COIN Is a Proven Failure
COIN Is a Proven Failure by LTC Daniel L. Davis, The American Conservative
In late October MSNBC’s Ronan Farrow asked retired Army Lt. Col. John Nagl to give viewers a deeper understanding of the fight between the Islamic State (ISIS) and Kurdish fighters around Kobane. Widely credited with “writing the book” on successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, Mr. Nagl said, “we’ve got 1,500 guys on the ground, but they’re not as far forward as they need to be to make a real, immediate impact on the battlefield.” He and a number of COIN experts argue that along with 15,000 U.S. ground troops, Iraqi, Kurdish, and Syrian rebel soldiers can defeat ISIS. Before making any decisions, American leaders should first consider this: despite what is often claimed by a host of advocates, the COIN theories upon which these recommendations are based were in fact demonstrable failures in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We must not sacrifice any more American lives and harm American interests any further by acting on theories that are likely to fail again…
Counterinsurgency — as we understand it today — was/is based on the post-Cold war belief that populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes, would — quickly, easily and mostly own their own — throw off their old ways of life and old ways of governance and, in the place of these, readily adopt modern western political, economic and social ways.
This suggesting that the military aspects of our regime change/ counterinsurgency operations would be short, sweet and cheap as, after regime change, (1) the populations would be “with us” and, thus, (2) our military would only be needed to deal with a few “losers”/”dead-enders.”
It was based on this (false) premise, I suggest, that we unleashed the dogs of war.
Problem: We read these populations wrong. Liberated from their oppressive regimes, these folks did not wish to order, organize and orient their lives more along modern western political, economic and social lines. Rather, they wished to order, organize and orient their lives in numerous other, different and/or contrary ways.
In such an environment (the population is against you and your initiative), then:
a. Regime change tends only to open Pandora’s Box. And
b. COIN (which is based on a more-limited use of military forces and capabilities?) cannot save you or your initiative.
Thus, finding oneself in such an unenviable position requires that one either:
a. Ramp up one’s efforts considerably, employ the “hard hand” to this effect and stay for 50 our more years to achieve your objective. Or
b. Find a way to “get of of Dodge.”
Bottom Line: Neither COIN — nor Mr. Nagl’s more-forward deployment of 1,500 additional military personnel in Iraq — can adequately solve the problem at hand, to wit: that the population is against us and our “be like us” initiative. These people having other ideas as to how they wish to organize, order and orient their lives.
Just as we at least are finally learning to admit that COIN was just one big failure and that a large number of defense contracting companies and some leading military officers and one former advisor made a ton of money on the concept–it failed because one never fully understood both the insurgency we were facing and we never admitted we did not fully understand just how we were to counter it.
COIN was provided to the public as the military’s answer to explain the large number of losses and the spending of over several tillion in tax payer monies and face it –it sounded at least “scientific” and as we “understood” the problem and we “knew” what we were doing”.
NOW we seem to be reinventing the same wheel again with the new BUZZ word “hybrid warfare”. Everyone is jumping on the band wagon again.
One hears it over and over and over and we hear at the same time –hey we have answers for it and they are great answers.
AND again we are committing the same basic failure as we did with COIN–we simply do not fully understand the new Russian UW strategic/tactical UW concept and we “fully” do not want to even come close to understanding “political warfare in the 21st century”.
Why because we are in a “developing neo isolationism” phase and to fully understand we must then turn to a degree back to “hard power” which the current leadership is extremely reluctant to do.
This problem extends well to the new Chinese military doctrine and it really extends to IS.
We talk a great game but where are the clearly defined strategies, where are the key decisions necessary to go to “hard power” if need be?
If we would have paid more attention to the daily events in the Ukraine we would be discussing here at SWJ exactly what are the “weaknesses” being currently seen in the Ukraine that point to potential single points of failure in the Russian UW strategy and there are currently three that would allow the US/EU/NATO to craft counter measures for—the same goes as well for the IS.
Instead we seem to love debates, buzz words, and unending discussions all of which do not provide either strategies and or solutions.
One single point of failure that Russian has vastly under estimated when they started their UW campaign against the Ukraine.
As of Dec 2 #Russian army losses in war w #Ukraine is 4672 KIA, 970 WIA, 2560 MIA.
http://oyblogg.blogspot.se/2014/11/22.html
pic.twitter.com/PYgC4Otl8C
Since the early Sept 2014 Russia has lost more troops than we the US did in all of the time spent in Iraq—sound like a super win for their UW strategy—and nearly half of those lost in the AFG eight year war–again a win or loss–sounds to me as if their UW strategy has a weak point.
But again no discussion on just why the high loses.
Yesterday they lost another approximate 30 SF killed attempting to take an airport that has been under attack for over 180 days—sound like a military strategy win?
So while everyone runs around bemoaning that hybrid warfare is the next greatest thing since sliced bread we need to stop and to fully understand just what we are in fact “seeing” and be able to call a spade a spade.
Which by the way we have never been good at–especially at the mid and senior military leadership levels and at the White House.
It sounds strange but just maybe the Ukrainian Army is showing us the way forward with countering hybrid warfare–we just need to fully understand just what we are seeing.
It pains me that we’re still having this discussion, so many years later, and about a topic for which the answer is so painfully obvious. The statement that “COIN is a proven failure” is juvenile to the point of barbarism.
Are there examples of successful COIN at the tactical level? Yes, there are plenty, many of which can be attributed to American units since 9/11. Are there examples of successful tactical level COIN successes translating into successful COIN at the operational level? Yes, but they’re fewer, although many can still be attributed to American units since 9/11. Are there examples of successful operational level COIN successes translating into successful COIN at the strategic level? Yes, but they’re still fewer, and one would be hard pressed to point to an American COIN operation that resulted in a strategic victory.
