NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War
NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War
By Jim Garamone
DoD News, Defense Media Activity
WASHINGTON, March 23, 2015 – Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove discussed the implications of hybrid war during a presentation to the Brussels Forum over the weekend.
Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of U.S. European Command, said Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea and continued actions in the rest of Eastern Ukraine is a form of hybrid war.
Russia is using diplomacy, information warfare, and its military and economic means to wage this campaign, he added.
Aspects of Hybrid War
One of the first aspects of the hybrid war is to attack credibility and to try to separate a nation from its support mechanisms, the general said.
“Informationally, this is probably the most impressive new part of this hybrid war, all of the different tools to create a false narrative,” he said. “We begin to talk about the speed and the power of a lie, how to get a false narrative out, and then how to sustain that false narrative through all of the new tools that are out there.”
Military tools remain relatively unchanged, he said. “But how they are used or how they are hidden in their use, is the new part of this hybrid war,” the general said. “How do we recognize, how do we characterize and then how do we attribute this new employment of the military in a way that is built to bring about ambiguity?”
An Across-government Approach
Using the economic tool, he said, hybrid warfare allows a country to bring pressure on economies, but also on energy.
“What the military needs to do is to use those traditional military intelligence tools to develop the truth. The way you attack a lie is with the truth,” Breedlove said. “I think that you have to attack an all of a government approach with an all of government approach. The military needs to be able to do its part, but we need to bring exposure to those diplomatic pressures and return the diplomatic pressure. We need to, as a Western group of nations or as an alliance, engage in this information warfare to … drag the false narrative out into the light and expose it.”
Regarding Western response to Russian actions in Ukraine, no tool should be off the table, Breedlove said.
“In Ukraine, what we see is what we talked about earlier, diplomatic tools being used, informational tools being used, military tools being used, economic tools being used against Ukraine,” he said. “We, I think, in the West, should consider all of our tools in reply. Could it be destabilizing? The answer is yes. Also, inaction could be destabilizing.”
Excerpt:
QUOTE: One of the first aspects of the hybrid war is to attack credibility and to try to separate a nation from its support mechanisms, the general said.
“Informationally, this is probably the most impressive new part of this hybrid war, all of the different tools to create a false narrative,” he said. “We begin to talk about the speed and the power of a lie, how to get a false narrative out, and then how to sustain that false narrative through all of the new tools that are out there.”
Military tools remain relatively unchanged, he said. “But how they are used or how they are hidden in their use, is the new part of this hybrid war,” the general said. “How do we recognize, how do we characterize and then how do we attribute this new employment of the military in a way that is built to bring about ambiguity?” END QUOTE
The question is are we able to operate within this type of warfare which can perhaps also be characterized as political and unconventional warfare. While we think what is happening with Russia in Ukraine and Crimea is new if we look back to our own doctrine we can see parallels (and we do not even have to go back to George Kennan’s 1948 memo on political warfare. (http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm) Below is an excerpt from the no longer published DOD Encyclopedia from 1997. (http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp-encyclop(97).pdf)
QUOTE: UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the U.S. perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving U.S. national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic or operational objectives.
When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:
• Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.
• Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
• Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
• Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
• Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society. END QUOTE
It is interesting to read about Gen Breedlove’s frustration with Russia’s actions in the Ukraine. In my view this is what happens when NATO apparently has a paradigm that seems to embrace the view they are either at peace or war, and adversaries don’t cross the line that equates to conventional war NATO is at a loss of what to do.
While the impact of globalization changes many things (strategic considerations based on relations between actors), underlying the changes is a persistent continuity. Dave’s comments below on UW are certainly worth thinking deeply about, and I would only add that the USSR had similar plans for Western Europe that NATO was well aware of, and were allegedly prepared to counter. Maybe it is time to dust off and update old plans? Maybe NATO nations need to invest more in counterintelligence to get as far left of bang of possible. To prevent the Russians from achieving their goals by establishing decisive local political conditions via subversion in the first place?
I’m not convinced you counter UW with UW, but you certainly have to understand UW to counter it. We shouldn’t hesitate, the CJCS should mandate that UW as a concept is a mandatory part of joint and service professional military education. Assuming our interagency partners have anything that comes to close to a professional development program they should also gain an awareness of this form of warfare also. It all too often seems we’re driving blind. Having sat in numerous intelligence briefs over the past few decades I have noted a shift from when they used to address subversion and other UW activities, to now getting a blank stare if you ask an analyst if country X or Y is conducting this type of activity. This is why I think one of the most important comments Gen Breedlove made in this interview is,
“What the military needs to do is to use those traditional military intelligence tools to develop the truth. The way you attack a lie is with the truth,”
General Breedlove is in fact frustrated due to several things;
1. he knows after watching events unfold in the Ukraine that any C-UW strategy, tactics and then deployment takes a “total whole of government approach” and that as they say “ain’t never going to get off the ground” when one has to get 28 yes votes just to change a word in any joint doctrine document at ACT.
2. he has seriously now fully understood and watched daily the Russian “informational conflict” at work and to counter that alone will cost the US and NATO well north of a billion in start up costs. Russia paid out in budget money just for their own 113 TV and radio stations in 113 countries a billion plus and have budgeted 700M USDs for next year–that is not counting their social media troll business based on St. Petersburg where 300 plus are employed 24 X 7 365.
If one cannot control the daily narrative and the daily news cycle with all media forms especially the social media–do not even get into an informational conflict as you have already lost it.
I count currenly four different infor war initiatives that have started–Ukrainian, NATO, DoS and the EU is considering starting an operation long term. what is needed is a centrally controlled and driven operation in all major languages spoken in Russia AND in real time.
3. he knows that from a tactical level he is seeing a well orchestrated joint conventional and SOF operation which again “ain’t going to happen” inside 28 countries–try getting a SF decision on something that involves the SF international training site where only six NATO members are involved.
4. he is seeing a National Command Authority unwilling to make decisions for a number of reasons 1) do not want to disturb the legacy after 2017, 2) need Russian support on Iranian deal, 3) soft power preferred and no inkling to even use the threat of hard power even if treaty after treaty has been basically violated by Russia to include the INF, 4) absolutely no understanding of Putin and current Russian influencers.
Remember the NCA is not a product of the Cold War veteran generation nor was he educated during that period of time.
UW as being currently practiced by Russia, China and Iran have been basically successful– we are simply coming late to the party as we focused way to long on two wars around COIN that should have never been fought to begin with.
A typical “hybrid warfare’ day today in and around the Ukraine and Russia and one then wonders by General Breedlove is frustrated–and this is just the social media side of the house?
It’s #Ukraine or Bust: https://goupillon.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/rus
So, the #Russia|n’s are breaking Minsk by preventing @OSCE inspecting, verifying heavy weapons withdrawal in #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/aKusRSMQEK
WHAT??? FORMER PUTIN ADVISOR SAYS #RUSSIA SHOULD DECLARE WAR ON #BALTICS AND #POLAND http://upnorth.eu/former-putin-advisor-says-russia-should-declare-war-on-baltics-and-poland/ …
#Russia wants own international tribunal for war criminals to replace #Hague court “that depends on sponsors of the war crimes in #Ukraine”
(Touched up a little.)
The context within which political warfare, hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare today are being contemplated was anticipated by Ambassador Paul Nitze in the early 1990s.
Herein, Ambassador Nitze voiced his concern that the victorious United States/the West, post-the Cold War, would come to adopt the thinking (universal values) and the associated practices (ignore sovereignty; impose one’s political, economic and social preferences on others) that had been the purview of the former Soviet Union/the communists during the Cold War.
Thus, Ambassador Nitze suggested — before we go down such a “role-reversal” road (we become the cultural aggressors rather than the cultural defenders) — that we consider “one of the most important lessons of the past era;” which he believed was to be derived from the Soviet/the communists experiences of the past half-century.
This being that, in spite of communist leaders efforts — for decades — of trying to impose a common culture and society on others, they did not succeed.
Why? Ambassador Nitze suggested that the reason was “the near impossibility of erasing cultural ties, ethnic identities and social practices in a world where communications and ideas cannot be suppressed.”
Thus, Ambassador Nitze suggested that the United States post-the Cold War — instead of going down the same road as the Soviets/the communists in the second half of the 20th Century — adopt “political diversity” as our way forward.
As we know, the United States/the West ignored Ambassador Nitze’s such warnings and suggestions and, accordingly, paid the price.
It is against this backdrop (that we are the one’s who are now seen as attacking/undermining sovereignty and attempting to impose our alien/profane way of life and way of governance on others) that we must understand the common strategy, the common narrative, and the common defensive measures which are being undertaken by the Rest of the world.
In this regard, and re: the Russians/Putin specifically, consider this from the Economist:
” … Mr Putin’s purpose is not to rebuild the Soviet empire—he knows this is impossible—but to protect Russia’s sovereignty … ”
” … When thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets demanding a Western-European way of life, the Kremlin saw this as a threat to its model of governance.”
“Russia feels threatened not by any individual European state, but by the European Union and NATO, which it regards as expansionist. It sees them as “occupied” by America, which seeks to exploit Western values to gain influence over the rest of the world.”
“We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots, including their Christian values,” said Mr Putin in 2013. Russia, by contrast, “has always been a state civilization held together by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox church.”
“The Donbas rebels are fighting not only the Ukrainian army, but against a corrupt Western way of life in order to defend Russia’s distinct world view.”
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
Thus, it is via this “West v. the Rest” narrative, which essentially suggests a role-reversal for the United States (now seen by all the world as the destroyer of individual cultures) that not only the Russians but also the Chinese and various entities within the Middle East and elsewhere are able to effectively stand against us.
The Soviets/the communists — during the Cold War and with amazing political/hybrid/unconventional warfare capabilities — were unable to overcome the fundamental truth of their untenable position.
The United States/the West, to suffer this same fate, and for much the same reason?
Something to consider (i.e., the wrong political objective, of fundamental and comprehensive outlying state and societal transformation, thus, the same goal the Soviets/the communists had during the Cold War) before:
a. Going further down the political/hybrid/unconventional warfare path so as to
b. Attempt to overcome such “natural” resistance — as is described above.
(Note: This, as we know, did not work for the Soviets/the communists.)
And there is no current “disconnect” between NATO, SACEUR Breedlove and the National Command Authority Obama who is nominally the Commander and Chief of all US Forces—someone convince me there is no “disconnect” over Russia and the Ukraine and Europe.
The current European view is that he simply no longer cares as it is not on his “legacy list of things to do ie Cuba and Iran”.
He can deal with Iran but not NATO where the Russian stated geo political goal is to disconnect the US from NATO and Europe–remember the recent Russian FM infowar messaging that stated Europe should not be following US Generals and Obama as it will lead them to disaster.
Bloomberg View ✔ @BV
.@joshrogin scoop: Obama snubs NATO chief at moment of crisis. http://bv.ms/1xxOrUO pic.twitter.com/Pb0BbES4YR
From that article the following sticks out–it seems that in three full days in DC the WH “light calendar schedule” somehow could not fit the NATO SG’s visit in–how can that be in the days of at least Twitter?
Last Friday, at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum, Stoltenberg talked about the importance of close coordination inside NATO in order to first confront Russian aggression and then eventually move toward a stable relationship with Moscow.
“The only way we can have the confidence to engage with Russia,” he said, “is to have the confidence and the strength which is provided by strong collective defense, the NATO alliance.”
“The only way we can have the confidence to engage with Russia,” he said, “is to have the confidence and the strength which is provided by strong collective defense, the NATO alliance.”
Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski told the Brussels Forum that there has been a worrisome lag between NATO’s promises of more defensive equipment for Poland and what has actually arrived, a blow to the alliance’s credibility. “It’s very important and necessary for everyone to have the conviction, including the potential aggressor to have this conviction, that NATO is truly determined to execute contingency plans,” he said.
The White House missed a perfect opportunity to reinforce that message this week in snubbing Stoltenberg. It fits into a narrative pushed by Obama critics that he would rather meet with problematic leaders such as Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who will get an Oval Office meeting next month, than firm allies. The message Russian President Vladimir Putin will take away is that the White House-NATO relationship is rocky, and he will be right.
Outlaw — at his March 25, 2015 1:35am comment below — asks us if there is really anything new since the early 1980s re: hybrid (and political/unconventional?) warfare?
Herein suggesting that “the only difference between say 1983 and now is the internet, speed of mass communications i.e., social media, and new weapons technologies.”
I must beg to differ.
As my argument below suggests, what is new is that the United States/the West, post-the Cold War, has (1) adopted the position that the Soviets/the communists held during the Cold War and, thus, has (2) ceded the moral high ground to our opponents — wherever in the world they may be.
Explanation:
a. During the Cold War, the Soviets/the communists were the one’s that were seen as being embarked on a crusade to impose their alien and profane political, economic and social preferences on others.
b. Post-the Cold War, it has been the United States/the West that has been seen in this light.
c. During the Cold War, the United States/the West could, in the face of the Soviet/communist threat to traditional ways of life, be seen as something of a “cultural defender.”
d. Post-the Cold War, the United States/the West could (much as was the case with the Soviets/the communists during the Cold War) be seen as something of a “cultural destroyer.”
e. Thus, during the “Soviets/the communists v. the Rest of the World” scenario of the Cold War, the United States/the West could often find common cause with the Rest of the World.
f. In today’s the “United States/the West v. the Rest of the World” scenario, however, it is the Russians, the Chinese, the Islamists, etc., who can often find something akin to a common cause and, thus, can be seen to be employing somewhat common defensive rationales, rhetorics and techniques.
