Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now
Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now
by Mike Fowler
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Shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, an insurgency campaign began against the US occupational force in the Philippines. In less than four years, the counterinsurgents were able to claim victory as the last of the major insurgent leaders surrendered. As of 2010, an entirely different insurgency campaign in the Philippines dragged into its fifth decade. This analysis provides fresh insights into effective counterinsurgency strategy while offering a heavy dose of caution to the transferability of lessons learned from one counterinsurgency to the next. While this study confirms many key factors of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the findings of this study also indicate that lessons cannot be universally applied in all counterinsurgencies due to wide variations in insurgent strategy.
This study is a comparative analysis of two periods of major insurgency in the Philippines: 1899-1902 and 1969-2009. The analysis compares both insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies between and within the two periods. Although there is no “recipe” or checklist that will ensure a successful insurgency or counterinsurgency, there is significant overlap among the best practices recommended by both academics and the military. From this overlap, this study employs five factors to analyze insurgency and six factors to analyze counterinsurgency.
Of the five key factors for insurgency, arguably the most important is the insurgents’ primary objective. The primary objective varied widely among the insurgencies from social and political revolution to local autonomy and independence. Knowing the objective is an important part to understanding how to defeat the enemy or negotiate a path to victory. Second, the insurgencies’ tactics were an important contribution. While several relied upon guerrilla warfare, some dabbled with conventional operations usually with disastrous consequences. Third, the insurgency’s level of external support influences the groups’ ability to secure weapons, supplies, and funds.. In the case of the Philippines, insurgencies received only limited supplies, weapons, funds, and ammunition from foreign partners. Although Philippine insurgencies generally lacked foreign support, several were able to create a safe haven sanctuary, the fourth factor. A save haven is a critical portion of ensuring insurgency survivability and longevity. Without it, the overwhelming conventional firepower of the state will generally win out. Finally, the study analyzed each insurgency’s efforts to attempt to gain the support of the population. Support of the population provides insurgents a key logistics hub and intelligence network.
This study used six factors to analyze counterinsurgency strategies in the Philippines. Gaining the support of the population is just as important to the counterinsurgent as to the insurgent. The support of the population both denies logistics to the enemy while extending the counterinsurgents human intelligence network. Second, just as it is important for an insurgent to have an enemy sanctuary, counterinsurgency strategy requires the elimination of a save haven. Third, separating the insurgents from the population both provides security to the population while denying resupply of the insurgents. Fourth, victory can come through negotiation. A willingness to concede something less than total annihilation of rebel forces is a common trait among successful insurgencies. Fifth, capture of key leaders is often important to breaking an insurgency. Many insurgencies revolve around charismatic figures that depend upon allegiance based on the leader’s personality. Without the personality, the cause can flounder. Finally, targeting the enemy’s logistics is a common method of forcing insurgents to capitulate.
Each of the factors above was subjectively analyzed based on historical data. The study is organized into three main parts. The first section analyzes the strategies employed during the 1899-1902 Philippine War. The second section covers 1969-2009. The final section compares the various strategies and summarizes with some insights for the counterinsurgent strategist.
Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now
Lt Col Mike Fowler is a 17-year Air Force intelligence officer. He received his Master’s Degree in International Relations from Troy State University and his PhD in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently researching the effects of violence on state political development.
