Perspective: Beyond Narcos − Mexico, the United States, Nearshoring and Organized Crime

Perspective: Beyond Narcos − Mexico, the United States, Nearshoring and Organized Crime

Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and John P. Sullivan

The headlines on both sides of the border continue to be dominated by speculation over the details of the 25 July 2024 capture of two important capos of the Sinaloa Cartel:  Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán López, one of the “Chapitos” (son of the legendary “Chapo” Guzmán). The saga reads like an episode of Netflix series or in a telenovela (soap opera) with one version framing the detention as a lawful arrest, and others as extra-judicial rendition, surrender via betrayal (or among some as treason). In truth, the reality may be somewhere in between. To this day, uncertainty and contradictions surround the case. The reality could be somewhere in between, but to date inconsistencies abound amid rumors, leaks and conflicting stories.

US-Mexico Border Near San Diego, 2019. DVIDS, Public Domain

Yet, the episode is emblematic of the popular prejudices and ‘official’ governmental biases in both nations.[1] Organized crime in Mexico is framed by the caricature of the “narco” with dominant criminal cartels with legendary and “all-powerful” capos sowing violence on both sides of the border.  As a result politicians and law enforcement on both sides of the border seek the symbolic relief of the “kingpin” strategy—which consists of capturing the leaders of these criminal enterprises—in an effort to supposedly alleviate public concerns over insecurity and to demonstrate governmental prowess. This view is a truism; the reality is far more complex.

Illicit Transnational Networks

Analyzing Mexico’s criminal landscape and transnational organized crime through a vision centered on omnipotent drug cartels is irrelevant and incompatible with reality. There are certainly prominent criminal organizations recognized for their enormous influence and firepower, such as the Sinaloa Cartel and its rival the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which, among other criminal activities, are dedicated to drug trafficking. But rather than corporations or companies with a centralized structure and well-defined leadership, we could think of complex ecosystems or systems formed by a network of criminal actors. These illicit networks include opportunistic alliances among the so-called cartels, subordinate gangs, mafias, sicarios (or hired killers), and other economic actors. These alliances are nourished by illicit collusion with politicians and authorities at different levels of government.

These groups are in reality formed by a network of subordinate gangs, tenuous alliances, and illicit collusion with correct politician and police at all levels of government. All of these components are linked to global illicit economic flows and contrary to “populist” political messaging on both sides of the border there is no cross-border criminal invasion of the United States by Mexican cartels. Rather, we are seeing a dynamic of criminal “inter-penetration” and cooperation among criminal enterprises that transcends territorial boundaries both within and across national frontiers—that is, we are referring to illicit economic flows that transverse the entire Mexican Republic, cross the US-Mexico border, interact with actors engaged in legal and illegal activities throughout the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the world throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. This illicit political economy can be considered a facet of what Nils Gilman called “deviant globalization.”[2]

Fueling Deviant Globalization

Violence and insecurity are the outward face of organized crime groups (OCGs) presence and activity. Some of these groups focus on drug trafficking, but others specialize in extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, fuel theft, among other illicit activities. Territorial control and criminal governance amplify the problems caused by the presence of these actors. When violence and conflict with the State worsen, these OCGs can be considered as criminal armed groups (CAGs), which enter into competition with the State and threaten its monopoly on violence.

These dynamics seem to be at work in some regions of Mexico today. In terms of visible violence, ambushes and attacks on police and armed forces are clearly detected, as well as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to attack rival groups (both state forces and other criminal gangs), kidnappings, disappearances and brutal massacres that are amplified on social networks and promoted (or glorified) in narcocorridos. In this context, corruption and impunity are the most insidious factors, posing the greatest threat to the state and its society. This allows the OCGs to convert their violence and firepower into latent economic and political power-mostly at the local level.

In the economic and development sphere, extortion is perpetrated against a range of economic actors—such as OXXO stores, tequila makers, avocado, lime, and tortilla producers, and a whole range of local businesses. Add to this the illicit extraction and [cross-border] trade of hydrocarbons-including oil and its derivatives such as gasoline (huachicoleo)—which primarily affects the state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), and a classic mafia economic/political mix is consolidated.