However, that’s not an indictment against COIN itself; rather, it’s an indictment against how America, but more specifically the U.S. Army, has traditionally approached the COIN problem set. The units with the best COIN records, both before and since 9/11, have been the Marine Corps and SOF units, specifically Army Special Forces (when the latter haven’t been overwhelmed with direct action assignments). The tactical and operational successes ultimately fail to be consolidated into strategic victories because doing so lies outside the U.S. Army’s combined arms maneuver comfort zone. Big Army has repeatedly resisted COIN, even from 2004 to 2006 when it was clear that the approach they were using in Iraq (and later Afghanistan, though there were other factors involved there) wasn’t working. Big Army failed to implement proven COIN doctrine, and focused its scholarship on lessons from failed COIN campaigns in Algeria and Vietnam, virtually ignoring successful COIN campaigns in other theaters like Malaya, Dhofar, and Central and South America. As we discussed a couple of weeks ago, Big Army is in the process of institutionalizing that resistance with the ultimate goal of preventing policy-makers from putting the Army in a position to fight another large scale COIN operation in the future. Even when an Army officer isn’t commanding a particular campaign, the Army still exerts disproportionate influence relative to the other services because it provides the preponderance of forces, meaning that the campaigns in which it’s involved suffer from the Army’s institutional and doctrinal preference for combined arms maneuver. The DoD’s COIN doctrine is essentially sound, but the Army essentially ignores it, tries to throw more combined arms maneuver and technology at the problem, and undermines those tactical and operational successes.
We can talk about mismanagement by Generals Sanchez, Casey, McChrystal, or others; or the fateful decisions in the White House to entrust Afghanistan to NATO in 2003, or to follow through with a precipitous troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. We can talk about the scope and duration of commitment involved with COIN operations (some successful examples of which I’ve listed), or with regime changes and the establishment of Western-style democracy (Germany, Japan, Korea, and India are notable examples). We can discuss elected officials and, unfortunately, flag/general officers’ atrophying understanding of grand strategy; or the federal government’s seemingly chronic incompetence at getting commensurate returns on its military and development investments; or the American public’s attention deficit and unrealistic/non-contextual expectations with respect to foreign affairs. Bill C. touches on some of these challenges, but oversimplifies them. These are conversations worth having, but they do not prove that COIN is a failure. Claiming that they do is a distraction that prevents us from addressing those challenges to ensure that we sacrifice less blood and treasure the next time around. To quote a much greater expert on such matters than any of us:
We will find ourselves dragged into COIN operations again, likely in my lifetime. The Army may resist it kicking and screaming, and by the time it comes it may have mothballed its entire library of COIN lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. As for me, I will continue stockpiling those lessons and acknowledging COIN’s necessary status in the domain of strategic effect, in the hope that doing so may save blood and treasure on the next go-’round.
COIN as practiced by the United States the past decade will always fail to acheive a sustainable, strategic effect. Simple deductive logic concludes that to be a counter-insurgent, one must be sovereign to begin with or else what insurgents are you actually countering. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States quickly formed governments (culturally misaligned and out of step with the populace they were formed to govern) and gave sovereignty to these governments. The insurgency was always focused on the governments we formed — not us. So, what counter-insurgency are we fighting exactly? As a number of British officers have told me, “you Americans are terrible colonialists.” There are some instances of successful American support to Counter-Insurgency. 1950s Phillippine struggle against communist “Huk” insurgents comes to mind. In that case, the Phillippine Defense Secretary was willing to take the fight to the insurgents and the nation itself acknowledged and tried to deal with the symptoms that gave rise to insurgency in the first place. British governed Malay also comes to mind as a successful COIN effort — but the Brits were sovereign in that case. Post 9/11 US COIN? I call it “watch the shiny coin of pretending to win hearts and minds,” as we attempt to kill and capture our way to victory on behalf of a unwilling, corrupt partner that does not, will not, and cannot enjoy the support of its population as constructed (and more cynically, watch General Officers being created as our nation puts one general after another into the theater of operations in the most recent “penultimate year of the campaign.”). At least in Afghanistan, perhaps there might be some hope with a new President that can (if he is willing) restructure government to be responsive to his people and make decisions without having to consult a 100,000 + US Army precense on his back (please don’t argue NATO was in charge, American policy makers and officers were calling the shots that mattered). The United States sowed the wind in Iraq and then did the same thing in Afghanistan. As a result — we reaped a whirlwind of wasted tax expenditures, many wounded and dead soldiers of our own, broken military families, and thousands and thousands of dead Iraqi and Afghan security forces and civilians. And to what effect — to what end? If am being juvenille — then I am proud of being juvenille. As a nation, we will probably always be bad colonialists because our populace will not accept American colonialism in an outright manner; therefore, COIN as a way of American war will always fail. Support to COIN will work when the partner is interested in COIN for themselves — and I am pretty sure doctrine for that has been around for more than 50 years (see Foreign Internal Defense).
I agree with Bill C. COIN has been successful when the government of the country in conflict is seen by the population as being better than the alternative offered by the insurgent.
Neither Iraq or Afghanistan has an effective and representative government. Iraq has been ruled by strongmen. And Malaki’s errors has further alienated the Sunni’s and destroyed the effectiveness of the army. The question is how important is the area to US interests? How much money and lives do we want to spend? There is no doubt that we have the power to stabilize the situation but what end can we achieve.
Afghanistan is much the same. In my tour of duty corruption was deeply entrenched and most of the population in my AO lived in near starvation.
If the government cannot not improve the lot of the people, propping up the Afghan armed forces will not be a success.
It is not a simple task to change how a people are governed.
Government by a strongman does not prepare people for self government.
Bill C: I think I see where you’re going with your argument, but I think it ultimately falls short of the mark. In essence, you’re arguing that the American government has sort of improvised its own definitions of “strategy” and “strategic victory”, and that while they’re attuned to that definition, they’ve misunderstood the problem set, set unrealistic goals, and done a poor job of achieving goals that were ultimately unachievable. There are several problems with your understanding.
The first problem is that strategy is an established social science, with a history of vigorous peer review and a corpus of literature which forms various appendices around the discipline’s fundamental document, Vom Kriege/On War by Carl von Clausewitz. “Strategy” and “strategic victory” are not simply things for which one can improvise new definitions. I know all of this because I hold an MSc (with distinction – the Scottish equivalent of summa cum laude) in Strategic Studies from a respected British university. I chose to attend that institution in large part because I’ve been unsatisfied with what I’ve seen coming out of comparable programs in America. As far as I’m concerned, the worst case is the Army War College, and I can give examples if you’d like more detail. At best, America teaches field grade and general officers campaigning, which is not strategy; the idea that American military education is “all Jomini and no Clausewitz” has been a point of contention for years. It’s one thing for elected officials to be strategically illiterate, as they come from a variety of different professional backgrounds. It’s quite another for American military officers to be illiterate, given that they are charged not only with the implementation of those civilian leaders’ strategic vision, but with advising (and, dare I say, leading) those civilian leaders in the formulation of that strategic vision.