Thus, I suggest — and specifically re: political, hybrid and unconventional warfare considerations today — it is this amazingly new, different and, shall we say, “role reversal” backdrop and paradigm that must come to form the basis for our discussions.
Discussions that have (as the fate of the Soviets/the communists might indicate) exceptionally important implications.
I posted this in another thread and I think it belongs here:
“Americans: You are trying to use NATO to push the EU as a trading bloc! Want us to protect your back while YOU pivot to Asia economically!
French: The EU is American hegemony! You screw us over to get better deals FOR YOU!
British: The Americans are screwing us over on the EU! Do you know how much we invest in your country?
Americans: Yeah, thanks for nothing on NATO by the way, whispering in our ears to get involved in Syria and stay in the MidEast while cutting your defense budgets! Who are you all fooling on the Saudis and the Gulfies? Nice of the Qataris to be so interested in British education.
British: Ha, like you should talk. Any retired Generals asking for the 28 pages to be released. Oh, wait a minute. Don’t do that.”
Pushing into Ukraine (and many parties supported this within many different nations for different national reasons) only intensified this, and, frankly, General Breedlove’s behavior has increased the tensions among different parties, IMO, although some around here probably think I am being too hard on him. His behavior is not that of a, uh, uniter, though. Not in practice.
I wonder what collection of DC factions is supporting him and what he is really representing? The Germans must have been furious for that article in Der Spiegel to appear. Or is he stuck because if he stays quiet, some get upset, but if he speaks up, others get upset.
Built into the cake of NATO expansion and game theory, I guess.
What a riotous mess. And why no mention of this?
(Reuters) – Ukraine’s president fired powerful tycoon Ihor Kolomoisky as a regional governor on Wednesday in a risky move that could affect the internal balance of power and Kiev’s fight against Moscow-backed separatists.
Ukraine leader fires powerful oligarch Kolomoisky as regional chief
BY RICHARD BALMFORTH
Sorry, again with the links but you can search for yourselves.
It’s not 1985. There are different medias, heck, Google Earth, you know? The Chinese must be laughing themselves silly. Hey, I don’t blame them, they work hard, they want to be top dog. It’s just life. Everyone does, in one way or another.
@ Bill
I was thinking of this article, among others. To be fair, the article says that Washington is vetting this stuff, he’s no rogue? I confess, I find the whole thing very strange. Various NATO parties are fighting and the Ukraine crisis is the result (partly):
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-concerned-about-aggressive-nato-stance-on-ukraine-a-1022193.html
The differences between German and American views on Russia in Ukraine may very well be cultural. Since WWII there is a cultural inclination in Germany to shy away from war, so follows all of western Europe. The Germans alone suffered about 9 million total civilian and military deaths. The U.S. has no comparable experience to such heavy losses. The U.S. and Germany see Russia through different experiences, it should be no surprise how they interpret intelligence, the OE, or how they spin their views on Russia to to the public….for better or worse.
This dispute is similar to the current US/KSA and US/Israeli dispute–reminds me of this quote that kind of sums up everything.
By the way it seems both the KSA and Israel are going it alone as they have written off the current US administration as nothing but interested in their 2017 legacy nothing more nothing less.
Notice how the US “leaks” intel info although old but in fact just as damaging in the ME.
Outside of four single sat photos released by the US taken over the Ukraine and around the Debaltseve fighting the US has released absolutely nothing that would rock the Russia boat even though the Russians have challenged them three times to release their data–ever wonder why?
Obama’s recent actions, sadly, confirm the great Mideast scholar Bernard Lewis’ dictum: “America is harmless as an enemy, (but) treacherous as a friend.”
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/032615-745366-was-release-of-nuke-report-meant-to-aid-terrorist-iran-.htm#ixzz3Va5MFEYj
Sirs,
You are surely familiar with the Gerasimov Doctrine of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE, which appears to be working splendidly for Putin?
Russian Army General Valeriy Gerasimov articulated this doctrine in 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Science’s annual meeting. In 2014, his doctrine was officially adopted as Russian Military Doctrine. Was anyone in NATO paying attention?
Since then, Putin has effectively enacted almost every single plank of Gerasimov’s doctrine.
Gerasimov builds his concept of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE out of the doctrine of COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, which Thomas Schelling discusses in detail in his classic work on the subject, filling a hopper with examples from the Comanche in North America to the Mongols of Ghengis Khan. CD is the precurser of hybrid war and ambiguous warfare. Its orgins are found in tribal wars and tribal conflicts.
Another forgotten source for hybrid warfare is Professor Dean C. Worcester who was Teddy Roosevelt’s man in the Philippines. Worcester was the first strategist to derive lessons about hybrid warfare from the US “Indian” wars and apply those lessons learned to conduct covert-type, anti-insurgent operations on foreign terrain (1890s). What Worcester articulates in his post-war memoires sounds very much like what you are describing as hybrid warfare today.
Coercive diplomacy and ambiguous warfare FAIL, as the scholar of war doctrine, Seymour Brown, points out, when open war breaks out. Putin knows that neither NATO nor the EU will engage him or his proxy Army in OPEN war.
In your “hybrid model,” you don’t take account of the current RUSSIAN practice of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE. Yet, Putin and his General are proving to be masterful shadow commanders.
As I have said elsewhere at SWJ, I don’t see us (NATO/EU) responding effectively to those who are ACTUALLY practicing what you appear to be preaching—namely ambiguous warfare. But Putin most certainly does put his money and hardware where his mouth and doctrine are.
A nice push back by NATO against the Russian argument that NATO could not operate and or have long term bases in the former Warsaw Pact countries that joined NATO-at the outset of the Crimea this was the Russian core disinformation campaign to discredit NATO in the eyes of the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic.
The Russian disinformation was constantly repeated that they had been “told” by Western leaders there would be no eastern NATO expansion and yet NATO expanded eastward thus threatening Russia.
NATO then announced the “Dragoon Ride” of the 3/2 CAV back from their Baltic training areas in the form of a 1200km road march which served both as a warning to Russia, served to visually support NATO eastern members and was a great training opportunity for a CAV unit to conduct a very public tactical road march and get massive PR along the way.
By the way USAREUR has been increasing the public appearances of US military units inside Germany during exercises simply because with the withdrawals/drawdowns and the GWOT most European civil societies have never seen US military forces and their equipment in the public eyes for literally years.
Russia disinformation exploded with subtle threats and not to subtle verbal threats that they would respond in kind which was they unannounced 80plus exercise in full violation of OSCE and Vienna Conventions.
But aside —a great pushback against the Russian disinformation campaigns against the Baltics.
US Mission to NATO ✔ @USNATO
#DragoonRide rolls along…. and #Warthogs come to the party | Video: https://youtu.be/_DqDg9sI1K4?list=PLEFGlgO6LCiSrxdVygQG2akiocBnoM1-f …
Politically speaking this was and is a massive not so subtle statement to Russia that NATO reserves the right of free and unlimited access to all of it NATO members and you will notice the “ride took them close to the Ukraine” something that has not be so publicly stated since 1994.
SACEUR does fully understand the conventional threat that Russia now shows NATO—this scenario is not far from wrong–we are now formally in Cold War v2 and it is not going away in our generations until Russia swings back from her far right side of politics:
Polish, U.S. air defense units exercised countering massive RU ballistic and air attack (map from a tv report) pic.twitter.com/eA65k4eyBU
The exercise, staged with a U.S. Patriot battery, assumed up to 100 Iskander-M strikes and up to 500 air raids in first 12 hrs of conflict.
Russian media ” USA wants to provoke Russia into a conflict in Transdnistria” http://ria.ru/world/20150329/1055211717.html
Bill M., at his March 28, 2015 7:17 AM comment below, suggests, if I read him correctly, that Putin’s political objective was/is to weaken NATO and that, accordingly, this is what Putin is applying his hybrid warfare approach to achieve.
Did I get that right?
General Breedlove, for his part then, would seem to be saying that we should use our “diplomatic tools, informational tools, military tools, economic tools” to counter Putin’s strategic approach and, thereby, prevent him (Putin) from weakening NATO.
Does this also seem correct?
My concern is that the political objective of Putin is not to weaken NATO but, rather, to prevent the West from causing the Ukraine (et. al?) to (a) make a decisive break with Russia and, instead, (2) move to affiliate itself with the West. Putin believing that such a move — if successful — by populations within the Ukraine, would stimulate similar demands and moves by populations within Russia. (Thus, Outlaw’s “Maiden” argument?)
If my (really just Outlaw’s) characterization of Putin’s concerns above is accurate, then we must come to understand Putin’s post-Cold War motivations, political objective and strategy more in terms of “containment” and “roll back” of the West generally. This, given the fact that today it is the United States/the West that is seen — by the populations within Russia and elsewhere throughout the world — as being in an aggressive/expansionist mode.
This such understanding — by populations throughout the world — has important and rather mind-boggling implications, I suggest, for such things as U.S./western political warfare, unconventional warfare, hybrid warfare, information warfare, and “the truth” (and applications of America’s special operations forces to support same).
If “we” are being viewed as being on a crusade today (much as the Soviets/the communists were during the Cold War) to transform other states and societies more along our rather unique and unusual political, economic and social lines — and if “they” are seen (much as we were during the Cold War?) more as “defenders of the faith,” then our enemies will be able to:
a. Point to (much as we did during the Cold War) the fact that such state and societal transformations as the foreign power requires will radically, completely and fundamentally alter the values, attitudes, beliefs and way of life of the targeted populations. Thus, our enemies will be able (much as we were able during the Cold War?) to:
b. Ally themselves “naturally” with the conservative (and/or radically conservative) elements of these populations.
Does this such role-reversal — and the implications thereof — not give us pause? Specifically as relates to such things as how political warfare, hybrid warfare, unconventional warfare, information warfare, etc., would need to be waged/approached by the United States/the West — in such radically different/reverse circumstances as we find ourselves in today?
In discussions on the Russian hybrid warfare or what they call non-linear warfare we definitely do not need to forget that there is also a conventional aspect of non-linear warfare which often gets forgotten.
Finally a US Army General calls what has been ongoing in eastern Ukraine exactly what it has been—pure uninhibited conventional warfare with a very large W.
Gen. Hodges:”The fighting that has been going on in Ukraine is a very serious, kinetic, violent steel-on-steel fight” http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs…nd-rocket-fire …
US general says new Russian offensive in Donbas ‘possible after Easter’
http://www.unian.info/world/1062027-…er-easter.html … pic.twitter.com/lOsDXgPEje
Russia had to supply 150 tons of artillery shells and rockets per day of fighting—NOTE: there is no artillery munitions and or rocket munitions plant inside eastern Ukraine—it all came from Russia usually via rail and or their so called “humanitarian aid” convoys.
Gen. Ben Hodges: “We have never been under Russian artillery like the volume that they are experiencing” in Ukraine
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs…nd-rocket-fire …
Bill M & Outlaw,
When our opponents sign up for what we erroneously call Jihad, they are essentially giving away their lives for a small monthly wage. To them (and their dependents) this wage is often the only paid job they’ve ever had and probably the only one they’ll ever have. When such fatalism – borne of grinding poverty and a sense of complete hopelessness – is misrepresented by us as a desire to go to heaven and get laid (I still find this absurdity so ridiculous every time I read or hear it – and it’s been 30 years now ) we basically deny ourselves any opportunity of ‘Knowing your enemy as you know yourself…etc.’ as Sun Tzu would have it and our military decline continues unabated.
The leadership of the Pak ISI, KSA Mabahith, Iranian Quds and the Fruitcake do not labor under any such ill-founded ‘God’ nonsense. Why is it we do?
It’s all good and well lamenting the absence of Operational art and Strategic vision but for 14 years thru this jaundiced lens we have nourished a malformed ‘Jihad’ acorn and grown a massive RMA oak that has very little penetrating roots into the ground upon which it stands – whether Iraq, AF or perhaps soon the Uk. The slightest breeze (a squad is overrun, a single helicopter goes down, one of our own is captured etc.) and the entire effort begins to lurch alarmingly.
The failure in VN required an enormous effort by the PAVN against the French and the US that took millions of Vietnamese 30 years to bring our military crashing down. IMO in a fight, the Taliban, IS or QUD, would struggle to match a single PAVN Regiment.
Our opponent’s simple fatalism towards their job is the fundamental difference between the manner they execute UW and our own approach. In my mind the acceptance of death as an employment condition goes a long way in explaining why their successful campaigning has cost millions of dollars and our own failures have cost trillions. We are determined to reduce the hazards of dismounted close combat to the same level of risk a policeman might face battling crime in a tough inner-city neighborhood. We have convinced ourselves RMA can solve this impossible equation and render us triumphant. A fools errand if ever there was one.
If we are hoping to create a force that can be rapidly dropped into an UW battle ecosystem we need to attract individuals who are as unconcerned with their future as many of our opponents are. IMO to help facilitate this sentiment for UW we need to attract recruits who are at least 25 year olds. By that age you have seen enough of life’s experiences to wilfully choose a job that is very likely to get you killed or maimed.
Obviously if we hand out body armor and declare ‘Èi tàn èi èpì tàs ‘(With this, or upon this) we’ll attract our own version of fruitcake but currently we are at a considerable disadvantage when we promote any future beyond serving in a fighting infantry unit.
