If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.
Journal
Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process
A critical analysis of statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri reveal a fragmented and weakened Al Qaeda disguising its internal incoherence and lack of appealing strategic and political aims.
Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.
Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.
Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise mission command.
Good stories trump doctrine for effecting cultural change because they reach us emotionally; they inspire. Consider America's first battle and what we can glean its many relevant lessons.
An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.
Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.
Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.
Some US objectives remain unmet.
Chavista strategists have decided its best course of action is to run Chavez for president for a fifth time, only this time by proxy.
The issue of the reach of the state needs to be put into a wider focus by including women and gender issues as part of the narrative.
One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.
If physical success on the battlefield cannot be translated into part of a larger aim, it is largely irrelevant even if it does a great deal of physical damage to the enemy.
The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.
Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the cause.
Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago remain.
Unlike other major wars the US has fought, Iraq & Afghanistan demonstrate extremely low occurrence of troops who become POW/MIA & high injury survival rates.
The study demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars with which Pakistan financed groups that kill American soldiers almost on a daily basis.
What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but what happens in the Middle East and South Asia spreads to the world.
Sudan is the Sub-Saharan country that most resembles those of North Africa, with its shared religion, culture, and language. Will the Arab Spring blow south?
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.
Russia has integrated cyber operations into its military doctrine.
Maintaining official armies in Africa makes little security, political or economic sense. The continent will do better without them altogether
The Egyptian Sinai is becoming a breakaway state.
While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.
Modern American values continue to grow apart from traditional military values, changing the face of military culture. Munsing offers a few ways to adjust to societal change.
The explosive effects of rumors in Syria and insurgenceis around the world.
The trajectory of developments holds value as a guide to the challenges of the next decade and the education and training needed to meet them.
Constraint, imagination, and collaboration can produce meaningful innovations.
Do the terrain and the friendly and enemy situations allow stability operations at the village or district level?
Knowing the balance between when to exercise power and when to hold back is vital to maintaining America’s strength.
The only long-term solution to end the LRA’s child soldiering is through a decisive victory, which requires expanded regional and international involvement.
Regardless of whether Britain and France arm the rebels, Syria faces more challenges than Assad’s rule. An interview with Nathaniel Rosenblatt from Caerus Ascociates by Robert Tollast.
The provision of both financial and development programs in the northern territories of Mali is an effective way to deter vulnerable groups from adhering to AQ ideology.
Successful information operations (IO) often require effective inter-cultural communications in order to inform and influence foreign audiences.
The realities of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated “just-in-time” cultural training that focused heavily on the “do’s and don’ts.” A more deliberate approach is warranted in Asia.
Making IPB an “entire staff” process is critically important to achieve shared understanding of the various mission variables.
Paul was an independent thinker, uninterested in unifomity of behavior in others. His thinking and practice were contextual—shaped by and for each new situation
A proof of concept for an integrated language and culture learning program.
Women are acting as combatants in approximately one-third of present-day armed insurgencies. Are there lessons for the US military?
The CIA should focus on gathering intelligence to inform policy makers and to attack the underlying causes and enablers of terrorist group formation and action.
When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.
This article proposes a positive vision for how disruptive junior officers and established senior officers should advance the discussion about improving their services.
West German law enforcement used combinations of intelligence analysis and HUMINT collection while simultaneously engaging and disrupting the Red Army Faction.
Under certain conditions, supporting rebels can achieve strategic objectives without causing instability or humanitarian catastrophe.
Miller traces the history of conflict resolution and negotiation during the four Tuareg rebellions in Mali, focusing primarily on the role of ideology.