With respect to your proposed American definition of “strategic victory”, it’s not completely off, but I think you’re confining yourself to only one aspect of the bigger picture. To offer one example, Saudi Arabia plays a huge role in Washington’s strategic calculations, but I think any argument that the American government is trying to “Westernize” Saudi Arabia are flimsy at best.
So, with those qualifications in mind, I think that your defense of elected officials and flag/general officers as being highly attuned to their definition of “strategic victory” falls flat. At best, I think you could claim that flag/general officers have a general concept of what constitutes a successful campaign (operational level), and a handful of civilian leaders have a vague concept of what a strategic victory would look like. The evidence I’ve seen suggests that those flag/general officers rarely understand strategic (e.g. political) ends and how to consolidate operational accomplishments to achieve those ends; meanwhile, those civilian officials, at least recently, have a poor track record of marrying means (funding) and ways (methods) to ends.
You make a valid point about national leaders’ unfamiliarity with foreign populations, but I think you give it too much credence. History is ripe with case studies in which one nation imposed its will upon another (in the Clausewitzian sense) using tactics, techniques, procedures, and operational concepts we would identify with counterinsurgency, rather than combined arms maneuver or other “regular” warfare methods. Intimate familiarity with the local populace on the part of the aggressor (for lack of a better term) has generally been a requirement for success, but equivalent familiarity on the part of civilian officials in the aggressor’s capital has not. With respect to this statement…
… You’re oversimplifying the issue by fixating far too closely on Afghanistan and Iraq, which we’ve already established to have been inadequate implementations of established COIN theory for reasons I’ve already covered. At the risk of sounding like twenty-first century Marxists, it’s nonsensical to claim that COIN is a failure by citing two cases in which COIN wasn’t seriously implemented. In fact, the list of cases in which an outside aggressor successfully “force-fed their way of life, etc., to them, via COIN” is long, though most people won’t dare whisper most of the cases because they’re associated with colonialism.
I agree with your assertion that a credible host nation counterpart is a requirement for success in modern counterinsurgency, and my colleague and I offered that as one of our requirements last July when SWJ published our article on the topic. I think that America had some opportunities on that note in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and nurtured them poorly. Again, the gold standard is the British government’s training and mentoring of Sultan Qaboos and other Gulf monarchs. In fact, the Dhofar model, about which I’ve written previously, might appeal to you and challenge many of your assumptions: it involved a hostile populace; a gradual transition from primitive conditions to more modern economic, political, and social conditions; and a variety of other lessons which have been almost completely overlooked due to its coincidence with the Vietnam War. The bottom line, though, is that the credible host nation counterpart must be credible, which should not be confused with popular from the outset.
I can accept some of your points, but I don’t agree that they add up to the sum that you’re so fond of espousing. The ultimate result is that your observation about American forces staying longer in places like Iraq falls flat. Had that force of 23,000 that the military advisors (and SecDef-to-be Ashton Carter, for that matter) recommended in 2011 been allowed to stay in Iraq, I think the situation in Iraq and the region more generally would look dramatically different than it does today. To have done so would have been consistent with accepted COIN theory; instead, we’re seeing COIN theory excoriated by strategically illiterate (and in many cases, safely retired) flag/general officers who didn’t implement COIN theory or understand grand strategy in the first place. You’ll excuse me if I continue to roll my eyes at such myopic hindsight.
I think we are more accurate when we say that our COIN doctrine is horribly flawed, and that our operations conducted in the context of that doctrine have proven the failure of that doctrine.
There are many layers to why our COIN doctrine is a failure, and it can not all be lain at the feet of those who rose to fame promoting the highly celebrated doctrine driving us to where we are now (Gen Petreaus, Dr. Nagl, Dr. Kilcullen, etc) – but they still believe in and promote those concepts, so that should be noted as well.
The problem begins with our understanding of insurgency itself. One cannot counter insurgency until one first understands what insurgency is in general, what the variations of insurgency are based on critical, rather superficial critiera, and what type or blend of insurgency one is actually dealing with in any particular time and place.
The problem gets deeper when we take the perspective that the COIN mission one conducts domestically is the same as the COIN mission one conducts in the support of someone else. This may seem a fine point, but it is fundamental to why host nations struggle to develop legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and why they collapse so rapidly once we withdraw our support. Imagine if instead we were talking about how to discipline one’s children, and we believed ourselves as parents to be experts in how we discipline our children. Then the neighbor has a problem with their children they cannot solve (in our opinion compared to what we think “right” looks like, and clearly lacks the capacity to discipline them correctly (again, in our opinion and based on our perspective). So we go next doors and begin to discipline their children for them. We have them step aside and soon we are leading the activities as we train them on the side to do as we do. To make matters worse, we justify that it is ok to employ much more drastic and violent approaches to disciplining the neighbor’s kids than we do our own; and if the neighbor complains about our approaches we chastise them in front of their children and the rest of the neighbors as being a bad neighbor and lacking capacity to run their own family on their own.
Sounds ridiculous, but that is how we do “COIN.” That is why I insist that COIN is domestic operation, and that when one supports someone else’s COIN it must be called something else and also requires a doctrine that clearly lays out how one operates to ensure that distinction.
There are more layers, and each layer takes us farther away from being successful in helping others with their insurgencies. Insisting that insurgency is “war” when most are merely illegal politics; Insisting a government remain “uncoerced” when invariably evolution of governance is required to resolve the base disputes; etc.
We need to scrub the whole pile, and that begins with first getting real about what insurgency is and why it happens.
Bob
thedrosophil:
I have done some early reading, as you suggested, re: the Dhofar Insurgency.
