COIN Doctrine Under Fire
11.20.2013 at 11:33am
COIN Doctrine Under Fire by Richard Sisk, DoD Buzz.
The vaunted counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy promoted by retired Gen. David Petraeus that guided the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has come under renewed and caustic criticism from one of its reluctant practitioners, both as a general and diplomat.
“In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan,” said Karl Eikenberry, the retired Army lieutenant general and former chief of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan who was later U.S. Ambassador to Kabul.
Eikenberry dissected and dismissed the COIN doctrine as applied in Afghanistan in a recent article for Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” …
Retired Gen P. should take notice—even TRADOC is burying COIN—so are his comments about the surge just “intellectual exercises with little value”. Sounds like TRADOC is burying COIN so deep it will never return.
Begs the question as to whether all the military organizations that deal with IW/COIN will now finally disappear as well.
“The deputy commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command indicated last week that the debates on COIN and how it was used were intellectual exercises with little value as the military prepares for future challenges.”
What appears to be the current thinking:
a. COIN costs a lot of money.
b. We don’t have a lot of money right now.
c. Therefore we cannot do COIN right now.
d. But since we believe that we will, in the not too distant future, be back in the money again, we should only mothball COIN.
e. That way, when we get back in the money, we can again look to COIN to help us achieve our goals and objectives.
f. These goals and objectives are:
” … to compel other peoples, races or religions to conform to Western views and governing structures” … “to transform their cultures into something palatable to Western tastes.”
( See paragraphs 4 and 5 of this article by authors Fitzgerald, Deptula and Gentile: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cheaper-stronger-army-8895 )
g. In mothballing COIN, we have not abandoned our enduring goals and objectives stated immediately above, but only determined to pursue these goals and objectives — in the present period of austerity — via other ways and other means.
h. Bottom Line:
1. We realize that we still may need to use military power to compel other peoples, other races or other religions to conform to Western views and Western governing structures.
2. Likewise, we realize that we may again have to carry out lengthy military occupations of foreign lands to transform their cultures into something more palatable to Western needs.
3. Thus, we must plan and prepare (and retain present-day COIN knowledge, skills and abilities accordingly) with this reality in mind.
Bill C—regardless of the lack of money —- I really doubt there will ever be future large scale budgets equal to the past ten years.
This particular section of the key sentence tells it all—it indicates to me—the future is being envisioned in a different and not in a COIN way.
“debates on COIN and how it was used were intellectual exercises with little value as the military prepares for future challenges.”
Nagel is attempting to resurrect his image by beating the COIN drum again. If you buy the author’s claim in this book review, the self appointed COIN guru is more interested in personal gain than saving the military from itself. The entire evolution of the old COIN doctrine being rewritten and claimed to be new is shameful, but more than that it demonstrates how self-interested individuals seeking influence in political circles create a narrative regardless of the facts that refute it.
It is a short and pointed review, well worth your time and consideration.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/revenge-of-the-coin-doctrine/
“Thus, the knife depicted on the cover of the book, which was released this month, is no table utensil, but a hunting knife. That might be fitting, considering the many ducks, blinds, and decoys he presents throughout. But like everything else Nagl has promoted over the years, it’s all just a bit difficult to swallow.
Simply put, Nagl, once called the “Johnny Appleseed of COIN,” uses his memoir to a) paper over the huge failures of counterinsurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan by saying the best we can hope for now are “unsatisfying but not catastrophic outcomes”; b) to distance himself—and COIN—from defeat by blaming everything but the strategy for why it didn’t work as promised in the field; and c) burnish his own resume—which takes up much of the book—for a possible return to a Democratic administration in 2016.”
Bill,
I too read the cited American Conservative article, which was not unexpected in its content and tone.
As you are aware from the recent BBC documentary on Afghanistan much is better being in the UK of words similar to “COIN, no we are not doing that again – this has been too costly etc”. I have a recollection that after the fall of South Vietnam (post-COIN admittedly) the USA appeared to think in the same terms.
COIN is not dead, it maybe in decline, but it is hard to imagine circumstances where SMALL COIN does not appear. Going back in history for examples Dhofar (Oman), El Salvador and the southern Phillipines come readily to mind. Plus those smaller places where the French notably and SOF have worked.
SMALL COIN could be good, notably in working WITH local partners and for domestic political purposes being kept small.
Of course all will be fine and dandy until a local insurgency strikes hard and viciously at a domestic Western target or even a nearby mass of Western tourists, say a cruise ship – then we can expect ‘liberal intervention’ (just revenge) and CT to be cited in support of an expedition.
We – the USA, the Uk and allies – are NOT the primary users of COIN. There are many nations with ample experience and continuing insurgencies that use their own COIN, for example India.