Turning Back the Clock: Leveraging Game Theory Across the Conflict Continuum
Introduction
Eighty-nine seconds to midnight; this is the current time on the Doomsday Clock, maintained in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. When the clock hits midnight, it means the extinction of humanity is at hand. Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer founded this organization in 1945. It is not a surprise that those who worked on the Manhattan Project would use nuclear risk and global conflict as indicators of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe. Over time, this has evolved to examine various sources of global risks, including emerging technologies and diseases. As we approach midnight, policymakers need to determine how to reset the clock.
The nature of a negotiated settlement after a conflict determines the subsequent position of actors in the conflict continuum, shaping whether the post-conflict environment leans towards competition, crisis, or renewed conflict. Each phase of the conflict continuum corresponds with a greater likelihood of specific game theory opportunities, such that the competition phase enables positive-sum outcomes, crisis engenders zero-sum outcomes, and conflict creates a landscape favoring negative-sum outcomes. To illustrate this, this article will first provide a brief overview of the conflict continuum, game theory, and military operations. Then it will examine several case studies, spanning from historical to contemporary. Following the examination of these case studies, the framework will then consider practical applications including Professional Military Education (PME) and negotiation preparation. Finally, this investigation will respond to potential counterpoints and conclude with a summary of the information discussed.
Background Information
The Conflict Continuum identifies three broad phases of international engagement: Competition, Crisis, and Conflict. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more nations have incompatible interests but are not seeking armed conflict. Crisis is the gray zone where an emerging threat is detected, and a nation will respond. Crisis could be the result of an adversarial state or non-state actor, or even the mere threat or warning of such an actor. It is also important to note that a crisis can exist when any instrument of national power is threatened or weakened. Armed conflict is the use of violence as the primary means to achieve an objective. Competition is the desired phase of the continuum because this is the time when a nation can prepare for crisis and armed conflict. It is also worth noting that, during the competition phase of the continuum, a nation retains all the advantages of its instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic, otherwise known as DIME). As we transition from competition to armed conflict, we lose our ability to utilize all instruments of national power effectively.
Figure 1. The conflict continuum represented as an arrow spanning from competition to conflict. Inside of the arrow you can see the probability of each type of game-theory outcome with green representing positive-sum, yellow representing zero-sum, and red representing negative-sum outcomes. (Ownership of this image is that of the authors.)
The terms positive-sum (win-win), zero-sum (win-lose), and negative-sum (lose-lose) are borrowed from game theory. A common analogy to conceptualize game theory involves multiple actors sharing hypothetical pies of varying proportions. An example of a positive-sum outcome would be if two people brought together all the ingredients for a pie and then baked one together. Both parties now have pie; this is a win-win. In zero-sum outcomes, there is a finite amount of pie, and one person’s gain comes at a direct loss to the other. This is a win-lose situation. In a negative-sum outcome, the pie is actively shrinking at the expense of both parties. This is a lose-lose situation.
Military operations, at their core, are three things simultaneously: they are human endeavors, they are conducted in dynamic and uncertain environments, and, ultimately, they are designed to achieve a specific political purpose. These operations are all executed within the context of the conflict continuum. Negotiations share many of the same characteristics as military operations, but are seldom, if ever, examined through the lens of the conflict continuum. In addition to the terms borrowed from game theory, there are two other terms commonly used in military operations that involve negotiation at any level. The first is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), which is the point at which each party would revert if an agreement is not reached. The second term is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), which is the range in which both parties can reach an agreement.
Historical and Contemporary Case Studies
Armed conflict necessitates political action to both initiate and terminate. Negotiated settlements are among the few effective ways to end armed conflict. There are plenty of armed conflicts to examine as case studies, but no paper on settlements would be complete without considering the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles represents a negative-sum outcome, where the punitive terms imposed on Germany, combined with the geopolitical failures of the Allies, led to economic ruin, political instability, and the eventual resurgence of global war, leaving all major actors worse off than before. In this case study, the result of a negative-sum settlement was renewed conflict. Another insight from this case study is the failure to consider secondary and tertiary consequences in favor of focusing on short-term gains. Now, let us examine armed conflicts that have resulted in negotiated settlements, which can be viewed as a zero-sum outcome.