The most important difference that I have noted so far, re: the Dhofar Insurgency then and our current insurgencies today, is that:
a. With the Dhofar Insurgency, it was the communists insurgents who sought to transform the state and societies (of Dhofar) more along alien and essentially profane lines (to wit: more along communist political, economic and social lines). This unpopular move allowing the British to win over much of the population — and, indeed, win over many of the insurgents — by appealing to their conservative and religious heart-strings.
b. Whereas today, and with our current insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, it is we westerners who have sought to unnaturally transform the way of life and way of governance of these Muslim populations; in these cases, more along the equally alien and profane lines of modern western civilization. This providing that it is the insurgents, today, who have been able to (1) appeal to the conservative/religious heart-strings of the people and (2) win over much of the population to their side.
Given this fundamental difference re: the Dhofar Insurgency (the West is seen as the good guy/a friend/the defender of conservative causes) and our current insurgencies (the West is seen as the bad guy/the enemy/the destroyer of traditional ways of life), then is the Dhofar Insurgency really a very good model for us to look to; re: how we might solve our insurgency problems today?
thedrosophil, in his 8:26am reply-to-comment below, said:
” … here was a fantastic opportunity in immediate post-Taliban Afghanistan to bring the average Afghan into the eighteenth or nineteenth century, and to gradually advance them toward international norms over twenty or thirty years with an initial military commitment to ensure security, followed by a dwindling military commitment and a slowly increasing development agenda. A similar approach could have been taken in Iraq, which was already ready a twentieth century culture in 2003. Again, the Omani Renaissance – its initial approach, combined with the long game of preparing the populace for a more representative form of government – should be seen as the gold standard. For a variety of reasons, many of which boiled down to either international or American national reticence, these approaches were compromised, and combined with some fairly basic tactical and operational mistakes along the way which ultimately undermined the opportunity for a strategic victory.”
I believe I see where thedrosophil is going here. And I think he is right.
First: I appreciate that thedrosophil understands what the mission actually is. To wit: to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines and to, thereby, incorporate these outlying states and societies more into the global economy and international community. (These folks, in this way, to become less of a problem for/burden on — and more of an asset to — the global economy/international community — or so the thinking goes.)
Second: thedrosophil seems to suggest that this can be achieved by, shall we say, a more-“classic” COIN approach; one which distinguishes itself from our current “end-of-history/universal values” COIN approach in that it, specifically, does not try to do (a) too much (b) too soon.
Example: In classic COIN, one might be happy to only replace a non-cooperating dictator with a cooperating dictator. Understanding here that going straight to democracy may be more than these particular people can reasonably understand and/or deal with. And, thus, be more likely to produce counterproductive rather than productive results. This same argument (don’t try to do too much too soon) to often apply to the application of our equally alien and profane “modern” economic and social ideas and norms.
Thus, “classic” COIN to be seen as simply:
a. Getting rid of a “normal” ruler (say a king or a dictator) — that we are having trouble working with — re: our goal to transform his state and society more along modern western lines and
b. Installing a similar ruler (ex: a king or a dictator) in his place; but one that is more likely to do our bidding.
c. Everything else (the move to install western political, economic and social ideas and norms) to be undertaken — depending specifically on just how “primitive” the population is — in a subsequent, and in a more gradual, manner.
To sum up:
What is to be rejected (because it has indeed failed ) is not COIN, per se, but COIN of the post-Cold War variety; which, due to its “end of history/universal values” thinking, falsely suggests that:
1. The population is (always) waiting — with baited breath — to obtain our way of life, our way of governance, and our values, attitudes and beliefs. And that, accordingly,
2. COIN, to be effective, must introduce these matters (democracy, capitalism, western social norms) immediately after our boots hit the ground.
These are the post-Cold War COIN ideas that are false and that have, accordingly, failed.
And, regarding this argument (not to throw the classic COIN “bath” out, with the post-Cold War COIN bathwater), thedrosophil makes an excellent point/hits the nail directly on its head.
We had a COIN success in Iraq?
The author wrote this in 2007 and it is one of the main reasons COIN failed. Robert would say it is all about the rule of law and good governance.
We have failed to properly address the abuse of Iraqi detainees. Men like me have refused to tell our stories, and our leaders have refused to own up to the myriad mistakes that have been made. But if we fail to address this problem, there can be no hope of success in Iraq. Regardless of how many young Americans we send to war, or how many militia members we kill, or how many Iraqis we train, or how much money we spend on reconstruction, we will not escape the damage we have done to the people of Iraq in our prisons.
I am desperate to get on with my life and erase my memories of my experiences in Iraq. But those memories and experiences do not belong to me. They belong to history. If we’re doomed to repeat the history we forget, what will be the consequences of the history we never knew? The citizens and the leadership of this country have an obligation to revisit what took place in the interrogation booths of Iraq, unpleasant as it may be. The story of Abu Ghraib isn’t over. In many ways, we have yet to open the book.
The same author wrote an editorial in the NYTs for today on the same 2007 subject.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/opinion/the-torture-report-reminds-us-of-what-america-was.html?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-must-open-the-book-on-the-use-of-torture-to-move-forward/2014/04/11/67925756-c18e-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html
Both are well worth the read and raises the question as to why the investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal was never fully completed.
I am going to, using thedrosophil’s and my discussions below, take a stab at suggesting what we may actually mean when we say that COIN is a proven failure today.
What we mean is that:
a. Our efforts to transform Afghanistan and Iraq recently,
b. More along modern western political, economic and social lines,
c. This, via invasion and regime change,
d. And via the immediate forced introduction of our unique way of life, our unique way of governance and our correspondingly unique values, attitudes and beliefs,
e. Herein using:
1. Inappropriate methods (derived from the Cold War; when we were the defenders of conservative values and ways of life and not the destroyers of same as we are today). And/or
2. Flawed techniques (not even consistent with our own SOPs and other understood “best practices”).
These such efforts (“a” – “e” above) have, indeed, failed (in Iraq and Afghanistan).
Given any or all of these qualifiers (our recent activities in Afghanistan and Iraq only; the requirement to transform states and societies, immediately after invasion, specifically more along modern western political, economic and social lines; the use of methods derived from a non-similar time (to wit: the Cold War — when we were the defenders of the status quo — not the destroyer of same as we are today); and the failure to follow even our own SOPs and otherwise acknowledged “best practices”).
