The Documentary “The Vietnam War”: Artistic License as History
The Documentary “The Vietnam War”: Artistic License as History
W.R. Baker
As time creeps or races by, those who experienced the Vietnam War are fading from the scene and it’s becoming increasingly important to record a history of that war that is truthful. Increasingly, the written word is being tossed aside in favor of film and the “documentary” – both allow for “artistic license” instead of facts.
Ken Burns and Lynn Novick took $30 million and ten years and used only 80 interviews that, like some others have said, tell how America was wrong, while the communist bloc with the American protestors and politicians were right all along.
Was the American soldier (using this as an all-encompassing term) always right, always moral, always politically correct (especially by today’s standards)? Of course not. Among the many things missing from the documentary were the answers to these same questions of the VC, NVA and the North Vietnamese Government who habitually violated all their agreements, including the Geneva Conventions.
The documentary cherry-picked American actions during the war – just as many predecessors have in books and films. But this was, unfortunately, predictable and expected.
Even before the first show aired, some in the press claimed the documentary to be a masterpiece, blah, blah. Now that they may have seen it, they won’t change their evaluations, egg on their faces are not something they know how to handle.
Too bad the documentary will be pushed as history – accuracy used to be something the press strove for, “but that was yesterday and yesterday’s gone.” A major problem will be in our schools, however, where accuracy will be presumed.
Just ask the 1-2.5 million persons who entered in re-education camps and listen hard for the whispers of the 165,000 who died as a result of the North’s inhumane treatment, though in the Paris treaty, they promised no retribution.
Months ago, Burns and Novick were interviewed with the last question asking if the war could have turned out differently? In reply, everything was the fault of the U.S., of course. When you set out to prove a point and you use only highly selective items to show how balanced on the subject you have been, then guess at the result.
Vietnam remains a communist country today because the military was not allowed to fight and win because the politicians knew best. Then, they sealed the fate of the Vietnamese by letting South Vietnam die on the vine, with nary a word by the press.
Figures.
With reference to the last paragraph:
The war was actually won militarily despite both civilian and military errors, but lost on the 6 o’clock news and the college campus. However as one NVA colonel is reported to have commented, “That may well be true, but it is irrelevant.”
When we purposely cut off South Vietnam from the promised support, the press said a great deal about it. They were supportive, even ecstatic that Nixon’s War was lost.
At 68 I shall not live to see it, but I do hope that at some point the history will be more accurately written.
I think it unfair to blame the way the Vietnam War ended only on the media. Our criticism seems to be limited to Americans committing war crimes, for example Kerry’s claim that tens of thousands of war crimes were committed by soldiers etc. but he never personally documented specific instances or is on record as having attempted to stop them like many soldiers and officers did during the war. War crimes have been made by the American to only have applications against American forces. Groups like VVP and even some chapters of the VVA spin the war fairy tale style and advocate Communist propaganda of the period.
SOF on line ran an excellent rebuttal to the Burns PBS piece. But PBS is not anymore likely to give up its ideological positions than Kerry did.
One of my friends in College was the son of Christian Doctors who were devoted to assisting Lepers in Vietnam I still have a letter from his father thanking me for a donation to repair a jeep they needed to get from one end of their compound to another, over 10,000 patients and families. During Tet, He was murdered in cold blood by the heroic peoples army, sic. Then the NVA invaders began tossing satchel charges into the bunkers the women and children had sought safety and murdered hundreds of civilians. The lefty loons denied and still deny that lepers existed in Vietnam and ascribed the civilian casualties to the USA.
This is the slippery slope and it is not simply a media issue the media is merely the messenger it is ideologues like Kerry, Obama among others that spread lies believing history will make moot the facts.
If anyone is interested the author David Galula, quoted on the SMJ header, work on Counterinsurgency @1964 may be found on this link:
http://ready4itall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Counterinsurgency-Warfare-Theory-and-Practice.pdf
It is in a pdf format , 130 pages.
I wonder if Baker and I watched the same documentary? Baker may only be happy with a white washed history of the war, but in my view the series was relatively fair. It did point out the flaws of the North Vietnam, how they employed terrorism, and it pointed out that the North Vietnam government was fighting to establish a communist state, a form of government not considered legitimate by the people. The government established a very harsh communist goverment that led to the death of thousands, and a massive refugee crisis. The PBS series covered all of this. It also pointed out the flaws of our strategy, the folly of LBJ’s management of the war, etc. It was a series that made all sides uncomfortable. That is an indicator it was well done, not perfect, but good.
I found it interesting that Ho believed the pro Buddhist uproar offered an opportunity to end the war without a US escalation and our leadership believed it justified an escalation. The maximus pertaining to understanding what war you are embarking on played its fateful hand at that point in time. Ho got it right and we got it wrong in 1964. Ho seemed genuinely perplexed as to why our leadership could be so stupid to think any other final outcome was remotely possible.
I am a Vietnam Vet with 4 trips South. I am disappointed with the film. Sorley, “A Better War”, identifies the Vietnam Vet as more prosperous, better educated, and better adjusted than the civilian counterparts. Two thirds of those who served in Vietnam were not drafted. Burns is just wrong. Contrary to Burn’s account, casualties were not disproportionately poor, black service members. Casualties were representative of the population in general. Another exception I take is reference to Marines and soldiers as kids. There were no kids in our military and I resent the arrogance of those who would talk down to real men or suggest we were supporting the wrong side. Burns continually shows our combat men huddled scared, bleeding, and not knowing what to do. While, they continually show bright faced, organized NVA and VC with their female support. Now that is a great combination! I found the North Vietnamese to be some of the dumbest people on the face of the earth. The weren’t liked by Southerners and I didn’t like them either. They were brutal little men trying to be big by assassinating hamlet and village officials. At no time did the Southerners rise up against the government. The alternative of communism was not worth it. I never served with a Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Montagnard who wouldn’t fight. He pays little attention to day-to-day activities that put 92% of the population under government control by the time we left. This film is foreign to my experiences and I will trash it.
