Journal

Smaller and weaker opponents do not have a monopoly on asymmetric warfare and it does not need to be left to Guerrilla movements for us to romantically read about in the future.   We need to become better at fighting with very few resources.

A review of the use of new media in recent insurgencies.

The practical application of the principles of VSO over 150 days of planning, operations, and refinement in Afgahnistan.

Reading the Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

Where does legitimacy derive from in the local populace?

Octavian continues his inquiry into Pakistan

A Contrarian’s Lament

Understanding how Egyptian's understand their past rebellions

Refining analytical methods for a better war

Better understanding the so-called Arab Spring

Imperatives for Confronting Irregular Challenges

A Revisionist Approach to Foreign Policy

Overcoming apathy through empowerment is the key to success in Afghanistan

Is the threat of AQAP overblown and sensationalized?

20 Articles of Effective Assessments in Counterinsurgency

Author describes operations in Iraq in 2008

Social Scientist explores human emotions and reactions in the conflict in Iraq

Theory of elasticity suggests gun control measures are ineffective without a corresponding increase in security.

Author describes his unit's methodology of measuring effectiveness in Afghanistan

Declassified outline of Rhodesian Tips, Tactics, and Procedures in COIN.

Nearly ten years into the war, the Afghan Army still struggles to learn basic soldiering skills.

A conversation on the United States military's history of manhunting.

Can local law enforcement use technology to deter riots?

Are Al Qaeda's piracy and raiding efforts merely disruption tactics or part of a larger strategy for control of the Middle East's waterways?

How does your organization think, and how does it not think?

Former Battalion Commander describes frustrations of command relationships in Afghanistan and offers recommendations.

Is Pakistan in a low-level equilibrium trap or simply too focused on India?  Octavian investigates for SWJ.

An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.

Current doctrine framing Irregular Warfare is wron -- historically, semantically and conceptually -- and should be reexamined to enable decision-makers at all levels to better identify emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities, better allocate resources, and in the process, enhance our national defense.

Current doctrine fails to fully expound on the tactical leader's involvement in economic activity and the necessity for achieving sustainable economic development in the operating environment

by Bob Tollast

Download the Full Article: Obama's Pledge: A Responsible End to War in Iraq?

At the beginning of May, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan presented CWC report 4 to Congress, detailing the forthcoming State Department mission in Iraq. It lays bare the challenges in what will be an historic mission, in uncharted waters. It also raises serious questions about Obama's pledge to bring the war to a responsible end, and whether this will be fully resourced.

Download the Full Article: Obama's Pledge: A Responsible End to War in Iraq?

Robert Tollast is an English Literature Graduate from Royal Holloway University of London, and he is a periodic contributor to Small Wars Journal.

Book Review by Frank G. Hoffman

Download the Full Review: Transforming Command

In the Foreword of this well executed book, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, USA warns that American thinking about defense transformation and Revolutions in Military Affairs up until Iraq and Afghanistan had begun to eclipse the doctrine or command philosophy called "mission command." "The orthodoxy of defense transformation," he notes, "considered war as mainly a targeting exercise and divorced war from its political, human, psychological and cultural dimensions." He goes on to associate the neglect of mission command with negative impacts on U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Israeli efforts in Southern Lebanon in 2006.

Thus, Transforming Command is certainly timely. Partly in response to the effects of the transformation agenda promoted by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and partly in recognition of the leadership challenges posed by operations against today's adaptive adversaries, the requirement for empowered and decentralized leadership is once again being recognized in the United States. The U.S. Army's latest capstone concept, developed by General McMaster stressed "Future operations...must remain grounded in the Army's long-standing concept of Mission Command defined as the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment." The Army goes on to emphasize disciplined initiative and prudent risk taking based on commander's intent as key elements of mission command.

