Radical Islamist Weaponized Drone Use I&W (Indications & Warning) in Africa: A Terrorism Research Note

Radical Islamist Weaponized Drone Use I&W (Indications & Warning) in Africa: A Terrorism Research Note    

John P. Sullivan and Keaton O.K. Bunker

 ISAWP Propaganda Video Created by Drone Flying Overhead (Screen Grab)

Source: Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) Propaganda Video (21 January 2022)[1]

The global rise of drones has made vast changes to how countries wage war, spy on their enemies, and even deliver goods. Terrorist groups are also rapidly incorporating drone technology for intelligence, propaganda, and attack purposes. The impact of weaponized drone use has been felt in conflicts all over the world including the Russo-Ukraine war, conflicts in the Middle East, and now it has begun to enter Africa. There have been more struggles between governments and violent nonstate actors in Africa than anywhere in the world, and now that drones are actively being used by radical Islamist terrorist organizations in the continent, it is important to analyze how they have utilized drones since 2018 and how that usage may change via an indications and warning (I&W) perspective.

Key Information: Dionne Searcey, “Boko Haram is Back. With Better Drones.” New York Times. 13 September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html:   

Nigeria’s war against the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram was supposed to be over by now. President Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler, was re-elected earlier this year after boasting about his progress battling Boko Haram. He has repeatedly declared that the group has been “technically defeated.” On Tuesday, the president conceded that “its members are still a nuisance.”

A full decade into the war, however, Boko Haram militants are still roaming the countryside with impunity. Their fighters now have more sophisticated drones than the military and are well-armed after successful raids on military brigades, according to local politicians and security analysts.  

Key Information: “Using drones and disguises, terrorists target northern Mozambique.” Independent Online (IOL). 29 May 2020, https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/using-drones-and-disguises-terrorists-target-northern-mozambique-48690955:

Amade Miquidade, interior minister of Mozambique has detailed how terrorists are wearing the uniforms of the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM), using drones to identify their targets and using civilians as human shields, reported Club of Mozambique, the country’s leading digital news platform.

Key Information: Karen Allen, “Drones and Violent Nonstate Actors in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 6 August 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drones-and-violent-nonstate-actors-in-africa/: 

Within Africa, the potential for insurgent groups to emulate such tactics as those observed in Iraq, has received little attention. There has been some focus on Libya with proxy supporters of both the Libyan Arab Armed Forces coalition of militias led by Khalifa Haftar in the east of the country and the Government of National Accord supplying drones for surveillance and long-range strategic strikes. However, it is the recent escalation in hostilities in the Cabo Delgado Province of northern Mozambique that has raised the specter of violent nonstate actors in Africa deploying this technology…

…This aligns with other unverified reports by private security companies operating in the region that small drones have been deployed by armed nonstate actors for surveillance purposes. Jasmine Opperman, a former South African intelligence analyst, observed that “If we look at the ease with which [the insurgents] are getting weapons and mounting attacks on the military, I will never underplay the possibility that they start making use of more technologically advanced capabilities, and with that I include drones.” She added that “If you can bring in cellphones by the hundreds through illegal smuggling routes, what is preventing them from bringing in drones?”

Key Information: Malik Samuel, “ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence.” Institute for Security Studies. 13 April 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence: 

Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) could be close to using delivery drones for attacks in the Lake Chad Basin. Weaponising and adapting unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is a new trend in the group’s operational strategy, and could worsen the conflict. 

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that ISWAP is already trialling delivery drones to carry improvised explosive devices. This includes assessing the weight that can be carried, how far they can go and how long they stay in the air. The threat goes beyond military targets and may impact humanitarian service delivery. 

Ongoing operations by Nigeria’s military and clashes with Boko Haram faction, Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), have inflicted heavy losses on ISWAP and significantly reduced its space to operate. And successful intelligence-driven strikes resulting in arrests of ISWAP members outside the north-east are preventing the group from expanding. These setbacks may be forcing ISWAP to adapt its strategy, as it has done before.