Then can we actually say that COIN generally — and/or COIN specifically as I have described it above — was/were given a fair shake?
It is interesting how despite the desire to achieve the same outcome our collective experiences grappling with Jihadi Joe appears to shape wildly different opinion. From my own viewpoint I am constantly perplexed by the widely held notion that Jihadi Joe (JJ) is motivated primarily by Islam in his inclination to take up the fight with us.
On a scale of 10 to 1 (10 being the primary reason and 1 being the minor) I would grade Islamic conviction somewhere between 5 and 1 – wherein 5 was a good pair of boots and 1 being a regular supply of porn magazines.
Of the hundreds of JJs I have questioned and/or observed at close quarters I would argue the top five motivators ( in no sense of order) to be money, getting laid by a women (in marriage), access to drugs, peer/tribal pressure and avoiding soul-destroying refugee boredom.
For reasons as varied as weather, terrain, enemy action, tooth-ache, illicit homosexuality, family crisis etc. the order of priority of the five may change on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. However in my experience these top five would constitute the average JJ’s motive tool-set to get him to the fight and keep him there.
In my experience all five sentiments were openly displayed/discussed at every opportunity amongst the JJ ‘band of brothers’. This openness is one of the reasons I find the Islamic or Jeffersonian motivational based argument so surprising.
I imagine thoughts on the difference of revolutionary or resistance insurgency would have floated around with Islam in the lower 5 but 99% of the JJ’s I entertained grew up in godforsaken refugee shit-holes wherein any semblance of legitimate governance was more abstract than a balanced form of Islamic education.
Most were Afghan or Pak-born Afghans (there is a big difference) but there was a considerable number of Palestinians, Sudanese, Somalis, Saudi, Egyptian and a sprinkling of French, British and Americans. Some of the JJs from Western countries initially came across as a representation of the more ‘conventional’ view of the JJ but upon a closer examination I found many to be suffering from a mental illness.
The exception being Pakistan Army soldiers who had ‘strayed’ across the frontier – they were merely following orders.
Along with Arabs from more affluent backgrounds I came to understand many of these FFs had been recruited whilst sleeping rough or residing within mental institutions back in their homelands. These folks were often primed with opiates and fed a constant stream of ill-founded Islamic dogma that, along with the midday sun , rendered some of the more mentally vulnerable criminally insane.
The recent Brit JJ executioner being a perfect example of the type of individual.
The reason I point out these observations is that an individual who maintains these 5 motivational characteristics represent an ideal recruit for a military command that wishes to execute a UW campaign.
However by the same token these are the very last sentiments a command would desire in the makeup of its foot-soldiers if it was hoping to inspire/execute/sustain a Islamic Revolution or Resistance.
In my long-winded way I arrive at the question of whether Real COIN, US COIN, SAS COIN, Indian COIN, FM 3.24 COIN whatever, is the solution/problem. I would flag CvC’s first and foremost question pertaining to the nature of the war on which you wish to embark. IMO if we engage an individual as an insurgent – when in fact he is a UW fighter – our best efforts do not stand a snowflakes chance in hell of prevailing.
If you attempt to apply COIN to counter the efforts of a proxy army made up of individuals that possess no interest in domestic politics, religion, governance, economics, society or peace you will arrive at a situation much as we have in the ISIL and eastern Afghanistan.
A good example that illustrates the UW mind-set occurred last month in Yahyakhil District in Paktika. The region enjoys considerable buyin from many armed groups from both sides of the GIRoA/Insurgent equation that you could argue resulted in a successful application of COIN. The UW mind-set recognized this as an existential threat and therefore killed 45 people and wounded 60 others who were watching a volley-ball match.
I mean I doubt very few people would advocate the application of Ukrainian COIN in eastern Ukraine. But many lives and much treasure has been wasted doing exactly that in AF because we failed to recognize the difference between an insurgent fighter and a UW fighter.
I agree with Outlaw on the importance of the actions of the vacationing Russians in eastern Ukraine but I would argue the ‘black flag wavers’ are just as important for reasons pointed out by Bill M.
I don’t believe there is anything new about the Russian UW. In fact I get the distinct feeling Putin has lifted a copy of the ISI UW Field Manual and appears to be enjoying as much UW success against the Ukrainians as the ISI has enjoyed against us.
RC
There is a lot of excellent discussion on why when and where COIN has not been successful. I do not see many ideas on what to do in its place. Can we garrison Iraq and Afghanistan and hunt down the insurgent for years on end?
The track record on teaching a people “good” government is poor. What is the long term solution.
Would we be better off if we withdrew and use our assets to monitor and then act only if our interests were threatened or attacked?
RantCorp writes further down in the thread (Dec. 17):
Or it is such a mix of factors that trying to understand what is more important in terms of violence is the first step. The blogger Pundita I am always quoting around here says that “thin the forest first,” meaning, how do you know until you kind of deal with the UW and see if the insurgency is still robust. And if it is, does it’s locality and local nature mean anything?
What is interesting to me is how the Taliban insurgency came to be the main way in which the region was viewed and not through the UW of many outside parties. I believe this consisted of a combination of bad thinking arising from the standard NATO narrative of violence in the region–and information operations by more than one party.
If you go back and start reading the articles from the very specific period in Sept, Oct., Nov, you find many interesting and fantastical things, sort of like the Saudi Ambassador on air soothingly saying, “but they hate all our values, not any one policy,” or something to that effect.
Iraq and WMD wasn’t the only smoke being blown around….
Rant Corp made many interesting comments below and I’m posting questions/comments to him about some of them here rather than below on his Dec 17th post.
Rant, you are forgetting that the Pakistan Taliban largely could be considered insurgent fighters whose motivation is to create an Islamic State in Pakistan. If they were under Pak government control, they would not be under attack by the Pak Army in some areas for the first time in a decade. If the Pakistan Taliban and TTP were under ISI or Pakistan government or Army control, it would not be conducting attacks in Karachi and TTP would not be outlawed. The Pakistan Taliban also would not be responding to Pak Army attacks on them by blowing up a school breeding future Pak Army officers.
