Why the U.S. Lost the Vietnam War
03.25.2013 at 11:54am
Why the U.S. Lost the Vietnam War – CSPAN video of authors and veterans of the wars in Iraq and Vietnam debating the reasons why the U.S. lost the Vietnam War.
I will watch this when I have the time – but if the focus is not about the political/policy decisions leading up to the 1956 elections, it will be a waste of time.
We love to argue the relative merits of tactical approaches to put the horse back into the barn…but no one ever wants to take on the flawed wisdom of letting the horse out in the first place.
We did what we felt would best serve our interests in the fear-laden strategic environment of the times. We convinced ourselves that what we offered was so good that it would be received differently than how any society, any place, any time has responded to such external manipulation of their governance. We applied the same rationalization process going into Iraq (Anyone seen the Cheney interview where he talks about how, on the basis of talks with a handful of self-serving Iraqi expats that he believed the US would be greeted as liberators?) and also in our decision to “fix” Afghanistan and build a friendly government around the Northern Alliance. We are 0-3 on these decisions, and getting ready to go 0-4 in Syria.
But I suspect this will be another debate of the relative merits of generals, bombing, not invading the North, sanctuaries, strategic hamlets etc. We love our tactics.
Just a comment in re: There never was a place called South Vietnam. Absolutely true in one sense, and false in another. Yes, the DRVN and RVN refused to recognize Vietnam’s separation.
The fact is that Vietnam had been ruled as two separate states since the Trinh-Nguyen split in 1598 until Gia Long’s ascendance to the throne in 1802. And right up until the French took control of all Indochina in 1887, various parts of the “Tonkinese Alps”, Central Vietnam, and the Mekong Delta remained independent of Vietnamese control. It was the French who pushed Vietnam’s boundaries to its present trace, with one notable exception, and that was the Mekong Delta.
Under Gia Long and his immediate successors, the South was ruled by the Eunich warlord Le Van Duyet, who dealt with the Court at Hue much like the Nguyens had dealt with the North. Duyet recognized the multi-cultural frontier character of the “Gia Dinh” region from Bien Hoa to Camau and Ha Tien, so he ignored any decrees which would have undermined its peace and prosperity. Upon his death, however, the royal desecration of his tomb, and the annulment of many of his decress, sparked a series of rebellions. The hard handed measures taken by his officials did much to pave the way for the success of French intervention.
Up until 1949, the French had recognized Cambodia’s claims to certain parts of the Mekong Delta. In 1946, when the French were scrambling for troops to re-establish order in South Vietnam, Prince Sisowath Monireth ordered the drafting of two battalions of troops to serve under French command. One of these was drafted within Cambodia itself, and the 2nd Battalion of the Far-East Brigade was recruited out of Cochinchina’s Mekong Delta, underscoring that a Cambodian administration continued to function within South “Vietnam” as late as 1946.
These multi-cultural characteristics of Cochinchina is what induced Thierry d’Argenlieu’s ill-fated attempt to recognize Cochinchina as a separate republic. In any event, on the face of it, South Vietnam had a better chance of surviving as a separate state than Korea did. Self-government independent of central authority was not an alien concept in the South.
Just a comment in re: There never was a place called South Vietnam. Absolutely true in one sense, and false in another. Yes, the DRVN and RVN refused to recognize Vietnam’s separation.
The fact is that Vietnam had been ruled as two separate states since the Trinh-Nguyen split in 1598 until Gia Long’s ascendance to the throne in 1802. And right up until the French took control of all Indochina in 1887, various parts of the “Tonkinese Alps”, Central Vietnam, and the Mekong Delta remained independent of Vietnamese control. It was the French who pushed Vietnam’s boundaries to its present trace, with one notable exception, and that was the Mekong Delta.
Under Gia Long and his immediate successors, the South was ruled by the Eunich warlord Le Van Duyet, who dealt with the Court at Hue much like the Nguyens had dealt with the North. Duyet recognized the multi-cultural frontier character of the “Gia Dinh” region from Bien Hoa to Camau and Ha Tien, so he ignored any decrees which would have undermined its peace and prosperity. Upon his death, however, the royal desecration of his tomb, and the annulment of many of his decress, sparked a series of rebellions. The hard handed measures taken by his officials did much to pave the way for the success of French intervention.