Key Information: Reuben Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa.” Lawfare. 1 May 2023,https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa: 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

In 2020, al-Shabaab used drones to record and coordinate an attack on a U.S. military base in Manda, Kenya. U.S. government officials have confirmed that al-Shabaab uses drones in their operations, and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) noted a “prolific use” of drones by the group. In May 2020, Ahlu-Sunnah wal Ja’maa (ASWJ), an Islamic State affiliate in Mozambique, used drones to identify targets in the Mocimboa de Praia attacks. The following year, ASWJ used drones again for ISR in its attack on Palma. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has also used drones for ISR to aid in their attacks. In July 2022, in the town of Gubio, Nigeria, ISWAP used a surveillance drone to survey the location of a Nigerian military convoy before ambushing them. A month later, Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) also carried out a drone-assisted attack on security forces in Mali.

Military forces have begun to notice an increased use of terrorist drones. A July 2022 U.N. Security Council report noted that the Mozambican army had neutralized several drone formations that they suspected were gathering intelligence on local security forces’ positions. In February 2023, Mozambican forces shot down another two ASWJ surveillance drones. Mini-drones were also detected over a military base in the Shabelle region of Somalia.

Propaganda Videography

Apart from ISR, terrorist groups have used drones to film propaganda videos. The use of drones not only adds cinematic value to the videos but also is a symbol of airpower, status, and technological prowess that could aid recruitment. ISWAP released propaganda videos in January and April 2022 showcasing aerial footage that was likely shot using a commercial quadcopter drone. In November 2022, Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) also released a propaganda video shot using drones, and Mali-based al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM) has madesimilar drone videos.

Key Information: Ana Aguilera, “Drone Use by Violent Extremist Organisations in Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab.” Global Network on Extremism and Technology. 5 July 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/07/05/drone-use-by-violent-extremist-organisations-in-africa-a-case-study-of-al-shabaab/: 

When discussing the offensive capabilities of drones, it is crucial to differentiate between commercially-intended drones and militarised drones. While al-Shabaab primarily relies on commercially-intended drones due to their affordability, remote operation capabilities, and broad accessibility, militarised drones are less accessible without state sponsorship, and any leaked military drone is more likely to be traced by authorities and law enforcement agencies. It is therefore expected that al-Shabaab would heavily rely on commercial drones, however, despite their attractive features, al-Shabaab does not prioritise them in its political agenda and communication strategy.

One plausible explanation for al-Shabaab’s limited use of commercial drones is the current restrictions in terms of payload capacity, range, and accuracy. Commercial drones are primarily designed for civilian applications such as photography, videography, and product delivery, and lack the advanced military-grade features necessary for large-scale attacks or advanced surveillance options.

The affordability and accessibility of commercial drones mean that they are widely available to various end-users, including counterterrorism agencies. This increases the likelihood of detection and interception by authorities, making it challenging for al-Shabaab to effectively employ them without drawing attention.

It is essential to acknowledge the ongoing evolution of technology, particularly in the field of commercial drones. These drones are continuously advancing in capabilities. A notable example is Ukraine’s recent adoption of drone-on-drone combat warfare, where non-professional drones equipped with cameras are used for surveillance and intelligence gathering on Russian positions. These drones have successfully intercepted small aircrafts while airborne, without causing damage. The continuous technological progress presents opportunities to exploit these advancements and adapt them for various purposes, potentially opening the door for future offensive drone strategies employed by al-Shabaab.

Analysis

The earliest verified incident of drone usage by radical Islamist terrorists in Africa was when Boko Haram used drones in 2018 to spy on military personnel. This marked the beginning of the rise of drones being used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in Africa (Refer to Table 1). Boko Haram continued to be the main organization with such usage as of 2019 when they were noted to have more sophisticated drones than the Nigerian military. This shows the immense growth the group made over a single year from their first trials with drones in 2018 to their advanced ability in 2019. The quick shift may be due to Boko Haram’s connections as an Islamic State affiliate, a group known to use drones in a similar manner some years earlier in Iraq and Syria. Soon this practice spread to other armed groups in Africa.  