Few would dispute that the Haqqani Network is a UW element under ISI influence that is allowed to attack into Afghanistan. However, the Pak Army has begun attacking them this year for the first time and of course news reports indicate that remotely piloted aircraft attacks have struck the Haqqanis for years inside Pakistan. That would seem to indicate that at least some elements of the Pak Army and/or government allow U.S. use of its airspace and see the need to put down the ISI-fed dog that bit the Pakistani hand via the TTP and recent over-the-top attacks on Pakistan.
Except that Pashtun insurgents have every reason to want greater control of traditionally Pashtun areas. Pashtun insurgents may conduct attacks because they simply want greater local control and governance and want to end the U.S. and foreign presence that is seen to support a largely non-Pashtun government. Pashtuns also appear to be more conservative as Muslims than other ethnicities and may not want the Western modern influences and schooling for girls that other ethnicities may accept. In northern areas with greater control by non-Pashtuns, you probably can make a greater argument for UW and HiG influence in some attacks and shadow governance perhaps under al Qaeda or ISI influence.
I’ve heard you argue in the past that Pakistan would not want a Pathan/Pashtun state within Afghanistan because it could create calls for an expansion of Pathan/Pashtun control across the Durand line into Federally administered territories and would expand calls for a self-run Baluchistan. But doesn’t Pakistan want Pathan/Pashtun control of most of if not all of Afghanistan to counter the Indian and Iranian influences that favor other ethnicities? That sounds like Pathan hegemony to me. Isn’t that why ISI helps the Afghan Taliban and Haqqanis?
Whoa, so you believe that Punjabi ISIS and Army commanders ordered a TTP attack on the Pakistan military school? Then why is the TTP saying that the attack is in response to new Pakistan Army attacks on the Pakistan Taliban? What proof do you have that the students were Pathans and not Punjabis and even relatives of Pakistan Army officers? If you are talking about the Volleyball game attack in Afghanistan that was probably more of a Haqqani operation which is pure conjecture on my part. I was also somewhat suspicious that some in Afghanistan orchestrated the attack on the Pakistan school as payback for the volleyball attack but then why would the TTP and Pak Taliban take credit?
Your insurgent vs. UW fighter argument forgets about the criminal element. When the Taliban were in control (almost all Pashtuns) the heroin trade dried up due to Taliban decree and punishment. So you are essentially arguing that the new dog will change its spots and now support continued poppy growing when the Taliban retakes areas of southern Afghanistan? Isn’t this disconnect between what Pakistan wants and what the Pashtuns want the whole reason for the TTP and Pakistan Taliban. They don’t want the same things as the Pakistan government or ISI.
I read with interest your earlier comments on ISIS and Taliban UW fighter motivations. But many of those are essentially things that motivate men and war in general which is why human history is replete with war. Unique religious motivations exist when so many ISIS fighters are foreign fighters leaving a (more) comfortable U.S. or European existence to go fight in a foreign land for very little pay. If women are the motivation it’s kind of hard to see how suicide attacks “get the chicks” who would seem to more accessible in the U.S. and Europe anyway. I don’t buy that 90% of Afghan violence is UW-driven and disagree that Pashtuns who make up the overwhelming majority of the Taliban are not motivated by gaining greater control of governing Pashtun areas.
The head of ISIS uses the “C’” word (Caliphate) quite a bit, and they seem to be killing a heck of lot of Sunnis and other non-Shiites who get in their way or won’t accept their same level of radicalism. That implies not just Sunni control but radical Sunni extremist control that would threaten the very existence of GCC governance and would probably expand into a nuclear arms race with Iran that would in turn make Israel very nervous. ISIS also seems to have robbed banks and is selling black market oil which would not be necessary if KSA and other state sponsors (to include Turkey) were fully financing ISIS. Rich radical guys are supporting them to be sure but KSA, GCC, and Turk government support would imply suicidal tendencies since ISIS would look at conquering them next just as the Pakistan Taliban proved to be beyond ISI control.
I commented on the original but will here also. The COIN doctrine of the present FM 3-24 has some really questionable negative language. It appears that with every positive statement, there is a caveat which negates the positive. I will cheery pick but you will get the idea. The authors of 3-24 created a failure to start if they wanted a warrior to execute it.(6-11) The American way bias may be unhelpful. (7-14) Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their soldiers and marines. (1-151) Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.(A-24) Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work. Movement on foot, sleeping in villages, and night patrolling all seem more dangerous than they are..(A-29) Do not try to crack the hardest nut first. Do not go straight for the main insurgent stronghold. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards (a contradiction). (A-31) An approach using combat patrols to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks is counterproductive. (A-24) The first rule of COIN operations is to establish the forces presence in the AO. (1-149) The ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. (1-113)The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. NOTE: The “Ultimate” is neither the “first rule” nor the “primary objective”. (7-6) Senior commanders inculcate tactical cunning in small unit leaders….employing skills of the profession in shrewd and crafty ways to out-think and out-adapt enemies. (A-48) Remember small is beautiful…Keep programs small. This makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable is they fail. (A-50) Only attack insurgents when they get in the way. (1-149) Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. (1-150) Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.(1-152) Sometimes, doing nothing is the best reaction. (1-156) Tactical Success guarantees nothing. (1-76) The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed in the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in STORY form. (1-67) Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density….depending on the situation. Remember, this is the graduate level of war. You can’t make this confused, incoherent, doctrine up. I haven’t taken things out of context, because there is no context.
@ RantCorp: that comment was amazing. And don’t bother trying to get understanding from some others in this thread. It won’t take. Some people don’t understand and can’t. I’m not sure why.
On that note, best to all, best for the holidays, and I’ve learned a lot. This time I think my vow to stay away from milblogs and FP sites will stick. It really is long past time to go away. The world is too beautiful to be depressed by stupidity.
Shame too, the stuff I’ve been reading lately is getting interesting but I can read and not share. It’s cool:
1. The continued pushing for missile defense from the 80s to today by American arms companies and the relationship to current Russian sanctions.
2. The Chicago and wider midwestern Eastern European voting diaspora and its relationships to current sanctions.
3. Karen Hughes of the Bush administration and her pride on batting back Taliban propaganda while the spokesman was sitting in ISLAMABAD during the initial 2001 invasion. It all seems absurd in hindsight.