Likewise the U.S. Marine Corps has updated its Marine Operating Concepts with a chapter on Mission Command. It defines it as "A cultivated leadership ethos that empowers decentralized leaders with decision authority and guides character development of Marines in garrison and combat." For the Marines, Mission Command "promotes an entrepreneurial mindset and enables the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding necessary for decentralized decision making and the tempo of operations required to seize the initiative..."

Download the Full Review: Transforming Command

Frank G. Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies. He is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant

How would you see today the rationale behind the 2007 Bagdad surge? To act as a buffer between the Iraqi sectarian, ethnic pressures and ontological (group extinction) fears? To protect a Sunni population that could not be protected by the formal Iraqi security forces (either because of weakness or because the Sunnis didn't trust them) and setting the stage for the next level-a rational political space?

Protecting the population is important. But the sad fact is that by early 2007 in Baghdad, the Sunni groups had been pushed back to small enough enclaves that it was fairly easy to protect them, save in Southern Baghdad, where the cleansing continued well into the fall of 2007. The continued cleansing in South Baghdad made me skeptical that things were working until very late in 2007, despite the obvious reduction in violence elsewhere in the city as of late summer.

So yes, protecting the population is important. But I don't think that we could have done much to protect them in mid-2006. The civil war had to burn itself out—the Sunnis had to realize that they had lost and the Shi'a had to realize that we had won—before a settlement could be reached.

I do think that the presence of additional U.S. troops in the urban areas tamped down the end of the civil war faster than it might otherwise have happened. U.S. forces worked with the local trend to accelerate it, and did not impose a totally foreign agenda. Had we started the "surge" plan in Sadr City, for example, I think the outcome might have been much less favorable. I have come to a more tempered view of what military forces are able to accomplish, as I tried to lay out in my Washington Post piece on the "three wars" in Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: The Iraqi COIN Narrative Revisited: Interview with Douglas A. Ollivant

Douglas A. Ollivant is a Senior National Security Fellow with the New America Foundation. He most recently spent one year as the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to the Commander, Regional Command-East at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, returning to Washington this spring. He served in Iraq as the Chief of Plans for MultiNational Division Baghdad in 2006-2007 and he led the planning team that designed the Baghdad Security Plan, the main effort of what later became known as the "Surge." An expanded view of his thoughts is presented in Countering the New Orthodoxy-Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform

by Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, and Michael Few

Download the Full Article: Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform

Nearly a decade removed from 9/11, United States military forces remain entrenched in small wars around the globe. For the foreseeable future, the United States Government (USG) will continue to intervene in varying scale and scope in order to promote democracy and capitalism abroad. While many made efforts to describe small wars and methods of coping with them, our field manuals have not kept up with the wealth of knowledge and wisdom learned on the ground.

In order to prepare for the future, we must first understand where we have been moving beyond individual articles of best practices and lessons learned. The intent of this essay is to provide the critique in order to promote an evolution in our thinking. The purpose is to better prepare those who will follow in our footsteps. Finally, we believe that this reform is a duty required from those who directly observed the costs of today's small wars.

Download the Full Article: Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform

Carl Prine is a former enlisted Marine and Army infantryman who served in Iraq. Currently, he serves as a reporter at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and blogs on national security affairs for Military.com.

Captain (P) Crispin Burke is an active duty aviator who commanded in Iraq. Currently, he is the unmanned aviation observer controller at the Combined Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, and he blogs on national security affairs at Wings over Iraq.

Major James Michael Few is an active duty armor officer who served multiple tours to Iraq in various command and staff positions. Currently, he serves as the editor for Small Wars Journal.

Dealing with the U.S. Military

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Dealing with the U.S. Military

Many of the civilians who gravitate to counterinsurgency (COIN) work for the Departments of State and Justice have some knowledge of the military or have served in uniform. But many people from other agencies will not have such a background. Suddenly living among the military on a daily basis, and often depending on them totally for security can come as a culture shock that is almost as great as that experienced by stepping into a host nation's culture. It helps to come somewhat prepared. The Provincial Reconstruction Team classes given by the State Department's Foreign Service Institute are good but short, and they give out excellent advice, but it would help if you do homework on your own. This piece will attempt to give some background and perspective.