A perfectly level-headed 5th generation refugee stuck for his entire existence in some Baluchi/Gaza/Kashmiri/Somali shit-hole does not concern himself with longevity, medevac, college degrees or a pension when he is making a decision to join the fight. He wants to know on what day of the month he gets paid.
Funnily enough the best example of how not to recruit for UW is to reflect upon the mental aptitude of the foreign fighters who originate from more affluent societies and join guerrilla armies. Many of them have volunteered because they have been marginalized by their own society. This manifests in a range of problems – dysfunctional behavior at best and severe mental health psychosis at worst. As opposed to popular belief such ‘committed’ FFs are generally considered a liability by the natives and find themselves steered into actions that often result in severe losses – Kobane in Iraq being a perfect example.
The dirt-poor illiterate native on the other hand is as sane a person you’d ever hope to meet. He has made a rational decision to exchange a unrewarding laboring job for a regular income carrying a weapon. Before he embraces such a dangerous undertaking he accepts that death is highly probable and gets on with it. If he did not he would not enlist. Such an understanding enables an individual to remain an effective and resilient fighters for decades and at a fraction of what we spend to motivate a sane westerner to do a single tour. For our opponents each successive month they remain in the job is considered another bonus month among living wage-earners!
As Bill M said the US can train you like no other and I would add once you are in the fray they can keep you alive like no other – as opposed to the complete absence of decent training & support our fatalistic opponents endure. We need to marry this same grim acceptance that death is inevitable to our vastly superior ability to keep our fighters alive and effective.
Obviously death is not a given nor desirable but we need to establish the understanding that for a UW fighter there is nothing that warrants serious consideration beyond the next UW fight. This sentiment ratcheted up by our vastly superior training, support and resources would give us an extremely powerful advantage when fighting at close quarters. A coming together of such psychological and physical fighting qualities would create a hair-raising matrix of the support being challenged by the sharp end to keep them alive and vice-versa.
Currently our obsession with avoiding casualties is neutralizing the possibility of this dynamic combat matrix emerging.
The Army of Sparta took this to an even more personal level by disallowing marriage whilst on active service and encouraged a camaraderie wherein many a Spartan was physically and emotionally in love with the man standing at his shoulder. His hoplon was not designed to shield his own body but the man to his left. This is level of commitment is a step too far for most but it is interesting to note the Taliban, IS et al all practice pederasty and when inclined to seek female companionship they enslave or recruit ‘Jihadi’ brides.
Who knows perhaps the current ‘Women for Combat’ movement could find their ambition to have women in combat fast-tracked by SOC endeavoring to raise an effective UW/CUW force.
My own personal bias stops me suggesting your own children as ‘camp-followers.’ I for the life of me can’t see anything martially inspiring about having your own children in theater (in fact the complete opposite) but that’s just me. Our opponents however are more than happy to have their off-spring located within earshot of the battlefield upon which they fight.
Obviously this uncompromising ethos is not necessary nor desirable for most of the military. However one thing is certain, if the chain of command responsible for conducting UW does not embrace Mission Command as the be all and end all of sustainable UW, we will continue to get weaker.
I just thought of a name to put on your UW tab – Spartan.
Git sum,
RC
We keep forgetting as well that the Iranians also drive on a form of hybrid warfare.
Things are now getting “hot” in the Sunni Shia divide–the US Administration simply did not anticipate this occurring when in fact a number of people warned them it would happen–ie the KSA.
This Qassem Soleimani Instagram was deleted minutes after it was posted. The Mideast as Iran vs Saudi pic.twitter.com/0a7cio4HkU
Needless to say we have all had different experiences that have shaped our opinions regarding the religious beliefs of our opponents – and our allies for that matter. I would suggest in Iraq and AF 99 % of our opponents consider themselves to be practicing Muslims. The important question is to what extent those beliefs motivate their determination to fight and die for Islam.
Many moons ago I was struck by how ideal the obligations demanded in the Koran for the conduct of Jihad were suited to UW. I somewhat naively believed folks who were religiously observant in their daily lives would be as equally faithful in the application of a Jihad/UW matrix. I don’t know why I equated the commitment to the simple rituals pertaining to daily pray, ablution, greeting, abstinence, clothing etc. with the hardship and violence of irregular warfare. As I said, it was a long time ago.
During my first deployment I identified a trend that indicated effective fighters, who I knew to be particularly strict with themselves in matters of their faith, were more likely to be among the KIA. Whereas those less observant remained in vocal abundance and rude health. This wasn’t something that went unnoticed by the majority and it could cause considerable bad blood if a ‘doubting Thomas’ (if you will) felt embarrassed by the actions of the more determined/pious.
Though this resentment came as somewhat of a surprise to me it did not surprise the natives. After about 12 months I began to appreciate a significant difference between the majority talking the talk and a very small minority walking the walk when the question of faith and death came calling.
The straw that broke the camel’s back came when I returned to HQ with a small bundle of personal items belongings to a popular and effective commander who was KIA. He was also deeply religious. We had attempted to stretcher the wounded men out but attempting to transport badly wounded in this manner is an appalling experience for both wounded and the stretcher-bearers. After a day sepsis took hold and the constant jostling caused by manhandling stretcher cases over mountainous terrain broke open the wounds etc. They all succumbed to a slow painful death before we reached safety.
Standing before their CO I recounted the harrowing experience and how better a field-ambulance or a field-hospital in-country would do wonders for all concerned. Sitting in his water-cooled office, behind a teak neo-Georgian desk, in his tailored silk clothes, gold RADO watch, fine carpets, shiny new pickup parked out front he chided me for my lack of understanding for his faith and how those that had succumbed to their wounds were blessed to have been martyred. With a scarcely concealed yawn (it was midday and the height of summer) he proceeded to regale his desire for his own martyrdom (no doubt sometime after his midday nap).
This commander (who I had thought one of the better ones) wasn’t a religious blowhard but his Staff was peppered with Wahhabi Fruitcake who were particularly odious in their fire & brimstone lecturing of the natives and the occasional infidel. The mostly illiterate fighters were forever reminded by the Fruitcake of their ignorance of the holy language and were constantly berated for their fondness for dancing, female Hindu singers and other transgressions.
When the lack of Fruitcake presence at the sharp end was mentioned the Fruitcake denouncements took on a more shrill tone bordering on hysteria. One particular Fruitcake prosecuted the line that these heroes considered their HQ skills a curse and if only the natives were better Muslims and capable Staffers, they would gladly go off to the front where blissful martyrdom was plentiful.
My team were somewhat bemused by my anger at this complete bullshit. Despite nearly all of them being much younger than I and with ‘goat-shit between their toes’ they were somewhat perplexed I expected anything different.
Within a year this disastrous Wahhabi influence (much of it funded by the US Gov it has to be said) had begun to spread throughout the leadership. By the time the Soviet had basically wiped out the resistance insurgency the senior leadership had been completely corrupted by their friends from the Gulf. The rise of the Wahhabi and the demise of the Muj fighting effectiveness didn’t come as a surprise to anyone – perhaps with the exception of Charlie Wilson.
Equally unsurprising when the Soviet support dried up and this toxic Pak-centric leadership returned to AF they proceeded to destroy what remained of the country. Whilst the Pak-based leaders fought among themselves the UW arm of the Pak Army (The Taliban) stepped into the chaos. The Talibs were followed by the Costa Nostra who proceeded to blanket the countryside with poppy under the patronage of the Talibs and their ISI masters.
What followed is history.
The effects of toxic leaders is something we are all familiar with. However in a fighting force that purports divine inspiration and eulogizes death in combat as the ultimate prize, bad leadership is extremely destructive. Throw in a bunch of Fruitcake who cast the light fantastic how everyone should be actively trying to get themselves killed and you have a toxic mix from hell that makes effective IW impossible.
I dare suggest 99.9 % of the fighters had never heard of Lord Acton but if you were to remark ‘Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’ your average illiterate fighter would know exactly who and what you were referring to.
So what?
As Bill M rightly points out it is highly likely you will be confronted by some opponents willing to fight and die for Islam. My experience is that these folks represent a very small minority and are KIA quickly and often wastefully. The destructive decision-making causes those who witness the death of these faithful few to question the purpose of these deaths and the blatant hypocrisy/incompetence of the leadership that caused them.
It is my experience Jihadi leadership attracts a type of personality that our secular outlook might better be served by viewing it as fascist rather than Islamic. Rather than religious leaders acting like fascists I believe it is more accurate and useful to approach it as fascist leaders acting as Muslims.
The application of simplistic dogma, racial intolerance, religious bigotry, rigid discipline, gratuitous violence, avarice, corruption, extreme vanity etc. (and that’s directed at their own people) are all characteristics we readily identify with fascism. The IS’s slaughter of Shite recruits is something you could have lifted out of a WW2 concentration camp newsreel.
Naturally many of the faithful who are not KIA or WIA end up deserting. Those who choose to remain, find it necessary to re-examine their philosophical approach to the fight. From my observations those who remain religious and are effective fighters internalize their religious beliefs and disassociate the fighting and dying from religion and stay for more material/worldly reasons. Their religion becomes somewhat puritan and this path becomes very narrow and personal to the extent there is little room for fellow-travelers.
Taking orders from some native asshole who claims to be inspired by God is profoundly resented – to put it mildly. If a Wahhabi Fruitcake wants them to do something he needs to show the money well before he opens his big mouth.
This sense of disillusionment with leadership offers an opportunity for us to exploit. If we are able to show respect for their faith – both in word and deed – it is possible to drive a wedge between the leadership and its fighters. IMO we tend to succeed in conveying the notion we are not attacking their religion but we squander any goodwill extending from the fighters in particular, and the local population in general, by approaching the leadership as if it were Islamic rather than fascist.
Not only does the leadership find this highly amusing but we alienate the majority of the population who we are at pains not to offend. It is if we put Eichmann, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler etc. on trial for heresy from the teachings of Christ. You’d be hard-pressed to find anyone who was not offended. We couch our dealings with the fascist element with whom we are fighting in a vernacular based on Islamic this, jihadi that, fundamentalist here, sharia there – despite the fact this cadre of leaders cares little for such ideologically based reasoning.
Islamic sensitivity gets us absolutely nowhere with the less than 1% who are actually doing the fighting as they have long given up on the Islamic dimension of the conflict and their cynicism leaves them equally unmoved.
The remaining 99% who are neither fascist nor violent just get more pissed off with the whole charade dragging their faith thru the mud.
IMO the leadership of the KSA and Iran are the best examples of fascist regimes masquerading as a religious entity. The orthodox attire, sharia governance, populist bombast etc. is an elaborate facade for two oil cartels who are determined to control the means of oil production so as to acquire wealth for a tiny clique of elites.
The Pakistan leadership has the decency to wear military uniforms as the go about enriching themselves whilst 180 million of their fellow countrymen are mired in abject poverty.
In the broader sense if adherence to Islamic martyrdom was a significant motivation for Muslim fighters, Israel would not exist. As Israel clearly does exist the faith argument would dictate the Israeli national boundary was a berm running along all its entire borders that contained the bones of several hundred million Islamic martyrs who perished attempting to reclaim the Temple Mount.
In a more contemporary example, if religious motivation was a moral obligation driving Muslim fighters, why is it Islam’s most extreme militant element – the IS – abandoned Kobane and is currently fleeing Tikrit?
We all have one,
RC
NATO is firming up their counter UW strategy in the Baltics:
#NATO will use #SpecialForces in case #hybridwar in #Baltic region.|PL|http://zwojska.pl/4446/nato-wojska-specjalne-wojna-hybrydowa/ … #NSHQ #SOF #NRF #VJTF pic.twitter.com/G2hM0RMVe7
Russia and Putin have truly decided on war in the Ukraine–there will be no compromise.
US and western diplomacy is literally a waste of time and the language of “hard power” is about the only thing he will understand.
This President cannot change his approach at this late of date that makes any impact at all going forward–just reinforces the idea he has swapped the Ukraine for Iran and also reinforces Putin’s image that this President is basically weak.
[B]”Waste of time and nerves” – #Steinmeier acknowledges it was difficult to speak ‘language of diplomacy’ with #Lavrov[/B]http://joinfo.com/world/1001982_
To understand Putin one must learn to “listen” to what he says and sometimes one must learn to read between the lines especially if one “understands” the ideology that drives Putin especially from his chief ideologue Dugin.
Reread his comments on the US and it does say something about his views of the US that will never change.
The whole Putin Q and A session is premised on the false, pre-Enlightenment view that the leader of a country is totally infallible.
Now, a massive military parade so vets can ask Putin a q. One asks if #Russia has any allies, namely against Nazis pic.twitter.com/JN41othw7u
Asked if #Russia has any allies, Putin starts by quoting Alexander III saying Russia has only two: the Army & Navy. Then mentions BRICs
TV host: Who are our enemies? Putin: We’re a big country w/ lots of resources & “nuclear resources & potential
“But we don’t consider anyone to be our enemies” says #Putin (that was 1st reference to Russia’s nuclear potential btw – certainly not last)
Putin said many European leaders don’t want to come to Victory Day because they’ve received a call from the “Washington obkom” banning them
Putin says the U.S. is trying to force its models of development on Eastern Europe just like the Soviet Union did after World War II.