4. Various Special Forces airpower books that look more critically at whether air power might have been more blunted than we think in the initial invasion.
5. British Pakistani and British establishment propaganda on Kashmir and South Asia.
6. Revisting American threats toward its allies during the run-up to Iraq 2003 (threats in order to get people in line with the invasion).
And so on.
It’s an interesting world. Digging deep, though, is perhaps not for everybody. The military needs to untie its intellectual from think tanks but it won’t happen. It’s been a disaster, though, those various relationships.
Be well.
@RantCorp
Enjoyed your comments and I’m in general agreement. I would like your thoughts on how we target the Afghanistan’s UW problem without putting more pressure on those sponsoring it? We attacked a state (removed the Taliban) to address a non-state actor problem (al-Qaeda). When attacking one state proved not to be sufficient, we attacked another one. Darn, if we could just build stable democratic states all our non-state actor problems would go away. Oddly the two states that actually sponsor terrorism, Iran and Pakistan, got a pass and they conducted UW against our foolish COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Somehow this made strategic sense to our leaders, and eventually I may reach the aha moment where it all makes sense.
You said the Taliban wasn’t the Costra Nostra, but they are linked to transnational criminal organizations that are just as dangerous. For those interested they can research more about Dawood and his D-Company online, to include using the FBI’s website. This gets to the point of convergence between various actors to include states, insurgents, terrorists, warlords, militias, etc. to use the ever expanding illicit economy, or more accurately the shadow economy to facilitate achieving their objectives whether it is simply power, money, or ideological.
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/13/bin-laden-joaquin-guzman-dawood-ibrahim-business-world-most-wanted_slide_4.html
As noted in other discussions, many of these groups don’t want to see the war/conflict end. It has created a shadow economic system that they thrive in. Who wants the burden of actually running a state and conforming to international norms that will limit profits and freedom of movement to respond to market demand for drugs, people, weapons, etc.? j
Everyday I’m more convinced that our large scale occupations and colonial COIN practices are going to lead us to ruin. They simply make our adversaries stronger and weaken us.
Should we say that a/the central problem with RantCorps’ discussion/argument of December 17th (well below in this thread) is that it focuses on — and distinguishes between — the characteristics and motivations of the insurgents and the foreign fighters. And does not, as it should, focus on the characteristics and motivations of the general population?
This, because population-centric COIN is said to be an exercise in (1) using the general population to (2) isolate and overcome both the insurgents and the foreign fighters alike? (Both foreign fighters, and insurgents — as the earlier version of FM 3-24 pointed out — being not unique but, indeed, common to insurgencies?)
Thus, in population-centric COIN, what motivates the insurgent is of much less concern, and what motivates the general population is of much greater concern?
Our problem being that, in our version of population-centric COIN, we often:
a. Fail to understand — or simply ignore — what the general population wants.
b. Substituting, therefore, what we want (outlying state and societal transformation — along the often alien and profane lines of our ultra-modern western civilization).
c. This wrong turn having the potential to:
1. Screw up the population-centric approach to COIN, shall we say, by the numbers. And
2. Give aid, comfort and supporters to the enemy?
Bill,
Heroin is a weapon system. Unfortunately we don’t recognize it as such for many reasons – all of which are unfathomable to me. Admittedly it’s not painted green and it hasn’t got much ‘hell-yeah’ mojo but nonetheless it is a weapon system to be reckoned with.
Break things down to the basic common denominator and it doesn’t take a genius to appreciate the heroin weapon system (HWS) is much more lethal than any tactical, operational or strategic weapon system we currently deploy in Afghanistan. I’m the last person to advocate the McNamara/Thornton linear calculus as a measure of military effectiveness but it is the God that drives all of our military hardware design so it is a relevant factor that justifies scrutiny in this instance.
In terms of deaths, approx 30K people have become casualties of war in AF since 2001. That’s everyone – coalition, enemy and civilians. 30K dead is a year’s worth of death by heroin in the West. Triple that for the rest of the world and it’s not hard to see who is the meanest SOB in the valley.
Add the costs of the tens of millions of functioning junkies and their impact upon family, friends, neighbors, healthcare and law enforcement and the comparative feebleness of our tactical, operational and strategic effort is pathetic.
Our failure to recognize the crucial role the HWS plays in the Pak’s UW campaign is symptomatic of our constant failure to believe what our eyes our telling us. Political leadership across all coalition partners cite a desire to reduce coalition casualties as the main reason for draw-down.In the face of this vote-winning sentiment the DEA inform’s us that this year’s heroin crop in AF will reach an all-time high.
Even the most dim-witted politician will figure out that record crop will lead to a rise in deaths and related costs in his or her own electorate no matter where he or she lives on the planet. This failure to recognize key elements impacting our strategic goals is not something new.
In Vietnam the oversight was Vietnamese nationalism. We attempted to reverse a War of Independence and we lost. The McNamara/Thornton crowd sold us the ‘business model’ that RMA Mickey Mouse bullshit would overcome this fundamental mistake and they got the morons Westmoreland et al to go with it. 3 million people died before we came to our senses and stopped. Go figure.
So what?
Essentially we have a UW campaign that inflicts death and destruction across the globe. AF is in fact one of the safer places westerners can be located if they you wish to avoid being a victim of this UW campaign. The most likely country in the world in which your chances of falling victim to heroin is Pakistan. Maniacs running around shooting school children with PKMs shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone. Go down to the ER of any hospital in America and ask about what junkies are capable of doing.
Add rogue nukes to the mix and you have Ultra UW.
What to do?
We should spray the poppy – convert A10s to crop dusters and I suggest thousands of good old boy pilots from across the globe will volunteer by the New Year to fly a A10 crop-duster.
However unlike previous proposals we should encourage the 2 million households who currently grow poppy to keep doing so. At some point prior to the head of the poppy reaching the maturity to produce resin we should spray herbicide from the air.
We should then offer the to purchase the dead plant at better than the Costa Nostra rate. This cost will be a fraction of the cost we will incur if the Costa Nostra refines it and sells it to us later. A dead immature plant is a dead loss to the Costa Nostra, the UW campaign, the Pak elite and a whole hat full of assholes across the globe.. On the other hand it is a valuable commodity to us for exactly the same reason it is a dead loss to them.