This corrosive and corrupt combination erodes national sovereignty and provides opportunities for both criminal governance and exploitation of Mexican society by external actors and foreign politicians—in the framework of what is known as hybrid warfare. This combination also amplifies fear, social division and xenophobia. This phenomenon, in the presence of populist and authoritarian political actors, can also fuel calls for “decisive” and unilateral military action.

Of course, the solution to the corrosive effects of corruption, rampant criminal extraction (rent-seeking), and criminal governance is promoting the rule of law and empowering robust and transparent civil society, as well as strengthening institutions of justice. These entities (police, courts, and corrections) are the elements necessary for combating corruption and impunity while upholding and sustaining the rule of law.

Nearshoring and Cross-Border Cooperation

As the United States attempts to overcome the challenges of reconfiguring global supply chains in a new multipolar world and in the context of new international military conflicts—especially in manufacturing and in the cyber and information sphere—Mexico (as the United States’ main trading partner) is positioned as a key geo-political player. In this context, and in the midst of multiple tensions that focus on border security, drug trafficking and organized crime in general, US-Mexico trade relations are critical for both nations.

Building a strong and sustainable nearshoring capacity will benefit both economies. The fight against organized crime is one facet of this cross-border collaboration. Promoting transparency, anti-corruption and multilateral cooperation efforts throughout the hemisphere are essential components of creating mechanisms to reduce insecurity and maintain the rule of law. The “Bicentennial Understanding” laid the groundwork for potentially effective, multidimensional cooperation that included Mexico’s voice, while considering its problems and priorities. It was not a unilateral call from the dominant nation, nor an imposition of its irrelevant and ineffective narco-focused policies. Our colleague Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez has also presented an interesting proposal for a North American Security Treaty between the United States, Mexico and Canada.[3]

The latter is a reasonable initiative consisting of viable actions to address a hemispheric and, at the same time, global problem. We believe that such a “North American Security Space” could potentially form the basis of a space to promote multi-lateral security in the Americas, from the Arctic to the Southern Cone. The details of the treaty proposal and the concrete actions required to make it operational need to be fully understood. Many are concerned about the dependency scheme that this perspective could generate or reinforce, as well as the unilateralism that has always characterized this type of agreements with the United States at the forefront.

The recent saga of “El Mayo” and the “Chapitos,” the historical role of the DEA in Mexico, the distrust between neighbors, the political and geopolitical use of the so-called drug wars, as well as the corruption and impunity that reign in Mexico (and of course in the US drug market)—generate doubts and resentment about the future of treaties that could contribute to advance towards true regional and hemispheric integration. On the other hand, populist discourses on intervention and the promotion of unilateral military actions are real obstacles to cross-border cooperation, regional security and the development of our nations under a new multipolar order.

Endnotes 

[1] See Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, “Política antidrogas fallida y narcoestado (Failed anti-drug policy and narco-state).” La Opinión. 5 August 2024, https://laopinion.com/2024/08/05/politica-antidrogas-fallida-y-narcoestado/ for one perspective on these popular and governmental biases.
 

[2] See Stewart Brand, “Interview: Nils Gilman, Deviant Globalization.” The Long Now Foundation via YouTube. 3 May 2010, https://longnow.org/seminars/02010/may/03/deviant-globalization/ and Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, Eds., Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century New York: Continuum, 2010.
 

[3] See Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “Hacia un Tratado de Seguridad para América del Norte (Towards a Security Treaty for North America).” Nexos. 1 February 2024, https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=77510.

Earlier versions of this essay were published in Spanish were published as «Crimen organizado, integración y relaciones México-Estados Unidos» at  La Opinión, 26 August 2024 and «Más allá del “narco”: Crimen organizado, integración y relaciones México-EU» at Sin Embargo MX, 19 August 2024.