Classic #Putin: Yes, our forefathers were wrong to use force against eastern Europeans. Now Americans trying to do same thing. They’ll fail
‘You can’t compare Nazism and Stalinism’ Putin says. Highly sensitive topic today in Russia.
Putin says wrong to compare Nazism & Stalinism but talks about Stalinism’s monstrousness, says the Soviet Union did force model on E Eur
“You can’t compare Nazism and Stalinism side by side because Nazis tried to kill entire races,” says Putin. Stalin deportations not as bad.
Putin says recent murders of regime opponents in Ukraine – including Oles Buzina, killed minutes ago – show Ukraine’s not becoming European.
#Putin: I will tell you openly and straightly. There are no #Russia|n troops in #Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/tWB6golhHY
Putin: I’m not nationalist. We’re against nationalism. It’s not our fault that relations with the West are ruined. U.S. wants “vassals.”
Need to pay attention to what specific Russians are saying—
Gerasimov hinting at a future world war: “It’s difficult to foresee how this will all end”
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/570891/Russia-US-Nato-West-world-domination-world-war-3 … pic.twitter.com/DtLimQhV4h
#Russia’s chief of the General Staff accuses the #US of seeking world dominance and says that was what forced #Russia to invade #Crimea.
This comment today from Putin in his annual 4 hour telephone question and answer session should put to rest the accussation concerning NATO expansion–seems that the eastern Europeans knew what they wanted after the SU. Anything but the Soviet Union.
Even Putin confirmed it today–sometimes he amazes me and admits the truth.
#Putin admits that it was wrong after 1945 to try and force eastern #Europe to live under a Soviet system and they are feeling the echoes.
If one takes the time to read phases one and two of the Russian UW doctrine of non linear warfare you will notice the extreme importance of “informational conflict” or what some of us call “weaponization of information”.
Russia lies, cheats and steals if necessary to fulfill their geo political goals as that is “allowed” when using their doctrine all the while complaining the West is not influencing the Ukrainians enough and or actually responsible for what is happening in the Ukraine–“it ain’t us” is their constant mantra and has been since Crimea.
We have heard the countless “myths” spun since the crimea;
1. NATO expansionism
2. violating our perceived “sphere of influence”
3. we were lied to during the 4+2 German agreements about no NATO bases in the east
4. US supported and pushed a junta style takeover of the Ukraine
5. the US is responsible because of it’s previous actions in Libya, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq, Syria and Yemen
6. the US “wants” to keep us from being a great country-they are attempting to dictate to us as a vassal
7. we were forced by US actions to physically take Crimea
And the list goes on for a couple of more points.
BUT then Putin himself yesterday basically blames the Soviet Union for the mistreatment of the eastern European countries and then this today:
U.S. military trainers in Ukraine may ‘destabilize’ situation: Kremlin http://reut.rs/1DcAN5s
One could actually make the accusation that it is in fact Putin is the “destabilizing factor” ie;
1. he defined his Putin Doctrine in his Duma speech after the Crimea annexation–I will defend all ethnic Russians regardless of where they reside PLUs he annexed Crimea
2. Putin is driving a neo nationalistic form of Russian fascism that is built on expansionism–built on religion and hatred of anything non Russian and or neo liberal
3. Putin supported a very corrupt Ukrainian President where the country is basically missing an unbelievable shortfall of 30B USDs that “disappeared on his watch”
4. Putin “allowed” eight different Russian nationalist mercenary groups to cross into the Ukraine as paid mercenaries
5. Putin has provided “vacationing and contract Russian soldiers” to fight in the Ukraine as well has new and modern heavy weapons, munitions and fuel almost on a daily basis and yet denies it all
6. Importantly Putin is paying for all the Russian mercenaries AND stealing factory after factory and shipping them back to Russian along with Ukrainian coal.
6. AND most importantly Putin is not implementing any of the Minsk 1 and 2 agreements yet complains it is the US that is “destabilizing” and the Ukrainians are not “fulfilling Minsk”.
Strange is it not that the West continues to believe they can actually deal with him on any level???
Seems the Russian military are quick learners when they notice a single point of failure within their own UW doctrine or what should be improved.
Russia’s army of bots & trolls is getting reinforcements: Moscow plans a special “information ops” military unit.
https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/04/17/russia-to-set-up-information-forces… …
There is another single point of failure in the Russian non linear warfare doctrine that is becoming daily more apparent:
What happens when the locals wake up one day and discover you are not really supporting them in their demands that you are declaring to the world are so important. IE defending the rights of ethnic Russians wherever they reside.
1. this week 100 Russian mercenaries returned to St. Petersburg retuned and told Russian news media–the locals were constantly calling them “occupiers and they should leave”
2. then this video in a town being hotly contested by Russian mercenaries an older women made her comments known to one of the top Russian mercenary leaders who was visiting there with Russian JCCC personnel providing them protection
At Shyrokyno, Ukrainian woman asks Russian stooge Basurin a fair question. Full video http://youtu.be/N_DlrQkINeo pic.twitter.com/OjVFboXooo
Now that we fully understand the Russian “end state for the eastern Ukraine” what will the response for Obama and his NSC be since the obvious failure of negotiations with Iran are becoming more apparent daily???
We do not need negotiations if the motto “is to just give everything away to avoid conflict”–just give it away would save the US taxpayers a lot of travel expenses being paid to the negotiation teams and the media a lot of waiting around time.
#BREAKING #Putin says Russia would consider recognizing “#Donetsk/#Luhansk People’s Republic”
Was not this exactly what they stated about Crimea before they actually did annex the Crimea???
http://www.interfax.ru/russia/437036
BUT then again it just might be the 18th version of a 29 version informational conflict campaign–IMO Putin himself is just winging it hoping not to start a full blown war.
#Russia’s #Putin says ready to work with #US only 2 days after accusing America of trying to dominate world affairs
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3044667/Russias-Putin-says-ready-work-United-States-TV.html …
Really worth the reading of this article:
‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t
Mark Galeotti, Apr 16 2015
When Russian special forces seized Crimea at the end of February 2014, without their insignia, but with the latest military kit, it seemed as the start of a new era of warfare. Certainly, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that Moscow, in a bid to square its regional ambitions with its sharply limited resources, has assiduously and effectively developed a new style of ‘guerrilla geopolitics’ which leverages its capacity for misdirection, bluff, intelligence operations, and targeted violence to maximise its opportunities. However, it is too soon to declare that this represents some transformative novelty, because Moscow’s Ukrainian adventures have not only demonstrated the power of such ‘hybrid’ or ‘non-linear’ ways of warfare, but also their distinct limitations.
The Genesis of the Idea
The essence of Russia’s tactics was precisely to try and avoid the need for shooting as much as possible, and then to try and ensure that whatever shooting took place was on the terms that suited them best. To this end, they blended the use of a range of assets, from gangster allies to media spin, in a manner that draws heavily on past political operations, not least the aktivnye meropriyatiya (‘active measures’) of Soviet times (Madeira, 2014).
While not entirely new, their tactics were given a particular novelty simply by the characteristics of the contemporary world, something recognised by the Chief of the General Staff Valerii Gerasimov, in a crucial article from 2013, in which he noted that ‘The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness’ (Gerasimov, 2013). In what is ostensibly a piece on the lessons of the ‘Arab Spring’ – which Kremlin orthodoxy presents as the result of covert Western campaigns of regime change – he outlines a new age in which:
Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template… [A] perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a morass of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.
There are a variety of reasons why today’s Russia may find itself favouring operations in which, still to quote Gerasimov, ‘The open use of forces – often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.’ For a start, despite the still-formidable size of its military, in practice, many of its forces remain antiquated, poorly trained, and scarcely operational. Moscow clearly has the preponderance of military and economic muscle in post-Soviet Eurasia, the region in which it feels it has hegemonic rights. However, not only is this apparent advantage to a considerable extent neutralised by the risk of involving the USA, China, or even the European Union in case of obvious aggression, it is also often not so overwhelming as to guarantee a quick and above all risk-free adventure. Even the five-day war against Georgia in 2008, while a victory, was a sufficiently painful one – with friendly fire incidents, communications mix-ups, and vehicle break-downs – that it galvanised meaningful military reform for the first time in more than two decades (Cohen and Hamilton, 2011).
Non-Linear Instruments
Instead, Russia finds itself in a situation where many of its strengths are either less decisive than it might like, or else are constrained because of economic or geopolitical realities. Put bluntly, a country with an economy somewhere between the size of Italy’s and Brazil’s is seeking to assert a great power international role and agenda. To this end, Russia has turned to this new ‘guerrilla geopolitics’ as a means of playing to its strengths and its opponents’ weaknesses. It has also invested disproportionate resources into the assets most useful for such conflicts.
These are, broadly speaking, three, and they reflect how this is a way of war which even more explicitly than most targets not the opponent’s military or even economic capacity, but their will and ability to fight at all. Of course there is a ‘kinetic’ element ¬– the need to deploy armed forces and sometimes for them to fight – but the forces required for this will tend to have to operate with more autonomy than has in the past been usual for Russian troops, and likewise with greater precision. Thus, Russia has been developing its special and intervention forces, especially its 12,000 or so Spetsnaz. These are generally described as special forces, but they are highly mobile and effective light infantry akin to US Rangers or the French Foreign Legion, rather than true commandos (Galeotti, 2015). Instead, the newly established Special Operations Command (KSO) has perhaps 500 true operators in what in the West would be called ‘Tier One’ akin to the British SAS or US Delta force. Nonetheless, the Spetsnaz, like the VDV Airborne Troops or the Naval Infantry marines, represent an ‘army within an army’ able to operate professionally, decisively, covertly if need be, and outside Russia’s borders.
There is an ‘intelligence-war’ dimension beyond the ‘military war’. The Kremlin has devoted particular resources in its intelligence community. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU, military intelligence), and even the Federal Security Service (FSB), which is increasingly involved in overseas operations, are not only agencies tasked with gathering information about foreign capabilities and intentions. Rather, they are also instruments of non-linear warfare, spreading despair and disinformation, encouraging defections, and breaking or corrupting lines of command and communications.
The third particular focus for Kremlin efforts has been its capacity to fight the ‘information war,’ to broadcast its own message and undermine and contest those of others in the name of winning the war in their hearts and minds (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014). The RT international television station, for example, has become a crucial player not only in espousing the Kremlin line, but, perhaps more importantly, in challenging Western media orthodoxy with a glitzy mix of genuine investigation, bizarre conspiracy theory, and cynical disingenuousness (Ioffe, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2014). Its 2015 budget is due to increase by almost 30%, suggesting the Kremlin appreciates its role.
Crimea: When It Works
The application of these new, deniable, and politically driven tactics in Ukraine has proven their potential value, but also the risks. In so many ways, Crimea was the perfect context in which the Russians could test out their new approach. The Peninsula already had Russian Black Sea Fleet facilities including the 810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade, amongst whom KSO operators could quietly be secreted under cover of regular troop rotations. The local Ukrainian military forces, which in any event would never get clear orders from Kiev, were essentially technicians and mechanics, not front-line combat troops. The local population, alienated by twenty years of neglect and maladministration by Kiev, were largely willing to join richer Russia, and there were political and also criminal powerbrokers especially eager to become the agents of a new Muscovite order.
On 27 February, KSO and Naval Infantry seized the Crimean parliament building and began blockading Ukrainian bases on Crimea. Despite their modern Russian uniforms and weapons, the lack of insignia on these ‘little green men’ and Moscow’s flat denial that they were Russian troops was enough to inject a moment’s uncertainty into the calculations in both Kiev and NATO. Were they mercenaries, could it be Crimean vigilantes, or was this some unsanctioned adventure by a local commander? This deliberate maskirovka, or deception operations, was enough to give the Russians and their local allies the time to take up commanding positions across Crimea, including blockading Ukrainian garrisons, such that even if they had then been ordered to fight, they would have been in a very weak position. Ultimately, they surrendered after at most the demonstrative use of a few tear gas grenades, and Russia was able to seize Crimea without a single fatal casualty (Howard and Pukhov, 2014).
The reasons for the success were several. The new government in Kiev was already in disarray and mistrustful of its military commanders, something Moscow could encourage. The Russians had not only good troops already in-theatre and the opportunity covertly to introduce more, they also had a broadly supportive local population. Ukrainian forces, by contrast, were largely not combat ready, scattered in smaller garrisons, demoralised and in some cases sympathetic to or suborned by the Russians. Likewise, the local police and even Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) were penetrated by the Russians, while there were ample allies within the Crimean political and criminal elite to provide both compliant front men and a supply of thuggish ‘local self-defence militias.’
For Moscow, these were the ideal possible conditions. They precluded the need to destabilise the target before intervention, allowed Russia to wage a pre-emptive information war to establish grounds for its mission, and allowed it to use its troops to assert and maintain a near-bloodless fait accompli with, if not deniability, at least a degree of ambiguity.
The Donbas: When it Doesn’t
However, the subsequent adventure into south-eastern Ukraine – Novorossiya in the new Russian lexicon – while undoubtedly also following the non-linear war playbook, has shown how this is by no means the guaranteed war-winner some had initially assumed. Again, the Russians armed and supported irregular allied detachments, backed by a deniable force of their own special forces, while presenting this as an entirely spontaneous and local response to an illegal transfer of power in Kiev. The full panoply of Russian propaganda was deployed to muddy the waters in the West, especially by presenting the new Ukrainian regime as comprising or depending on ‘fascists.’
