Overview
Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a second generation version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting "jointness" but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military.
These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages a new with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome.
This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment.
Comments
A good article. I'd also add that there are some other problems associated with an IA G/N Act - it may effect the way some committees and sub-committees conduct business, share power, influence policy - as well as how their constituents in the public and private sector are able to influence events - there are politics to overcome greater then just the potential recalcitrance and cultures of the various agencies that might be brought together.
Two other things stuck out - one was the discussion under the 9/11 attacks:
Any discussion of reorganizing the national security bureaucracy will necessarily deal with the question of organizing the military and supporting agencies around future large-scale, Iraq-style occupations, and the necessary development and retention of counterinsurgency expertise. These missions may be destined for failure when they are undertaken by an American democracy--counterinsurgency operations that last "nine to ten years"13 are unrealistic for an American public that faces no existential threat, holds elections every 2 years, and does not know how to reliably measure progress in counterinsurgency.
While true, what you get is not always what you thought you were going to get, and unless we are going to be timid in our foreign policy, I dont think you can guarantee that the outcome you get when using military power will preclude your involvement in something very much like the circumstances we see today - you throw the dice, and there are multiple combination that may occur - re-roll them and something new comes up. Suddenly your rationale for continued military involvement may look different then the rational/political objective that convinced you the use of military power was required or favorable in the first place. As such, fortune favors the prepared - and some flavor of inter-agency reform will likely make us better prepared.
The second thing that stuck out was the diagram on pg. 4 (A Shared Vision of Preparedness). In the top tier the National Military strategy is absent, as is any ref. to military doctrine, or the QDR. Enabling Civil Authority (or doctrinally called Civil Support in our Full Spectrum Operations shake out) is a large part of what we do on the Homeland Security side - DoD is the go to Agency in many respects when flash capacity is required - be it moving stuff, or securing stuff, or a host of other tasks that DoD might fulfill. I guess my point is that when we talk Inter-Agency, its good to remember that DoD is part of that equation.
Again, a good article, that is thought provoking.
Best, Rob