We will never learn the strategic lessons of Vietnam, if we refuse to address them. Burns does a good job of laying out facts important to understanding the conflict in strategic terms, but does not draw the strategic conclusions necessary for us to fully understand the nature of our defeat. He does not offer how we could have served our interests far more effectively by avoiding this tragedy of violence we embarked upon. He does not adequately expose our poor understanding of the nature of events unfolding in South East Asia, and the power of our fears, fueled by that flawed understanding, that grew to giant proportion in the minds of decision makers.
We see the same thing today in how we mischaracterize the nature of the conflicts raging across the Middle East, and once again our distorted fears are driving decisions that serve little to make us safer, and absolutely make the violence worse.
Yes, Mr. Burns is fueling stereotypes of the Americans who fought in this conflict. He flirts with fairness, but the overall tone is clear. Protesters were noble, and fighters were victims. No such clear lines can be drawn, and there was far more nobility in those who were willing to risk their lives for their nation, than in those who protested far more out of self interest than any holistic noble purpose. The war was an unnecessary strategic tragedy, and all those it touched were merely players.
Bottom line is that the people of South East Asia were fighting for independence, not communism. But if one is going to throw off the control of the most powerful nations on the planet, one is going to need an ideology that can stand up against all that that entails. One is also going to need the UW support of other powerful nations equally opposed to the ones you are taking on. Such an ideology must be consistent with the culture of the people, and it must be as harsh as that mission demands. That is why communism worked in the rice cultures of SEA; and why Islamism works in the culture of the Middle East. Consider how radical US governance ideology was compared to the kingdoms of Europe. One does not lead a successful revolt with a moderate message. But radical messages tend to become substantially more moderate once those fights are won.
We still think about Vietnam as war story, or as social tragedy. Sure, it had those things, but it was a strategic mistake first and foremost; and we apply the same flawed logic and make the same mistakes today in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategically we have learned very little.
You might be able to find the “truth” in the past in pinning down what time X crossed the LD or how many bombs Y dropped but sorting out the motives of people is tremendously difficult and what “could have happened” is impossible.
What is certain is that the US entered the Vietnamese war, left and then their allies were defeated.
Could the US have won? Who knows…it didn’t. If the public had been more supportive. If the media were on side. If the army had been told to take Hanoi. If the Chinese and Soviets had signaled they would sit on sidelines while the US took N. Vietnam. If an expanded draft to provide the manpower for taking and holding all of Viet Nam didn’t lead to massive social unrest in the US…
Helping the French and then joining in a civil war was a bad idea. Fantasizing about what might have been is pointless as is complaining that the Communists were nasty too.
McLuhan was incisive when he asserted that, “the medium is the message”. In the case of the Thirty-Four Years War in Indochina, American participation only came under both the spotlight and the microscope of the mainstream Western media when significant ground forces were committed in 1965. What of the previous decade of airstrikes and covert action?
From 1965 on, Americans at home could see and hear the war in an immersive and unfiltered way that only combat veterans could have hitherto. It became quite apparent to them that Sherman’s maxim held true. All eligible draftees had to do was turn on their televisions to fear being sent “over there”. Of course, conscientious objection to an immoral war felt better than evading one’s duty to one’s country out of fear, and all the better if resistance to the war was doing one’s patriotic duty.
Yet the enemy fought under the cover of darkness. Hanoi’s follies and atrocities would not be exposed by marauding reporters or by disillusioned insiders. I can think of no films and few photos of the 4% of North Vietnamese that Ho and the CPV murdered in order to “collectivize” the country. By comparison, the death toll resulting from Saigon’s clumsy and corrupt authoritarianism was a mere rounding error. But who will forget the clip of the ARVN officer shooting a NLF prisoner in the head brazenly in the middle of the street? When the victorious CPV caused 10% of the population of South Vietnam to flee in the years following the U.S. withdrawal, it did nothing to alter the narrative of the war in American popular culture.
It is curious that many believed in the myth of the war as a “people’s one”. That the NLF were broken in 1968, that the NVA relied upon endless materiel and protection from the Soviet Union and China – which had deployed some 400,000 personnel to North Vietnam, and which had established the densest air defense network in the world there – was lost on the public. Had the U.S. truly returned the favor in Afghanistan, the Mujaheddin would have been driving Abrams tanks, U.S. forces would be occupying the Durand Line as a firewall, and U.S. pilots would be flying F-15s and F-16s in “Afghan” markings.
Burns’ “The Civil War” was a masterpiece. However, I did not expect him and Novick to add anything new or significant to the popular discourse on the war. Today, war footage in the mainstream media is sanitized – for now obvious reasons – except for amateur YouTube clips.
The Vietnamese were convinced our Domino Theory was a clumsy lie prosecuted to reimpose French colonialism. The suggestion the Vietnamese would allow themselves to facilitate Chinese expansionism was dismissed out of hand as it flew in the face of thousand years of anti Chinese hatred.