The expectation appears to have been again that this would be a quick operation that would capitalise on Western hesitancy and its need for consensus politics. Chaos would be stirred up in Novorossiya to demonstrate to Kiev just what could happen if it failed to appreciate its place within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Rather than face a Russian-backed insurgency just at the time it was trying to build a new Ukraine, the government would make suitable obeisance and concessions, above all ruling out further movement towards the European Union and NATO and also constitutional guarantees for Moscow’s allies and clients in the east. Russian active operations would be ended, and all before the West had had a chance to decide what to do.
So much for neat plans, and the Kremlin’s glib assumptions that all would run smoothly epitomises a cocky attitude that prevailed in government circles after Crimea. As one senior military advisor told me at that time, ‘Russia is back. And we now know of what we are capable.’ The very disarray in Kiev, which had worked to Moscow’s advantage over Crimea, now proved a serious problem, as there was no one there able or willing to make the kind of politically ruinous concessions the Russians were demanding. Instead, a ‘short, victorious little war’ (as Interior Minister Plehve invoked before the disastrous 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War) turned into a ‘bleeding wound’ (as Mikhail Gorbachev characterised the 1979-88 invasion of Afghanistan).
Militarily, Russia could maintain the war, not least by the drip-fed addition of military matériel for the fighters of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. Russian troops maintain a role on the battlefield in the guise of ‘volunteers’ alongside locals, mercenaries, and adventurers, including many Russians and Cossacks marshalled and armed by the GRU in Rostov and moved across the border into Ukraine (RFE/RL, 2014). Others provide training or technical support for the heavy weapons Russia has provided. In situations where it looks as if government troops might even make serious headway on the battlefield, such as in August, a large body of Russian troops were deployed across the border directly to ensure that the insurgent forces were not defeated, only then to be withdrawn – all without any formal acknowledgement of their role.
Russia has been able to maintain an insurgency which, by all accounts, has some genuine local support, but which in military terms is really best considered a loose coalition of local warlords, gangsters, opportunists, and Kremlin proxies. However, it has done so at catastrophic cost, considering the economic impact of the consequent Western sanctions regime, and with no evidence of any successful outcome. Both Kiev and Moscow now want the conflict to end, but unless one side or the other is willing to make greater concessions than have yet been placed on the table, Novorossiya risks becoming an unviable frozen conflict, a pseudo-state dependent on Moscow for its security and economic survival, while in return dooming Russia to continuing international opprobrium and economic crisis.
Conclusions: Politics Is All
Why such a different outcome? The first crucial difference was in the intended outcome: seizing Crimea was a relatively simple objective and although the issue would have been more complicated had the Ukrainians fought, either on Kiev’s orders or local initiative, ultimately it was up to the Russians to win or lose. Their subsequent adventure, though, was a political gambit to influence Ukrainian politics and, as such, dependent on a multitude of factors beyond Moscow’s control, or even imagination.
Most of the same operational advantages were present. A contiguous border allowed for the quick deployment of forces and reliable resupply of men and matériel. The Russians had and have near-absolute command of the air and a preponderance of artillery. Ukraine’s forces have proven largely of indifferent quality; their capacity is undermined by Russian intelligence activity, including the presence of foreign agents within the ranks of their command structure (Galeotti 2014). Moscow had the initiative, and could also rely on local allies and agents.
But while in military terms, the operation was a success, the military is purely a part of the political campaign, and that has been a disastrous failure. What this highlights is that this new style of war, which seeks to rely on multiple military and non-military shocks to paralyse the enemy and break their will to resist, depends above all on a clear and accurate understanding of the political context in which it will operate. Putin gambled that over Crimea, Kiev would be unable to respond meaningfully and on time, and that Western anger and dismay would likely soon ebb, not least as new crises and challenges arise to direct its attention elsewhere. He was probably right. But perhaps over-emboldened by the effortless victory in Crimea, he overreached dangerously in his subsequent intervention into mainland Ukraine.
The Russian state won the ‘military war’ to create Novorossiya. It won the ‘intelligence war’ to support combat operations. It even had successes in the ‘information war’ to undermine Western enthusiasm for direct involvement, at least until the tragic blunder which was the shooting down of MH17. However, the essence of ‘non-linear war’ is that all these diverse components must effectively combine to win the underlying ‘political war’ to achieve the desired aim, and here Moscow is losing, and losing badly.
Does this mean that ‘non-linear war’ is just a temporary fad? No. In an age of interconnected economies, expensive militaries, and the 24/7 news cycle, if anything the fusion of a range of different types of conflict will become the norm. Indeed, arguably the combination of Western military aid on the battlefield, economic sanctions, and political pressure represent a similarly non-linear and asymmetric response. Where Russia leads, the West – but also perhaps China, India, and other powers looking to asserting their power in restrictive and non-permissive political environments – may well follow, albeit carefully learning the lessons of Crimea and Novorossiya alike.
References:
Cohen, A. and Hamilton, R. (2011) The Russian Military and the Georgia War: lessons and implications. Carlisle: US Army Strategic Studies Institute.
Galeotti, M. (2015) ‘Behind enemy lines: the rising influence of Russia’s special forces,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, January.
Galeotti, M. (2014) ‘Moscow’s Spy Game: Why Russia Is Winning the Intelligence War in Ukraine,’ Foreign Affairs, 30 October. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142321/mark-galeotti/moscows-spy-game.
Gerasimov, V. (2013) ‘Novye vyzovy trebuyut pereosmyslenniya form i sposobov vedeniya boevykh deistvii,’ Voenno-promyshlennye kur’er, No. 8.
‘The “Gerasimov Doctrine” and Russian Non-Linear War’ (2014) In Moscow’s Shadows, 6 July. Available at: http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/#more-2291.
Howard C. and Pukhov, R. (eds) (2014) Brothers Armed: military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine. Minneapolis: East View Press.
Ioffe, J. (2010) ‘What is Russia Today?’ Columbia Journalism Review, 28 September. Available at: http://www.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php.
Madeira, V. (2014) ‘Russian subversion – haven’t we been here before?’ Institute of Statecraft, 30 July. Available at: http://www.statecraft.org.uk/research/russian-subversion-havent-we-been-here.
O’Sullivan, J. (2014) ‘The difference between real journalism and Russia Today,’ The Spectator, 6 December. Available at: http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9390782/the-truth-about-russia-today-is-that-it-is-putins-mouthpiece/.
Pomerantsev P. and Weiss, M. (2014) ‘The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,’ The Interpreter. Available at: http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf.
RFE/RL (2014) video, ‘Interview: I was a separatist fighter in Ukraine,’ 13 July. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-i-was-a-separatist-fighter/25455466.html.
An interesting farewell from a solid journalist who has been working the eastern European area and who I have met here in Berlin recently.
10 years and 300,000 words later, a final farewell
Almost exactly ten years ago Edward Lucas took over Wi(l)der Europe, now it is time to say goodbye.
by Edward Lucas on 17.04.2015 / 07:44 CET
“Write whatever you like, and at exactly 600 words so they have no excuse to edit it.” With those words my friend Robert Cottrell bequeathed me the then “Wi(l)der Europe” column in European Voice. Almost exactly ten years and 300,000 words later, it is time to say goodbye, with a mixture of gratitude and disappointment.
The thanks go to my editors, chiefly Tim King and Andrew Gardner, for steering the column into print with the lightest of touches, for paying me generously, and for allowing me the pleasure of untrammelled access to their pages. I am also grateful to the many readers who lauded (and sometimes complained) about my thoughts, facts and arguments.
The disappointment is because I failed.
My aim was simple: to give voice to the concerns and viewpoints of the former captive nations of what we used to call “Eastern Europe” (a term I detest), in the hope that sooner or later nobody would try to engage in lame wordplay between “wider” and “wilder”.
I used to take a light-hearted approach, writing about food and drink, linguistic and psychological quirks, literature and scenery. Even then the column had a hard edge. I berated West European politicians and opinion-formers for their pomposity, snobbery and ignorance, and lamented the narrow-mindedness, corruption and incompetence that were the hallmark of post-communist life.
I felt that we were winning. Normality—the decency, dignity, liberty and lawfulness which luckier countries take for granted—was spreading. “Eastern Europe” ceased to exist.
But the big question was always Russia. As an old cold warrior (the last journalist to be expelled from the Soviet Union, in 1990, and Moscow bureau chief for The Economist when Putin came to power in 1998), I had long feared that old Soviet bad habits were merely buried, not dead.
I have a fair claim to be the first to see the current crisis coming. I wrote a book in 2007 called “The New Cold War”. It was widely mocked as scaremongering when it was published; fewer people do that now. Since the Ukraine crisis broke, I have written the column exclusively (some might say monotonously) on the grim topic of European security.
It is grim because we are losing. We are not willing to spend money on defence. We are not willing to take risks. We are not willing to use force. We are not willing to accept economic pain. We are not willing to deal with Kremlin information warfare. Worst of all, we are not yet willing to accept even that Russia is a revisionist power which wants to change the rules.
This is not an east-west split. Some of the countries falling fastest into Putin’s orbit, such as Hungary, are those which suffered greatly at the hands of Soviet occupiers. Some of those that are his most stalwart opponents, such as Sweden, are not even members of NATO. The European Commission has emerged as a formidable adversary for the Kremlin, particularly on energy, just as the disastrous administration of Barack Obama seems set on America’s eclipse as a European power.
I hope still that we are in the darkness before dawn. It is not too late to bolster the Baltics, to save Ukraine, and to punish the Putin regime with real sanctions—directed at the money looted from the Russian people, and the Western bankers, lawyers and accountants who helped launder it.
But I’m not optimistic. Perhaps Putin is right, and the West’s heyday is indeed over. We may have to get used to a world in which rules don’t matter and might is right. Watch this space.
This goes to a large degree to the seemingly confusion in the Putin decision making processes.
IE–one day condemning the US for being responsible for all the world problems and today stating we want to work with the US.
It goes to the term “altered state of reality” I often use.
http://bne.eu/content/story/stolypin-moscow-disconnect
STOLYPIN: The Moscow Disconnect
Mark Galeotti of New York University
April 16, 2015
In a hold over from Soviet days, the mighty Kutuzovsky Prospect highway leading into Moscow’s city centre still has a special middle lane reserved for emergency vehicles or, more often, the motorcades of senior government officials. Not for them the misery of the capital’s notorious traffic jams. They whisk past, in a wholly separate world of smooth, fast and easy transit, protected by wailing-sirened police cars, incognito behind tinted windows. Russian politics likewise appears to be devolving into two distinct realms, as Vladimir Putin and his closest cohorts retreat from the increasingly problematic realities of the real world, into their privileged and secure haven, apart from the people who actually have to administer Russia for them.
It is hardly unusual for there to be disconnects between the rulers and the ruled, but not only are these are times which require some tough and far-sighted policies, but even within the broad category of the “rulers” there is a distinct gulf. Two of the prevailing themes that emerged from a range of meetings and conversations I’ve had in Moscow these past two weeks are a sense of drift and a lack of connection between even senior figures within business, politics and government, and the small circle who actually define policy. As one unusually forthcoming middle-ranking official put it, albeit wisely off the record: “Government has retreated from view, orders come from a secret court, and we don’t know who is making them, how and why.”
Secret Court
Even those who are still confident in their president and claim optimism about the country’s future become coy when pressed about how far they feel that the channels to transmit their views up the power vertical are working well, and to what extent they feel their individual and collective interests are being represented within that “secret court”.
This is perhaps especially visible when it comes to the economy. An economist who in his day consulted frequently for the government threw up his hands and said: “nothing’s happening, we have no meaningful policy.” The people whose job it is to manage Russian macroeconomics do seem strangely uncertain, perhaps because they often don’t get to do their jobs. Multiple sources claimed that the governor of the central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, tried for over a week to schedule a meeting with Putin before last year’s ruble collapse, and Kremlin aides seem to have had at least as much influence over interest rates.
Meanwhile, there is an on-and-off war being waged in Ukraine, but neither the generals nor the diplomats seem either to know the intended end result – or be consulted about strategy. Both within the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their role seems to be simply to await instructions. These often come through Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), which generals grumble now seems to be defining policy.
Although there is something of a cult of Foreign Minister Lavrov these days – you can buy We-Heart-Lavrov t-shirts in the Evropeisky shopping mall – even he does not seem to be playing much of a role in advising on policy, merely executing it. Consider, for example, Russia’s recent attempts to play the “nuclear card”, using a forum of generals to threaten a response up to and including atomic weapons should Nato deploy more troops into its own eastern member states. Apart from the fact that this is a hollow threat, it served only to harden resolve in the Nordic regions. Five nations – the very kind of states Moscow presumably hoped to dismay and deter – came together explicitly to characterize Russia as the foremost threat they faced. As one recently retired diplomat sniffed: “Lavrov would not have made that mistake.”
Detached
It is, of course, a disturbing development when not only the foot soldiers of the Russian state, but also its noncoms and field officers feel that their own commanders are out of touch and unwilling to listen to them.
Beyond that, though, this also speaks to a second, even more problematic issue. If the people making the final decisions seem detached from the processes of daily governance, this is not just a problem for the executive: that same distance makes it harder for the executive to really know what is happening, as a basis for effective policy. In other words: we do not know what Putin knows.