In the wake of Boko Haram’s use of drones, there was an outbreak of drone incidents across multiple other groups. Al-Shabab, a jihadi group acting in Mozambique (not to be confused with the older group of a similar name operating in Somalia), began using drones to identify targets in 2020 as can be seen in attacks in the Cabo Delgado province. Additionally, the older al-Shabab group allied to al-Qaeda began using drones in a similar matter in attacks in Kenya and Somalia. Ahlu-Sunnah wal Ja’maa (ASWJ), another Islamic State affiliate in Mozambique, used drones for target identification in an attack in Mocimboa de Praia, Mozambique. Up to this point, ISR was the main use of drones by terrorist organizations in Africa. This was most likely due to a lack of ability to obtain drones as well as the influence of Boko Haram. Drones used for ISR can be reused as long as they do not get destroyed by enemy action. Fully weaponized drones are much more likely to get destroyed by opposition forces or, in the case of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), be sacrificed as an intended part of what is essentially a kamikaze attack. As drones are still somewhat challenging to obtain, this is one of the causes for groups to stick to ISR. Further, ISR use helps to facilitate terrorist operations whereas single use drone attacks have a much more minimal impact on terrorist operations as a ‘one off’ event.

The initial use of drones is what sparked many groups to follow suit, so Boko Haram’s focus on ISR can also explain other terrorist organizations hesitancy to attempt to fully weaponize drones. In addition to ISR, multiple violent non-state actors (VNSA) have begun to film propaganda videos and other promotional material by way of drones, allowing for larger recruitment videos and easier recordings of “show of force” demonstrations.

In more recent years, African terrorists have slowly started to become more interested in weaponizing drones with IEDs. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) began testing drone capabilities for carrying explosive devices to engage in attacks in the Lake Chad Basin in Nigeria. Though this method has yet to be put into practice, the organization has clearly begun developing techniques for the future. Other entities will soon follow ISWAP’s lead to weaponize drones just as they did when Boko Haram began using drones for ISR in 2018.

Looking at trends in drone usage over the past five years, jihadi groups (Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, ASWJ) have had the most expansive use. One possible reason is that jihadi organizations have benefited from outside training from larger ‘mother’ groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This theory is supported by an instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo when a man with connections to an Islamist militia in the Middle East was caught helping with the development of drone usage of the VNSA known as the Allied Democratic Forces.[2]

The confiscation of military drones and the buying of foreign drones have been two pathways for drone access by African terror groups, but the expansion of civilian drone access has begun to be the biggest threat that will allow non-state actors to acquire drones in the future.[3] As we have seen, simple modifications that can be performed by the organizations themselves can easily transform these commercial drone models into larger threats. One simple version of this is the placement of IEDs on a civilian drone. While a fanciful plot to utilize 3D printed drones in Africa for Islamic State affiliate usage was interdicted by authorities in the United Kingdom in January 2023, this presently does not represent a realistic pathway for African terrorist access to such devices.[4]

Potentials for Terrorist Group Capacity

The future use of drones by VNSAs—including both terrorist and criminal armed groups (CAGs)—is unknown. That is, when looking at current trends the use of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) has been limited. Yet, as Reuben Dass noted in his analysis at Lawfare, the implications for enhancing future terrorist capacity can’t be discounted:

Terrorist groups in Africa face few obstacles to accessing commercial drone technology, but so far they have been slow to weaponize this capability, as groups have elsewhere. Two possible reasons stand out for why this is the case. First is a lack of technical capability. African terrorist groups might still lack the technical know-how for adapting drones for delivering munitions. In October 2014, an Islamic State defector told the International Crisis Group that ISWAP members had sent pictures of an unarmed drone to colleagues in Syria asking them what the object was. Islamic State militants in Syria replied with video instructions for assembling and using it. If technical knowledge is an impediment, it is unlikely to persist. Weaponizing off-the-shelf hobbyist drones is now entirely possible with commercially available equipment. With simple communications between Islamic State affiliates in Africa and the Middle East and the prevalence of online manuals and material, this obstacle may be easily overcome.

A second reason African terrorist groups may be reluctant to weaponize their drones could be caution. An active-offensive use of drones may prompt an increased counterterrorism response, and the groups may be avoiding a potential escalation with security forces. But strategies and operational objectives are always subject to change, and the fact that these groups have not weaponized their drones does not mean that they won’t in the future.