The Chinese were equally convinced nobody would be stupid enough to believe the Vietnamese would tolerate any form of Chinese hegemony and came to believe we were intent on occupying Vietnam as a prelude to an invasion of China itself.
This was why they fought with so much tenacity. The Vietnamese were willing and able to take an Ia Drang or a Hamburger Hill every week and the Chinese were ready and willing to provide the means. We on the other hand are still traumatised by these two very brief tactical events despite suffering a tenth of the KIA.
The Vietnamese wanted it more, not because they were braver or better fighters, but because our leadership’s dereliction of duty led them to believe their very existence as a nation depended on victory.
From COL Jones comment below:
“We still think about Vietnam as war story, or as social tragedy. Sure, it had those things, but it was a strategic mistake first and foremost; and we apply the same flawed logic and make the same mistakes today in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategically we have learned very little.”
If we agree that:
a. Our strategy of the Old Cold War was “containing communism.” And that:
b. Our strategy in the current era has been, shall we say, “advancing market-democracy.”
Then is it not interesting to see that:
a. In places like Vietnam, communism was not contained? And that:
b. In places like the Greater Middle East, market-democracy has not been significantly advanced?
Thus, and now as per Bill M’s thoughts below re: “freeing the oppressed,” should we not consider that — in both locales noted above — there simply may not have been sufficient numbers of people who:
a. Considered themselves oppressed? Or who, while considering themselves oppressed,
b. Simply did not associate the idea of “freedom” with our way of life, our way of governance, our values, etc.? Or who, while (a) considering themselves oppressed and (b) associating the idea of “freedom” with our way of life, etc.,
c. Simply were not willing to fight and die to achieve such “freedom?”
Thus, in both the Vietnam and Afghanistan/Iraq cases, was such a thorough “sufficient numbers of people” analysis done?
Likewise, a “the strategic importance of these countries” study done; in Vietnam, re: the goal of “containing communism” and, in Afghanistan/Iraq, re: the goal of “advancing market-democracy?”
If not, were these such “analysis deficiencies” — which might help explain why Vietnam and Iraq/Afghanistan were “strategic mistakes” (see COL Jones above) — were these such “analysis deficiencies” adequately addressed in the PBS documentary? (Note: I missed the very first part.)
To Col. Robert C. Jones:
Burns and Novick tend to focus on what American participation in the Vietnam War during the 1965 to 1972 meant to Americans – to those who served and those who did not. I completely disagree that they enabled viewers to develop a comprehensive understanding of the conflict in strategic terms or in a way that could be useful in understanding the wars against Islamists from 2001 to present.
Strategically, the harsh lesson delivered during 1972-1974 was that the United States entered the conflict with a major intelligence deficit. Yet historically, this has always been the case. I cannot think of a major conflict that the U.S. has embarked upon in which it had a surfeit of intelligence.
From late 1941 to mid-1942, Japan nearly succeeded in destroying the U.S. Navy, driving the Western powers out of the Asia-Pacific region, and rendering their return prohibitively costly. These victories were achieved despite tactical and operational intelligence superiority on the part of the Western Allies, their realistic appraisal of Japanese strategic intentions, and their overwhelming industrial overmatch of Japan. In 1946, the U.S. government only started to understand its new rival and soon-to-be adversary, the Soviet Union, even though the Soviets had regained their conquests from 1939-1940 and were expanding further. Nor were Americans able to prevent the Communist conquest in China from 1946 to 1950, despite strong Sino-American relations and an American presence since 1937. In 1950, the U.S. was wrong-footed twice: first by the North Koreans, and second by the Chinese; South Korea was nearly lost due to these blunders. Even the groundbreaking American victory in 1991 over Iraq concealed major intelligence deficits. Iraq’s conventional forces were far weaker than anticipated, and yet its nuclear weapons program was far more advanced. Yet prior to the overkill of Operation Desert Storm, there were advocates in the presidential administration who believed that the deployment and use of tactical nuclear weapons were necessary given Iraq’s perceived capabilities in 1990.
I believe that you do a disservice to the cause for making intelligence a priority, when you gloss over Indochina/Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Each region, country, administrative division and theater is different.
The peoples of East and Southeast Asia were fighting for a variety of causes from 1946 to 1979, and in no way were Chinese and Soviet-backed Communists more indigenous or independent than the states and societies they sought to overthrow. They were, however, totally committed to victory and were prepared to kill en masse for the sake of unity. Indeed, the white terrors of the period where typically an order of magnitude less than the red terrors: Ho and the Communists mass-murdered some 4% of the North Vietnamese population, before causing 10% of the South Vietnamese population to fee; the popular trope of Han Chinese conformity is less due to cultural aspects, and more to do with the fact that Mao mass-murdered 10% of the Chinese population.
As for the Middle East, Islamism is a unifying force for the Sunni Arabs as Arab Nationalism was. The latter was broken on the rock of Israel and then devolved into sclerotic tyranny. If the West wants strong and friendly states in the Sunni Arab world, it will need to make an effort on the order of what took place in Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, where the peace is still being won more than 65 years later.
Has anyone every asked the simple question what if we had actually taken up Ho’s offers for discussions and cooperation, he allowed the OSS to function under VM supervision, and he professed a deep respect for what George Washington had accomplished.
Maybe if we had played our cards differently towards the re-establishing of French control over a colony, we might have never been in VN at all.
Even when supporting France in Indochina, France left NATO in the end so we could have in theory gone our own way.
An interesting thought.