I tend to discount the kind of over-heated claims that he is irrational and erratic. However, a rational actor makes decisions based on the evidence and assessments with which he is presented. We have very little hard information about just how well Putin is being briefed, but another leitmotif of conversations in Moscow was scepticism from specialists of every stripe that he was being kept well informed about their particular area. The economists might accept that he is on top of geopolitics, but were anxious that he did not appreciate the real depth of the financial challenges ahead. The cops assumed everything was going to plan in the Donbas, but felt that the president did not understand the practical challenges they were facing – especially in light of the 10% personnel budget cut being imposed on them – and listened too much to the FSB. And so it went.
Sometimes, the problem seems to be that no one wants to be the one to bring Putin bad news. Within the intelligence community, for example, each agency briefs separately and has learned that getting his ear and favor tends to mean telling him what he wants to hear. Likewise, the Presidential Administration, according to some people I spoke to, can be more interested in keeping everyone happy than ensuring the most accurate perspectives get to Putin’s desk. And a president who prides himself on not using the internet, who has housetrained the media, and who rarely now interacts with his people in anything other than carefully-scripted media events, is unlikely to get an independent take on the state of the nation.
Why should Russia’s rulers address traffic jams so long as they have their own lane? Indeed, do they even know how much time ordinary Muscovites waste in traffic, the frustrations and angers generated as a result? Is anyone telling them? When policy is being determined by a small circle of people increasingly detached from the realities of the country’s situation, and whose own advisers appear determined to protect their isolation, then even the smartest and most rational leaders are unlikely to generate smart and rational policies.
Where in the world has the US IC been in the last seven years–no one was working the Russian desks?
The military capabilities of Russia are expanding faster than expected – the Pentagon
http://liveuamap.com/en/2015/18-april-the-military-capabilities-of-russia-are-expanding …
Some discussion of pre/non-Putin — but, rather, post-Cold War Russian — reasons and responses to NATO expansion:
“One of the observations I made in the Nation article was that after NATO expansion was announced, even Boris Yeltsin—the most pro-Western Russian leader in recent memory, in some ways a weak and, to many Russians, incompetent defender of Russian national interests—even his administration took steps to organize a counter-alliance to NATO. This notion that Putin represents an aberrant nationalist response—that response was already evident even under a much more Western-oriented or compliant Russian regime.”
http://www.thenation.com/blog/181507/hate-say-we-told-you-so-nato-expansion-edition
“Thus, rather than establishing the foundation for a mutually agreed-upon security order, NATO expansion opens the door for future geopolitical rivalry by in effect legitimizing Moscow’s efforts to create its own alliance. One can, of course, hope that despite NATO expansion future, Russian leaders will be smart enough to focus on economic modernization, but as NATO approaches Russian borders, one cannot rule out the return of old fashioned alliance building. Even the Yeltsin government, which represents the political faction in Russia most inclined toward economic modernization and cooperation with the West, has seemingly accepted this logic, for it has in the wake of the signing of the founding act stepped up efforts to strengthen its ties with the former Soviet republics as well as to expand relations with China and Iran in an effort to balance NATO.”
http://thenation.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/caseagainstnatoenlargement1997.pdf
“With the opening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance’s eastern boundary now comprises a new line of contiguity with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as another geopolitical entity within—the Union of Belarus and Russia. Whereas the former states find greater security and regional stability in their new political-military arrangement, NATO’s eastward expansion has led Belarus and Russia to reassess strategic imperatives in their western peripheries, partially stemming from their mutual distrust of the Alliance as a former Cold War adversary. Consequently, security for one is perceived as a threat to the other.”
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/szyszlo.pdf
Thus, shall we agree and admit, that the problem created by NATO’s expansion — and Russia’s responses thereto — (1) transcend Putin and (2) his ideas and behavior?
Next to the use by Russia of special forces and intelligence operations in non linear warfare their “information conflict” is the key to the entire UW strategy and it is one area the West is not even on the same planet with Russia.
Russia military doctrinal definition of their “information conflict”.
Confrontation between two or more states in the information space to damage the information systems, processes and resources, which are of critical importance, and other structures, to undermine the political, economic and social system, and effect massive brainwashing of the population for destabilizing the society and the state, and also forcing the state to make decisions in the interests of the confronting party.
Great example of Russian doctrinal “information conflict”.
Classic propaganda by distortion: #Russia’s map of #NATO “military bases”, and the reality. pic.twitter.com/pIj3nv9dc8
this example depicts what the Russia propaganda machine provides their civil society–if one believes it Russia “would in fact be surrounded by NATO”.
Just a side comment–we hear all the time that NATO must invest and spend more on it’s on defense and one cannot expect the US to constantly led but then if one takes a serious look–what is exactly the US defense posture that signals serious intent to Putin?
A-10s are actually on loan and are not stationed in Europe.
Most of the AF fighter aircraft are from National guard units.
No heavy armored brigade and or division at all in Europe–takes two months or longer to bring one over.
No heavy artillery brigades whatsoever in all of Europe and one Patriot brigade.
One airborne brigade, one helicopter brigade and one ACR–that is it.
Now today the announcement the 24 Apache attack helicopters of the 12th helicopter brigade are being pulled out of Europe due to cost savings and yet we openly complain when each NATO country does not spend 2% of their budget on defense.
Interesting message the WH is sending Europe these days.
Removing Apaches is “surprising decision…adds to uncertainty… around US role in European security”
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/us-removing-24-apache-helicopters-from-europe …
Below I provided information that suggested that Russia’s concern with — and adverse reactions to — NATO’s expansion:
a. Begin before and, thus, transcend Putin. And, thus,
b. Relate more to concerns of defense and security rather than offense and empire.
Herein, for example, we find (in my last link at my comment immediately below):
Yeltsin of Russia, and Lukashenko of Belarus, together forming a strategic and military alliance based on “a Slavic-Orthodox unity increasingly threatened by the West in the form of an expanding NATO.”
Quoted from this link:
“One of the greatest strategic impediments facing Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union was the disappearance of the defensive shield built up by the USSR in its western periphery to protect the Russian heartland from the Western powers. NATO expansion caused Russia to reassess strategic imperatives and rethink security alliances in areas of traditional interest. Belarus was central to that reassessment, as both states regard close military cooperation as a major element of their national security. As the contemporary European security architecture took shape, a new battle began to brew between an expanding NATO and a Russia increasingly concerned over the compression of its western security space—an area which it has held long-standing hegemony.”
This such knowledge seems to negate the argument that Yeltsin and Lukashenko’s actions then — and/or Putin’s actions now — relate to (a) historic Russian imperial/global expansionist designs of which (b) Putin is just the latest version.
Rather, Yeltsin and Lukashenko’s actions then — and Putin’s actions now — appear, in the context offered above, to be more those of a cornered animal; one whose desperate maneuvers and lashing out can best be understood in terms of how dire and dangerous it perceives its present predicament.
Bill M. points to the fact that these such Russian actions — regardless of motivation — threaten U.S./Western interests.
In this I would have to agree.
This, given the fact that U.S./Western interests today are best defined as (1) the desired expansion of our power, influence and control via (2) the promotion of our way of life, our way of governance, our related institutions, and our associated values, attitudes and beliefs.
Seen in this light, Yeltsin and Lukashenko’s actions then — and/or Putin’s actions today — do appear to stand in the way of, and thus threaten, such United States/Western interests.
The question we must ask ourselves, however, is: Re: this obstacle/threat — and because of our insistence on expanding NATO — are we (rather than, for example, Yeltsin, Lukashenko and/or Putin) — really the one’s to blame?
Currently the Russian FM has been on two “rants” over Minsk 2 the last two days that makes one wonder what he has been smoking lately.
When we talk about non linear warfare we assume Putin is not ever going to go nuclear–but given the sheer number of serious threats and the actions of his missile forces and his bomber pilots lately are we really sure he will not go at least tactically nuclear???
At first IMO it was bluffing, but lately it is taken on a different look and feel and it appears that right now Putin and his inner circle are bunkering in and not listening or responding to true “reality” that would make a leader stop and think and others are starting to rethink his threats.
Here’s How Putin Might Use The Nuclear Weapons He Keeps Talking About
The War Room
Tom Nichols
Sep. 2, 2014, 11:42 AM
Tom Nichols is a Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, and a senior associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.
I don’t miss the Cold War, but apparently Russian President Vladimir Putin does. Either that, or he’s now clinically insane.
There aren’t a lot of other explanations for Putin’s nuclear chest-thumping in the past week or so.
So far, it’s vintage Putin: swaggering braggadocio about Russia’s nuclear status that isn’t actually linked to a specific threat, but with enough dots to connect that any foreign observer can take his meaning.
Like the mobster he is, Putin never directly threatens, but instead talks in circles, sort of the way a loan shark explains the many ways you could have an “accident” if you don’t pay up.
This isn’t as new as it looks. The Soviet and later Russian militaries have always been obsessed with nuclear weapons — yes, even more than the Americans — but mostly, in the last few decades, to compensate for the pitiful state of Russian conventional forces. Apparently, nuclear deterrence has now reverted back to Cold War dice-throwing.
So what, exactly is Putin on about? Let’s look at this seriously for a moment, as if Putin isn’t a gangster or a lunatic. Is there actually a strategic logic to the use of a nuclear weapon anywhere in this current crisis?
Russian commentator Andrei Piontkovsky thinks that Putin, at least, believes there is. As Paul Goble reports:
Clearly, [says Piontkovsky], Putin does not seek “the destruction of the hated United States,” a goal that he could achieve “only at the price of mutual suicide.” Instead, his goals are “significantly more modest: the maximum extension of the Russian World, the destruction of NATO, and the discrediting and humiliation of the US as the guarantor of the security of the West.”
To put it in simplest terms, Piontkovsky continues, Putin’s actions would be “revenge for the defeat of the USSR in the third (cold) world war just as the second world war was for Germany an attempt at revenge for defeat in the first.”
If Putin is the old-school Soviet thug I now think he is, then his notional plan will look something like this:
1. Provoke a crisis within the current crisis. There are rumors, for example, that the shootdown of MH17 was actually supposed to be the shootdown of a Russian airliner that could then be used as a pretext for invasion. That’s a little too clever for me, but imagine a sudden Russian lunge toward, say, Odessa, and the US and UK take the recent advice of Ben Judah in the New York Times and send troops to hold the airport there. Now we have exactly the NATO-Russia standoff for which Putin has been striving for months.
2. Get some Russian soldiers killed. Make sure it looks right on RT, preferably with Ukrainian soldiers using Western weapons. (Or better yet, with NATO soldiers returning fire on innocent Russian “peacekeepers” and “aid convoys” or whatever idiotic ruse Putin uses the next time.)
3. Use a nuclear weapon. NATO shatters as everyone west of Warsaw loses control of their bladders.
I’m not saying this is a good plan, but it might be the one Putin and his cronies are considering.
Of course, this is pure crazy talk on many levels.
The Consequences Of Using Nuclear Weapons
First, I can’t figure out how even Putin thinks he secures the future of Russia by becoming the first nation since 1945 to use nuclear weapons. If the Russian president’s goal is to make the world forget about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, place a permanent stain on the word “Russia” for all time, and unite the entire planet against his still-poor, still-weak country, then he is not only unhinged, he’s just plain stupid.
There are other considerations, of course. Exactly what does Putin think he’s going to hit with nuclear weapons? A NATO base in Poland, perhaps? A UK submarine pen? A US ICBM base in Wyoming? This is one of those ideas that probably sounded good after that fourth vodka at 3 am in the Kremlin, hanging out with the boys and getting a shoulder rub from Alina Kabayeva.
Indeed, you can almost see it: jackets open, ties loosened, cigarette smoke hanging in the air, the clink of glasses, the generals and the spooks sitting around smugly talking about NATO having a collective pants-browning over the display of Russian nuclear might.
Unfortunately (for them) it’s not 1974. It doesn’t work that way. No matter how Putin’s team or his courtiers in the Russian media try to spin the story, the first use of a nuclear weapon is still the first use of a nuclear weapon. Russians, raised on the idea that only the bad guys would ever use nukes first, will know exactly what happened. And then they will wait for the cloud of fallout to hit them — as it will within a few days if the target is in European NATO.
And some of them — especially the smarter ones who are already trying to get the hell out of Russia — will wonder why their lives and futures are being sacrificed for the sake of the memory of a country that ceased to exist while they were still toddlers.
A Russian Pariah State
How any of this helps Russia is beyond me. Even if the exchange stops at one weapon — and I don’t think any U.S. President needs to retaliate by adding yet more poison to the planet, but that’s just me — Russia will forever be contained by the international community as the Worst Country In The World.
Of course, if Putin thinks the exchange will stop with one weapon, then he’s the most confident gambler since Hitler in 1936. (I’d also bet that the Chinese are probably rooting for Putin to get off the leash and go nuts, because it will allow them to finally get the stink of Mao Zedong’s crazy off of them and make it stick forever to Moscow.)
If the exchange doesn’t stop at one weapon, then the rest is irrelevant, and you and I will likely not be sitting here calmly reading and reflecting on international affairs.
Putin isn’t going to live forever, and after using a nuclear bomb his successors will have two choices: either revert to complete Soviet-like isolation and self-sufficiency in world that will forever hate Russia (and live off pickled herring and apple juice for another century) or abjectly throw the Russian Federation on the mercy of international opinion, and engage in prolonged atonement that would almost certainly require demilitarization of the Russian state and war crimes tribunals for the surviving leaders and generals.