Crisis or competition below armed conflict can be more challenging to narrow down, as it is often referred to as the “gray zone”. Starting with Israel in 1948 with the war for independence, there is an observed trend of zero-sum outcomes, which includes the Six-Day War (1967), the Lebanon War (1982), and Operation Protective Edge (2014). This falls into the category of zero-sum due to the territorial loss to the Arab nations and the gain of Israel. In each of these conflicts, negotiations eventually led to the end of armed conflict; however, it did not move their relations with their neighbors into the competition phase of the conflict continuum. This has a significant impact on Israel’s ability to leverage all of its instruments of national power, specifically making it difficult for Israel to effectively use its diplomatic power in the international community, limiting its ability to control the themes and messages in the informational domain, and continuing to limit its economic engagement with several of its neighbors. The existence of positive-sum outcomes is evident in Israel, providing a case study, so we will now examine that outcome and its lasting impacts.
There is one notable example of conflict reverting to competition in Israel’s history. The Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel (1973) culminated in the Camp David Accords (1978) and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979). This is the first example of a positive sum outcome that we continue to see the impacts of to this day. This negotiated settlement was a positive-sum agreement for several reasons, paramount among which is that Israel gained international recognition from Egypt, while Egypt retained control of the Suez Canal. More than 40 years later, a durable and stable peace remains between Israel and Egypt.
Figure 2. The conflict continuum and game theory overlayed with historical case studies showing the status of the conflict continuum following post-conflict negotiations.
Summary and Future Application
We can observe a correlation between a negotiated settlement’s status within game theory and the resulting position of the participating actors on the conflict continuum. There is almost no existing literature that applies game theory to negotiation frameworks and then contextualizes them within the conflict continuum. Military operations and negotiation framework, even in our doctrine, treat them as separate fields of study. The long-term future application is to incorporate negotiation education into the professional military education model, utilizing either the same or a similar framework to how we approach military operations. Even if soldiers are not diplomats, they need to understand wartime negotiation at a minimum so that they can advise their civilian counterparts.
In the context of the conflict continuum, it is recognized that military operations will often necessitate a degree of negotiation, especially when looking at security cooperation agreements in the Indo-Pacific. Formal education on negotiation often lacks several key factors that could prepare leaders to conduct negotiations effectively or advise partners on how to do the same. The most immediate future application is the need to approach negotiations in the same way as planning military operations is approached. Specifically, incorporating aspects of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), “Mission Analysis,” into our preparation before entering negotiations. Understanding the operating environment (OE) is paramount to any military operation, and this principle should also apply to negotiations. By conducting a PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time) crosswalk, negotiators can identify areas of potential positive-sum cooperation before the negotiation begins. This also allows negotiators to adjust the ZOPA or aspiration by thinking outside of the box.
Finally, the most important future application is utilizing the predictive nature of this novel framework to adjust our Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). It is paramount that negotiators do not continue to believe that the status quo is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). The likelihood of competition turning into a crisis is too great, especially in the Indo-Pacific. This is also held in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East. A great modern example is the most recent Israel-US-Iran conflict. We can say definitively that this conflict centers around nuclear proliferation. We also know that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was framed as a positive-sum agreement in 2015; however, after the United States’ withdrawal in 2018, it has quickly evolved into a negative-sum outcome, culminating in armed conflict.
Reaction and Counteraction
A critical part of the military decision-making process is course of action analysis, otherwise known as war-gaming. At this point we will war-game our own framework to find its weakest point and answer any critics. When attempting to use the predictive nature of the framework it becomes clear that determining the corresponding game-theory outcome is difficult. Predicting outcomes, like wargaming, requires careful consideration. In fact, the answer to reducing the subjectivity of determining outcomes can be solved by applying steps 4, and 5 of MDMP to the negotiations process. When we are “war-gaming” the potential outcome of a negotiated settlement we will need an arbitrator who can properly analyze the actions, reactions, and counteractions of the actors. Only then can we compare one potential settlement with another using an evaluation criterion. Even then, as we discussed earlier, like military operations, negotiations are human endeavors that also take place in dynamic and uncertain environments.
Conclusion
The nature of a negotiated settlement after a conflict determines the subsequent position of actors in the conflict continuum, shaping whether the post-conflict environment leans towards competition, crisis, or renewed conflict. Historical and contemporary case studies demonstrate a correlation, at the very least, between game theory, negotiation frameworks, and the conflict continuum. We are also running out of time. The clock is ticking; ultimately, conflict and negotiation are just language games. As Wittgenstein wrote in his “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” In the conflict continuum, when the space for mutual understanding and negotiation collapses, silence is replaced by crisis, and ultimately, by war. The challenge for military leaders and strategists is to recognize and protect the fragile space where language still holds.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Government.
