as unique among Operation Iraqi Freedom engagements.

Counterinsurgency operations carry their own metrics, different from those that measure success in combat against an enemy who stands and fights. But by all military standards, Lt. Col. Barry Huggins' 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division Stryker battalion achieved a smashing success in what might have been the most traditional battle of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It ended in such a one-sided victory for U.S. and Iraqi forces that anticoalition media attempted to frame it as a "massacre" - until details came to light of the enemy's plans, detailed preparations and prodigious arsenal of weapons and equipment.

On Jan. 28 and 29, 2007, a fanatic and well-armed Shiite paramilitary faction stood and fought in southern Iraq against two companies of 2-3 Inf. augmented with engineers, 8th Iraqi Army elements and two Special Forces detachments, on a compound the insurgents had prepared for months. Riddled on three sides with deep trenches, high berms and antitank positions and protected on the fourth by the Euphrates River, nearly 600 Jund as-Sama', "Soldiers of Heaven," fired all of their considerable ordnance and launched one assault after another throughout the night in attempts to surprise and outflank the Patriot Battalion task force. For the Shiite fighters, they had begun an apocalyptic battle they believed would hasten the return of the Mahdi, the 12th Imam.

When to Confront Mahdists: A Challenge for the U.S. Military

Jun 15, 2008

by Reidar Visser

Combating Terrorism Center

Soon after the 2008 incident, the two Mahdist groups became mixed up in the Western media. There is, however, reason to believe that the cells that were targeted in 2008 had developed quite independently of the Najaf group. Styling themselves as “followers of Ahmad al-Hasan al-Yamani,” the group had a visible presence in Basra since at least 2005 [3]. In the subsequent period it remained active in Basra and the far south, gaining adherents among former Sadrists and religious students, especially in Basra and Nasiriyya. In the wake of the 2007 clash in Najaf, the group vigorously distanced itself from the Jund al-Sama’ group, claiming they disagreed over interpretations of how and when the Hidden Imam would reappear [4].

Rivers of Babylon

by Nibras Kazimi

Prospect Magazine

Why would a handsome, fun-loving man from Birmingham, newly possessed of British citizenship, sell his profitable business and return to his native Iraq to die in a hail of bullets? Muhammad Hussein, never known as particularly religious, recently sold his barber shop in Moseley and took his wife and two-year-old son to a settlement near Najaf, where he was probably killed when Iraqi and US forces stormed the compound of the Soldiers of Heaven cult in late January. Muhammad’s charred British passport was found among the wreckage. In the final tally, 263 cult members were killed.

Before leaving, Muhammad told a Rivers of Babylon source over a couple of beers in a Birmingham nightclub: “I am going off to do humanitarian work in Iraq,” where “the Mahdi is about to emerge.” Many of the dead in the Soldiers of Heaven compound were found chained to each other, and it is possible that Muhammad did not know he was being recruited for battle.

Victoria Fontan on Slain Iraqis Journey

At Carl Prine's Line of Departure, Victoria Fontan traces the journey of Mollah Nadhom from bystander, to al-Qaeda insurgent, to Abu Ghraib, to Sawha member and human intelligence source. It ended on January 25 with shots from a silenced gun in Baghdad.

Because Mollah Nadhom is just another casualty of counter-insurgency, liberal peacemaking and nation-building, the moral of his story remains: Never trust an occupier who claims to be working for “peace,” for this peace is never what it claims to be.

Read more about Victoria Fontan on Slain Iraqis Journey

National Security Decision-Making and Small Wars

I enter the COIN argument to say that the debate is misplaced in an article at Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel.

Before arguing about counterinsurgency as a tactic or a strategy, we must first acknowledge a key point: America did not enter any of these wars (going back to Vietnam) as a counterinsurgent or a nation-builder. America entered these wars with ill-defined strategic goals, the result of lowest common denominator bureaucratic negotiations. These goals were not sufficiently thought out, clearly stated, or properly subscribed to by the government writ large, resulting in nearly immediate drift. This fact should point us toward the true roots of the problem.

This Week at War: Winners and Losers of the Defense Budget

In my Foreign Policy column, I discuss Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's roll-out of the Pentagon's post-COIN budget. He's taking the military to the high-tech future Donald Rumsfeld had in mind in 2001.

Is Donald Rumsfeld still at work at the Pentagon? The twice-former defense secretary came to the Pentagon in early 2001 with a plan to shift expenses away from manpower and toward technology, but 9/11, Iraq, and Afghanistan pulled him away from that course and eventually pushed him out of the building. But judging from the news out of Washington this week, Rumsfeld's high-tech, lean-headcount vision for the U.S. military has finally prevailed. The Pentagon's new way forward could hardly be more Rumsfeldian.

On Jan. 26, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta outlined the Pentagon's next five-year budget plan, beginning in fiscal year 2013. Budget Day at the Pentagon always gets the attention of defense contractors and congressmen concerned about maintaining the flow of federal dollars to their districts. But things were a little more dramatic this year. Panetta was required to chop $259 billion over the next five years, enroute to a $487 billion cut over the next decade.