As the regional conflict grows and terrorist groups hold more territory, terrorist groups may well turn to weaponized drones. The threat will almost certainly not come from advanced, military-type drones; instead, groups are likely to use repurposed commercial, off-the-shelf drones, as has been seen on battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and more recently in the conflict in Ukraine. Counterterrorism forces in the region must remain vigilant, well equipped, and prepared, and they must focus on preventing terrorist groups from obtaining drone technology, as it is likely only a matter of time before weaponized drones hit the skies in Africa.[5]

Somali authorities recently confiscated a shipping container packed with military supplies intended for use by al-Shabaab, including parts to assemble drones.

Source: National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), Somalia (May 2023)[6]

Conclusion

In summary, while the threat of drone use is increasing, there have not been many attempts to fully weaponize drones by African terrorists, however, there has been common use of drones for ISR across a large number of groups. Table 1 provides a seleted overview of some of these incidents. These have been used for scouting areas before attacks, following military convoys, and filming propaganda videos.[7] Generally, propaganda videos are taken of the armed entities doing training or demonstrations of force rather than the actual attacks. These uses are more practical because it allows the drones to not be one time use, as they would be in an IED employment (which represents the initial stage of drone weaponization prior to the development of aerial bombardment capabilities). Despite a lack of actual incidents, the threat of weaponized drone usage for direct attacks has gone up in recent years as seen by planned attempts by ISAWP in the Lake Chad Basin.[8]

The African weaponized drone threat can be expected to grow until it becomes a common occurrence within the region, similar to how weaponized drone usage has evolved in other regions such as in the Middle East with terrorists and insurgents and in Mexico and with the cartels and criminal armed groups (CAGs).[9] In addition, weaponized drone use can be expected to converge with advanced cyber threats such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI), including generative AI, such as ChatGPT. This could build from the current ISR applications to more AI aided autonomous attack capabilities.[10] 

Continued extremist drone evoltion in Africa can be expected to be joined by weaponized drone use by CAGs sould the transational criminal situation continue to deteriorate.  African security and police services need to carefully monitor these potentialsm and develop early warning capacities to adapt to the evolving drone threat environment.

Table 1. Radical Islamist Weaponized Drone I&W in Africa (Selected Incidents)

Sources

Ana Aguilera, “Drone Use by Violent Extremist Organisations in Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab.” Global Network on Extremism and Technology. 5 July 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/07/05/drone-use-by-violent-extremist-organisations-in-africa-a-case-study-of-al-shabaab/. 

Karen Allen, “Drones and Violent Nonstate Actors in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 6 August 2021,  https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drones-and-violent-nonstate-actors-in-africa/.

Reuben Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa.” Lawfare. 1 May 2023,https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa. 

“Using drones and disguises, terrorists target northern Mozambique.” Independent Online (IOL). 29 May 2020, https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/using-drones-and-disguises-terrorists-target-northern-mozambique-48690955.   

Malik Samuel “ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence.” Institute for Security Studies. 13 April 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence.

Dionne Searcey, “Boko Haram is Back. With Better Drones.” New York Times. 13 September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html.

Endnotes

[1] An early posting via TamTam at an ISWAP Affinity account: https://tamtam.chat/gf1_1/AX57o4mjOMU. Also later reposted by Reuben Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa.” Lawfare. 1 May 2023,https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa.

[2] “Congo Arrests Middle Eastern National for Links to Islamist Militia.” Reuters. 22 Sept. 2021, www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-arrests-middle-eastern-national-links-islamist-militia-2021-09-22/.

[3] Reuben Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa.” Lawfare Media. 1 May 2023,https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa and Ana Aguilera, “Drone Use by Violent Extremist Organisations in Africa: The Case of Al-Shabaab.” Global Network on Extremism and Technology. 5 July 2023, https://gnet-research.org/2023/07/05/drone-use-by-violent-extremist-organisations-in-africa-a-case-study-of-al-shabaab/.

[4] Robert J. Bunker, “Islamic State 3D Printed Weaponized Drone Plot in Coventry, UK.” C/O Futures Terrorism Research Note Series. 1 October 2023, https://www.cofutures.net/post/islamic-state-3d-printed-weaponized-drone-plot-in-coventry-uk.