Comment posted on behalf of the author W.R. (Bob) Baker:
One of the major points in my brief essay was that the press prints what it wants, when it wants and how it wants to present any given issue (or character assassination, for that matter). Fake news is nothing new, just look at how things were sometimes reported during the Vietnam War (particularly after Walter Cronkite’s comments on Tet 1968). Towards the end of the war, the press seemed to feel it was almost their sacred duty to show the NVA and VC in a better light than the always bad Americans.
One of the first things I was told when I arrived in Vietnam was that the VC and NVA didn’t usually take prisoners, especially the wounded. It might have been different if the American public could have seen and read some of the accounts of how the VC and NVA treated the local populace and how they almost enjoyed killing, mutilating, and torturing villagers and Americans who were caught or captured – on second thought, these atrocities probably wouldn’t have been published though because it didn’t fit what their paper or broadcast corporation felt about the war (just look at politics today, for example, and all the “fake” news). Kerry’s testimony before Congress was widely broadcast in 1971, but he couldn’t produce anyone to substantiate what he had to say. That’s okay, it didn’t matter, his political journey was insured and the press’ self-righteousness was reaffirmed.
Perhaps it’s just that we happy few who saw how things were in Vietnam who readily defend each other and the certain knowledge that we could have and should have been allowed to prosecute the war. But, somehow, conducting war was all right for the communist North, but not for the Americans and South Vietnamese. Poor South Vietnam and the thousands upon thousands who lost their lives after their country fell to the communist North, not to mention those who were in reeducation camps.
However, there were those who climbed the ranks and became flag officers who, because politics is even more intense at these levels, forgot what their mission was in Vietnam in favor of what it took to gain or further climb the “starry ladder” of promotion, where Command Time was an absolute necessity for advancement.
During a recent interview, Colin Powell said that the North Vietnamese were “truly willing to lose whatever it took to win.” Since we didn’t isolate the North (blockade their ports, strike inside Hanoi and other areas, Laos, and Cambodia for manufacturing, troop, and supply areas, etc.), it’s small wonder that one might think we weren’t willing to win. It was common for many of us in Vietnam to wonder aloud why we didn’t do this and that. We could see many of the things that could be done and we wondered why the “brass” couldn’t. We should have also looked at the politicians, who were reading the newspapers, giving the interviews to TV news, prompting the financial donations for their (re-)elections, which were endorsed then by the press.
Responding to a question about U.S. forces employing the take-and-hold approach to get a clear victory, Powell said, “My own view was—notwithstanding what many of my fellow veterans have said—that we could not have done that.” Powell goes on to cite the DMZ as the sanctuary by which the North “poured” troops and support in their southern efforts. Further, he makes the point that troops must secure areas won, because air and naval power can’t. If you can’t bomb it, cut the C3 networks and supply lines, etc., then he’s right – fight with one hand behind your back and see what happens. It isn’t “that we could not have done that” as much as we weren’t allowed to do very much to assure much success.
After the U.S. left South Vietnam in 1973, the promise that Nixon made was to continue support, but Congress wanted nothing to do with it anymore. “That’s the view of a lot of Vietnam veterans—that it was the Congress who lost this war. I can’t buy into that,” Powell goes on to explain that we are a “people’s army” and we had lost “the will to fight the kind of war that the North Vietnamese were going to fight.” A lot of “people’s army” veterans know we won all the battles we were called upon to fight and are rightly dismayed that politics seems to have changed how some politicos now think.
Some of the scenes of the Easter Offensive remain burned in my brain. How the NVA indiscriminately shelled QL-1 (the main north-south highway) clogged with so many civilians (and ARVN deserters). The often-overlooked point was that these people were headed southward, not towards those supposedly “liberating them.” A parallel between this exodus and the Viet Minh at Tra Ly and Ba Lang during the mass exodus of Vietnamese from the North during Operation Passage to Freedom seems obvious.
There will be many in high schools and colleges who will be subject to watching this documentary because it will be taught as fact. This false narrative should not be taken as anywhere near being absolute.
This is a general reply to some of the points brought up by Outlaw, Bill M. and RantCorp, among others:
1. In the country-specific and regional contexts, allowing France to re-establish control over Vietnam was a grave error. Yet there were broader and global contexts which led the U.S. to indulge Europe’s imperial powers in reacquiring the possessions they lost to Japan or otherwise as a result of World War II. The fact was that France was the most powerful U.S. ally on the European continent and situated closest to the potential conflict area of highest importance.
2. France was and remains an unreliably ally, although it is certainly not alone today. In addition to the economic, diplomatic and military support, France has received Anglo-American cultural support as well, and by that I am referring to the glossing over of a rather shameful and sordid episode in French history from July 1940 to September 1944. Yet the failure of French arms, its obvious dependence upon allies, and the clear and present threat of the Red Army raising the Red Flag over Paris, did not prevent France from quickly undertaking nasty adventures in Africa and Indochina as soon as it was able.
3. As for Ho, he was no George Washington. His death toll was less than other Stalinists such as Mao and Kim, but he still required some 4% of the North Vietnamese people to die in order to impose Communist rule, and this was prior to invading South Vietnam to “liberate” it. Indeed, murdering some 200,000 South Vietnamese and expelling 10% of South Vietnam’s population hardly qualifies as liberation, to say nothing of reconciliation. Those that would accuse the U.S. of “destroying the village to save it” in Vietnam, seem to have forgotten that this was exactly what the North Vietnamese did. I doubt that Ho would have made a reliable partner, and an earlier hypothetical Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the 1960s may well have brought in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union against China.