Panetta and his lieutenants used the strategic defense guidance released earlier this month to steer the new budget. That guidance calls for the Pentagon to focus on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions and prepare for high-technology threats rather than the extended counterinsurgency operations that had been the focus over the past decade. Those who expected a shift in funding from ground forces to naval, air, and space capabilities were not surprised by Panetta's briefing. Like an aging Rust Belt industrial corporation, Pentagon budget planners realize that they need to save money on headcount, cull unneeded capacity, and reinvest in where the future will be.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, said that listing today's winners and losers was the "least productive" way of analyzing the budget. He and Panetta asserted that the reshaped U.S. military will be a much better match for the strategic situation the U.S. will face in 2020. Contrary to Dempsey's view, discussing the budget's winner and losers is the best way to understand the 21^st century Pentagon that Panetta and his team are trying to build. Here are a few:

Winners

1. Long-range bombers. After steady declines over the past two decades, the new budget puts a stop to further cuts to the Air Force's long-range bomber forces. Plus, the Air Force's next-generation bomber will receive full funding for its development and rollout, presumably by the end of the decade. The new focus on the Asia-Pacific region, with its vast spaces and relatively few bases for U.S. short-range strike planes, means that long-range bombers are now more important than ever. Panetta apparently agrees.

2. Aircraft carriers. The Navy will retain all 11 of its big flat-tops, with the new Gerald Ford-class generation of carriers presumably fully funded. The new emphasis on the Pacific and Indian Oceans are the justifications for protecting the Navy's crown jewels. Last year, there were rumors that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, based in Japan, would be scrapped rather than go through an expensive mid-life overhaul. In putting an end to that talk, Panetta has also attempted to dispel doubts about the U.S. commit to its Asian allies.

3. Attack submarines and cruise missiles. Although the construction of one Virginia-class attack submarine, scheduled beyond 2017, will be slightly delayed, the Navy's attack subs are otherwise a high priority in the new budget. And future subs will be fitted with an extra module allowing them to carry more land-attack cruise missiles. Once again, the need for long-range striking power against potential adversaries in Asia and the Middle East is good news for the Navy's submarine force, and for Northrop-Grumman, one of the sub's contractors. Navy cruise missiles played a major role in the opening phase of the Libyan campaign last year. In a potential showdown with Iran, these subs and cruise missiles would undoubtedly be back in action.

4. Special operations forces. Bin Laden raid heroes SEAL Team Six pulled off a dramatic hostage rescue this week in Somalia, putting special operations forces back in the news. (Not to mention the major attention they received in the president's State of the Union address.) With stabilization and counterinsurgency now out of favor, the White House and Panetta are counting on special operations forces to hunt terrorists and assist in suppressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Less discussed, but a large part of Panetta's strategy, will be the use of special forces and other adviser teams to maintain training programs that build the military capacity of allies in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, areas that have been downgraded by the new strategy.

5. Electronic warfare, drones, and cyber operations. Panetta repeatedly emphasized the need for the U.S. military to maintain its technological superiority, to compensate for its reduced numbers and stretched geographical responsibilities. Even after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, the Pentagon intends to keep its ability to maintain continuous drone surveillance over 65 spots on the globe, with the capability to surge that to 85 if necessary. Advanced radar and electronic jamming are high priorities. Generous new funding for cyber operations reflects the Pentagon's concerns about the vulnerability of its networks and its interest in offensive cyber capabilities in the post-Stuxnet era.

Losers

1. Ground forces. As predicted, the active duty Army will decline over the next five years from 570,000 to 490,000 troops, with the Army disbanding at least eight of its 45 active-duty brigade combat teams. The Marine Corps will also shrink from 202,000 to 182,000, losing at least one of its nine infantry regiments, some of its aircraft squadrons, and a number of support units. The Pentagon will withdraw two of its four remaining Army brigades from Europe.

2. Pay and benefits. Over the past decade, military personnel costs -- outside of the increased costs for war funding -- rose 30 percent above inflation over the same period. That would cease by 2015, Panetta warned. Over the past decade, Congress has increased military pay faster than the increase of pay in the private sector. Panetta's warning implies that future military pay will likely lag behind. Panetta also warned that military retirees will pay more for their health insurance, although still less than those in the private sector pay. Finally, Panetta will appoint a commission to redesign the military's retirement plan, but promised that everyone currently serving will see no changes.

3. Old ships and planes. Panetta recommended retiring seven of the Navy's oldest cruisers and two of its oldest amphibious ships. The Air Force will retire 27 of its oldest C-5 transport planes along with 65 of its oldest C-130s. According to the Pentagon, the ships don't have modern capabilities and the transport aircraft won't be needed after the Army's headcount reductions take place.

4. Joint Strike Fighter. Although Panetta pledged to defend the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps versions of the troubled F-35 fighter, he is also putting the brakes on the overall program. Full production of the plane will be delayed and more testing will occur first. The program seems likely to survive for now. However, we should not be surprised to see production stopped early sometime next decade, as the Air Force and Navy's long-range strike aircraft take priority in future budgets.

