Small Wars Journal

Small Nuclear Reactors: Enabling Energy Security for Warfighters

Sun, 03/27/2011 - 7:51am
Small Nuclear Reactors: Enabling Energy Security for Warfighters

by Micah J. Loudermilk

Last month, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University released a report entitled Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. Authored by Dr. Richard Andres of the National War College and Hanna Breetz from Harvard University, the paper analyzes the potential for the Department of Defense to incorporate small reactor technology on its domestic military bases and in forward operating locations. According to Andres and Breetz, the reactors have the ability to solve two critical vulnerabilities in the military's mission: the dependence of domestic bases on the civilian electrical grid and the challenge of supplying ample fuel to troops in the field. Though considerable obstacles would accompany such a move -- which the authors openly admit -- the benefits are significant enough to make the idea merit serious consideration.

At its heart, a discussion about military uses of small nuclear reactors is really a conversation about securing the nation's warfighting capabilities. Although the point that energy security IS national security has become almost redundant -- quoted endlessly in government reports, think tank papers, and the like -- it is repeated for good reason.

Especially on the domestic front, the need for energy security on military bases is often overlooked. There is no hostile territory in the United States, no need for fuel convoys to constantly supply bases with fuel, and no enemy combatants. However, while bases and energy supplies are not directly vulnerable, the civilian electrical grid on which they depend for 99% of their energy use is -- and that makes domestic installations highly insecure. The U.S. grid, though a technological marvel, is extremely old, brittle, and susceptible to a wide variety of problems that can result in power outages -- the 2003 blackout throughout the Northeast United States is a prime example of this. In the past, these issues were largely limited to accidents including natural disasters or malfunctions, however today, intentional threats such as cyber attacks represent a very real and growing threat to the grid.

Advances in U.S. military technology have further increased the risk that a grid blackout poses to the nation's military assets. As pointed out by the Defense Science Board, critical missions including national strategic awareness and national command authorities depend on the national transmission grid. Additionally, capabilities vital to troops in the field -- including drones and satellite intelligence/reconnaissance -- are lodged at bases within the United States and their loss due to a blackout would impair the ability of troops to operate in forward operating areas.

Recognition of these facts led the Defense Science Board to recommend "islanding" U.S. military installations to mitigate the electrical grid's vulnerabilities. Although DOD has undertaken a wide array of energy efficiency programs and sought to construct renewable energy facilities on bases, these endeavors will fall far short of the desired goals and still leave bases unable to function in the event of long-term outages.

As the NDU report argues though, small nuclear reactors have the potential to alleviate domestic base grid vulnerabilities. With a capacity of anywhere between 25 and 300 megawatts, small reactors possess sufficient generation capabilities to power any military installation, and most likely some critical services in the areas surrounding bases, should a blackout occur. Moreover, making bases resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to disrupt the grid in the event of a conflict as military capabilities would be unaffected. Military bases are also secure locations, reducing the associated fears that would surely arise from the distribution of reactors across the country. Furthermore, small nuclear reactors, by design, are significantly safer than prior generations of reactors due to passive safety features, simplified designs, sealed reactor cores, and lower operational requirements.

On the foreign side, Andres and Breetz contend that mobile small reactors also have potential applicability in forward operating locations. Although this is a far riskier proposition than domestic reactor siting, the logistical burden of transporting energy via convoy to forward operating locations to meet base generation needs is both burdensome and extremely expensive. More importantly, the constant fuel convoys are sitting targets for attack and the drivers and troops who die every month in such convoys are constant reminders on the military's complete dependence on consistent fuel deliveries through hostile territory.

As with the incorporation of reactors on domestic installations, this proposal is not without risk -- in this case the possibility that a reactor could conceivably fall into enemy hands. When considering costs versus benefits, however, how does this play out? What is the likelihood that a U.S. forward operating base is overrun and captured? Additionally, the risk of loss or capture in the battlefield does not deter the use of other military technologies -- such as weapons systems, intelligence equipment, and operational vehicles -- so judgment by that cost alone is difficult. On the other hand, the ability of the reactors to reduce the need for fuel convoys and thus save lives is an assured benefit.

At the end of the day, small nuclear reactors offer a host of potential benefits in both areas where Andres and Breetz consider their use. On the domestic military installation side, they offer the ability to island domestic bases from the fragile civilian grid, ensure the availability of the nation's military assets in the event of a cyber attack or blackout, and provide a clean and assured supply of power to bases. On the foreign side, the use of small reactors in forward operating areas can reduce the use of liquid fuel to power base generators, lessening the need for constant convoys and ultimately saving lives in the field. Even when taking into consideration the potential hurdles to small reactor adoption on these fronts, the benefits are tangible and real enough to make serious discussion and pursuit worthwhile.

Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Comments

Douglas M. Scherer (not verified)

Tue, 03/29/2011 - 1:45pm

...Dr. Richard Andres of the National War College and Hanna Breetz from Harvard University...
Likud supporting NeoCons?
I never graduated from college. I don't care what letters you sport behind your names, you two are friggin' idiots or worse prostitutes for interests groups that have no concern for the national security needs of the American people.
You are wrong on many different levels. Local civilian power generation facilities would not be vulnerable to attack if the US military was fulfilling it's legitimate role and function by defending our borders.
Nuclear power generation facilities could be viewed as pre-positioned poison for future attacks against this nation. Some want to take us over for our agricultural capability, others would just as well leave us an irradiated nuclear wasteland with a 250,000 year half-life.
The recent and ongoing nuclear catastrophy in Japan just hasn't registered with the nuke industry and it's proponents yet. The rest of us have certainly taken notice.
And finally, what rational can you take for our military bases cutting themselves off from the rest of our society and hunkering down in some 'last ditch' Alamo defense. I suspect you recognize the American people are slowly but surely coming to the realization that our military is being used as a tool of the internationalist global bankster elites and they would indeed like to have the potential to cut all our military bases off from the people who may in our present trajectory contemplate future insurrection and revolution against a government that has turned rogue.
Read the Constitution. All we former military officers and enlisted personnel took our oath seriously.
We are not buying what you are schlepping.

DragonsBane

Mon, 03/28/2011 - 9:59pm

Small nuclear reactors on military bases would certainly provide a useful energy source. However, such a facility, if important to the functions of a base, especially if the base is then no longer connected to outside power sources, makes the reactor itself a prime target. If the reactor is heavy and stationary then missiles could zero in. If made mobile, such as submarine reactors, on wheels it could be hijacked and moved to a population center. Especially as only perimeter and not base personnel are allowed firearms. Damage to such reactors does not need to destroy them, they are non-functional if their cooling plumbing is hit. The main benefit to terrorists in targeting and damaging such reactors is the 'dirty bomb' effect. Radioactive contamination of the military site would easily make that site non-functional and tie-up vast resources, not only just the on-site military personnel in dealing with the damage and with the containment of spreading radioactive particles.

anonymouser (not verified)

Mon, 03/28/2011 - 1:19pm

Sure, why not? Put them in every FOB. You'll have that many more places that you cannot afford to abandon.

That's the very definition of operational weakness.

Let's not even go into the logistics, shall we?

slapout9 (not verified)

Sun, 03/27/2011 - 3:43pm

Excellent article! Finally somebody is thinking about ways to achieve real homeland security by making our utility system robust and survivable.