Download the Full Article: Dealing with the U.S. Military

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: Future of Pakistan up in the Air: Interview with Bruce Riedel

In early 2009 you were pivotal in directing and elaborating the basic strategic framework that it is still at the core of the current operations. How would you assess the progress in destroying AQ sanctuaries in the AfPak region since then? Did ISAF break the Afghan Taliban's momentum?

The death of Usama bin Laden is a major success for the American strategy as is the pressure the al Qaeda core is under from the drone program. Both those operations required bases in Afghanistan. The surge forces have also broken the Taliban's momentum in southern Afghanistan and prevented a catastrophic collapse of Afghan authority there. The progress we made is still fragile and reversible which suggests that a significant and rapid drawdown of the NATO forces in Afghanistan would be very dangerous and foolish at this point.

Download the Full Article: Future of Pakistan up in the Air: Interview with Bruce Riedel

Bruce Riedel is senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. A former CIA officer, he was a senior advisor to three U.S. presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues. At the request of President Obama he chaired an interagency review of policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan for the White House that was completed in March 2009. Riedel's latest book is Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

by Mark Kukis

Published by Columbia University Press (May 4, 2011),

240 pages, ISBN-10: 0231156928

Reviewed by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: Book Review: Voices From Iraq: A People's History, 2003-2009

Ultimately, the American intervention in Iraq is one small trajectory along the arc of nation and state development in the land that claims the birthplace of civilization. As with every human endeavor, this arc is fraught with tragedy, triumph, violence, resistance, and hope. The current history of the intervention remains American-centric examining what United States forces and their allies did and failed to do following the regime change of Saddam Hussein. In Voices From Iraq: A People's History, 2003-2009, Mark Kukis presents the Iraqi voice drawing from over seventy interviews conducted in 2009. This book is a must read as it adds to the comprehensive historiography of the past decade; moreover, through the personal narratives, the reader is given a glimpse into the emotional and physical costs of small wars.

Download the Full Article: Book Review: Voices From Iraq: A People's History, 2003-2009

Major James Michael Few is an active duty armor officer with multiple tours in various command and staff positions in Iraq. Currently, he serves as the editor of Small Wars Journal.

by Jimmy A. Gomez

Download the Full Article: The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD

Since October 2001, combat operations in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations have presented the U.S. Army with constant evolution of complex situations that have routinely highlighted shortfalls in current doctrinal solutions. At every echelon, the Army has adapted to the complex situations within the Operational Environment (OE) by revising doctrine to reflect the adaptive responses to the ever-evolving spectrum of threats. The spectrum of threats within the operational environment range from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic to a one-dimensional, all inclusive Targeting Process.

Download the Full Article: The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD

CW4 Jimmy Gomez is currently the Course Manager and Senior Instructor for the Field Artillery Warrant Officer Instruction Branch at Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He served with the 25th Infantry Division Staff in Afghanistan 2004-2005 and in Iraq 2006-2007.

Pakistan's Military Industrial Complex and Existential Crises of National Identity

by Patrick J Christian

Download the Full Article: Sleeping with the Enemy

In a May 2011 Wall Street Journal article, reporter Bret Stephens suggests that Pakistan is undergoing existential crises of national identity. The truth of this observation is sobering because Pakistan is at the heart of two very different, but deadly conflicts; an inter-state contest of nuclear will with India and an intra-state conflict in Afghanistan. Understanding Pakistan's existential crises of identity may well be the only way that the international community will keep these two separate conflicts from spiraling out of control into the next multi-continent war.

Patrick J Christian is a doctoral student at NSU Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution with an emphasis on psycho-cultural identity and ethnic based conflict.