5. Contractors and bases. Panetta pledged to find an additional $60 billion in administrative efficiencies over the next five years, on top of the $150 billion supposedly squeezed out by his predecessor Robert Gates. This will mean further pressure on the innumerable contractors providing support services to the department, not only to the Pentagon itself, but at military bases around the world.

As for all of those bases, Panetta has proposed reconvening the dreaded (at least by congressmen) Base Realignment and Closure Commission. Senators and congressmen clings tenaciously to the military bases in their districts, since they are conduits of federal money to their constituents. A smaller military might mean a smaller need for bases. But Pentagon planners need to be careful. Once bases are converted to parks, strip malls, or college campuses, the Pentagon will never get those training areas back. And that could pinch, should planners need to reconstitute military units during a future crisis.

The key to building an effective military that we can afford: Bring Back the Militia!

The key to building an effective military that we can afford: bring back the militia!

Fabius Maximus

Reposted with Full Permissions

Summary: Slowly realization spreads that we cannot afford our current military forces. This forces us to consider new forms of organization. In this, as in so many things, the Founders give us sound advice. Militia can provide a key component of our military.

“Going Back to the Future – Militia Model Could Cut U.S. Expenditures“, Ron Fogleman, DefenseNews, 16 January 2012 — Excerpt:

Throughout my career, I spoke frequently about the kind of defense America deserved — that is, a modern, balanced and ready force. … In its current form, the force has become unaffordable. … The big question is, how does the department reduce its budget and continue to provide a modern, balanced and ready defense when more than half of the budget is committed to personnel costs?

The all-volunteer force has provided the nation with the most capable and experienced force in our history. We need to preserve that capability; however, we cannot afford the imbalance of resources stemming from the size and composition of the force.

The answer to that question is right before us: We should return to our historic roots as a militia nation. … we should return to the constitutional construct for our military and the days when we maintained a smaller standing military and a robust militia. … This concept worked well for our country for the better part of two centuries. … The fiscal environment and emerging threats demand it. To do otherwise is to allow the budget to drive the future capability in a way that fails to meet the needs of the nation.

This is a great idea, one whose time may come soon. What kind of military does America need in a world with many nuclear power and few conventional threats (no superpower actively threatening to start WWIII, as the Soviet Union threatening Europe)? A world in which foreign armies are usually stalemated or even defeated by local forces, so that imperial adventures are dangerous and unprofitable (see here for details)? A world in which we face many enemies, but find a global program of bombing and assassination only generates still more enemies? Where growth and militarization of police and security services threaten our liberties?

Imagine a military composed of special operations units (training/support for allies; raids), navy & air force (transport, firepower), marines (light expeditionary forces), army (a small core of heavy land forces), and militia (several levels of trained citizen-soldiers). The first four are well-understood. Here is a sketch of how militia might work for us, from September 2005.

——

Summary: Militia might be our most reliable defense against fourth generation warfare (4GW). They have deep roots in western history, and many of these advantages can work for America today. Militia also are problematic for several reasons. These issues must be considered when designing their recruitment, training, and organization.

Contents

Why militia?

Strategic Implications

The right tool for the right war

History of the Militia

An American militia for the 21st Century

Role of an American Militia

Who controls the Militia? What can Militia do for America?

What can Militia do for America?

Politics of Militia

Militia as a Dangerous Innovation

Militia as nucleus for vigilantes

Private Military Companies (aka mercenaries, in a new form for the age of 4GW)

Decline of the State

Conclusions

For more information

As a follow-up see Lawrence Korb of CAP and CDI advocates a militia, 4 June 2008.

(1) Why militia?

{Click here to read this essay}

Let's not forget the new MIAs

The Vietnam War seared the issue of MIAs into America's culture. Writing for Time Magazine's Battleland blog, Marine Captain Bingham Jamison asks us not to forget about the newest MIAs.

Jamison described his feelings when he was assigned to track down two missing Marines during one of his tours in Iraq, a mission that ended with grim "success":

Common to all of these tragedies was a prevailing sense of disgust, horror, anguish, and frustration amongst those of us who searched for the MIAs. We let ourselves maintain enough hope during the recovery operations to help us press on, but not enough to expect a miracle. For as Nietzsche said, “Hope is the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the torments of man.”

U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Ahmed Kousay Altaie is the last American missing in action in Iraq. Jamison tells his story.

Please read the whole thing.

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Will Israel Attack Iran?

Ronen Bergman writes a must read article for this weekend's New York Times Magazine.

In calculating Israel's options with regard to the Iranian nuclear threat, Defense Minister Ehud Barak cited three broad questions:

1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand the inevitable counterattack?

2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an attack?

3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?

For the first time since the Iranian nuclear threat emerged in the mid-1990s, at least some of Israel’s most powerful leaders believe that the response to all of these questions is yes.

Read the whole article here.

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