Obviously we couldn’t purchase the dead poppy with cash as that would facilitate the UW fighters’ ambition in the first instance. We could barter using rice, soya beans, tractors, plows, water pumps, irrigation pipes, bricks, roofing iron, schools, aid centers etc. – anything that the UW fighters will find difficult to convert into cash to acquire weapons & munitions.
If the farmers refuse to trade with us they can try and sell the dead plants to the Costa Nostra.
Eventually one would hope the farmers would return to what they grew 20 years ago but in the mean time they won’t be idle and their families won’t starve – many will no doubt prosper.
The religious aspect will get a boost as an immature poppy plant could be considered halal in that peculiar Afghan way of looking at such matters. The spiritual benefits of raising a halal crop as opposed to the production of opiate resin that the Koran dictates as punishable by death speaks for itself..
The difference will not escape even the most dogmatic Taliban religious ‘zealot’.
Many would suggest the Costa Nostra would move somewhere else – back to the Golden Triangle in northern Thailand for instance. That’s a real possibility but from a strategic point of view, as long as they don’t have nukes where they go, we win.
RC
Note: This comment has been cross-posted in the original article that is being reviewed here.
I was in Iraq in ’09 and ’10 studying the successful application of COIN principles in the BDE I was embedded in (as a researcher). At that time, Iraq (certainly the AO I was in – Saladin Province) – was largely pacified, due to the combined efforts of the US Army and the Iraqi provincial government and security forces, acting in cooperation, as per (correctly applied) COIN principles. What spelled failure was the withdrawal of US troops and support services, leaving the Iraqis on their own without the manpower, intel or supports necessary to maintain the gains that were so hard-won. Terrorism and chaos (ex: bombings where 200+ civilians were killed) were the predictable result. ISIS was also the result of the vacuum that we left. COIN (correctly applied) does work – – but it takes time, energy, money and staying power. When we executed the Marshall Plan post WWII, we didn’t turn tail and leave shortly after. As a matter of fact, our bases are still there. And yes, COIN does have to be combined with policies to try and help/pressure/influence the actual foreign government to act like a responsible player. Our abandonment of Iraq, combined with our (previous and ongoing) reluctance to put enough pressure on Iraq to govern responsibly, insured failure. Initially it was the Iraqi people who paid the price (where I was going to attend school openings, now people are being massacred). But with the rise of ISIS (predictably, in the vacuum that we left) it is us that are and will continue to pay the price as well.
If we understand that counterinsurgency is a long-term process.
And if we understand that — at some point — a nation may no longer wish, for various reasons, to be engaged in such a long-term process.
Thinking, for example, that:
a. The price that must be paid for such a long-term effort (in blood, money, political capital, homeland cohesion and support, etc.).
b. This price is now considered to be much too high given (1) what actually might be gained by such an effort and (2) our other/new priorities.
Given such circumstances as these, then should one see the abandonment of the COIN approach in certain areas of the world as a failure of COIN?
Our should one see such an abandonment of the COIN approach as simply:
1. A different decision,
2. Made by the current or a new executive.
3. Based on his/her (the current or new executives’) new cost/benefit/other priorities analysis; outlined in my “a” and “b” above?
If this latter approach is considered to be most valid, then the decision to abandon the COIN approach in certain areas of the world; this such decision must be seen — not as a failure of COIN (it was not given its long-term run) — but simply as a management action/decision — based on a new analysis and/or on new and shifting priorities — which caused the executive to determine that the country had more important things to do with its resources.
MF,
The evidence establishing the active participation in heroin production by the Pak Gov. can be obtained from USG departments. Relying upon the media is somewhat pointless, unnecessary and often misleading.
The Costa Nostra is a money making business. It has no other objectives. Obviously it cannot/does not operate in a bubble so various other players are needed. As it so happens many folks in the Pak security forces like getting rich as well, but they also like conducting UW for reasons they claim to be in the best interests of their country.
Of all the actors it is only the Costa Nostra who are shamelessly honest about their work and are perceived by everyone for what they are. The ISI, our media, our military, our spooks, defense industries, politicians, priests, mullahs rabbis etc. intertwine and overlay various degrees of deceit/ignorance to further their interests. Our security forces apparently fail to recognize this (unlike the Costa Nostra) and dance to all of the tunes and understandably misdiagnose the problem.
It shouldn’t surprise anyone we subsequently prescribed the wrong solutions.
You highlighted various well-known ‘facts’ that reflect this dilemma. Heroin played no part in the defeat of the Soviet Union (besides worsening the drug problems in the ranks of the Red Army). Early days there was an effort to use drug money as a way to explain Muj financing but nobody was stupid enough to believe that. During the Soviet time most if not all of the heroin was grown in Pak. The Taliban did not decrease the growing of poppy. Ask the DEA, they’ve satellite mapped this stuff for 30 plus years.
You mentioned 9/11 deniers?! If all of the 9/11 hijackers were Sicilian and all the planes hit the DEA HQ in Arlington I might suspect something but initially the fallout 9/11 was bad for business for the Costa Nostra. Obviously the global UW fruitcake got a kick out of it but so what? As you know the numbers of slain on 9/11 are tiny compared to the toil inflicted by heroin.
As a country we have to reconcile a simple equation. Are we willing to accept the control of nuclear weapons by the global heroin dealer? There is no need for speculation, rumor or innuendo. We know the Pak Gov. has nukes and the DEA and other USG dept. know they control the global supply of heroin. Leaving aside the moral argument we can limit our response to strategic defense.
Heroin is unraveling the fabric of Pakistani society and seriously impacting the whole region. Many would argue the Paks sowed the seeds of their own destruction and a plague upon their house. Fair enough, but the fruitcake are there and waiting to pick up the scraps – and they have other fish to fry far beyond the region.
To-date our efforts in the region have been a spectacular disaster. Our flawed prescription is failing because we are distracted by so much ‘noise’ and fail to understand we are facing a powerful mix of political paranoia and criminality. My argument is if we get rid of the heroin, we and they might have a chance of solving the political paranoia problem.
Spray & Pray,
RC