Consider that earlier Mao had appeared to be a willing partner of the U.S. during the Sino-Japanese War, and that the OSS had a strong relationship with him from 1944 to 1947. Was China “lost” due to a lack of support for the KMT or due to anti-Communist hostility toward the CPC?
The reason that the U.S. regarded Mao and Ho as friendly or friendlier than say Stalin, was because Stalin was always an apex predator for Communists and anti-Communists alike. The only corollary to what a relationship between the U.S. and Ho may have resembled was that between the West and Yugoslavia’s Tito. Note that Tito had no problem taking Allied aid in part to settle scores at home rather than with the Germans, fueling a civil war in Greece despite the combined opposition of the Soviet Union and Western Allies, imposing Stalinism brutally on Yugoslavia but then rejecting Soviet leadership, and finally killing Westerners and Yugoslav refugees in the West whilst receiving Western aid. At no point did Yugoslavia’s “non-alignment” strategically alter the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in any appreciable way.
4. I completely agree that advice from experienced from subject matter experts tends to be ignored. Why? Because their advice is often specialized or focused narrowly and tends toward long-term strategy thought, when decision-makers elected to public office have a scattered or wider focus and predicate their decisions on short-term issues. Moreover, the decision-makers are accountable to electorates that are mostly uninterested and unknowledgeable about the issues in question until there is the sudden appearance of a problem. As my earlier comment to Robert C. Jones indicated, the U.S. has never been prepared for any of its military campaigns, and this includes Operation Desert Storm, where it was actually over-prepared.
5. There is no question, however, that taking up the baton from France was perceived as wholly different than defending an independent South Korea from Soviet client North Korea. Yet few Americans ask why the Korean War was almost lost or whether “strategic bombing” of North Korea was a war crime, etc. Why? Because it was considered a victory, whereas Vietnam is considered a defeat. As sports psychologists point out losing is far more impactful than winning.
From Bill M.’s October 4, 2017 – 1:58 am comment below:
“Where I agree with you to a point is that communism and Islamism are effective ideologies for organizing a resistance and providing governance to gain control of the populace, compared to our approach of running questionable elections, and then trying to make a weak, democratic government effective. That normally fails quickly, and the next thing you know the CIA is delivering bags of money to our proxy, which undermines our efforts from the tactical to the strategic level. If we’re going to compete successfully in the competitive control realm, the lesson we need to learn is how to establish control in way that is moral, but not chaotic. Once the resistance is defeated or sufficiently suppressed, we can assist that government gradually transition to a democracy. This is the lesson we failed to learn in my view. Whether we should get involved in conflicts to begin with we will have little influence over, how we conduct ourselves and our strategies we can influence.”
Might we agree then that while:
a. We (the U.S./the West) may definitely be against something — for example, communism and/or Islamism —
b. What we offer the populations — as an alternative — this may be even less appealing to them?
This, given that while:
a. What our enemies are offering the population includes, shall we say, “freedom” — from Western domination and from alien and profane Western ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. —
b. What the U.S./the West is offering the populations clearly does not? (And, indeed, includes only the promise of greater integration into, greater dependence upon and greater defiling by the modern western world?)
This begs the question: If (in the context of their common colonial experience?) “freedom” from Western domination, power, influence and control is what the populations actually desire — and “freedom” (at least initially) from alien and profane Western ways of life, ways of governance, values, etc. — then how can we overcome the populations such overwhelming desire?
In this regard, is it likely that, as per Bill M. above, a well-understood Western strategy of, shall we say, thinly veiled “deceptive democratization” (“establish control in way that is moral but not chaotic and, once the resistance is defeated or sufficiently suppressed, assist the government in a gradual transition to democracy”) will do the job?
Or will the populations concerned understand, from the get-go, that their desired end-state (i.e., the idea of “freedom from the West” expressed above); that this desired end-state of the populations will only be more easily thwarted by this such “less in-your-face”/more clandestine “Westernization” approach?
Bottom Line Question — Based on the Above:
Does the PBS documentary “The Vietnam War” adequately address this nature (continuing — as evidenced most recently by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?) of our conflicts; a nature which — yesterday as today — appears to include:
a. An “escape from Western transformation and incorporation” effort by the populations? (In this light to see [a] as COL Jones notes below, the value to the populations of communism and Islamism and [b] the lack of similar appeal of such things as “democracy” and “capitalism?”) This, in opposition to:
b. A (continuing — note Bill M.’s thought above?) Western “transform” (more along modern western lines) and “incorporate” (more into the western sphere of power, influence and control) agenda? (Which the populations actually appear to be fighting against/actually appear to be attempting to get free from?)
Is this “nature of the conflict” — yesterday as today — adequately addressed in the subject documentary?
The idea that the “US won militarily but….” is nonsensical. If they aim was to unite all of Vietnam under a pro US government that obviously was not even close to being achieved. If the aim was to destroy the NVA- again not even close. Destroy the VC- closer but still not achieved. Build up the ARVN so it could defeat the NVA- no.
The US lost. Period. How many communists it killed or the bravery or skill of US soldiers is irrelevant. It seems that some people- particularly veterans of the war- are looking for some sort of moral victory to make the cost of the war somehow palatable.
The war in Viet Nam was never worth winning, strategically. That being said, we didn’t need to loose it the way we did: by a journalist (WC) declaring defeat. But for him, we could have negotiated a much better deal.