I used to think the chance of any of this was about zero. But of course, that’s the problem with “about zero:” it’s not actually “zero.” Anything that’s not impossible has a finite chance of happening. Putin’s provocations might have only a million to one shot of producing a nuclear event, but if he tries those provocations a million times…well, you do the math.
I keep waiting for cooler heads to prevail in Moscow and thought this might have reached some kind of resolution over the summer. But that was 2500 Ukrainian deaths — and one innocent airliner — ago.
Still, I’m used to Soviet…er, sorry….Russian leaders talking about nuclear weapons, and so I’m assuming this is business as usual, circa 1980. But the fact that Putin is willing to throw away Russia’s future for the sake of a Soviet past means that this crisis is not close to being over. It also means that there is no way to deal with this crisis through negotiation: if Putin is so locked in the past that he thinks he can make nuclear threats, he’s not likely to change course now.
I also worry about one more thing, on our side rather than theirs. Putin is taking huge risks based on the idea that Barack Obama is the weakest American president in modern history. The Kremlin has plenty of reason to think so, especially after the graceless powder we took in Syria a year ago. There is no question that President Obama is among the least, uh, decisive leaders the White House has had in a long time, but even weak Presidents can only be pushed so far.
I worry that Putin, like other Soviet — sorry again, Russian, I mean Russian — leaders thinks that America is as leader-centered as Russia is, and will not understand that at some point the American foreign policy establishment will create a response that will totally surprise the Kremlin. That’s how major wars get started, but it’s not clear that Putin knows this, or cares.
this goes to the mindset behind the Putin current moves that one must truly understand if one is to understand non linear warfare.
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.de/2015/04/putin-needs-both-great-victory-and.html
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Putin Needs Both Great Victory and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Ikhlov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 21 – Vladimir Putin finds himself caught in a variety of paradoxes none more glaring than his simultaneous need to defend the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by which the USSR became an ally of Nazi Germany and his need to celebrate the Great Victory over the Third Reich, according to Yevgeny Ikhlov.
On the on the one hand, the Moscow commentator says, Putin needs the Great Victory because it completes the shift from a focus on communism as the explanation for the Soviet Union’s win to one on Stalin and his totalitarian system as the source of that triumph (vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/3741).
And on the other “and at the same time,” the Kremlin leader is prepared to defend with “all the authority of the Russian state” Stalin’s alliance with Hitler which is “delicately called ‘the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’” because “that pact for the first time legalized zones of Soviet influence” beyond the borders of the USSR and based on “continuity” with the Russian Empire.
This is just one of the insights contained in Ikhlov’s article about the importance of mythologizing the past in a country like Putin’s Russia, one where “the weaker the institutions in the state are, the stronger must be the all-embracing mythology.” Indeed, his system is based on the idea that “the picture propaganda provides of the world is the only reality for the population.”
Up to a point, this approach has served Putin well. It has “rooted Putinism in Russian political history.” But the problems begin when one tries to make that political history consistent, something that is virtually impossible without blatant falsification because various events point in so many contradictory and incompatible directions.
And that in turn means, Ikhlov says, that “the more improvisations are introduced into this renewed cult, the stricter will be the struggle to ‘defend history from distortions and falsifications’ … There are many countries which have introduced punishments for denial of crimes against humanity … but there are only a few which [like Russia today] are criminalizing the unmasking of historic crimes.”
The approaching celebration of Victory Day, of Russia’s attempt to take credit for the defeat of Nazism, highlights this “real schizophrenia” in Moscow’s position: “One should not call oneself the main victor over Hitlerism while being proud of the alliance with this same Hitlerism” at the start of Hitler’s war to “seize Europe.”
There is a logic in each of the narratives, Ikhlov argues, but trying to bring them together into a single narrative is “impossible,” because “to be at one and the same time an anti-fascist, an anti-communist, and an anti-liberal in the contemporary understanding of the ideological spectrum cannot be done.”
The only way it can be done, he suggests, is with “one’s own fascism,” or as Putin would put it “’the Russian world.’”
But there is a deeper paradox and problem for Putin, Ikhlov says. It consists of the fact that Russian history consists of a series of “hermetically sealed periods,” each of which engages in the denial of its predecessor, as the late philosopher Aleksandr Akhizer pointed out a generation ago.
That makes stability very difficult as does “the struggle of two competing directions” in each, “each of which offers mutually exclusively approaches to the overcoming of internal crises.” Typically, the leaders of a country must make a choice; Putin has been trying so far to avoid doing so.
“Putinism’s difficulties began when it ceased to be simply ‘velvet Pinochetism,’ a regime of authoritarian modernization and began to convert itself into ‘an oprichnina,’ into market Stalinism,” Ikhlov says. That violated a chief requirement of myths: a certain consistency in their internal logic.
According to the Moscow commentator, “isolationism and anti-Westernism require support in a messianic legend. But Orthodox fundamentalism remains too much an exotic phenomenon.” Moreover, it is dangerous because it contains within itself “a very strong anti-state attitude.”
Moreover, “all the misfortune of Putinism” is that doctrines like “Moscow is the Third Rome” have the effect of “denying development and transforming life into an uninterrupted waiting for the end of the world.”
That leaves Putin and Putinism with few options, Ikhlov argues. Indeed, the only one really available is the implementation of a 160-year-old tradition that was “aborted by Bolshevism – the development of right-wing fascism.”
During that period, he says, Russia has moved “along a totalitarian arc: from radical-left form in the shape of Bolshevism with a gradual falling away from utopian pseudo-Marxist ideas to the side of right-wing totalitarianism which recognizes and cultivates obscurantism, chauvinism and petty private property.”
This evolution, Ikhlov continues, has included “periods of black hundreds-style post-war Stalinism, the anti-market ‘left fascism’ of stagnation … and up to the current dawn of the Russian conservative revolution, the first conquests of which have already appeared in Crimea and ‘Novorossiya.’”
“The evolution of totalitarianism from communism to fascist was broken off only three times – during the five years of the New Economic Policy, the decade of the thaw, and the ingloriously just concluded liberal-perestroika thirty year period.” It is now resuming with full force and with all its contradictions in play.
Russia is in fact attempting via negotiations to break NATO and the EU and that is two of Putin’s three geo political goals.
Russia’s Master Plan to Break the Trans-Atlantic Alliance
Putin is using negotiations about the future of Ukraine to gain a voice in decision-making for all of Europe.
“#Russia’s Master Plan to Break the Trans-Atlantic Alliance”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-master-plan-to-break-the-trans-atlantic-alliance-1429575502 …
The fundamental flaw in our analysis and thinking today relates primarily, I believe, to our failing to understand the types of war that “we” — and, thus, “they” — are embarked upon.
Unlike the Cold War, today “we” are the one’s that are embarked upon a war of expansion (to implant our way of life, our way of governance, etc.).
While “they” (much as we were during the Cold War) are today embarked upon a war to prevent, contain and roll back these such expansionist designs.
Once one understands that these are the types of war that both “we” (expansion) and “they” (prevent, containment, roll back) are embarked upon today, then everything else seems to fall so easily into place.
For example and re: an expansionist agenda:
One comes to understand (much as Soviet’s came to understand re: their expansionist efforts) how:
a. The conservative elements of a population (charateristically more-opposed to fundamental state and societal change) might become one’s “natural enemy” while
b. The progressive and/or liberal elements of the population (charateristically more-considerate of fundamental state and societal change) might become one’s “natural ally.”
Clear evidence of this phenomenon (and, thus, clear evidence of the type of war that both “we” and “they” are now embarked upon) can be found in noting, for example, that:
a. The above-described “natural enemies and allies” of the Soviets, during their expansionist period, have now often become
b. Our “natural enemies and allies” and re: our expansionist designs.
It is through this exact lens (the West is now seen to be on an expansionist march; while the Rest are now seen to be in a prevent/contain/roll back mode) that I suggest that we might view the ability of our enemies — whether these are found in Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and/or elsewhere — to rally the conservative elements of their populations to their (increasingly conservative?) cause(s).
Small wars, hybrid wars, etc., etc., etc.?
These, today, to be understood — much as was the case during the Cold War — within the context of “the type of war that we (containment then; expansion now) and they (expansion then; containment now) are embarked upon.”
Looks like the EU has completely eliminated a massive economic weapon which is part and parcel of current Russian non linear warfare directed against the Ukraine and the EU.
Either Gazprom accepts the punishment being decided by the EU or it pays an estimated fine of 89B Euros.
The economic weapon is just a piece of the Russian UW strategy.
Margrethe Vestager ✔ @vestager
Statement of Objection against Gazprom activities in 8 countries. Our preliminary view: Gazprom partitioned market and charged unfair prices
BREAKING: European Union opens antitrust case against Gazprom amid worsening EU-Russia relations http://apne.ws/1Gif1og
Took all of about four hours for Gazprom to prove just how it is integrated into the Russian non linear warfare and toss overboard the mantra they are an independent public gas company doing their business independently based on market forces.
Notice the not so subtle threat of using Moscow.
In it’s just-issued denial to @EU_Commission antitrust charges, #Gazprom seems to want to pull Kremlin into case
pic.twitter.com/jOsGObUZ2X
Outlaw especially, I believe, will appreciate the following — which is from an article in the May/June 1995 issue of “Foreign Affairs” by Michael Mandelbaum. The article is entitled “Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion.”
(The terms “Cause” and “Effect” below, however, are mine.)
a. Cause:
” … Russia would regard the new configuration of European security that an expanded NATO would produce as illegitimate because it had been imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post-World War I settlement as illegitimate “dictated” peace. According to Sergei A. Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe in Moscow and a Yeltsin adviser, if ‘NATO expands eastward Russia, under any government, will become a revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order. It is significant to note that ALL the modifications in Europe’s security arrangements from 1987 to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion would mark a departure from that pattern.”
b. Effect:
“Three developments would signal the end of the effort to transcend balance-of-power politics in Europe. The first is Russian violation of the political or territorial integrity of its western neighbors, Ukraine and the Baltic states. Such violations are already occurring to Russia’s south, in the Caucasus, but do not threaten Western security as would comparable behavior to the west. A second damaging development would be a serious violation of the major European arms control treaties. The third deathblow would be the advent of a xenophobic, hypernationalist, or neo-fascist government in Moscow … ”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50965/michael-mandelbaum/preserving-the-new-peace
As we can see so clearly here, all that has transpired was predicted and warned against (as early as 1995!) but was simply ignored. This, because it appears that we had other fish to fry.
Thus, re: Russia:
a. Post-the Cold War we — both knowingly and willingly — made our (and the Ukrainian, et al’s) bed. And now, accordingly, both we, and they,
b. Must lie down in it.
Bill C–we seem to never fully understand the Russian move to neo fascism.
Dugin is the chief ideologue for Putin and his inner cirlce and is a “fascist” to the core.
#Dugin: Extremist supporter of murder & terrorism, advocate of “New Russia”, allowed to hold lecture in #US #Texas? pic.twitter.com/3vQ79x9lgD
US & Russia “patriots” on same page?! Far-right Dugin talks at TexasA&M on “American Liberalism must be destroyed” https://m.facebook.com/events/1625378057747741/ …
American Neo-Nazi Organizes Lecture for Russian Ultrarightist Aleksandr Dugin at Texas A&M http://bit.ly/1IJ66K1 pic.twitter.com/OUkb19zilJ
So it begs the question–everything to do with IS in the US is “evil” and inviting via a US travel visa a well known Russian “fascist” who has called for the complete destruction of the Ukraine and that Ukrainians are not a “people worth saving” has a free run into the US?????
So is Islamic fascism any different than Russian fascism????
Bill C wrote,
‘As I have argued repeatedly, the flaw in our thinking is, I believe, not related so much to our imprudent reliance on military force, RMA, etc., but, rather, on our imprudent reliance on the “universal” appeal of our way of life, our way of governance, our related institutions and our associated values, attitudes and beliefs. THIS is the form of reliance, I suggest, that has gotten us into — and kept us in — the very deep kimchi. ‘
Whilst I obviously disagree with your sentiment in regards to the explanation for the lack of native buy-in where we attempted COIN I am willing to accept my experience and my bias have rendered my opinions , if not completely wrong, at least considerably flawed. However I do have a question for you.
In what direction are the boat-people who are currently drowning like rats in the Mediterranean heading? Are they going north or south? I unfortunately have to rely on the media to ascertain where they are heading. The media are 100 % certain the boat-people are seeking a way of life you repeatedly argue many Muslims so violently oppose, they attack our aid efforts on a basis of repugnance.
The evidence from those who manage to survive indicates they prefer death rather than a return to their place of birth. Furthermore the nationalities of those who manage to survive indicates many countries in Africa propagate a way of life that many of their citizens are determined to escape, even if it kills them.
If you examine the boat-people heading to Australia the sentiment expressed by the refugees is very similar and the spread of nationalities is equally as diverse. The country-of-origin of the Pacific boat-people extends from the ME across to China.That’s half the world’s population.
I believe it is important to point out these wretched folk are illegal immigrants. The tens of millions of legal immigrants who are on the move are also attempting to cast off their native culture and embrace the westernized modernity you claim many of those same cultures violently reject.
Strange as it may seem the Europeans on the Mediterranean coast hate the folks coming from North Africa and have done so since before the birth of Christ. I too am somewhat perplexed why these Muslims (in the main) are so desperate to press themselves to the bosom of their nearest westernized neighbors – but what would I know.
