One Tribe at a Time

This is a well-developed and thought provoking piece. My comments are mainly questions, and Ill admit up front that I havent been to Afghanistan, or am I anywhere close to being an Afghanistan scholar.

My read of this, as a strategy or basis for campaign design, is that it really requires the whole issue of governance to be re-thought. Rather than integrating tribes into a government (regardless of how federal or centralized), its more about building that government on the basis of the tribes in the first place. That concept alone will require re-thinking our approach and our definition of "Afghanistan" as a sovereign nation with a functioning government. As described, the tribes fill a "whole of society" role, not just security. Shouldnt our "whole of government" approach be aligned in this way--PRT-type organizations focused on tribes, and not provinces? What is the utility of competing local government structures (tribes vs. provinces)?

The pitfalls that occur to me, along these lines, are that we will really be basing our long term commitment to Afghanistan on multiple commitments to individual tribes, rather than a collective commitment to a single Afghan government. Maj. Gant well describes how to engage a single tribe. What I would be concerned about is how we grow this to multiple tribes. He references "picking tribes", and in one instance reflects on "What is his role in inter-tribal warfare?" This seems to me to be a big question. At some point, we will get involved in tribe vs. tribe issues (unless someone can tell me that Afghan tribes dont fight or struggle with one another). We will possibly be in the position to have two Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) arrayed against one another. I understand references to inter-tribal councils. Will we have to be prepared for "peace enforcement" measures to prevent "allied" tribes from fighting one another? Or do we pick winners and losers?

In his description of the tribal environment, it really sounds like the Taliban and the current Government of Afghanistan both have the same goal: the recognition and authority as the sovereign rulers of a unified Afghanistan. In each case, this comes at some potential expense to the authority and autonomy of the tribes. The comment keeps cropping up that the Taliban dont need to "win", they just need to avoid losing. I would assert that while this may be the strategy while we are there, their ultimate strategy is to win--to become the effective local and national rulers of the country. Im wondering if a tribal-based strategy isnt really turning the tables on the Taliban. Rather than trying to "win" ourselves, we are just setting the stage to prevent them from achieving their national objectives through our web of tribal relationships. Rather than set up a central Afghan government, we merely establish, and manage, a web of security and economic relationships that must be constantly adjusted to keep the tribes strong enough to resist Taliban efforts towards either their destruction or assimilation. We also fight "not to lose."

Phil Ridderhof

Great piece- really good job, Jim! You wouldn't believe how many people have emailed me this and are talking about it- even outside of the military and on Capitol Hill.

When I first read it I couldn't help to think of the obstacles to this approach (some of them already mentioned):

1) having to get the buy-in and cooperation of GIRoA
2) re-structuring our forces to support and execute such a strategy
3) selling the American people on what our interests are that merit such risk and possible losses

The more I think about it, though, the more I think it is a great tactical-level approach to most of the problems in Afghanistan. Since COIN is so much low-level anyway- this, IMO, would get at probably 70-90% of the problems--?

A HUGE challenge that has already been mentioned is the tying together of all the TET efforts into a TES- as you mention. An operational campaign plan to support this would require a very savvy approach and constant wheeling, dealing, and adaptation at our BCT, BN, SOTF, and B team levels- possibly something those staffs are incapable of--?

What kills me is why SOF didn't have a campaign plan that had portions of your TES as well as a plan for the cities and something for Pakistan as well, and tying it all together- for the post-Taliban rule era. CENTCOM has been blamed for not having a campaign plan for Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban- but if SOF had had something like the TES we might could have avoided a lot of the pain and could now be trying to connect the tribes with the central government- without tons of conventional troops on FOBs. Lesson learned for TSOCs IMO: don't rely on a COCOM for a post-MCO campaign plan- do it yourself.

Good commentary. A couple of thoughts.

First, we all need to be relentless in pushing first for an Afghan government that the populace of Afghanistan believes is Legitimate. Without this, everything else we do is really a waste of time. (I stand by my position that the West needs to demand a comprehensive Loya Jirga, and then shut up and live by and support what comes out of it.)

The tribal efforts described by Jim have a very important role, as legitimacy here comes from the bottom up, not the top down. I constantly run into well intended smart people who use the terms "Official" and "Legitimate" as one and the same; but while the GiROA is "official" it all too often lacks "legitimacy" because of both its source and its lack of connection to the local populace where the ANSF operate.

This is where the tribal efforts come in, as they create tremendous "anchor points" if you will, where not only is there a zone of local securtiy and enfluence with full popular legitimacy; but also the presence of the SF team to connect them to other coalition and ANSF security forces operating in the area. Bringing "official" security and "legitimate" security together and allowing each to borrow from the other what they lack themselves (officialness to the legitimate force, and legitimacy to the official force).

I see this happening, and while it is a small, grassroots effort it does work. The keys will be:

1. Our commitment to not abandon those tribes who dare to place their trust in us and join such programs;

2. Our commitment to continue to dedicate high-value, low-density resources to such efforts;

3. And our development of a variety of ways to expand such efforts into the broader community, thinning and weaning them of the SOF that are critical for standing them up; and handing off effectively to conventional and ultimately, fully Afghan GiROA security institutions.