From SWJ quotes today, a worthwhile reminder to those who continue to try to sell the false argument of Ho’s legitimacy with the Vietnamese people. Ousting the French was a nationalistic and legitimate, imposing the foreign ideology of communism was not.
Quote.
“But the Viet-Minh had had about ten months in which to establish their administration, train their forces with Japanese and American weapons (and Japanese and Chinese instructors), and kill or terrorize into submission the genuine Vietnamese nationalists who wanted a Viet-Nam independent from France but equally free of Communist rule. The first round of the war for Indochina already had been lost for the West before it had even begun.”
— Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina
Bill M.,
I am afraid that you are up against emotional biases so entrenched, that there is no allowance even for the mere moderation of cognitive ones. Most people are very averse to chaotic complexity, and therefore strive to conceive of the world in ordered and simple terms. Unfortunately, this proclivity applies as much to combat veterans of the war as anti-war activists who never served. Historical events are debated with such ferocity for two reasons: to find meaning in the event, and to connect the past with the present.
With respect to Bob, he is an Army Special Forces Colonel (ret.) who served in Afghanistan and the Philippines during OEF, providing him a front row seat for the circus of American CT/COIN/FID efforts being conducted in corrupt and weak states. I also understand that RC served in Iraq after the 2003 invasion in a similar unconventional capacity. There is no question that successive U.S. presidential administrations have subjected diplomats and warfighters to extreme stress for almost fifteen years as they pursued multiple and concurrent military campaigns and state reconstruction initiatives that were deliberately under-resourced. Therefore, I cannot fault any veteran of these conflicts for leaning towards the perspective of Engelhardt and his group of similar-minded veterans affiliated with “The Nation”. Yet the quest to draw a clear line from the Spanish-American War to Operation Inherent Resolve, in which the Vietnam intervention plays a central role, is a march to folly.
Azor
If I recall this documentary on the Vietnam War correctly, I seem to remember seeing interviews/excerpts therein, where, both President Kennedy and President Johnson say, that in order to get re-elected/elected, they would need to — despite their misgivings — take a clear pro-Vietnam War/clear anti-communism stance. (Or words to that effect.) The implication being, that this is what the American people wanted, needed, expected and required of their presidents.
Do I recall these parts of the documentary correctly?
In consideration of the above, and looking at the Gallup poll provided below, can we say, then, that the Vietnam War was more of an American people’s war — a war that the American people, themselves, (at least until Tet) wanted, needed, expected and required — and no so much a war of either President Kennedy or President Johnson?
(“Blame,” etc., thus, to be allocated accordingly?)
http://news.gallup.com/vault/191828/gallup-vault-hawks-doves-vietnam.aspx
I agree with much of the comments made by the author. The media was prejudiced against America’s involvement in the war and the peace movement that has been unduly glorified was actually more of a draft resistance movement. Where are the huge anti-war protests since the reformation of an All-Volunteer Army?
One only has to follow the story of General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan summarily executing Nguyễn Văn Lém. It was a legal execution, Lem was a terrorist murderer, killed women and children, families he had been tried in absentia and no one denies his guilt. The American war resistance to this day describes it as an act of wanton
murder and proof of widespread war crimes.
There are authors who claim 2 million civilians were killed by the US the fact is the NVA and VC raped, tortured and murdered with impunity, by and large American forces followed prescribed articles of war not to say the fighting wasn’t brutal but what the war resistance did was blame all civilian casualties on the USA. The USA is to blame simply by the fact it attempted to help the South Vietnamese defend itself from a Communist insurgency and an invasion from the North.
Saigon did not fall because of a popular uprising, the VC were largely destroyed when they attempted a main coup on Tet. It was only after the US 113th Congress reneged on its promise of military aid did Saigon fall and that was by an invasion straight down the highway from the North.
Even the widely dispersed photo of a young girl caught in napalm was falsely reported by the “liberal” media in the USA. I heard her speak to my Unit she was grateful, , the napalm burned her but destroyed the NVA trying to murder her; she was saved from what the NVA would have done to her, rape torture death.
It was not a phobia or false hysteria that sent millions of Vietnamese into pirate infested waters braving high seas in leaky boats to escape the brutality of the Communists, and nearly a million died.
5 years ago in Hanoi over 100 Christians peacefully protesting for religious freedoms were shot down by the same sort of communists who brought so much destruction to their own country 50 years ago.
I know personally of dozens of NVA and vC atrocities, I did not witness the thousands are even a handful of atrocities committed by US troops. My response to such propaganda is if Senator Kerry witnessed these crimes while serving as an Officer in the US navy why didn’t he try to stop them, doesn’t that make him an accessory after the fact or just a plain old liar?
The last veteran I had a discussion with after he claimed to have thrown POWs off a helicopter ended when I proved he couldn’t have done so, the fact was he didn’t even recall the proper or general safe way to even get on a Huey. He might have been a veteran but I still don’t get why he would confess to committing a crime he didn’t commit? Why would he think that was a good thing?
(Edited and added to from my initial offering):
First, from a COL Jones comment below:
BEGIN QUOTE
Self determination. A simple concept that the founding of America is premised in, and that many revolutionary movements seeking support have turned to America, only to be denied because we valued some perceived interest of the day over their inalienable right. Don’t twist history to appease our conscience. We made a mistake in Vietnam. We exaggerated our Fears; we let our Honor fix us to our mistakes; and we created false Interests to validate our decisions. Admitting this does not dishonor those who served our nation in that tragic conflict; But ignoring it dishonors those who are sent in their footsteps…
END QUOTE
Note here that — in denying other peoples their right to self-determination — COL Jones suggests that this such action was/is undertaken because we valued some perceived “interest of the day” over other peoples’ such inalienable right.