I understand what they seek but I don’t believe they realize how unwelcome they are across Europe as a whole, and especially so in Southern Europe. But still they come.
I find your argument less convincing when you offer it as a cause of conflict amongst Europeans. The notion that the Western way of life offends Russians, Ukrainians, and Georgians etc. to the degree that they willfully kill their own people, whose only crime is an aspiration to live a more Western life-style, is an argument my experience finds without foundation.
Perhaps before Communism imploded the universal austere life-style under Communism gave your argument more gravitas. However, the former communist citizenry I know strongly disagree with this view and by and large maintain an opinion of their former political past that mirrors the attitude of the survivors being washed ashore in southern Europe.
Certainly all the young people from former communist countries I have encountered have nothing but scorn for the past their parents endured. In fact they would ridicule your suggestion the ‘way of life’ in France, German, Britain, Italy etc. is somehow imprudent or degrading compared to the present day Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Hungary, Russia, Belarus etc.
I am at one with your condemnation of one aspect of westernization we deliver abroad and that is the type of military force we apply to foreign political problems. Perhaps your discord with all things western/modern we attempt to impose/introduce upon non-Western societies is a consequence of us applying the wrong type of military force? I realize that is not your position but we put an enormous amount taxes into the military and we seem to gain very little dividend for the staggering cost. Rightly so many taxpayers have every right to be scathing in our foreign military adventures.
Whether we like it or not there are occasions when military force is necessary. Obviously if the problem is a domestic political aspiration (VN & Iraq) no form of foreign military force will alleviate the problem. However in cases wherein we are attacked (Pearl Harbor& 9/11) or an ally is attacked (WW1, Kuwait, and Korea) then a military response on our behalf is inevitable whether we like it or not.
RMA Mickey-Mouse was first identified as a threat to the US by President Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address. His main fear was the MIC would bankrupt America – what would he know. Unhappily what he didn’t mention was it would also lose us wars.
The present day MIC builds weapon systems that evolved from the victories RMA ‘weapons of annihilation’ delivered in WW2. The ultimate form of this approach to warfighting are Fusion weapons – hydrogen bombs. Everyone, except us and our friends, got the drift (Mao & Ho especially so) and cut their cloth to avoid being ‘annihilated in order to be saved’. We haven’t recognized this adjustment and have consequently been losing wars ever since.
In AF & Uk the military option to avoid this ‘annihilation’ is UW. The Pakistan military have gone one better by getting us to pay for their UW campaign that defeated our RMA – Ike just turned in his grave. No surprise the KSA have clocked this absurdity and are doing the same number on us with their IS proxy. The old KGB snake Putin is getting in on the act and decided to attack completely innocent Ukrainians for reasons that seem insane. He too appreciates the ability of UW to defeat RMA.
There are a depressing number of corrupt one man /one party totalitarian states that have also identified the folly of our RMA madness and the relative ease UW can defeat it. The tsunami of human misery that is being washed up on the coast of Italy and Greece or is devoured by sharks in the Timor Sea is the tip of an ice-berg of people trying to escape tyrants who are emboldened by the success of the ISI, IS and the FSB.
We need to resurrect our ability to fight CUW. In the face of tyranny (evidenced by the fleeing masses on sinking boats) eloquent reflection upon the merits of The Enlightenment, French Revolution and Jefferson are just grist to the mill of human misery.
The conflict in the Ukraine offers us the opportunity to recover the important skill of defeating a tyrant who employs UW. The alien operational environment of VN, Iraq and AF clouded the lens thru which we attempted to shape a successful strategy to such a degree that we acted if completely blind. In the Ukraine the Christian, European, prairie-like characteristics of the battle eco-system gives us the opportunity to identify the true nature of what UW tyranny is and how to successfully counter it.
RC
When we are honest with ourselves the core problem we are having with the Russian non linear warfare as well as that of Iran, IS and China’s non linear warfare is that we have as a nation one of the weakest Presidents and his NSC in the last 30 or so years.
They simply do not have any idea what they want, what the world wants from the US and even what it is the US as a nation wants from the world–meaning they are literally all over the map and we then expect the rest of the world to “figure out what it is we want from them”–is it really that hard when even social media knows what to do?????
Perfect example from Iran and Russia:
#Obama 2011-15: #Syria air-defense insurmountable for #USAF
#Obama 2015: #Iran air-defense with #Russia S-300 no problem for #US Air Force
#Obama 2013-14: #Iran 1 year from nukes- so enough time to negotiate
#Obama 2015: #Iran 2-3 months from nuke- so Congress must bless my deal
Ukraine truce: US accuses Russia of violating deal – BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32425602 …
Social media has picked up the single fact–that yes Russia is massively attacking the Ukraine, that it has more tanks inside the Ukraine than the total number of tanks in three NATO armies and on and on—AND now even the US is “complaining” Russia is in violation of Minsk 2 YET the US will in the end do nothing.
Worse yet some in Europe as openly saying the US has “swapped” the Ukraine for Russian efforts with Iran all in the name of a presidential legacy.
IE they just decided to take the last remaining AH64 apaches copters out of Europe which was designed to counter Russian armor another nod to Russia all in the name of “saving dollars”??
Seems social media is better at formulating US foreign policy than those that get paid to do it.
This is a critical statement as it is appearing to now NATO that Russia is heading to a major offensive to take the entire eastern Ukraine.
#NATO Sec Gen @jensstoltenberg on Russian forces/militias: “…capacity to launch big offensive with little warning”[/B] https://twitter.com/NATOpress/status/591285584280346624 …
The ability to attack out of a standing position is something this Russian army has been training for over the last five years and intensively the last year with multiple snap exercises.
The West feared this ability in the 80s and they did not have it then –they do now.
By the way Bill M had picked up on that ability as a critical problem for the West.
Bill M., Outlaw, RantCorp, Move Forward, et al:
Guys: I think this is really not as hard as we are making it out to be.
Thus, and to get to the heart of the matter, might I ask these few questions:
a. Should we consider the hybrid, unconventional, conventional, etc., warfare threats that we and our allies now face — and the state of world today — as a validation of:
(1) Our post-Cold War ideas of the “universal appeal” and “great positive galvanizing effect” of our way of life, our way of governance, etc., and
(2) The actions, post-the Cold War, that we undertook in these concepts name?
b. Or would it be more correct to say that the threats that we face today (hybrid, unconventional, convention, etc.; these, from such diverse quarters as the Greater Middle East, Europe, and Asia) — and the state of world today — these such matters:
(1) Invalidate our such ideas and suggest that
(2) The actions that we undertook — in these idea’s name — were ill-advised?
Herein to consider, for example, whether:
My “a” above (foreign policy success based on “universal values,” etc.) or my “b” above (foreign policy failure based on same) best addresses and explains the civil wars, chaos, suffering, dangers, deprivations, refugee flows (see RantCorp and Bill M. below) — and the various and sundry threats (hybrid, unconventional, conventional, etc.) — that we, and others, face today?
This, a full quarter century after the ending of the Cold War. (A decent period of time — and very favorable environment — wherein, if accurate and true, “universal values,” etc., should have been able to prove both their validity and their worth?)
MF,
I’m not opposed to a Revolution in Military Affairs. If we managed to master UW that would definitely be a RMA. The problem is what many consider a revolution in most weapon systems is in fact an evolution – not a revolution – from the systems that ensured victory in WW2. The RMA of WW2 was driven by the very necessary and honorable objective to annihilate the enemy in order to end a world war that cost 150 million lives.
The pinnacle RMA – the nuclear attack on Japan – probably spared the lives of ten million people. From the incredibly tough fighting on Iwo and Okinawa the US expected a million US casualties taking the Japanese homeland. As it happened there were no US casualties and perhaps 250K Japanese dead – a typical week of B-29 firebombing. A miraculous turn of events delivered by a revolutionary weapon.
The problem is this type of war is currently redundant and much of the RMA it inspired likewise.
The enemy respects this overwhelming power and neutralizes it by ‘swimming in the sea of people’. We stupidly keep deploying more and more powerful annihilators until we disappear up our own ass and go home beaten and broke. We have invested huge amounts of treasure for a form of war-fighting that is currently redundant. Certainly, as you point out, the proportion of our taxes invested is not as significant as in the past but in a liberal democracy, wherein soccer mums decide who governs the country, we have to prioritize.
Obviously the reason it is redundant is our supreme ability to annihilate and we need to maintain the capacity (something the Europeans, and recently even the Brits, have forgotten) but we need to adjust as we are taking hits and bleeding out.
What we need to do is uncouple our revolutionary targeting ability from the annihilation legacy of WW2. Currently our war-winning targeting capability is being completely undermined by the ‘destroy the village in order to save it’ mode. All the hell-yeah tough guy talk of bomb them and let Allah sort it out doesn’t work when a western liberal democracy is paying the bill.
The ISI, Mabahith, FSB believe it does but that is what makes them fascists.
The perfect example of the folly of slaving precision to HE in the current fight is the killing of OBL. For a good 3 months we just stared at him pacing his courtyard, hoeing his vegetable patch and milking his cow. Our decision-makers were caught on the horns of the dilemma by the inadequacy of our RMA. The only option the entire RMA arsenal offered was to annihilate the compound and possibility damaging many neighboring dwellings.
Despite the fact they could probably hit him with the nose-cone of a JDAM whilst he milked his cow they would have to flatten the whole compound to ensure it was him and not the only other 6’ 7” man on the Asian landmass. Not to mention a dozen innocent children, no positive ID of success, a more blatant violation of Pak sovereignty etc.etc. Further insult to injury he was perfectly aware of this capability gap and knew we would have to kick in his bedroom door to get him hence the series of locked reinforced internal doors within the house.
As it happened he was too clever by half and his ‘little house on the prairie’ defense ruled out the possibility of a few HMG or ATGMs over-watching from the neighboring compounds that would have destroyed the assault force. As it happened the SEALS were able land unopposed (excluding the efforts of a mud wall) and kicked in a few doors and killed him, three other men, one women and no kids.
All fantastic stuff but we would need 100K SF and 10K stealth helicopters if we did this to every bad guy who deserved it and many of those would have considerably more than two sleeping guards, 20 odd women and kids and a mud wall as a defense. This is obviously impossible and the ISI, IS, FSB and assorted Fruitcake know it.
It is this lack of power to deal with opponents who understand a western liberal democracy can’t afford the political cost of a war of annihilation that has caused all our defeats since WW2. My contempt for what many consider to be RMA is not a rejection of revolutionary technology it is a rejection of the folly of military design created by people who do not understand the kind of war we need to be capable of fighting.
I have always maintained the strategic reason for mastering CUW is to prevent nuclear proliferation. Already the KSA is saying if Iran goes nuclear they will do likewise. I imagine the day after a Shite bomb is tested the KSA will test the Pak one the Wahhabi paid for. The IS are starting to murder innocents in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban are appalled their franchise has competition.It will only be a matter of time they start working their ‘magic’ in Pakistan.
Things are beginning to spin out of control.
IMO if we want to stop the downward spiral our effort can be low tech, high tech or no tech – as long as it’s UW.
RC
This today out of the Russian General Staff–seems “they are calling their own kettle black” as it is their own non linear warfare they NOW accuse the US of using?????
Russian Federation stated that USA and Allies began phase 1 of a hybrid war against it. FFS! http://inforesist.org/v-rf-zayavili-chto-ssha-i-soyuzniki-nachali-gibridnuyu-vonu-protiv-nee/ … pic.twitter.com/Klyqr3VR70
Reminder Phase One of the Russian non linear warfare is as follows:
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological,
ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable
political, economic, and military setup).
Kind of a bold statement. Russian general staff:”The US is the mastermind behind all military conflicts in the world” http://lifenews.ru/mobile/news/153028 …
As Russian forces build up against Ukraine’s border, the Russian General Staff’s paranoia reaches a new height. https://twitter.com/tassagency_en/status/591568567306481664 …
This last one is interesting in that they now have a far lager invasion force since October 2014 in place literally next to the Ukrainian border and yet “claim” the US is building a global network of military points of presence in 100 countires.
This today out of the Russian General Staff–seems “they are calling their own kettle black” as it is their own non linear warfare they NOW accuse the US of using?????
Russian Federation stated that USA and Allies began phase 1 of a hybrid war against it. FFS! http://inforesist.org/v-rf-zayavili-chto-ssha-i-soyuzniki-nachali-gibridnuyu-vonu-protiv-nee/ … pic.twitter.com/Klyqr3VR70
Reminder Phase One of the Russian non linear warfare is as follows:
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological,
ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable
political, economic, and military setup).
Kind of a bold statement. Russian general staff:”The US is the mastermind behind all military conflicts in the world” http://lifenews.ru/mobile/news/153028 …
As Russian forces build up against Ukraine’s border, the Russian General Staff’s paranoia reaches a new height. https://twitter.com/tassagency_en/status/591568567306481664 …
This last one is interesting in that they now have a far lager invasion force since October 2014 in place literally next to the Ukrainian border and yet “claim” the US is building a global network of military points of presence in 100 countires.
Bill M, RantCorp, Outlaw, et al:
I have provided to Move Forward — at my Bill C. | April 24, 2015 – 3:57pm comment below — a (hopefully) more clear and more concise explanation of my thoughts on refugee flows — such as RantCorps, Bill M. and others have brought forward and addressed.
I would appreciate you guys’ thoughts, also, on my such ideas.