Narco-Armor in Mexico

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Download the Full Article: Narco-Armor in Mexico

Known alternatively as "narco-tanks" (narcotanques), "Rhino trucks," and "monster trucks"(monstruos), the crude armored vehicles emerging in Mexico's cartel war are evidence of a changing tactical logic on the ground. "Narco-tanks" are better characterized as improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs)—portending a shift in the infantry-centric nature of the cartel battlespace.

Narco-tactics have been, for the most part, infantry-centric—consisting of small raids, blockades, and gun battles. The use of armored sport utility vehicles for transportation, raids, and tactical in-battle maneuver is largely an extension of the small unit infantry operations that characterize the tactical logic of the cartel war. The presence of armored vehicles ups the ante.

Download the Full Article: Narco-Armor in Mexico

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and elsewhere.

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. He is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal and has published at numerous venues including The Atlantic, Defense Concepts, West Point CTC Sentinel, Infinity Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security.

by Lieutenant Colonel Cliff W. Gilmore

Download the Full Article: Molding Perceptions: A Response

In his Small Wars Journal article titled "Molding Perceptions: American Engagement with the Media after the bin Laden Raid", Marno de Boer identified a basic problem associated with U.S. public communication in the days immediately following the bin Laden operation: "During the first 48 hours after the raid," he states, "U.S. officials did not yet have a complete picture of what had happened inside the Abbottabat (sic) complex." This statement raises several significant questions, including:

- Why was U.S. public communication about the raid jumbled and frequently inaccurate?

- Why did U.S. public communication about the raid originate from the top of a hierarchy geographically removed from the event?

- Why was comprehensive, deliberate, timely public-communication not an integral part of planning for the raid?

Finally why, when closing on an established long-term goal following more than a decade of persistent warfare in which public perception plays an increasingly critical role, was the U.S. unprepared to shape the strategic narrative?

Download the Full Article: Molding Perceptions: A Response

Cliff W. Gilmore is a doctoral researcher in the field of organization management and leadership with Capella University and a 2010-11 Fellow with MIT's Seminar XXI on Foreign Politics, International Relations and the National Interest. The topic of his ongoing dissertation is principle-based communication as a leadership practice. He is an active duty U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel assigned as Special Assistant for Public Communication to the 8th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The opinions expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Marine Corps.

by Bob Tollast

Download the Full Article: Interview with Roger Hardister: The Global Partnership for Afghanistan

Since 2004, Global Partnership for Afghanistan has worked with Afghan farmers for sustainable agribusiness including horticulture, forestry and water management. Working across twelve provinces including Paktya, Paktika, Wardak, and Logar as well as supporting training facilities in Kabul and Kapisa, GPFA provides a package of tree stock, seeds, training and supplies so that farmers can invest their land and labor to produce higher annual incomes. Since 2004, GPFA has overseen over 15,000 farm enterprises, planting over 9,000,000 trees and seen the income of many farmers increase significantly. Additionally, GPFA runs the Women Working Together Initiative, which aims to boost the neglected but crucial contribution from women to Afghan farming. Supporting widows and the illiterate, this programme has expanded since its inception in 2005 and like other GPFA projects, has increased modern farming practices such as cold storage and horticultural training among long neglected communities, so that there are now a significant number of women run farms.

Download the Full Article: Interview with Roger Hardister: The Global Partnership for Afghanistan

Roger Hardister is the Executive Director of the Global Partnership For Afghanistan.

Robert Tollast is an English Literature Graduate from Royal Holloway University of London, and he is a periodic contributor to Small Wars Journal.

by Gregory Conti and David Raymond

Download the Full Article: Leadership of Cyber Warriors: Enduring Principles and New Directions

Leadership is a core competency of the officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers across the military services. A principle tenant of leadership is competence in the domain of operations. However, until recently, the defense of computer networks and the conduct of network warfare were treated as ancillary functions by the military services. The increasing cyber warfare threat against the United States, the creation of United States Cyber Command and the designation of cyberspace as a warfighting domain now necessitate study of the attributes of successful cyber warfare leaders and the leadership techniques required to successfully lead cyber warriors. In particular, we must develop an understanding of where traditional kinetic leadership paradigms succeed, where they fail, and where new techniques must be adopted.