Up until 1949, the French had recognized Cambodia’s claims to certain parts of the Mekong Delta. In 1946, when the French were scrambling for troops to re-establish order in South Vietnam, Prince Sisowath Monireth ordered the drafting of two battalions of troops to serve under French command. One of these was drafted within Cambodia itself, and the 2nd Battalion of the Far-East Brigade was recruited out of Cochinchina’s Mekong Delta, underscoring that a Cambodian administration continued to function within South “Vietnam” as late as 1946.
These multi-cultural characteristics of Cochinchina is what induced Thierry d’Argenlieu’s ill-fated attempt to recognize Cochinchina as a separate republic. In any event, on the face of it, South Vietnam had a better chance of surviving as a separate state than Korea did. Self-government independent of central authority was not an alien concept in the South.
Rantcorp, a worthy reply. Some quick comments.
First, we were quite willing to recognize Tito when it suited our interests in the Cold War. Unfortunately for Ho Chi Minh and Indochina, he lacked the same stature. Both aimed to place disparate populations under the yoke (Yugo) of Communism to forge a new nation, but Ho had no Winston Churchill in his corner, or the equivalent of a manageable (Greek) civil war on his doorstep to trigger U.S. interest. Yes Ho Chi Minh was a Communist first, last and always. But his actions suggest he would have been a very Vietnamese Communist. For all his Party’s faults, they did recognize that the had (Vietnamese) history to answer to.
As for most inhabitants of Indochina accepting HCM as an acceptable political unifying figure; No one in 1945, save for some members in the Party, even knew who Ho Chi Minh was. But at the moment he declared the DRVN, every Vietnamese was willing to follow any Vietnamse. (Not so the Cambodians and two out of three Laotian princes) Even the French were willing to accept him at one point, at a time when HCM needed French troops to winkle the Chinese Yunnan Army out of Tonkin. Once the war started, many Vietnamese began to take positions pro, neutral, and con. I liked Gerald Hickey’s noting of a bon mot making the rounds in Saigon on the day those elections were supposed to take place: “If Vietnam were capable of an honest election, those in the North would all have voted for Diem, and those in the South for Ho Chi Minh”.
Surely you are not going to argue that honest elections for a reunification of Vietnam under a Communist government were possible in 1956. Now, as to whether or not we should have cared? That’s another matter. What in 1956 Vietnam was worth the bones of a single U.S. Marine? (Something that may not have been so apparent to decision makers who had lived through 1945-56 with the Cold War as their frame of reference.)
The bottom line is that the French were not militarily wiped out, which ia partially why HCM agreed to the division. He didn’t have the manpower to eject the French, who were, after all, no longer interested in Indochina as a colony.
What the Geneva Accords said, and what everyone expected, were two different things. The division of Korea is still considered temporary, and that’s been going on since 1948 (the year of the ROK and DPRK founding)
A French speaking Catholic dictatorship? I’ve seen a list of senior ARVN officers from the Diem years, and the majority were Buddhist. And as I recall, the nexus of “Buddhist” opposition was Hue, where the most violent protests and crackdowns took place. And French speaking? Every educated person in Indochina spoke French, and most especially the Communists. So what? Can you show us a decree that established French as the official language of RVN? (Ignoring the fact that the present government participates in Francophone nation international forums.)
You are aware that the French Army had to use force to bring the Catholic bishophrics of Phat Diem and Bui Diem into supporting the Bao Dai government in 1949, aren’t you? Yes,the majority of northern Catholics were Nationalists, and not French supporters or lackeys. Many were VNQDD supporters.
As for cracking down on the rural Buddhist populations, you wouldn’t be able to reference me to a list of those hamlets, etc., would you? I know for a fact that they did not do it in Hau Giang province during that period. My impression was that protests took place in major population centers, and some took place after Diem’s murder.
As for the Keenedy’s killing Diem, there were internal South Vietnamese political fingerprints all over it. Was U.S. support a Ipsa Qua Non? Perhaps it was. I do agree it was one of our greatest mistake there. WSe couldn’t get along with Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek, but we continued to support them.
Yes, a comment by General Shoup. I wonder what his opinion was after 1975? I always wanted to make a John Lennon tee shirt. It would be red with a faded grey John Lennon face in the background, and a pile of skulls from the killing grounds in the foreground, under the slogan: Give Peace a Chance.