Given, however, that — now 50 years after the height of the Vietnam War — the U.S./the West continues to deny other peoples their right to self-determination, then can we honestly say that these such “denial” efforts were, then and/or now, undertaken because, as COL Jones’s suggests, of some perceived “interest of the day?”
Or, based on the enduring nature of our such denial of other peoples’ right to self-determination, should we not agree that:
a. Not our “interest of the day,” per se, was and/or is the driving force behind our such “denial” actions and activities. But, rather,
b. Our “enduring interests,” best described and articulated — then as now — in NSC-68:
BEGIN QUOTE
Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. … a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat …
END QUOTE
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-2.htm
Thus, while we might argue that denying other populations their right to self-determination (for example, the communists back-in-the-day and/or the Islamists today) was and/or is “a smart” and/or is “the best” way for the U.S. to achieve its such enduring interest (to wit: “fostering a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish”); one certainly would not seem to be able to argue, as COL Jones does below, that this/these such actions/activities (denial of other populations their right to self-determination) this was then — and/or is now — being done because of some perceived “interest of the day.” Yes?
Bottom Line Question — Based on the Above:
Given that, then as now:
a. “Enduring interest” appears to drive America’s strategies (“containment of communism” during the Old Cold War; “advancing market democracy” in the current age); given this such understanding,
b. What now are our thoughts on these and on subordinate/corresponding matters?
(Thus, a possible better way of looking at these matters:
In the “Long War” — to “foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish” — the U.S./the West, post-World War II, has engaged in at least two major campaigns:
a. First, the Cold War Campaign; wherein, [a] the strategy of “containment of communism” is formally adopted and, wherein, among others, [b] the “Battle of Vietnam” takes place.
b. Second, the Post-Cold War Campaign; wherein, [a] the strategy of “advancing market democracy” is formally adopted and, wherein, among others, [b] the “Battles of Afghanistan and Iraq” take place.
Herein, and in such a “Long War” — which now finds itself running for over 70 years — the U.S./the West consistently determining [rightfully or wrongfully] that [a] the “self-determination” of other countries and peoples; this [b] was not, and still is not, compatible with our “enduring interest” — of “fostering a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish?”)
BillC,
I believe that premise is fundamentally flawed. There is no mandate per the Constitution to go abroad and enforce our will on other systems of government in order to remain safe. What the Constitution does mandate is a requirement to defend the USA, which as President Reagan so aptly understood, we should install a peace shield around our country not constantly provoke adversaries with a threat of invasion and occupation.
This fundamentally flawed understanding of the Constitutional mandate and the resulting Foreign policies are the root cause of the security issues we face today.
BEGIN QUOTE
As Williams put it, the goal of U.S. grand strategy has been to create an “Open Door world” — and international system, or “world order” — made up of states that are open and subscribe to the United State’s liberal values and institutions and that are open to U.S. economic penetration. An Open Door world rests, therefore, on two pillars: the economic Open Door (maintaining an open international economic system) and the political Open Door (spreading democracy and liberalism abroad). These pillars are linked by the PERCEPTION that “closure” abroad threatens the survival of American core values — what policymakers call “the American way of life” — at home. … In other words, U.S grand strategy is based on the Open Door-derived assumption that political and economic liberalism cannot flourish at home unless they are safe abroad. This deeply rooted belief was reiterated by President George W. Bush in his second inaugural address, when he declared, “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.” …
(See Pages 30 and 31.)
Indochina
America’s involvement in Indochina in the late 1940s and early 1950s — the first step down the “path to Vietnam” — is a good example of how the link between economic openness and grand strategy not only requires the United States to defends its allies from direct threat but to guarantee their economic access to the periphery. …
Although Indochina’s intrinsic strategic value was minimal, it became important because Washington viewed it as a firewall to prevent the more economically vital parts of Southeast Asia from falling under Communist control. The United States crossed the most crucial threshold on the path to the Vietnam War in the early 1950s, when Washington concluded that the strategic requirements of economic openness — specifically Southeast Asia’s economic importance to Japan and Western Europe — necessitated that containment be extended to that region. The progressive U.S. entanglement in Indochina that culminated in the Vietnam War was the logical consequence of Washington’s commitment to the economic Open Door.
(See Pages 128 and 129.)
END QUOTE
(From Christopher Layne’s 2006 “The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present.”)
(Slapout: Re: your thoughts below on our Constitution: Note that the preamble to our Constitution will be specifically quoted and discussed in NSC-68 — the “Open Door” document whose rationale for intervention seems to extend even unto our present time [see President Bush above and, accordingly, our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq today].)
(Warlock: Do the above explanations help re: the questions in your comment below? As to your specific thought that only the threat posed by the Soviet Union drove the NSC-68 “Open Door” strategic train, did you not see the quoted item which I provided from NSC-68, wherein, a clear statement to the contrary is put forward (see: “a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat.”)
(dfil: You said: “To also say that Afghanistan is part of some grand democratization project is also frankly absurd.” dfil: Do you want to reconsider this and your other thoughts — based on the information that I have provided above?)
(COL Jones: Note that this book by Christopher Layne seems to, in general I believe, both agree with and support certain of your ideas and contentions.)