Download the Full Article: Leadership of Cyber Warriors: Enduring Principles and New Directions

LTC Gregory Conti is Military Intelligence Officer and Director of West Point's Cyber Security Research Center.

LTC David Raymond is an Armor Officer and Assistant Professor in West Point's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Here at last, Small

Wars Journal Vol. 7, No. 6 is now available.

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on the titles below for single articles. In this issue:

by Jamsheed K. Choksy

Download the Full Article: A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?

China and Iran are constructing a series of strategically placed harbors -- their strings of salt water pearls -- partially for independent strategic reasons but equally to ensure maritime commerce in oil, gas, other licit resources, and illicit technologies between both nations can continue uninterrupted. Those ports provide facilities for the two countries' warships as well, extending their military power into a region hitherto dominated by the U.S., Britain, and India. To ensure the Indian Ocean's vital transportation lanes continue remaining accessible to all nations and transfer of prohibited items does not occur, the U.S and Britain need to remain actively engaged in building political, social, and economic relations with several nations in South Asia. Diminishment in access to Indian Ocean ports will have serious long-term consequences for American and British military and commercial operations in a troubled yet important region of the world.

Download the Full Article: A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian, Iranian, Indian, Islamic, and International studies, and former director of the Middle Eastern studies program at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is also a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.

by Grant Martin

Download the Full Article: A Tale of Two Design Efforts

Trying to be a "good neighbor" to the Afghans

One Friday morning not too long ago I sat facing a row of ISAF officers assigned to one of their many information offices. Maybe Strategic Communications (STRATCOM), I wondered. No, I thought, the new director of STRATCOM had changed their name, but to what I could not remember. Maybe they were from the Public Affairs office. On my side of the table a jumbled mix of staff officers from other sections of ISAF talked in low voices waiting for the lead planner to begin the meeting. A brand-new School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate walked in and sat down confidently, his assistant clicking on the ubiquitous power point title slide that begins every gathering in the U.S. Armed Forces today from Washington, D.C. to Kabul, Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: A Tale of Two Design Efforts

Major Grant Martin is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He recently returned from Afghanistan where he worked as a planner in the CJ5 at NTM-A/CSTC-A. He is currently assigned to the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School (Airborne). The comments in this article are the author's own and do not constitute the position of NTM-A/CSTC-A, ISAF, the U.S. Army, DoD, or USAJFKSWCS(A).

Challenges Ahead in the Middle East

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Challenges Ahead in the Middle East

Two decades ago, flying with a friend over Cairo's City of the Dead, Hosni Mubarak pointed to the forest of TV antennas below and remarked, "This is why I no longer control Egypt as I once did."

Although the United States knew the events were coming that have swept through the Middle East, it was utterly unprepared for them. These events, protesting dictatorships and promoting democracy in a number of countries, will disturb the region for as long as it takes to complete the revolution and transition to stable democracies. If U.S. policy is to support this transition and promote change, it must consider differences in internal conditions leading up to the unrest within each country. But underneath the differences are much deeper social and cultural similarities that represent the real challenge. Unfortunately, these similarities are now being largely ignored.

Download the Full Article: Challenges Ahead in the Middle East

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

by John D. Johnson

Download the Full Article: Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Will the Arab Spring turn into an Israeli-Palestinian Winter? Judging by the recent icy meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, there is a significant chance it may. Also, the proposed vote for recognizing a Palestinian state in the UN General Assembly this fall may well be the critical turning point in the seasons of Middle East politics.