[5] Reuben Dass, “The Evolving Threat from Terrorist Drones in Africa.” Lawfare. 1 May 2023,https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-evolving-threat-from-terrorist-drones-in-africa. 

[6] Images reprinted in “Attack on Kenya Defence Forces Outpost Confirms Al-Shabaab Drone Use.” African Defense Forum (ADF). 25 July 2023, https://adf-magazine.com/2023/07/attack-on-kenya-defence-forces-outpost-confirms-al-shabaab-drone-use/. For an earlier related posting with more imagery see “Breaking: NISA Operation Busts Cargo Container filled with Arms and Explosives Meant For Al-shabab + More News.” Somalispot. 18 May 2023, https://www.somalispot.com/threads/breaking-nisa-operation-busts-cargo-container-filled-with-arms-and-explosives-meant-for-al-shabab-more-news.148122/.

[7] Karen Allen, “Drones and Violent Nonstate Actors in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 6 August 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drones-and-violent-nonstate-actors-in-africa/.    

[8] Malik Samuel “ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence.” Institute for Security Studies. 13 April 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence.  

[9] See Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Mexican Cartels are Embracing Aerial Drones and They’re Spreading.” War on the Rocks. 11 November 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/mexican-cartels-are-embracing-aerial-drones-and-theyre-spreading/ and Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Eds. Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs (A Small Wars Journal–El Centro Anthology). Bloomington: Xlibris, 2021.

[10] As the South African Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa) has observed, “Organised criminals in Africa use drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Drug cartels in Mexico already use autonomous attack drones under AI control, providing flexibility and coordination during physical attacks on human, supply chain or infrastructure targets.” See Romi Sigsworth, “Risks and rewards of AI for organised crime in Africa.” Institute for Security Studies. 11 July 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/risks-and-rewards-of-ai-for-organised-crime-in-africa; Karen Allen, “Weaponised drones – the latest tech threat to reach Africa.” Institute for Security Studies. 11 October 2022, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/weaponised-drones-the-latest-tech-threat-to-reach-africa; and Alejandro Santos Cid, “Drones: The latest weapon (and status symbol) of Mexico’s cartels.” El País. 1 February 2022, https://english.elpais.com/usa/2022-02-01/drones-the-latest-weapon-of-mexicos-cartels.html.

[11] “‘Boko Haram released video showing ‘gunned down aircraft,’ drone and other military assets in Sambisa.” Salkilda.com. 14 January 2018, https://salkida.com/boko-haram-released-video-showing-gunned-down-aircraft-drone-and-other-military-assets-in-sambisa/.

[12] Dionne Searcey, “Boko Haram is Back. With Better Drones.” New York Times. 13 September 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html.  

[13] “Using drones and disguises, terrorists target northern Mozambique.” Independent Online (IOL). 29 May 2020, https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/using-drones-and-disguises-terrorists-target-northern-mozambique-48690955. 

[14] Karen Allen, “Drones and Violent Nonstate Actors in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 6 August 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/drones-and-violent-nonstate-actors-in-africa/.  

[15] Op. cit,. Reuben Dass at Note 5.  

[16] Malik Samuel “ISWAP’s use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence.” Institute for Security Studies. 13 April 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswaps-use-of-tech-could-prolong-lake-chad-basin-violence. 

[17] Ibid.

[18] “Breaking: NISA Operation Busts Cargo Container filled with Arms and Explosives Meant For Al-shabab + More News.” Somalispot. 18 May 2023, https://www.somalispot.com/threads/breaking-nisa-operation-busts-cargo-container-filled-with-arms-and-explosives-meant-for-al-shabab-more-news.148122/.

For Additional Reading

“Drones Can be Deadly Weapons For Extremists.” African Defense Forum (ADF). 20 November 2022.

Karen Allen, “Drones as weapons: Africa needs better data to anticipate risk.” Institute for Security Studies. 17 November 2023.

Timothy Obiezu, “Regional Security Analysts Say Africa at Risk of Drone Terrorism.” Voice of America (VOA). 22 November 2023.