Attempting to come full circle now:
Should we say that our “Documentary on the Vietnam War” adequately addressed, rather glossed over, or, indeed, completely ignored — the compelling “Open Door” aspects of America’s, enduring, post-World War II grand strategy outlined above?
Banjo Bill,
If for argument’s sake we accept the existence of Grand Strategy purported in your quotation it strikes me that we did not remotely adhere to its sympathies when we started out on our Vietnam adventure in 1953.
I would suggest Ho et al would have traded with us, exchanged full diplomatic, economic ties etc. etc if our primary motive was as you oft insist.
Unfortunately we did nothing of the sort.
We instead insisted on imposing a colonialist model of elitist Catholicism on a Buddhist population; firstly with European masters, and after that failed, proping up the Catholic lackery of the vanquished French – within the boundaries of a fictitious ‘nation’ – into which we threw 500K round-eye troops for good measure.
I mean to ask could it get more un-American and more economically ruinous than that. Personally I couldn’t imagine a worse approach if a merchantist Grand Strategy was a primary motivator.
When the going started to get tough our leadership cited the danger of the possibility that the PAVN leadership would entertain replacing French colonialism with Chinese hegemony!
That lunacy convinced the PAVN (and the PLA for that matter) that we were liars or insane or both.
IMHO drawing lessons from such a cacophony of strategic mindlessness offers up very little insight into our current difficultlies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I mean to say nobody is suggesting we impose Christianity on either country , we have very few troops on the ground and as to how we might recoup the treasure we expended; in both Afghanistan and Iraq -every road, track and goat trail would have to be paved in solid gold just to pay the interest on our outlays.
RC
Banjo RantCorp and Warlock: Re: your thoughts and questions below: Might the following help:
BEGIN QUOTE
Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face the great problem of a free society, accentuated many fold in the industrial age, of reconciling order, security, and the need for participation, with the requirement of freedom.
END QUOTE
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-7.htm
BEGIN QUOTE
While Truman Administration officials were certainly concerned with the Soviet Union … Rather their gravest concern was with rebuilding the global economy in the wake of the Great Depression and World War II. Virtually every move the Truman Administration undertook aimed at this effort. Part of that required containing communism, but, as Acheson told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Even if there were no Russia, if there was no communism, we would still face very grave problems in trying to exist and strengthen those parts of the free world which have been so badly shaken by war and its consequences, the two world wars and the consequences of both of them.”
END QUOTE
https://books.google.com/books?id=bcLeZ7MLvM0C&pg=PT177&lpg=PT177&dq=Even+if+there+were+no+Russi,+if+there+were+no+communism,+we+would+still+face+very+grave+problems+in+trying+to+exist+and+strengthen+those+parts+of+the+free+world+which+have+been+so+badly+shaken+by+the+war+and+its+consequences,+the+two+wars+and+the+consequences+of+both+of+them&source=bl&ots=6W8diz-a5Q&sig=0tfrnwJf9i-wh2z_1-9NuUV3yxA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjbkOf9l5TYAhWIQyYKHQaqBfAQ6AEIKjAB#v=onepage&q=Even%20if%20there%20were%20no%20Russi%2C%20if%20there%20were%20no%20communism%2C%20we%20would%20still%20face%20very%20grave%20problems%20in%20trying%20to%20exist%20and%20strengthen%20those%20parts%20of%20the%20free%20world%20which%20have%20been%20so%20badly%20shaken%20by%20the%20war%20and%20its%20consequences%2C%20the%20two%20wars%20and%20the%20consequences%20of%20both%20of%20them&f=false
dfil and Warlock:
Given that I have noted Dean Acheson and NSC-68 in my comments below, I thought that you might find the following items interesting:
First, from then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cir. 2005:
BEGIN QUOTE
Soon after arriving at the State Department earlier this year, I hung a portrait of Dean Acheson in my office. Over half a century ago, as America sought to create the world anew in the aftermath of World War II, Acheson sat in the office that I now occupy. And I hung his picture where I did for a reason.
Like Acheson and his contemporaries, we live in an extraordinary time — one in which the terrain of international politics is shifting beneath our feet and the pace of historical change outstrips even the most vivid imagination. My predecessor’s portrait is a reminder that in times of unprecedented change, the traditional diplomacy of crisis management is insufficient. Instead, we must transcend the doctrines and debates of the past and transform volatile status quos that no longer serve our interests. What is needed is a realistic statecraft for a transformed world.
President Bush outlined the vision for it in his second inaugural address: “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” This is admittedly a bold course of action, but it is consistent with the proud tradition of American foreign policy, especially such recent presidents as Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan. …
END QUOTE
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901711.html
Next, a question: Is it not in this context (see the Acheson/Rice nexus above) that we should see and understand such things as — cir. 2008 — this “ISAF Strategic Vision” document, and specifically therein, the excerpt I provide below?
BEGIN QUOTE
1. We gather in Bucharest to reaffirm our determination to help the people and the elected Government of Afghanistan build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. …
END QUOTE
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
If we believe that we made a mistake (or not) in Vietnam. And likewise believe that we made a (similar?) mistake (or not) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then should we not consider some of the potential parallels and similarities that may be associated with these such conflicts — parallels and similarities such as those I attempt to explore here and elsewhere?
Again attempting to come full circle: Herein, should we say that our “Documentary on the Vietnam War” adequately addressed the — enduring it would seem — “Open Door” aspects of America’s post-World War II grand strategies (see my by Bill C. | December 15, 2017 – 11:41 am comment below); enduring aspects of America’s post-World War II grand strategies which seem to get us in trouble again and again?