As has happened many times before, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was in the news recently as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with President Obama in the Oval Office, Egypt brokered a unity agreement between Palestinian groups HAMAS in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank, and Israel celebrated its Independence Day while Palestinians marked what they call the "catastrophe" where many Palestinians circa 1948 left or were removed from their homes in present-day Israel, to name just a few headlines.

Download the Full Article: Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Officer. He has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army Staff, U.S. Army Europe, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (Baghdad), III Corps, U.S. Division South-Iraq (Basra), the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade (Korea) and most recently at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army or Defense Department.

by Ethan B. Kapstein

Download the Full Article: Military Metrics

How do governments know whether they're winning or losing a military campaign? That question is devilish enough in the context of conventional wars with pitched battles, as conflicts often take surprising twists and turns en route to their endgame. It was more than sheer bravado that led Charles De Gaulle, who knew a thing or two about military operations, to declare in June 1940, "France has lost the battle, but France has not lost the war."

Precise knowledge of a conflict's progress is perhaps even more difficult when it comes to the counterinsurgencies now being fought in Afghanistan and, somewhat more surreptitiously, in places like Yemen. How do military leaders and policy-makers ascertain if they are "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population? What are the indicators of success?

Military history suggests that generals and public officials have often looked at the wrong data—the wrong metrics—for information and insight about what's really happening on the ground. The Vietnam War provides a poignant example (Nagl 2002; Kilcullen 2010). As late as the summer of 1974, a study group from the U.S. House of Representatives boldly asserted that "it is unlikely that the North Vietnamese can win a military victory" and it shared the view of the American Ambassador to Saigon, Graham Martin, that South Vietnam was now on the verge of an "economic 'takeoff' similar to those which have occurred in South Korea and Taiwan." The congressional group drew this conclusion from the lopsided difference in military casualties between North and South Vietnamese forces—the infamous "body counts"—which cast doubt on the ability of Hanoi to sustain the constant pummeling much longer. Needless to say, Saigon would fall to the North within nine months of that study's publication, with Ambassador Martin departing by helicopter from the U.S. Embassy's rooftop.

Download the Full Article: Military Metrics

Ethan B. Kapstein is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a professor of public policy and business at the University of Texas at Austin. A retired naval reserve officer, he has served as an Academic Advisor to the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. His most recent book (with Nathan Converse), is The Fate of Young Democracies. The views expressed here are strictly his own and do not represent the opinions of any organization with which he is or has been affiliated.

by Wm Gawthrop

Download the Full Article: Dogmatic Basis of Jihad And Martyrdom

The dogmatic basis for jihad and martyrdom attacks (Sunni Tradition) are the core values and themes in Islam's doctrinal texts: The Quran and the Hadiths. Islamic dogma gives rise to a world view postulating perpetual, but not necessarily constant, war facilitated by the twin doctrines of jihad and martyrdom. The ultimate goal of Islam is its domination over other ideologies and the means for achieving that goal includes "jihad" at the individual collective and personally obligatory level.

Zakat, as a systemic and dedicated funding mechanism, combine with multiple forms of jihad (Jihad of the Tongue [speech], Jihad of the Pen [writings], Jihad of Wealth [financial support]) to feed and fuel Jihad of the Sword (combat, combat support and combat service support operations).

The themes of jihad and martyrdom, flowing directly from the core doctrinal sources, are amplified rather than moderated by the four schools of Sunni law. Absent a moderating interpretation of the world view, funding practices, and incitement to jihad, these themes will continue to attract new generations of responsive, autonomous, self actualizing believers.

Download the Full Article: Dogmatic Basis of Jihad And Martyrdom

William Gawthrop received his Masters of Science, Strategic Intelligence, from the National Defense Intelligence College and his Bachelor of Science, Law Enforcement, from Sam Houston State University, Huntsville Texas. He is also a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the United State Marine Corps Command and Staff College and served in Vietnam (Co H, 75th Infantry, First Cavalry Division). He is currently a Supervisory Intelligence Analyst with the United States Government.